People v. Gillam - Case Law

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:

Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

FILED JULY 18, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 131276

WILLIE R. GILLAM,

Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

TAYLOR, C.J.

At issue in this case is whether repeated requests by police officers for

defendant to come out of his apartment constituted constructive entry into his

home for Fourth Amendment purposes, thereby invalidating his arrest without a

warrant and rendering subsequently obtained evidence inadmissible. We conclude

that even if we were to adopt the constructive entry doctrine recognized by several

federal circuit courts of appeals, defendant in this case would fail to establish that

the police constructively entered his home in violation of his Fourth Amendment

right to privacy. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
that held to the contrary and remand this case to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Defendant’s alleged accomplice was arrested after at least twice selling

drugs to an undercover officer. On the basis of information gathered during the

drug transactions, the police learned that defendant (who was on probation) was

on a tether in his apartment, and determined that they had probable cause to arrest

defendant. On March 30, 2004, three plain clothes officers and two uniformed

patrol officers drove to defendant’s apartment to effectuate the arrest. While one

plain clothes officer, Officer Del Kostanko, watched the back terrace window in

case defendant tried to flee, and one plain clothes officer, Officer Jerry Blow,

stood behind a wall in the stairwell of the apartment building, the remaining plain

clothes officer, Officer Donald Bey, and the two uniformed officers approached

the front door of defendant’s apartment and knocked.

Defendant testified that when the police knocked on the door, he checked to

make sure his tether was not malfunctioning before he opened the door. He

testified:

[T]he police asked me to come out, I told them: No, I
couldn’t come out because I was on tether. We went back and forth.
They kept telling me: Come out the door. I kept telling them: No,
I’m on tether. We went back and forth, back and forth.

According to Officer Bey, the “back and forth” with defendant about

coming out took place in a matter of seconds, and defendant was cooperative. Bey

did not recall defendant saying that he could not come out of his apartment

because of the tether. Officer Blow stated that while he only heard bits and pieces

of the conversation, he did not hear defendant say he could not come out because

he was on a tether. Defendant claimed he eventually came out of the apartment

“because there was an officer to my right. There was something about it that made

me feel threatened. So I came on out and they arrested me.” In any event,

although he claimed that he was coerced, he admitted that he physically walked

out of the apartment and that no officers touched him before he crossed the

threshold.

Officer Bey testified that the entire arrest incident was calm, and no

weapons were drawn. Officer Kostanko similarly testified that the arrest took

place without incident and that defendant was cooperative. In contrast, when

specifically asked, “Were people yelling, were people excited or was this fairly

calm?” defendant testified that he “guessed” that the atmosphere was excited and

it “could have been” excited.1 Officers Kostanko and Bey both testified that after

defendant was arrested, Kostanko entered the apartment at defendant’s request to

get defendant’s coat and shoes. While inside, Officer Kostanko observed a piece

1
The dissent claims that “[t]he uniformed police officers created an excited
and coercive atmosphere,” post at 8, that the instant facts “reveal excited, repeated
demands for a person under house arrest to leave his residence,” id. at 9, and that
this establishes the coercive conduct necessary to find constructive entry.
However, as clearly indicated from the testimony of the officers and not
unequivocally repudiated by defendant himself, the atmosphere regarding the
encounter at defendant’s apartment door was calm.

of paper in plain view that contained the undercover officer’s undercover name

and telephone number, and he confiscated it as evidence.

At the preliminary examination, defense counsel objected to admission of

the piece of paper on the ground that he believed the police could not enter

defendant’s apartment without a warrant. The preliminary examination was

adjourned, and a suppression hearing was conducted, after which the trial court,

evidently crediting defendant’s version of the events, concluded that defendant

was coerced into leaving his apartment and granted defendant’s motion to

suppress evidence of the piece of paper.2

2
The dissent claims that the trial court did not clearly err when it found
that an excited atmosphere existed. Contrary to the dissent’s version of events,
while the trial court credited defendant’s version of events, defendant never
unequivocally stated that there was an excited atmosphere, and the trial court did
not explicitly find that there was an excited atmosphere. Rather, the trial court
stated:
Well, I listened to the evidence and . . . what is before the
Court is this arrest which really troubles me. These officers had an
address, had a name. They knew what the gentleman looked like.
They went there, and I think they found it more expeditious than
appropriate to just go there and arrest him on this probable cause
they had from Officer Tran, who wasn’t even present at the time of
the arrest. . . . I believe they were told by Mr. Gillam: Look, I’m on
tether. The gentleman has a record. He has a record here as long as
my arm. So he certainly is familiar with the system. And I’m
certain he knows the meets [sic] and bounds of a tether system. And
he knows he was told, apparently he was told, he said he didn’t want
to step outside. He was somehow or other—the officers say he
really steps outside. I find that hard to believe. In any event, I think
he was, in some manner or another, caused to step outside and be
arrested.

(continued…)

After the suppression hearing, the prosecutor moved to adjourn to allow

him to consider whether to appeal the suppression decision. The trial court denied

the motion. The next day, at what was to be the start of trial, the prosecutor cited

the suppression decision along with the failure to obtain a plea from defendant’s

accomplice and respectfully declined to proceed. The trial court granted defense

counsel’s motion to dismiss, but the dismissal was without prejudice.

The prosecutor appealed the suppression decision and the dismissal in the

Court of Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam, issued

(…continued)
Thus, there was no “finding” of an excited atmosphere and, accordingly,
any assessment of trial court error, much less clear error, in a “finding” the court
never made is not possible.
Nevertheless, the dissent also claims that the “trial court’s finding that there
was a coercive environment was not clearly erroneous, given the quantity and
weight of the testimony that supported it.” Post at 7 n 12. If, as the dissent
contends, id., the trial court “explicitly” found there was a coercive environment
when it stated, “He was somehow or other—the officers say he really steps
outside. I find that hard to believe. In any event, I think he was, in some manner
or another, caused to step outside and be arrested,” the trial court’s conclusion
would be clearly erroneous because the finding was contrary to the testimony of
the officers as well as defendant. As previously noted, the officers essentially
testified that defendant was cooperative and stepped outside when asked, and
defendant himself acknowledged that he physically walked out of the apartment
and that no officers touched him before he crossed the threshold. Moreover,
defendant could not identify any specific statement or action by an officer that
would indicate coercion; rather, he testified generally that the officers kept telling
him to come outside, and that something about the officer standing to his right
made him feel threatened. To the extent the trial court found that the officers
created a coercive environment, the clear error in such finding is apparent where
the trial court itself was unable to articulate how the officers’ actions or statements
were coercive.

April 4, 2006 (Docket No. 259122). The Court explained that (1) the evidence

was suppressed not because it was seized without a search warrant but because

defendant was arrested without an arrest warrant, and (2) while a warrant is not

needed to arrest someone on probable cause outside the person’s home, a warrant

is required, absent exigent circumstances, to arrest someone inside the person’s

home. It phrased the issue as whether “the trial court had a reasonable evidentiary

basis for concluding that the police actually coerced defendant to leave his place

of residence and thus expose himself to [an arrest without a warrant].” Slip op at

2. After reciting defendant’s testimony, the Court of Appeals stated:

[The prosecutor] argues that defendant did not describe any
actual coercion, but that he left the apartment voluntarily. However,
defendant did describe his reluctance to leave because of his tether.
The trial court credited this testimony, and observed that defendant
was in a position to understand the implications of breaking that
tether. Defendant additionally described a pattern of repeated police
entreaties to leave the apartment. Such persistence on the part of
uniformed police officers in response to defendant’s initial stated
disinclination to leave the premises could reasonably be taken to
constitute actual coercion. [Id.]

The prosecutor applied in this Court for leave to appeal. We granted leave

to appeal, asking the parties to address, among the issues to be briefed, whether

the police conduct “constituted a constructive entry into a citizen’s home for

purposes of a Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis.” 477 Mich 969

(2006).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The scope of the constructive entry doctrine and whether the police conduct

in the instant case constituted a constructive entry of defendant’s dwelling raises

Fourth Amendment implications. Issues of constitutional dimension are reviewed

de novo. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 146; 715 NW2d 778 (2006). A trial

court’s factual findings are generally reviewed for clear error. People v Williams,

475 Mich 245, 250; 716 NW2d 208 (2006).

III. ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [US
Const, Am IV.]

In Payton v New York, 445 US 573; 100 S Ct 1371; 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980),

the United States Supreme Court held that the police were prohibited by the

Fourth Amendment from entering a suspect’s home without a warrant or consent

for the purpose of making an arrest. Id. at 576. In doing so, it noted that the

amendment applied equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of property, and

that the chief purpose was to protect against physical entry of the home. Id. at

587. The Court summarized:

In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to
seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at
the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that

threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. [Id. at
590.]

Hence, Payton prohibited only the actual physical entry by the police into a

suspect’s home. Since Payton, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has

expanded the bar against actual physical entry to encompass situations involving

constructive entry, which occurs when a suspect leaves his or her home in

response to coercive police conduct. United States v Morgan, 743 F2d 1158, 1166

(CA 6, 1984). The Third, Ninth, and Tenth circuit courts of appeals have likewise

recognized the doctrine of constructive entry. Sharrar v Felsing, 128 F3d 810,

819 (CA 3, 1997); United States v Al-Azzawy, 784 F2d 890, 893 (CA 9, 1985);

United States v Maez, 872 F2d 1444, 1450 (CA 10, 1989).

However, several other federal circuit courts of appeals have declined to

adopt the doctrine, and the United States Supreme Court has yet to address the

issue. United States v Carrion, 809 F2d 1120, 1128 (CA 5, 1987); United States v

Berkowitz, 927 F2d 1376, 1386 (CA 7, 1991); Knight v Jacobson, 300 F3d 1272,

1277 (CA 11, 2002). Although state courts are bound by United States Supreme

Court decisions construing federal law, they are not similarly bound by the

decisions of the lower federal courts, and when there is a conflict of authority

among the lower federal courts, this Court is free to follow the authority it deems

the most appropriate. Abela v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 606; 677 NW2d

325 (2004). Indeed, even when there is no conflict among the lower federal

courts, we are free to follow or reject their authority. Id. at 607.

Amicus curiae, the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan

(PAAM), urges us to reject the constructive entry doctrine. It argues that (1) the

Unites States Supreme Court has always held that probable cause rather than a

warrant is required for an arrest; (2) in Payton, supra, the Court held that a warrant

was required not to accomplish the arrest, but rather to invade the privacy of the

dwelling; and (3) Morgan and its progeny have erred in focusing on arrests

without a warrant when the concern expressed in Payton was the crossing of

thresholds without a warrant. However, we need not decide whether to adopt the

constructive entry doctrine in this case because, even assuming that the

constructive entry doctrine applies, we conclude that defendant here has not

established that the police constructively entered his apartment in violation of his

Fourth Amendment right to privacy.

Unlike the siege tactics employed in Morgan, supra at 1161, 1164, namely

the encircling of the suspect’s house with nine officers and several patrol cars, the

strategic blocking of the suspect’s car with one of the patrol cars, and the use of

floodlights and a bullhorn in the dark of night to summon the suspect from the

home, the actions of the officers in the instant case, according to defendant

himself, merely involved knocking on his front door and asking him to step

outside.3

3
Although there were five officers at the scene, defendant testified that
there were only three at his front door at the time he opened it.

Similarly, the facts of this case do not approach those of United States v

Saari, 272 F3d 804, 806-807 (CA 6, 2001), in which four officers, with weapons

drawn, surrounded the only entrance to the defendant’s apartment, one officer

carried a shotgun, and the officers announced, “Police.” When the defendant

opened the door, he was instructed to come outside. He testified that he walked

outside with his hands in the air because he was afraid of being shot. In

suppressing the evidence seized incident to the arrest, the Saari court gave several

examples of situations in which a reasonable person would not believe that he or

she was free to leave:

“[T]he threatening presence of several officers, the display of
a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” [Id. at
808, quoting United States v Mendenhall, 446 US 544, 554; 100 S
Ct 1870; 64 L Ed 2d 497 (1980).]

In the instant case, while there was one more officer at the scene than in

Saari, there was one less officer at defendant’s door, and there is no indication that

defendant knew of the presence of the other two officers at the time he left the

apartment. Of the three officers at his door, only two were in uniform. This did

not constitute an overwhelming show of force. Further, there was no evidence that

the officers drew their weapons or used language that indicated that defendant

might be compelled to leave his apartment, and defendant specifically testified that

they did not touch him until after he crossed the threshold.

Nor did the officers’ behavior approach that of the officers in Al-Azzawy,

supra at 893 (the police completely surrounded the trailer with weapons drawn

and, with a bullhorn, ordered the suspect to leave the trailer and drop to his knees),

or Sharrar, supra at 819 (the police surrounded the house, pointed machine guns

at the windows, and ordered the suspects to come out). Each of those cases

involved overbearing police tactics.

Here, rather, the officers acted consistently with those in United States v

Thomas, 430 F3d 274, 276 (CA 6, 2005), in which four officers approached the

suspect’s house in the daytime, two at the front door and two at the back door

(which served as the primary entrance to the house), while one officer stayed in a

patrol car; the two who approached the primary entrance knocked, asked the

suspect to step outside when he answered the door, and arrested him when he

refused to speak with them. The Sixth Circuit found no Fourth Amendment

violation because “the police officers did not enter the house and . . . defendant . . .

did not exit the house as a result of physical force or any other conspicuous show

of authority by the police.” Id. at 275.

The court noted that consensual encounters between the police and citizens

were permitted, and they did not become nonconsensual merely because they took

place at the entrance of someone’s home. Id. at 277. The court explained that the

difference between a consensual encounter and a constructive entry is the show of

force by the police. Id.

Lastly, the court reasoned that the number of officers present did not

always indicate coercion; in finding that four officers was reasonable, the court

noted the potential danger of approaching a house believed to contain a drug

operation and stated that the officers were permitted to take reasonable security

precautions. Id. at 280. Similarly here, the three officers approached defendant’s

apartment to arrest him for conspiracy to deliver controlled substances. While one

of the officers testified that he did not expect to find evidence of drug trafficking

in the apartment because defendant was on probation and, thus, was subject to

random searches by his probation officer, the potential for danger still existed, and

the officers reasonably sent three officers to defendant’s door.

Moreover, while defendant claims he was coerced into leaving his

apartment by the repeated requests of the officers, he fails to indicate how a

second request that he step out of the apartment is any more coercive than a single

request. And, as noted in Thomas, an officer’s request that an individual step out

of his house to speak with the officer is not coercive. Additionally, defendant

failed to identify any specific statements of compulsion. Compare, for example,

the case of Boykin v Van Buren Twp, 479 F3d 444 (CA 6, 2007), in which the

circuit court noted in a footnote that if the plaintiff had brought a claim alleging

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights as a result of a constructive entry by the

police, instead of bringing a civil rights action under 42 USC 1983, he likely

would have had considerably more success. Id. at 450 n 2. In doing so, it found

the following comments demonstrated an unequivocal show of force, “‘I’m trying

to avoid coming into your home and dragging you out of your home. . . . And

we’re going to do that if you don’t listen to us.’” Id. The statements in Boykin

indicate that had the suspect not complied, the police would have physically

compelled his compliance. In contrast here, defendant merely testified that the

“Police said come out . . . . They kept telling me to come out the door.” These

statements do not threaten the use of physical force to compel compliance or, in

fact, threaten in any manner.4

Although this case is somewhat complicated by the fact that defendant

wore a tether and initially refused to leave the apartment, the suspect in Boykin

apparently also refused to leave his home. While the tether may have given

defendant a greater incentive to stay in his apartment, this alone does not lead to a

presumption that defendant’s will was overborne by a show of police force.

Rather, the tether, backed by a court order to remain in the apartment, instead of

supplying a basis for a reasonable person to have felt coerced to leave his

apartment as claimed by the dissent, would seem to provide more resolve to the

person wearing it to remain inside. In other words, armed with a court order,

defendant should have felt reasonably confident in refusing police requests that he

leave the apartment. Thus, with the caselaw we have discussed in mind, it being

4
The dissent claims that we have missed a crucial part of the dicta in
Boykin that “recognized that coercive statements alone could invoke the
constructive entry doctrine.” Post at 10. We reiterate that we have not yet
decided whether to adopt the constructive entry doctrine in Michigan. Even
assuming arguendo that the constructive entry doctrine as articulated by the Sixth
Circuit in Boykin were to apply, however, no coercive statements were made in
this case. It is, therefore, unnecessary to decide whether coercive statements alone
can invoke the constructive entry doctrine.

clear that there was no improper entry, constructive or otherwise, defendant was

arrested legally, and the trial court erred in suppressing evidence of the piece of

paper containing the undercover officer’s name and telephone number.

IV. CONCLUSION

In summary, even if we were to recognize the constructive entry doctrine,

defendant in this case would fail to establish that that police constructively entered

his home in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy. Accordingly, we

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial

court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded to the trial court.

Clifford W. Taylor

Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

STATE OF MICHIGAN

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 131276

WILLIE R. GILLAM,

Defendant-Appellee.

WEAVER, J. (concurring in the result only).

I concur in the majority’s holding that, if the constructive entry doctrine

were to be adopted in Michigan, defendant Gillam would not be able satisfy the

requirements of the doctrine under the facts of this case. I write separately to offer

a different analysis, truer to the purpose of the Fourth Amendment of the United

States Constitution, with regard to why the constructive entry doctrine does not

apply in this case.

The constructive entry doctrine is derived from the Fourth Amendment,

which protects the right of people to be secure in their homes. US Const, Am IV.

The Fourth Amendment provides:

under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant is required before the police can enter a

home to arrest a person, absent any exigent circumstances. Payton v New York,

445 US 573; 100 S Ct 1371; 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980). In Payton, the Court stated

that “the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.

Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed

without a warrant.” Id.

While the holding in Payton protects people’s Fourth Amendment rights in

situations where the police physically enter a home, some courts have expanded

on Payton to provide Fourth Amendment protection when the actions of the police

lead to a constructive entry of a home. The constructive entry doctrine has been

adopted by several federal circuit courts of appeals, including the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals, to deal with situations in which a person was arrested outside

his or her home after police conduct compelled that person to leave the home.1

Both the majority and the dissent characterize the constructive entry

doctrine as applying when a person is arrested after the police use coercive2

conduct that would compel a reasonable person to comply with the police and

1
See United States v Morgan, 743 F2d 1158, 1166 (CA 6, 1984); Sharrar v
Felsing, 128 F3d 810, 819 (CA 3, 1997); United States v Al-Azzawy, 784 F2d 890,
893 (CA 9, 1985); United States v Maez, 872 F2d 1444, 1450 (CA 10, 1989).

2
To coerce is to compel by force or threat. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th
ed).

leave his or her home. I generally agree with this characterization, but I find that

the Fourth Amendment requires an application of the doctrine that focuses on

police conduct with regard to crossing the threshold of the home rather than a

person’s belief that he or she must comply with an officer’s request to leave his or

her home. Any application that places more emphasis on a person’s compliance

with an officer’s request, and less emphasis on the Fourth Amendment’s

protection of the home, undermines the Fourth Amendment and creates too broad

of a doctrine. In applying the constructive entry doctrine, one should look to the

facts of the case only to determine whether the police compelled the person into

leaving his or her home by a show of force or threats to cross the threshold into

the person’s home.

The majority and the dissent argue over whether the facts of this case show

that the police created an excited atmosphere that would have compelled

defendant to leave his apartment. The more relevant question regarding

constructive entry is whether the police actually displayed a show of force or made

threats that would lead a reasonable person to believe that if defendant did not

come out of his apartment, the arresting officers would actually cross the threshold

of the apartment to retrieve him.

Under the facts of this case, there appears to be no way in which the actions

of the police could lead a reasonable person to believe that the police would have

crossed the threshold of the apartment to arrest defendant. According to the

testimony of defendant and the arresting officers, the only actions of the police

were to approach defendant’s apartment and ask him to come out.3 Any other

facts that relate to the atmosphere surrounding the arrest and whether defendant

believed he needed to leave his apartment at the request of the police are not as

relevant as the actions of the police under the test for constructive entry as stated

above.4 Because this case lacks any fact showing that the police made a show of

force or threatened to enter defendant’s apartment,

3
Although there were several police officers standing outside defendant’s
door, and they asked defendant to come out even after he first refused, these facts
do not show that the police at any time threatened to enter defendant’s apartment
to arrest him. Absent any condition indicating that the officers would enter the
apartment, the number of officers present outside defendant’s apartment is not
relevant to the issue: one police officer or ten police officers could enter into an
apartment to arrest someone.

4
Although the majority and the dissent state that the presence of
defendant’s tether may have contributed to a coercive environment, my test does
not give much weight to the environment surrounding the arrest. Because the
focus should be on the actions of the police and whether the police acted with a
show of force or threat to invade the home, the presence of the tether and
defendant’s reasonable belief that his tether restricted him to stay in his apartment
does not factor into any decision regarding constructive entry. Rather, if the tether
were to factor into the Fourth Amendment analysis of this case, the presence of the
tether may actually reduce defendant’s subjective and objective expectation of
privacy in his home under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v Smith, 457
F Supp 2d 802 (ED Mich, 2006). The tether allows the police to monitor his
movements at all times, including when he is in his home. If the police had
improperly entered defendant’s apartment, such entry would necessitate an
analysis of defendant’s expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
However, because the police did not improperly enter defendant’s home,
(continued…)

the constructive entry doctrine need not be applied in this case. Thus, I concur in

the result reached by the majority.

Elizabeth A. Weaver

(…continued)

constructively or otherwise, an analysis of defendant’s expectation of privacy is

not necessary.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 131276

WILLIE R. GILLAM,

Defendant-Appellee.

KELLY, J. (dissenting).

The issue here is whether certain police conduct constituted a constructive

entry into defendant’s home, violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, invalidating the arrest, and rendering inadmissible the evidence later

obtained.

The constructive entry doctrine is widely recognized. It is applicable in the

instant case where the police created an excited environment and refused to

respect defendant’s repeated refusals to leave his home. Accordingly, I would

affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that the trial court properly

suppressed the evidence that was seized after defendant’s arrest.

THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court reviews legal conclusions de novo and a trial court’s findings of

fact at a suppression hearing for clear error. People v Williams, 472 Mich 308,
313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005).1 Constitutional questions are reviewed de novo.

Michigan Chiropractic Council v Comm’r of the Office of Financial & Ins

Services, 475 Mich 363, 369; 716 NW2d 561 (2006).

THE CONSTRUCTIVE ENTRY DOCTRINE

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [US
Const, Am IV.]

In Michigan, the police do not generally need a warrant to arrest a person

when they have probable cause to believe that the person has committed a felony.

People v Johnson¸ 431 Mich 683, 690-691; 431 NW2d 825 (1988). MCL

764.15(1) lists the circumstances under which a police officer may effectuate an

arrest without a warrant.2 However, a warrant is generally required to arrest a

person in his or her home.

1
I note that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that the legal
finding that a seizure occurred is reviewed de novo; the underlying factual
findings are reviewed for clear error. See United States v Buchanon, 72 F3d 1217,
1222-1223 (CA 6, 1995).
2
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the police did not obtain an arrest
warrant before arriving at defendant’s apartment. However, at the suppression
hearing, the trial court determined that the police had probable cause to get an
arrest warrant. I will assume that the police had probable cause to believe that
defendant committed a felony and therefore could have effectuated a lawful arrest
without a warrant.

In Payton v New York,3 the United States Supreme Court held that the

Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a nonconsensual entry into a

suspect’s home without a warrant in order to make a routine felony arrest. Payton,

445 US 573 at 576. The Court stated that “‘physical entry of the home is the chief

evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’” Id. at 585,

quoting United States v United States District Court, 407 US 297, 313; 92 S Ct

2125; 32 L Ed 2d 752 (1972).

The Court further recognized that it is a “‘basic principle of Fourth

Amendment law’” that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are

presumptively unreasonable. Payton, 445 US at 587 (citation omitted). The Court

specifically drew the line between searches and seizures that do not violate the

Fourth Amendment and those that do. The line was drawn at the entrance to the

home:

The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a
variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly
defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual’s home—a zone that finds its roots in
clear and specific constitutional terms: “The right of the people to be
secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.” That language
unequivocally establishes the proposition that “[at] the very core [of
the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.” [Silverman v United States, 365 US 505, 511; 81 S Ct
679; 5 L Ed 2d 734 (1961).] In terms that apply equally to seizures
of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent

3
445 US 573; 100 S Ct 1371; 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980).

circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without
a warrant. [Id. at 589-590.]

Numerous courts have interpreted Payton as prohibiting not only physical

entries into a person’s home to effectuate an arrest without a warrant, but

constructive entries as well. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Sharrar v

Felsing,4 found a constructive entry where there was a “clear show of physical

force and assertion of authority.” In United States v Morgan,5 the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals stated that either a constructive entry or a direct entry into the

home would constitute an arrest. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United

States v Al-Azzawy,6 found a constructive entry where the suspect was not free to

leave, his movement was restricted, and the officers’ show of force and authority

was overwhelming. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v Maez,7

found that Payton is violated where there is “such a show of force that a defendant

comes out of a home under coercion and submits to being taken into custody.”8

4
128 F3d 810, 819 (CA 3, 1997).
5
743 F2d 1158, 1166 (CA 6, 1984).
6
784 F2d 890, 893 (CA 9, 1985).
7
872 F2d 1444, 1451 (CA 10, 1989).
8
A number of courts have not had the opportunity to discuss the
constructive doctrine entry. See, e.g., United States v Beudoin, 362 F3d 60, 68
(CA 1, 2004), citing Joyce v Town of Tewksbury, 112 F3d 19 (CA 1, 1997) (noting
that a there is no settled answer to the constitutionality of doorway arrests), and
United States v Gori, 230 F3d 44, 52 n 2 (CA 2, 2000) (declining to address the
questions presented when the police surround a dwelling, flood it with search
lights, and order evacuation over a bullhorn).

(continued…)

The constructive entry doctrine is a valid legal doctrine that protects

individual liberties and safeguards individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights. It

respects the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Payton, which drew a

“firm line at the entrance to the house.” Payton, 445 US at 590. Equally

important, the constructive entry doctrine recognizes that officers cannot do

through coercive tactics and the abuse of authority what they cannot do physically:

they cannot enter someone’s home to effectuate an arrest without a warrant. As

noted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, “[a] contrary rule would undermine

the constitutional precepts emphasized in Payton.” United States v Morgan, 743

F2d 1158, 1116 (CA 6, 1984).

Application of the constructive entry doctrine inherently requires a case-by

case analysis to determine whether the police conduct constituted a constructive

entry. A majority of this Court concludes that the conduct in this case did not

constitute a constructive entry. It arrives at this conclusion by noting that the facts

are not as egregious as those in other cases. Here, the police did not use

(…continued)
Other courts have indicated that the Fourth Amendment is not violated as
long as the officers do not cross the physical threshold of the entrance to the home.
See, e.g., United States v Carrion, 809 F2d 1120, 1128 (CA 5, 1987) (holding that
Payton was not violated when the police, without crossing the threshold, pointed
guns at and arrested the defendant when he was still in a hotel room), and United
States v Berkowitz, 927 F2d 1376, 1386 (CA 7, 1991) (Payton prohibits an entry
into a home without a warrant, not an officer’s use of his or her voice to convey a
message of arrest from outside the home).

floodlights and bullhorns9 or draw their weapons and place defendant in fear of

being shot.10 However, unlike the majority, I believe that a defendant’s Fourth

Amendment rights may be violated even though the police conduct was less

egregious than that in the most extreme factual settings.

The decision should be made on the basis of the degree of coerciveness of

the police conduct. The most relevant question is whether a reasonable person

would feel compelled to leave the house.11

9
Morgan, 743 F2d at 1161, 1164.
10
United States v Saari, 272 F3d 804, 806-807 (CA 6, 2001).
11
See United States v Thomas, 430 F3d 274, 278 (CA 6, 2005) (there was
no constructive entry where there was no indication that “a reasonable person,
confronted with a knock on the door by police officers, would believe without
more that he was either under arrest or otherwise compelled to leave the house”);
Sharrar, 128 F3d at 819 (no reasonable person would have believed himself free
to remain in the house when the police surrounded the house, pointed machine
guns at the windows, and ordered the occupants out).
Justice Weaver agrees that the constructive entry doctrine applies when a
person is arrested after the police engage in coercive conduct that would compel a
reasonable person to leave his or her home. However, she proposes a new test for
determining whether a constructive entry has occurred and the Fourth Amendment
has been violated. Under her theory, a constructive entry occurs when the police
conduct would lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she must step outside
his or her home. Otherwise, it must appear to the person, the officers would cross
the threshold to arrest him or her. I cannot agree that the police may use any
degree of coercive conduct or threats so long as they stop short of indicating that
they will physically cross the threshold. Under Justice Weaver’s test, the police
could station machine guns, bullhorns, floodlights, and barking attack dogs outside
a person’s door indefinitely. As long as they did not threaten to physically cross
the threshold of the person’s home, there would be no constructive entry. It seems
beyond argument that the Fourth Amendment affords greater protection than that.

In this case, the trial court believed defendant’s version of the events.

Defendant explained that, at the time in question, he had been confined to his

apartment on house arrest and was on a tether. The police knocked on his door.

He opened it, and the police asked him to come out. According to defendant, he

replied that he could not come out because he was on a tether. It is undisputed that

there was a repeated verbal exchange between the police and defendant in which

the police told defendant to come out and he declined to do so. Defendant

eventually emerged from the apartment “because there was an officer to [his] right

[and] something about it [made him] feel threatened.” Defendant testified that he

came out in what he described as an exited atmosphere,12 that he did not leave his

apartment voluntarily, and that he felt coerced by the officers.

12
The majority takes issue with my characterization of the situation as an
excited atmosphere. Defendant testified that the situation could be described as an
excited atmosphere and, as recognized by the majority, the trial court believed his
version of the events.
I do not find credible the majority’s view that the police made no coercive
statements to defendant. Even assuming that the officers’ requests to defendant
that he step outside were polite, by dint of their persistent repetition, they became
coercive. That combined with the excited atmosphere created by the police, and
the fact that defendant was on tether, enhanced the coercive environment. As
recognized by the majority, the trial court stated, “In any event, I think [defendant]
was, in some manner or another, caused to step outside and be arrested.”
Therefore, the trial court explicitly found that the police coerced defendant into
leaving his apartment. The trial court’s finding that there was a coercive
environment was not clearly erroneous, given the quantity and weight of the
testimony that supported it. The trial court, not the majority of this Court, was in
the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and make findings of
fact.

Given these facts, I would conclude that the police made a constructive

entry. The uniformed police officers created an excited and coercive atmosphere.

They refused to acknowledge or respect defendant’s repeated refusals to leave his

apartment. They made it clear that they would not take “no” for an answer and

would continue to ask defendant to step out despite his repeated refusals to do so.

Moreover, before the police arrived at defendant’s door, they knew that he

was on house arrest with a tether. When they called out to him, defendant told

them that he could not leave his apartment because he was on a tether. At the

suppression hearing, the trial court believed defendant’s testimony and noted that

defendant knew the “meets [sic] and bounds” of the tether system. Moreover,

when questioned by the trial court, an officer admitted that it was possible that

defendant’s tether had been set up so that he could not leave the apartment.

The fact that defendant was on a tether further supports the finding that

there was a constructive entry. Defendant was under a court order to remain in his

apartment, and yet the police officers repeatedly demanded that he leave it. Under

this situation, a reasonable person would have felt coerced to leave his or her

residence.13 The majority contends that the facts of this case are similar to those in

13
The Michigan Court of Appeals has addressed what constitutes coercive
conduct in a traditional knock-and-talk setting. In People v Bolduc, 263 Mich App
430, 441; 688 NW2d 316 (2004), the defendant testified that, after the police came
to his home, he denied them permission to search his residence and requested that
they leave the premises. The police ignored the defendant’s repeated requests to
leave his home and instead continued to question him. Id. The Court of Appeals
found that the police officers’ action constituted inherently coercive conduct. Id.
(continued…)

United States v Thomas,14 in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded

that there was no constructive entry. In that case, officers knocked on the door of

the defendant’s residence. Id. at 276. When the defendant opened the door, the

officers told him that the investigators wanted to talk to him and asked him to

come out of the residence. Id. Without objection, the defendant came out of the

residence, and the police arrested him. Id.

There are several important distinctions between the facts in Thomas and

those in the instant case. In Thomas, the police made only one request of the

defendant, who was not under house arrest, to come out of the residence. In the

instant case, the police knew that defendant was under house arrest and refused to

accept his repeated refusals to leave his residence. Unlike in Thomas, the instant

facts do not reveal a calm single request to leave the residence. Rather, they

reveal excited, repeated demands for a person under house arrest to leave his

residence.

The majority attempts also to distinguish the instant case from Boykin v

Van Buren Twp, 479 F3d 444 (CA 6, 2007). In Boykin, the police came to the

(…continued)
This Court has not yet discussed the constitutionality of, or limits to,
traditional knock-and-talk encounters. See People v Frohriep, 466 Mich 888
(2002) (Kelly, J., dissenting). In any event, the Bolduc decision indicates the
willingness of the Court of Appeals to recognize that repeated refusals by police
officers to leave a suspect’s home when requested constitute coercive conduct.
14
430 F 3d 274 (CA 6, 2006).

defendant’s house and stated, among other things, “‘I’m trying to avoid coming

into your home and dragging you out of your home . . . . And we’re going to do

that if you don’t listen to us.’” Id. at 450 n 2. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

opined that, had the issue been briefed, the Court would have been inclined to find

a constructive entry into the defendant’s home in violation of Payton. Id.

In attempting to distinguish the instant facts from those of Boykin, the

majority misses a crucial part of the Boykin commentary. Specifically, the Sixth

Circuit recognized that coercive statements alone could invoke the constructive

entry doctrine. This recognition necessarily belies the majority’s inference that

only overt physical acts, such as using a bullhorn or brandishing machine guns,

could constitute a constructive entry.

It should be noted, also, that the majority opinion risks establishing bad

public policy. It discourages people from opening their door to police officers.

Essentially, it signals to the public that it is acceptable for the police to ignore a

person’s repeated refusals to leave his or her home and sanctuary. Hence, people

might conclude that they should not open their doors when they see police officers

on the other side. This Court should encourage, not discourage, the public to

assist the police in their lawful investigations.15

15
The majority claims that the tether would provide more resolve to the
person wearing it to remain inside. However, as noted above, defendant did
initially display his resolve to remain in the apartment, and the officers refused to
respect it. It is apparent from the fact of the tether that defendant had prior contact
with the police and the court system. Presumably, the judge who ordered the
(continued…)

CONCLUSION

For the reasons I have discussed, I would affirm the judgment of the Court

of Appeals and hold that the trial court properly excluded the evidence seized. A

constructive entry occurred when the police created an excited environment and

coerced defendant who was on a tether into leaving his apartment in order to arrest

him.

Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh

(…continued)

tether encouraged him to cooperate with the police while on the tether. The

majority’s opinion encourages both those who do and do not have an ongoing

relationship with the court system to ignore police requests.