People v. Williams

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:

Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

FILED MAY 11, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 127115

JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________

PER CURIAM

This case concerns the constitutionality of a traffic

stop. After stopping defendant's vehicle for speeding, a

state trooper asked defendant routine questions about his

travel plans and obtained his consent to search the

vehicle. Cocaine and marijuana were discovered during the

search. Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeals

determined, that his consent was invalid because his

detention exceeded the proper scope of a traffic stop, in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals
held that the trial court should have suppressed the fruits

of the search.1

We conclude that the detention was reasonable and did

not exceed the proper scope of a traffic stop. Because

defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated as a

result of the detention, his consent was valid. We reverse

the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case

to the trial court for reinstatement of defendant’s

convictions and sentences.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2003, Michigan State Police Trooper

Jason Varoni observed defendant’s vehicle traveling eighty-

eight miles an hour on I-75 in Cheboygan County, where the

posted speed limit was seventy miles an hour. He stopped

defendant’s vehicle. Upon request, defendant produced his

driver's license. Trooper Varoni told defendant why he had

been stopped and asked defendant where he was going.

Defendant answered that he was going to Cheboygan to visit

friends and that he was staying at the Holiday Inn.

Because Cheboygan does not have a Holiday Inn, Trooper

Varoni was suspicious of this response and asked defendant

to step from the vehicle to answer additional questions.

1
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued August 5, 2004
(Docket No. 249853).

Defendant did so and, in response to further questioning,

explained that he was coming from Detroit and that he

intended to stay in Cheboygan for two days. No luggage was

visible in the vehicle’s passenger compartment; when asked

about this, defendant said that he brought no luggage on

the trip. Trooper Varoni asked defendant if he had “been

in trouble before,” and defendant disclosed that he had

previously been arrested for a marijuana-related offense.

Trooper Varoni then questioned the vehicle’s other two

occupants about their own travel plans, but their

inconsistent responses only increased his suspicions.2 This

questioning was completed about five to eight minutes after

the traffic stop occurred. Trooper Varoni then informed

defendant that he had received conflicting stories from the

occupants of the vehicle. He asked for defendant’s consent

to search the vehicle, and defendant agreed.

Trooper Varoni contacted the Tuscarora Township canine

unit, and asked that a drug-detection dog be sent to the

scene. The canine unit arrived within three minutes and

the dog signaled the presence of narcotics in the backseat

2
The front-seat passenger claimed that he did not know
where they were going or how long they would be gone; he
confirmed that he had no luggage. The backseat passenger,
defendant’s wife, told Trooper Varoni that they were going
shopping in Cheboygan and then Detroit. She said that they
had made no arrangements for accommodations.

of the vehicle. Trooper Varoni did not find any narcotics

in that area, and he asked defendant for consent to search

the vehicle’s trunk. Defendant initially agreed, but then

withdrew his consent. A warrant was obtained, and the

police discovered substances that appeared to be marijuana

and cocaine.3 Trooper Varoni wrote defendant a citation for

speeding and two drug-related felonies, and arrested him.

Defendant was charged with possession with intent to

deliver fifty grams or more but less than 225 grams of a

substance containing cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), and

possession with intent to deliver marijuana, MCL

333.7401(2)(d)(iii). He moved to suppress evidence of the

controlled substances seized from his vehicle, asserting

that the search4 and seizure were predicated on an illegal

detention. The trial court denied the motion. It

concluded that the statements made by the occupants of the

vehicle raised reasonable suspicions in Trooper Varoni’s

mind. It further concluded that the delay caused by the

3
This was confirmed through later testing.
4
Defendant disputes the validity of the initial search
of the car; he does not separately challenge the validity
of the later search of the trunk, which was conducted after
Trooper Varoni obtained a search warrant and which led to
the discovery of the controlled substances.

additional questioning was not unreasonable under the

circumstances presented.

Defendant was convicted as charged following a bench

trial, and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of

seven to twenty years (for the cocaine conviction) and two

to four years (for the marijuana conviction).

Defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s

denial of his motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals

reversed. Concluding that the initial traffic stop had

been lawful, the Court then determined that the trooper

“unlawfully exceeded the initial stop when he asked

defendant to step out of the vehicle” to answer questions

about his travel plans while the officer possessed only a

“generalized hunch” that criminal activity was afoot. The

trooper’s questions had no relevance to the traffic stop,

the Court held, and he had no reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity to warrant asking the questions. The

Court concluded that Trooper Varoni was acting on a

“hunch,” which is insufficient grounds for pursuing an

investigatory stop. For these reasons, it reversed the

trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress.

The prosecutor applied to this Court for leave to

appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court’s findings at a

suppression hearing for clear error. People v Jenkins, 472

Mich 26, 31; 691 NW2d 759 (2005); People v Custer, 465 Mich

319, 325-326; 630 NW2d 870 (2001). But the application of

constitutional standards regarding searches and seizures to

essentially uncontested facts is entitled to less

deference; for this reason, we review de novo the trial

court’s ultimate ruling on the motion to suppress.

Jenkins, supra; People v Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 191-192; 627

NW2d 297 (2001).

III. ANALYSIS

We review here the Court of Appeals determination that

the traffic stop escalated into an illegal detention in

violation of the Fourth Amendment, rendering defendant’s

eventual consent to search a nullity.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution

provides:

The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.[5]

5
US Const, Am IV.

In assessing the protections created by this amendment, the

United States Supreme Court has “long held that the

'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.'”

Ohio v Robinette, 519 US 33, 39; 117 S Ct 417; 136 L Ed 2d

347 (1996) (citation omitted). Reasonableness is measured

by examining the totality of the circumstances. Id.

Because of “'endless variations in the facts and

circumstances'” implicating the Fourth Amendment,

reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that does not

lend itself to resolution through the application of

bright-line rules. Id., quoting Florida v Royer, 460 US

491, 506; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983).

In analyzing the propriety of the detention here, we

apply the standard set forth in Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88

S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).6 Under Terry, the

reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on “whether

the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and

whether it was reasonably related in scope to the

6
Knowles v Iowa, 525 US 113, 117; 119 S Ct 484; 142 L
Ed 2d 492 (1998) (despite existence of probable cause, a
common traffic stop is more analogous to limited detention
authorized by Terry than to an arrest) (quoting Berkemer v
McCarty, 468 US 420, 439-440; 104 S Ct 3138; 82 L Ed 2d 317
[1984]).

circumstances which justified the interference in the first

place.”7 Terry, supra at 20.

In this case, there is no dispute that the initial

traffic stop was occasioned by defendant’s speeding, and

was therefore based on probable cause and was reasonable.

Robinette, supra at 38. Under Terry, the remaining

question is whether the subsequent detention was

“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances" of this

case. Terry, supra at 20. We conclude that it was.

As a threshold matter, the Court of Appeals erred when

it agreed with defendant that the purpose of this traffic

stop was fully effectuated when defendant handed Trooper

Varoni his driver's license and other requested paperwork.

This view of the essential nature of the traffic stop

imposes an unreasonable restriction on an officer’s ability

to investigate a violation of the law.

A traffic stop is reasonable as long as the driver is

detained only for the purpose of allowing an officer to ask

reasonable questions concerning the violation of law and

7
The reviewing court considers the objective facts
relating to the traffic stop; the officer’s subjective
state of mind is not relevant to the determination whether
the detention was proper. Oliver, supra at 199.

its context for a reasonable period.8 The determination

whether a traffic stop is reasonable must necessarily take

into account the evolving circumstances with which the

officer is faced. As we observed in People v Burrell, 417

Mich 439, 453; 339 NW2d 403 (1983), when a traffic stop

reveals a new set of circumstances, an officer is justified

in extending the detention long enough to resolve the

suspicion raised.9

It is no violation of the Fourth Amendment for an

officer to ask reasonable questions in order to obtain

additional information about the underlying offense and the

circumstances leading to its commission. For example, in

addition to asking for the necessary identification and

paperwork, an officer may also ask questions relating to

8
There is considerable discretion allowed an officer
charged with enforcing the traffic laws as a member of the
executive branch of government. This discretion can be
exercised effectively only if an officer is allowed to ask
reasonable questions concerning the context of a traffic
offense. To deny an officer the ability to ask
reasonable questions, reasonably circumscribed in scope and
duration, is to deny the officer the ability to reasonably
exercise the officer's discretion.
9
Put another way, when considering whether a detention
is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances of the
case, a reviewing court must consider whether “the
officer’s subsequent actions were fairly responsive to the
emerging tableau—the circumstances originally warranting
the stop, informed by what occurred, and what the officer
learned, as the stop progressed.” United States v Chhien,
266 F3d 1, 6 (CA 1, 2001).

the reason for the stop, including questions about the

driver’s destination and travel plans. United States v

Williams, 271 F3d 1262, 1267 (CA 10, 2001).10 Specifically,

an officer may ask about the “purpose and itinerary of a

driver’s trip during the traffic stop” in order to

determine whether a “violation has taken place, and if so,

whether a citation or warning should be issued or an arrest

made.” United States v Brigham, 382 F3d 500, 508 (CA 5,

2004). Such inquiries are “within the scope of

investigation attendant to the traffic stop.” Id.

Implicit in the authority to ask these questions is

the authority to ask follow-up questions when the initial

answers given are suspicious.11 Likewise, there is no

constitutional prohibition against asking similar questions

of any passengers in the vehicle.12

10
See also United States v Givan, 320 F3d 452, 459 (CA
3, 2003); United States v Linkous, 285 F3d 716, 719 (CA 8,
2002); United States v Hill, 195 F3d 258, 268 (CA 6, 1999);
United States v Johnson, 58 F3d 356, 357 (CA 8, 1995).
11
United States v Johnson, 58 F3d 356, 357-358 (CA 8,
1995).
12
Linkous, supra at 719 (an officer may question the
occupants of a vehicle to verify information provided by
the driver).

Simply put, the Fourth Amendment does not impose a

“one size fits all” rule of police investigation,13 much

less one that restricts the officer to informing the driver

of the nature of the infraction, and subsequently obtaining

the information necessary to fill out a citation. The

Fourth Amendment requires only that the detention be

reasonable—that is, that it be reasonably restricted in

light of all the facts available to the officer. See

Robinette, supra at 39.

That standard was satisfied here. Trooper Varoni

introduced himself to defendant, explained the purpose of

the stop, and obtained the necessary identification and

paperwork in order to complete the citation for the civil

infraction of speeding. In response to a routine question

about his travel plans, defendant provided Trooper Varoni

with an explanation that was implausible.14 Therefore, even

before Trooper Varoni could resolve the matter of

13
See Robinette, supra at 39 (“In applying this test
we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead
emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness
inquiry.”).
14
The Court of Appeals stated that there were
“plausible” innocent explanations for the statements made
by the vehicle occupants. But the fact that such
explanations can be imagined does not mean that Trooper
Varoni acted unreasonably in seeking to resolve the
inconsistencies. See Oliver, supra at 204.

defendant’s violation of the traffic laws, he was presented

with additional suspicious circumstances that warranted

further investigation.

Trooper Varoni acted on these new suspicions by asking

defendant additional questions about his travel plans and

whether he had been in trouble before, and by briefly

speaking with the vehicle's occupants. None of the answers

provided by defendant or his companions allayed Trooper

Varoni’s suspicions. Moreover, the entire encounter took

only five to eight minutes, at which time Trooper Varoni

requested and obtained defendant’s consent to search the

vehicle.

After reviewing the facts and evaluating the totality

of the circumstances, we conclude that the traffic stop

here was reasonable in both scope and duration.

It follows that defendant was not being unlawfully

detained when he was asked to consent to the search.

Consent must be freely and voluntarily given in order to be

valid. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 294; 597

NW2d 1 (1999); Royer, supra at 497. An investigatory stop,

as occurred in this case, is not so inherently coercive

that it renders involuntary consent given during the stop.

Royer, supra at 501, 502; People v Acoff, 220 Mich App 396,

400; 559 NW2d 103 (1996). There is no suggestion that

defendant was coerced into giving his consent.15

It is unnecessary to consider whether Trooper Varoni

had an independent, reasonable, and articulable suspicion

that defendant was involved with narcotics, or even whether

the Fourth Amendment might impose such a requirement under

different circumstances.16 The detention and search here

were reasonable because: (1) the initial traffic stop was

lawful, (2) Trooper Varoni’s questions about defendant’s

travel plans, and his limited follow-up, were reasonable

and did not exceed the proper scope and duration of the

initial traffic stop, and (3) after Trooper Varoni

concluded his questioning, defendant voluntarily consented

to the search of the vehicle. All in all, rather than

amounting to a constitutional violation, we find that

15
Defendant’s own actions show that he understood that
he could refuse the request. He later declined to consent
to a search of the trunk.
16
One aspect of an officer’s ability to conduct a drug
search without independent, articulable, and reasonable
suspicion was addressed in Illinois v Caballes, 543 US ___;
125 S Ct 834; 160 L Ed 2d 842 (2005). Employing the
reasonableness standard of Robinette, the United States
Supreme Court held that, as long as the traffic stop is not
prolonged, an officer may use a drug-detection dog to sniff
a vehicle during the stop, even if the defendant does not
consent and the officer lacks reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle are involved
with narcotics.

Trooper Varoni's work in this case amounted to excellent

police work. The trial court properly denied defendant’s

motion to suppress evidence of the controlled substances

found during the search of his vehicle.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the detention was reasonable and did not

constitute a violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment

rights, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and

remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of

defendant’s convictions and sentences. MCR 7.302(G)(1).

Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 127115

JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________

KELLY, J. (dissenting).

I agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court

erred by denying defendant's motions to suppress and to

strike the evidence provided by Trooper Jason Varoni. The

trooper's questions of defendant were not reasonably

related to the purpose of the traffic stop. Furthermore,

defendant's statement to the trooper that he was staying at

a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan could not evoke a reasonable

suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity.

Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of

Appeals.

Terry v Ohio

Traffic stops are subject to the test established by

the United States Supreme Court in Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1,

20; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). According to

Terry, an officer's investigation of a traffic stop must be
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which

justified the interference in the first place." Id. A

defendant may not be detained even momentarily without

reasonable, objective grounds for doing so. Florida v

Royer, 460 US 491, 498; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229

(1983). The scope of the detention must be carefully

tailored to the justification for the stop. Id. at 500.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, I would

find that the officer's questioning in this case exceeded

the permissible legal scope of inquiry regarding a speeding

offense. It was not reasonably related to defendant’s

violation of the speed limit. Furthermore, I believe that

the answers to the officer’s questions did not give rise to

an articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.

Scope of the Stop

Trooper Varoni detained defendant for driving in

excess of the speed limit. An additional reason for the

stop was that his vehicle had a cracked windshield. There

was no reasonable articulable suspicion of any other

offense.

Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the

Michigan Supreme Court has ever ruled that questioning

beyond the scope of a traffic stop is allowed. The Court of

Appeals decision in this case accurately reflects Michigan

law. However, with this decision, the Court changes

Michigan law to enlarge the permissible scope of an inquiry

by a police officer during a routine traffic stop.

Permissible Questioning

The questions "Why the rush?" and "Where are you

headed in such a hurry?" from a police officer may be

reasonably related to a traffic stop for speeding. They

seek an admission of speeding.

But questions about a driver's destination, purpose,

length of stay, and with whom he will be staying are meant

to inquire into issues beyond a speeding offense. Not only

have they nothing to do with a speeding offense, they are

not helpful to a police officer's decision to release the

driver or to issue a citation or warning.1 Ante at 10.

On direct examination, Trooper Varoni testified that

he asked defendant where he was going and that defendant

offered that "he was going into Cheboygan to visit friends

and that he was staying at the Holiday Inn." However, it

is apparent from the cross-examination of Trooper Varoni

that defendant did not volunteer this information to the

1
The majority cites several federal circuit court of
appeals cases for the proposition that questions about
travel plans are reasonably related to the scope of a
traffic stop. We are not bound by these decisions, and, as
noted above, I find their logic defective.

trooper in response to a general question. Instead, as

Trooper Varoni admitted:

A. Uh, it's—it's my practice to ask more
than just for those three pieces of uh,
documentation [referring to license,
registration, and insurance paperwork].

* * *

Q. All right. And then you proceeded to
further this investigation by questioning Mr.
Williams as to um, issues of where he was going
and what he was going to do when he was there, is
that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And these questions weren't relevant to
how fast he was going, were they?

A. I-I ask everybody I stop where they're
going to and where they are coming from.

* * *

Q. My question was; the question about where
he's going and how long he is staying is not
relevant to how fast he's going and the purpose
for your stop; is it?

A. That's correct.

Without question, the trooper asked defendant

questions that exceeded the scope of legal inquiry

regarding a speeding offense. The trooper evoked an answer

regarding the location where defendant was planning to

spend the night. He also asked defendant if defendant had

any prior narcotics convictions. Trooper Varoni testified:

Um, I asked him if he had been in trouble
before and uh, he told me that he had. I asked if

it had any—you know, related narcotics [sic], if
he'd ever been arrested for anything to do with
drugs and he told me that he had. I asked him for
what and he said marijuana.

This question likewise was unrelated to the purpose of the

traffic stop. Once defendant stated that he was staying at

a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan in response to a question about

where he would spend the night, the purpose of the

investigation changed. Trooper Varoni's subsequent

questions, having nothing to do with the scope of the

traffic stop, changed the fundamental nature of the stop.

What began as a routine traffic stop became an all-

encompassing criminal investigation. Trooper Varoni

admitted it:

Q. Your purpose of the initial stop had
seized [sic]; you weren't investigating speeding
violation [sic] anymore were you?

A. No, no I wasn't.

Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity

Even if Trooper Varoni's questions had been

appropriate for a traffic stop, a second pertinent concern

for the Court is whether defendant's answer provided a

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring.

Trooper Varoni essentially admitted that he continued

questioning the occupants of the vehicle on the basis of a

hunch that something "wasn't quite right."

Q. [Mr. Kwiatkowsi]: Is it possible that he
was in error as to where the Holiday Inn was?

A. [Trooper Varoni]: That's possible, yes.

Q. And the fact that someone misstates where
they're staying um, you're saying that made you
suspicious of him, is that right?

A. Uh, you—you can call it what you want, I
don't know about suspicious but, yeah, it made me
think twice about the statements he made.

Q. All right, so you weren't suspicious?

A. Yeah, I-I questioned his statements.

Q. Well, now when you're talking about
suspicion you understand suspicious of something,
right? Of some activity that's unlawful, right?

A. Yes, that could be.

Q. Well, what was it about that response
that you were suspicious of that was unlawful?

A. I wasn't suspicious of any particular
thing that was unlawful.

Q. So it was unparticularized suspicion is
that what you're saying?

A. Um, I guess that could be.

Q. Okay. Because you couldn't put your
finger on what it was you were suspicious of,
right?

A. I was suspicious that something wasn't
quite right.

Q. But you didn't know what it was, right?

A. That's right.

The trooper’s intuition that "something wasn't quite

right" and his observation that no luggage was visible in

the passenger compartment were the things that made him

suspicious. The trooper admitted that it is not uncommon

for people to carry luggage out of sight in the trunk.

Therefore, the only valid reason for the trooper to be

suspicious was defendant's statement that he was staying at

a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan.

The fact that defendant answered with the name of a

hotel chain that did not have a facility in Cheboygan

hardly created a reasonable suspicion that criminal

activity was afoot.2 The next question of defendant, once

he had stepped out of the vehicle, was whether he had any

prior conviction for drugs. It was likewise unrelated to

the traffic stop. This question is a further indicator

that the trooper was acting on a mere hunch.

Where there is no articulable basis to suspect that a

crime is being committed, the officer's questions amount to

2
It is noteworthy that the explanations Mr. Williams
and his two passengers gave are not as inconsistent as the
prosecution would have the Court believe. Mr. Williams
indicated that they were going to Cheboygan to visit
friends and would be there "about two days." They would be
staying at a Holiday Inn. His companion, Mr. King,
indicated that he was not sure how long they were going to
be gone. This is not inconsistent with defendant's
statement.

Mrs. Williams indicated that they were planning to do
some shopping in Cheboygan. She was not sure where they
were staying; they did not have reservations. This is also
not inconsistent with Mr. Williams's explanation.

nothing more than a fishing expedition. The questioning

and the subsequent search in this case went beyond the

scope of the traffic stop and were unsupported by any

reasonable articulable suspicion.

I agree with the Court of Appeals that, given the

totality of the circumstances, the trooper had insufficient

grounds for pursuing an investigatory stop and conducted

his investigation based merely on a hunch. People v

Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). I would

affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Marilyn Kelly