Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. Advanced Cellular Systems, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 06-1332

IN RE: ADVANCED CELLULAR SYSTEMS, INC.;
ADVANCED PAGING SYSTEMS CORP.,

Debtors.
------------------------

PUERTO RICO TELEPHONE COMPANY, d/b/a VERIZON WIRELESS,
f/k/a CELULARES TELEFONICA, INC., f/k/a VERIZON WIRELESS
PUERTO RICO, INC.

Creditor, Appellant,

v.

ADVANCED CELLULAR SYSTEMS, INC.;
ADVANCED CELLULAR PAGING SYSTEMS CORP.,

Debtors, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, Senior U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Circuit Judge,

John R. Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge,

and Howard, Circuit Judge.

*
Of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
 Ricardo F. Casellas, with whom Ricardo L. Ortiz Colón and
Fiddler González & Rodríguez, P.S.C. were on brief, for
appellant.
Carmen D. Conde Torres with whom C. Conde & Associates was
on brief for appellee.

March 28, 2007
 HOWARD, Circuit Judge. This appeal concerns a contract

dispute that arose during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding.

The debtor is Advanced Cellular Systems, Inc., a reseller of

cellular telephone numbers and services in Puerto Rico. Through an

arrangement with the Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Advanced

Cellular purchased cellular services and telephone numbers from

Puerto Rico Telephone at wholesale prices and resold them to

consumers at retail prices. The relationship between Advanced

Cellular and Puerto Rico Telephone was governed by a contract

entered into in 1986 and by subsequent tariffs filed by Puerto Rico

Telephone with the Puerto Rico Telephone Authority. In April 1998,

Puerto Rico Telephone ended its relationship with Advanced Cellular

because of Advanced Cellular's allegedly delinquent debts.

Thereafter Advanced Cellular filed for bankruptcy

protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and Puerto Rico

Telephone filed a proof of claim for the disputed debt in the

amount of $1,655,391.96. Advanced Cellular objected to this claim,

asserting that, in fact, Puerto Rico Telephone owed Advanced

Cellular money.1 It based this objection on several grounds,

including that Puerto Rico Telephone owed Advanced Cellular

reimbursements in the sum of $1,334,204.62 for the fraudulent use

1
The bankruptcy court limited its consideration of Advanced
Cellular's objection to whether it owed funds to Puerto Rico
Telephone. The court dismissed without prejudice Advanced
Cellular's claim that Puerto Rico Telephone owed it money.

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of telephone numbers that it had purchased from Puerto Rico

Telephone.

The type of fraud at issue is commonly referred to as

cloning. Cloning occurs when a third party uses a device to steal

the identifying information of an authorized cellular telephone

number through the air waves and then uses the stolen information

to make calls that appear to have originated from the authorized

number. Cloning surfaced in the cellular telephone industry in the

early 1990s. In response to this problem, which placed significant

financial strain on Advanced Cellular and Puerto Rico Telephone's

other resellers, Puerto Rico Telephone began to reimburse resellers

for losses suffered from cloning. To receive reimbursements,

Puerto Rico Telephone required resellers to submit claims within 90

days of billing.

During the course of their relationship, Advanced

Cellular received over $5,750,000 in reimbursements for cloning

from Puerto Rico Telephone. The dispute in this case centers on

$1,334,204.62 in claims made by Advanced Cellular that Puerto Rico

Telephone had denied because they were filed outside of the 90-day

window. Before the bankruptcy court, Puerto Rico Telephone claimed

that it had no contractual obligation to reimburse Advanced

Cellular for cloning claims at all, and therefore had the

discretion to deny claims that were untimely. Advanced Cellular

countered that Puerto Rico Telephone was contractually responsible

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for losses incurred due to cloning and that the 90-day claim window

was arbitrary and unreasonable.

The bankruptcy court agreed with Advanced Cellular. It

concluded that the parties' agreement did not have a specific

provision regarding cloning but that Puerto Rico Telephone had a

contractual duty to maintain and operate the cellular network. The

court determined that this duty included an obligation to take

responsibility for cloning. It also concluded that it "defied

common sense" to believe that Puerto Rico Telephone would have

reimbursed over $5 million of cloning claims made by Advanced

Cellular if there were no obligation to do so. Finally, the court

ruled that the 90-day window for reimbursement claims was

unreasonable and that Puerto Rico Telephone "had a duty . . . to

allow Advanced Cellular a reasonable time, such as 120 days, to

submit their [sic] fraud claims." The court accordingly disallowed

Puerto Rico Telephone's proof of claim.2

Puerto Rico Telephone appealed to the district court,

which affirmed. The district court addressed a provision of the

tariff not explicitly mentioned by the bankruptcy court that

2
While the cloning fraud issue accounted only for
$1,334,204.62 of the $1,655,391.96 that Puerto Rico Telephone
claimed, the bankruptcy court concluded that Advanced Cellular was
entitled to other credits in the sum of $709,277.04. It therefore
held that Advanced Cellular was entitled to a total credit of
$2,043,480.27, which exceeded Puerto Rico Telephone's entire claim.
The rulings that resulted in the $709,277.04 credit in favor of
Advanced Cellular have not been appealed.

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provided that Advanced Cellular "shall be solely responsible for

any . . . fraudulent use, by any person, of any number or numbers

assigned" to it. The court interpreted this provision to apply

only to fraud committed by "authorized users" of numbers assigned

to Advanced Cellular. Because cloning is fraud conducted by

unauthorized third parties, the court concluded that this provision

did not govern. The court also concluded that this provision could

not apply to cloning because Advanced Cellular's relationship with

Puerto Rico Telephone had commenced in 1986, which was at least

five years before cloning emerged as a problem in the cellular

telephone industry.

Having concluded that the fraudulent use provision did

not apply, the district court adopted the bankruptcy court's

rationale that Puerto Rico Telephone was responsible for cloning

because of its contractual obligation to operate and maintain the

cellular network and because of its actions in reimbursing sellers

for cloning losses. The court also upheld the bankruptcy court's

ruling that the 90-day filing window was unreasonable because

Puerto Rico Telephone could not "unilaterally condition its own

preexisting obligation" to assume responsibility for cloning.

Puerto Rico Telephone timely appealed.

We review the bankruptcy court's findings of fact for

clear error and its rulings of law de novo. Palmacci v. Umpierrez,

121 F.3d 781, 785 (1st Cir. 1997). In so doing, we provide "no

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particular deference" to the district court's conclusions. In re

Healthco Int'l, Inc., 132 F.3d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 1997).

The validity of Puerto Rico Telephone's proof of claim

rests primarily on the plain meaning of the relevant tariff, and so

we look to Puerto Rico law to guide our analysis. See Raleigh v.

Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000) ("The 'basic federal

rule' in bankruptcy is that state law governs the substance of

claims.") (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 57 (1979)).

Puerto Rico Telephone argues, as it has throughout this litigation,

that the tariff's fraudulent use provision unambiguously placed the

risk of loss from cloning on Advanced Cellular. As the parties

agree that the tariff binds them, we turn to consider this

provision.

The tariff provides that Advanced Cellular, as a

reseller, "shall be solely responsible for any . . . fraudulent

use, by any person, of any number or numbers assigned to" it.

Cloning is a form of "fraudulent use" as it involves a misstatement

by a third party that the party is an authorized user of a cellular

telephone number; cloning is conducted by "any person," cf.

DIRECTV, Inc. v. Budden, 420 F.3d 521, 528 (5th Cir. 2005)

(describing the phrase "any person" as broad); and cloning involves

the making of telephone calls by third parties impersonating

authorized users of "numbers assigned to" Advanced Cellular. Under

this plain reading of the fraudulent use provision, Advanced

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Cellular assumed responsibility for losses from cloning.

Advanced Cellular offers several unavailing arguments in

an attempt to undermine this straightforward reading of the

fraudulent use provision.3 First, it points out that its

relationship with Puerto Rico Telephone began in 1986, before

cloning had surfaced as a problem. Based on this fact, it argues

that the fraudulent use provision cannot be interpreted to reflect

an intent to assign responsibility for losses from cloning. While

it is true that the parties' initial agreement was signed in 1986,

the tariff was not filed until 1994, after cloning had emerged.

Moreover, even if the risk of cloning was unanticipated when the

tariff was adopted, Advanced Cellular agreed to broadly assume the

risk of all fraudulent use. If Advanced Cellular meant to agree to

assume a narrower risk, it was incumbent upon it, especially as a

sophisticated party, to make the limitation clear. See MBIA Ins.

Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) (where

sophisticated parties include broadly worded clauses in contracts,

courts will likely assume that they "said what they meant and meant

what they said").

Second, Advanced Cellular contends that the fraudulent

use provision was intended to apply only to fraud perpetrated by

"authorized users" of the cellular numbers assigned to it and

3
We reject Advanced Cellular's contention that Puerto Rico
Telephone waived reliance on the fraudulent use provision. The
argument was squarely raised in the bankruptcy and district courts.

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therefore does not cover cloning perpetrated by unauthorized third

parties. The fraudulent use provision does not, however, refer to

"authorized users" but rather to "any person," a term with a common

meaning broad enough to encompass fraud committed by third parties.

See Metlife Capital Corp. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 224 F.

Supp. 2d 374, 382 (D.P.R. 2002) (stating that under Puerto Rico law

contractual terms should generally be assigned their common

meanings). Indeed, the phrase "authorized user" appears in other

provisions of the tariff, which strongly suggests that this was not

the intended meaning of "any person" in the fraudulent use

provision.

Third, according to Advanced Cellular, the fraudulent use

provision was meant to apply only to losses from stolen cellular

telephones. This argument fails because the tariff contains a

specific provision directly related to stolen telephones.4 It is

well-established that courts should avoid interpretations that

render a provision of an agreement surplusage. See Restatement

(First) of Contracts § 236 (1932). To interpret the fraudulent use

provision to apply only to losses from stolen cellular telephones

would violate this principle because it would render the provision

directly related to the issue meaningless.

4
Under this provision, Advanced Cellular was responsible for
losses from stolen telephones until it informed Puerto Rico
Telephone of the loss.

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 Fourth, Advanced Cellular asserts that a provision in the

1986 agreement concerning Puerto Rico Telephone's responsibility

for maintaining the cellular network makes it liable for cloning.

The provision states, in relevant part, that Puerto Rico Telephone

is responsible for "mistakes, omissions, interruptions, delays,

errors or defects in transmission" that result from its failure "to

maintain proper standards of maintenance and operation" of the

cellular network. Through this provision, Puerto Rico Telephone

appears to have taken responsibility for technical problems in

service. Cloning by third parties is different in kind from these

sorts of difficulties, as it is the product of wrongful human

conduct, not a system malfunction. In any event, the network

maintenance provision does not specifically cover losses from

fraudulent use, and therefore, the provision that speaks directly

to this issue governs. See Bank v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 420, 427-28

(1st Cir. 1998).

Finally, Advanced Cellular relies on Puerto Rico

Telephone's policy of reimbursing timely cloning fraud claims from

resellers to argue that Puerto Rico Telephone was contractually

obligated to provide such reimbursements. It contends that this

evidence shows the parties' intent because Puerto Rico Telephone

would never have reimbursed such claims unless required to do so by

contract.

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 Under Puerto Rico law, "[i]f the terms of a contract are

clear and leave no doubt as to the intentions of the contracting

parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be observed."

P.R. Laws Ann. tit 31, § 3471. Consequently, a court may not

consider extrinsic evidence at all, if it finds that the terms of

an agreement are clear. Borschow Hosp. & Med. Supplies, Inc. v.

Cesar Castillo, Inc., 96 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1996); Vulcan Tools

of P.R. v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 23 F.3d 564, 567 (1st Cir. 1994).

An agreement is clear when it can "be understood in one sense

alone, without leaving any room for doubt, controversies or

difference of interpretation." See Catullo v. Metzner, 834 F.2d

1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1987) (internal citation omitted).

As discussed above, Advanced Cellular unambiguously

assumed the risk of losses from cloning through the tariff's

fraudulent use provision. Therefore, extrinsic evidence is not

admissible to assist in the interpretation of the provision.5 See

Mercado-Garcia v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 979 F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir.

1992). In a similar circumstance, we affirmed the exclusion of

extrinsic evidence of a party's attempt to accommodate the other by

not enforcing clear contractual terms. See Executive Leasing

Corp. v. Banco Popular de P.R., 48 F.3d 66, 69 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995).

5
Advanced Cellular argues only that Puerto Rico Telephone's
conduct in reimbursing cloning claims is relevant to interpreting
the contract. It does not argue that this conduct demonstrated a
modification or other alteration of the parties' agreement.

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We determined that, because the meaning of the contract at issue

was clear on its face, the party's subsequent conduct was not

admissible to alter the contract's unambiguous terms. Id. So too

here.6

In sum, the tariff's fraudulent use provision

unambiguously placed the risk of loss from cloning on Advanced

Cellular, and it was error to credit Advanced Cellular for the

cloning claims not reimbursed by Puerto Rico Telephone. We

therefore vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.7

So ordered.

6
Even were we to consider extrinsic evidence concerning Puerto
Rico Telephone's conduct in reimbursing cloning claims, we do not
think that it bears the weight placed upon it by the bankruptcy
court. There was evidence that cloning fraud was causing Puerto
Rico Telephone's resellers substantial financial difficulties.
Even though not contractually obligated to do so, it would not
"def[y] common sense" for Puerto Rico Telephone to assume losses
stemming from cloning in the hope of forestalling its resellers
from suffering crippling losses that could force them out of
business.
7
Puerto Rico Telephone argued in its brief that we should
decide the legal significance of an alleged admission by Advanced
Cellular that it owed Puerto Rico Telephone in excess of $700,000.
At oral argument, Puerto Rico Telephone conceded that this claim
had not been resolved by the bankruptcy court and therefore should
not be decided as part of this appeal. Puerto Rico Telephone may
pursue this argument on remand.

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