F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAY 6 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk
ROBERT A. RASCON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-2194
U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS,
INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
_______________________________
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Amicus Curiae.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-94-524-LH)
E. Justin Pennington (Loretta Medina on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
James E. Hautzinger (Heather Fox Vickles with him on the brief), Sherman &
Howard, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
C. Gregory Stewart, General Counsel; J. Ray Terry, Jr., Deputy General Counsel;
Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate General Counsel; Lorraine C. Davis,
Assistant General Counsel and Robert J. Gregory, Attorney, Washington, D.C., on
the brief for Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Before EBEL, McWILLIAMS, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Circuit Judge.
Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Mr.
Rascon on his claim arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995). U S West appeals, arguing that the district
court erred in various respects. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. FACTS
Mr. Rascon suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder, presumably as a
result of his service in Vietnam in 1968-69. This case arises from absenteeism
caused by his participation in an in-patient posttraumatic stress disorder treatment
program. While Mr. Rascon was participating in the program, U S West
terminated his employment.
In 1971, Mr. Rascon began working for U S West as a Network Technician
in Albuquerque. Although he received satisfactory to outstanding job
performance ratings, he had problems with anger and fighting in the workplace.
U S West suspended him eleven times and fired him three times due to fighting;
however, it reinstated him each time.
2
In the early 1980's, U S West sent Mr. Rascon to an in-house anger
management counseling program. A U S West Employee Assistance Counselor
advised him that he had posttraumatic stress disorder. Mr. Rascon's symptoms
included cluster headaches, insomnia, impaired ability to judge situations,
difficulty in concentrating and controlling intrusive memories, flashbacks, anger,
irritability, suspiciousness, hostility, and nightmares. In 1989, Mr. Rascon
attended a posttraumatic stress disorder counseling program through the
Albuquerque Veterans Administration (VA). This program involved individual
therapy and weekly group sessions. Dr. Jose Canive supervised Mr. Rascon’s
therapy at the VA.
In 1991, Mr. Rascon received paid disability leave from U S West in order
to attend a seven-week out-patient treatment program at the VA. U S West
allowed him to work part-time during this treatment program. After completing
the program, Mr. Rascon received additional leave in order to work half days for
a period of three months. Even with this treatment, Mr. Rascon’s posttraumatic
stress disorder symptoms persisted. Dr. Canive, therefore, recommended that Mr.
Rascon seek more intensive treatment from the National Center for Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder in Menlo Park, California. Dr. Canive submitted an application to
the Menlo Park program on behalf of Mr. Rascon.
3
On October 10, 1992, Mr. Rascon received notice that he would be granted
a screening interview for admission into the Menlo Park Program. On January 6,
1993, he informed his supervisor, Lorrie Sullivan, that he would be attending the
screening on January 21, 1993. He told Ms. Sullivan that he had posttraumatic
stress disorder, and he tried to explain to her what it was and why he was seeking
this type of treatment. When Ms. Sullivan became Mr. Rascon’s supervisor (two
months earlier), she did not know what posttraumatic disorder was. She testified
that in January, Mr. Rascon told her he had “this Vietnam syndrome.” Aplt’s
App. vol. IV at 463.
During the January 6th conversation, Mr. Rascon informed Ms. Sullivan
that the program could take anywhere from six weeks to nine months, but that a
four-month duration was likely. He requested a paid leave of absence under U S
West’s disability plan, but he told Ms. Sullivan that he wanted to participate in
the Menlo Park program regardless of whether U S West approved a paid
disability leave. The following day, Ms. Sullivan informed Mr. Rascon that U S
West’s Health Services Department needed further information in order to process
his request for leave. He stated that he did not wish to contact Health Services
and asked Ms. Sullivan to find out what information was needed.
On January 14, 1993 (Mr. Rascon’s last day at work), Mr. Rascon attended
a meeting with management and two union representatives. At that time, Ms.
4
Sullivan advised Mr. Rascon that U S West did not have enough information to
grant a paid disability leave but that U S West would grant unpaid departmental
leaves of absence, thirty days at a time, in order for him to attend the Menlo Park
program. During this meeting with Ms. Sullivan, Mr. Rascon requested that U S
West grant leave for the duration of his treatment, rather than in thirty-day
increments. He reminded her that the estimated duration was four months. Ms.
Sullivan denied this request. Ms. Sullivan did not discuss with Mr. Rascon
various options under U S West’s leave policies, including Personal Leave of
Absence or Anticipated Disability Leave.
Ms. Sullivan prepared a memorandum, memorializing various aspects of the
January 14th meeting. The memo, which Ms. Sullivan showed to Mr. Rascon
before he left for Menlo Park, reiterated that U S West would reauthorize
additional thirty-day leaves of absence as his treatment progressed, if he provided
adequate information to Health Services. The memo stated that “[i]t would be
best to provide authorization for Health Services to maintain contact and
information sharing with all providers involved in the examination and/or
treatment process. The best way to ensure that this process occurs smoothly is to
complete a release and waiver before absence occurs.” Id. vol. I at 75. The
memo stated that Mr. Rascon or his doctors must apprise Health Services on a
continuing basis that he was following recommended treatment in order for
5
Health Services to reauthorize thirty-day departmental leaves. It further stated
that because Mr. Rascon had not supplied Health Services with what it considered
sufficient information, U S West was denying paid leave.
After Ms. Sullivan showed Mr. Rascon the memo, he signed a release
authorizing U S West’s Health Services Department to maintain contact with his
health care providers and gain access to his medical records. Mr. Rascon
understood from Ms. Sullivan that signing the release was all that was required of
him in terms of U S West accessing information regarding his disability. Id. vol.
II at 86. Mr. Rascon signed two medical releases, one for the VA in
Albuquerque, and one for the Menlo Park program. Id. at 162. The releases were
valid for one year, unless revoked in writing.
The day after the meeting, just before Mr. Rascon left for Menlo Park, he
spoke with Cindy Truitt, a counselor in U S West’s Health Services Department in
Denver. The conversation lasted for approximately one hour. During the
conversation, Mr. Rascon explained his circumstances in detail to Ms. Truitt. Ms.
Truitt informed Mr. Rascon that it was important that his doctors remain in
contact with her. Ms. Truitt testified that she told Mr. Rascon a medical release
was not enough and that it would be necessary for his doctors to remain in contact
with her. Id. vol. V at 668.
6
Following this conversation, Dr. Canive and Ms. Truitt had a telephone
conversation about Mr. Rascon. Just after the conversation, and in response to it,
Dr. Canive mailed Ms. Truitt a letter providing the Health Services Department
with requested information. In his letter, Dr. Canive explained that Mr. Rascon
had been a patient in the posttraumatic stress disorder program at the VA in
Albuquerque. Dr. Canive noted that despite Mr. Rascon’s full cooperation in the
program, his “irritability, anger, suspiciousness, hostility, nightmares, intrusive
memories and insomnia continued to interfere with his daily living.” Id. vol. I at
167. Dr. Canive explained the reasons for his referral of Mr. Rascon to the Menlo
Park program. Dr. Canive stated that as a result of his posttraumatic stress
disorder, Mr. Rascon “has been severely impaired both at work and at home. The
fact that he continued to work in spite of his severe symptoms demonstrates his
high motivation and work ethic.” Id. at 168. Dr. Canive asked U S West to
reconsider Mr. Rascon’s case and grant him some disability income during his
treatment at Menlo Park. He closed his letter by inviting Ms. Truitt to contact
him if she needed further information. After Dr. Canive sent this letter to Ms.
Truitt in early February, nobody from U S West contacted him for more
information about Mr. Rascon. Id. vol. III at 252.
The Menlo Park treatment program admitted Mr. Rascon on January 21,
1993. Upon admission to the program, the doctors there diagnosed him with
7
posttraumatic stress disorder. His treatment in Menlo Park consisted of classes
and intensive group and individual therapy sessions seven days a week, from
approximately 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Mr. Rascon’s first thirty-day departmental leave ran from January 21, 1993
to February 21, 1993. In a letter dated March 10, 1993, U S West authorized a
second thirty-day departmental leave to run from February 22, 1993 to March 22,
1993. In that letter, Ms. Sullivan stated that “[t]he medical department of U S
West has been unable to certify any disability due to inadequate information from
your doctors.” Id. vol. I at 61. However, in addition to her February conversation
with Dr. Canive, in early March, Ms. Truitt spoke with Dr. Bernard Finley, Mr.
Rascon’s treating physician in Menlo Park. On March 4, 1993, Dr. Finley sent
Ms. Truitt a report about Mr. Rascon’s disability and treatment. Dr. Finley’s
report explained the reasons for Mr. Rascon’s admission to the program, the
nature of the therapy, and Dr. Finley’s prognosis. It estimated that Mr. Rascon
would need four months to complete the program. Dr. Finley’s report also noted
that Mr. Rascon “is working hard in treatment and has excellent motivation.” Id.
at 72. Dr. Finley opined that “[t]he outlook for [Mr. Rascon] is quite favorable
for a much improved adjustment at home and at work.” Id. He ended by thanking
Ms. Truitt “for any assistance you can give to this very deserving combat
veteran.” Id.
8
On April 9, 1993, Ms. Sullivan sent Mr. Rascon a letter stating that his
departmental leave had expired on March 22nd. The letter informed him that
Health Services still did not have enough information. The letter stated that if U
S West did not hear by April 23, 1993 that he continued to be receiving beneficial
care or continued to qualify for benefits, then his name would be removed from
the payroll. In effect, then, U S West granted a third thirty-day leave of absence,
from March 22nd to April 23rd.
At some time in April, Dr. Finley discussed with Mr. Rascon U S West’s
request for additional information. Mr. Rascon stated that he was afraid U S
West was “trying to get rid of him.” Id. at 116. He asked Dr. Finley not to send
U S West any further information; however, he did not revoke his medical release
in writing. On April 16th, Dr. Finley spoke with Ms. Truitt about Mr. Rascon.
Dr. Finley told Ms. Truitt that Mr. Rascon did not wish him to share any more
information with U S West. According to union representative Bill Spina, Mr.
Rascon's coworker, Mr. Rascon did not wish U S West to know every detail
regarding his disability and its treatment. Id. vol. IV at 478.
On May 14, 1993, U S West sent Mr. Rascon a letter explaining that it had
not received “information regarding your continuing participation in a program
from which you are benefitting.” Id. at 66. The letter stated that because the
information was not forthcoming, U S West could not grant another thirty-day
9
departmental leave. In the letter, U S West informed Mr. Rascon, for the first
time since he had requested leave in January, that he could apply for a personal
leave of up to twelve months. The letter informed him that a personal leave of
absence carried no guarantee of reinstatement. The letter went on to state that if
Mr. Rascon did not apply for a leave of absence by May 24th, U S West would
remove him from the payroll. In effect, then, U S West granted Mr. Rascon
another thirty-day leave, from April 23rd to May 24th.
Mr. Rascon did not apply for personal leave. U S West notified Mr. Rascon
of his termination effective June 7, 1993. The termination letter stated “we are
unable to grant you another 30 day departmental leave of absence.” Id. at 68. At
the time of his termination, Mr. Rascon had four weeks of unused vacation. The
termination letter stated that a check would be mailed to Mr. Rascon’s residence
for this unused vacation.
Each of the letters that U S West sent to Mr. Rascon was sent by certified
mail to his residence and to the treatment facility in Menlo Park. It is disputed
whether Mr. Rascon actually received the letters; however, he was aware of at
least some of them through his conversations with Dr. Finley, who received
copies of the letters. It is undisputed that neither Mr. Rascon nor his wife
communicated directly with U S West while he was in the treatment program.
10
Mr. Rascon was released from the Menlo Park program on June 17, 1993.
Dr. Canive testified that upon Mr. Rascon’s return from Menlo Park, “his
symptoms were improved and he felt content and happy, and he thought that he
had accomplished something.” Id. vol. III at 256. However, the improvement
that Mr. Rascon made as a result of the program gradually diminished. The
financial difficulties and stress of unemployment exacerbated Mr. Rascon’s
posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. Id. at 256-57.
U S West’s sickness and accident disability plan informed employees of the
option of applying for social security benefits, which “are in addition to your
benefits” under U S West’s disability plan. Aple’s Supp. App. at 76. While he
was a patient in the Menlo Park program, Mr. Rascon met with financial
difficulties because he was on unpaid leave. Another veteran at the hospital
suggested he contact the Social Security Administration for assistance. Mr.
Rascon applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. In his
application, he stated that he was totally disabled and unable to work. Mr.
Rascon testified that upon completion of his treatment, he intended to relinquish
his benefits and return to work. Aplt’s App. vol. II at 113.
The Social Security Administration initially denied his application;
however, it subsequently found Mr. Rascon disabled and awarded him benefits on
December 19, 1993, six months after he was terminated from U S West. The
11
Administration found Mr. Rascon disabled as of January 21, 1993, the date of his
admission to the Menlo Park program. Mr. Rascon continued to receive social
security disability benefits at the time of trial.
II. DISCUSSION
U S West presents five issues on appeal. U S West argues that the district
court erred in: 1) refusing to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar Mr.
Rascon’s ADA claim based on statements he had made in connection with his
application for social security disability benefits; 2) finding that Mr. Rascon had
established a prima facie case of disability discrimination; 3) finding that Mr.
Rascon’s requested leave of absence was a reasonable accommodation; 4) finding
that Mr. Rascon provided his employer with sufficient information regarding his
disability and its treatment; and 5) awarding compensatory damages based on a
finding of intentional discrimination.
We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
conclusions of law de novo. Estate of Holl v. C.I.R., 54 F.3d 648, 650 (10th Cir.
1995). When an issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, we use either
the “clearly erroneous” or the “de novo” standard, “depending on whether the
mixed question involves primarily a factual inquiry or the consideration of legal
principles.” Id. The issue of the application of judicial estoppel presents a legal
12
question, and the remaining issues present mixed questions of law and fact, which
we will delineate as we discuss them.
A. The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not bar Mr. Rascon’s ADA
claim.
“Judicial estoppel bars a party from adopting inconsistent positions in the
same or related litigation.” United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387,
390 (10th Cir. 1986). U S West argues that because Mr. Rascon, in his social
security application, took a position that U S West views as directly adverse to the
position he now takes in his ADA claim, his lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of
judicial estoppel. We rejected the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Parkinson v.
California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 437-38 (10th Cir. 1956). We again refused to apply
the doctrine in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509,
1520 n.10 (10th Cir. 1991). Recently we stated that "[w]e wish to make clear that
under the law of this circuit, [an ADA plaintiff] is not judicially estopped from . .
. making claims that are inconsistent with his prior representations to the [Social
Security Administration] . . . . The precise impact, if any, of prior SSA
representations on a plaintiff's ADA claim is still an open question in this circuit
and one that we do not decide today." Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., ____ F.3d
____, No. 96-3018, 1998 WL 110011, at *6 (10th Cir. March 13, 1998). The
district court noted that the doctrine of judicial estoppel has been rejected in this
13
circuit, and, therefore, refused to apply the doctrine to bar Mr. Rascon’s claim. 1
Aplt’s App. vol. I at 54. On appeal, U S West invites us to adopt judicial
estoppel where an ADA plaintiff has applied for or received disability benefits,
but we decline.
In order to prove discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that
he or she is “a qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The
ADA defines a qualified individual with a disability as one “who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the [job].” 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8). By contrast, in order to secure social security disability
benefits, an applicant must prove that he or she is disabled and unable to work.
See 42 U.S.C. § 416(i). Thus, on the surface, it appears that a claim of inability
to work is inconsistent with a claim of ability to perform the essential functions of
a job.
Other circuits are divided on whether judicial estoppel should be adopted in
this context. However, the circuits do not align themselves on either side of a
neatly drawn line; rather, the varying approaches to the issue lie along a
continuum. At one end of the continuum is McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91
We note that various district courts in this circuit have applied the doctrine of
1
judicial estoppel in this context. See, e.g., Cline v. Western Horseman, Inc., 922 F. Supp.
442, 446-49 (D. Colo. 1996); Nguyen v. IBP, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 1471, 1484-85 (D. Kan.
1995).
14
F.3d 610, 618-20 (3d Cir. 1996), upon which U S West relies. The McNemar
court held that a plaintiff with AIDS who claimed an inability to work for
purposes of collecting disability benefits was estopped from arguing that he is a
“qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA. However, a subsequent
Third Circuit panel has noted that “McNemar has been the object of considerable
criticism” because of its failure to take into consideration the differing purposes
of the Social Security Act and the ADA. Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126
F.3d 494, 502 (3d Cir. 1997).
One of the purposes of the Social Security Act is to provide income support
to an individual who is unable to work, perhaps temporarily, because of a
disabling condition. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381. One of the purposes of the ADA is to
provide an opportunity for an individual to work in spite of a disabling condition,
by requiring accommodation and by eliminating discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(8) (“[T]he Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities
are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for [individuals with disabilities].”); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b)(1) (“It is the purpose of [the ADA] to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”) Thus, the ADA takes into consideration whether
an individual with a disability can work given reasonable accommodation. See
15
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). The Social Security Act, on the other
hand, does not take into consideration whether an accommodation would render
the individual able to perform a job. Therefore, a statement that a person is
disabled for purposes of obtaining social security disability benefits--a
determination made without regard to accommodation--is not necessarily
inconsistent with a statement that a person has been discriminated against in the
workplace on the basis of her disability--a determination made only after giving
due regard to accommodation.
Despite McNemar’s shortcomings, at least one circuit has indicated a
willingness to adopt the Third Circuit’s approach, albeit not applying the doctrine
of judicial estoppel per se. See Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-
82 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding, without applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel,
that the plaintiff, who made sworn statements of total disability in a social
security disability application and then testified at her deposition that she was not
totally disabled, failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she
was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA); see
also Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying
judicial estoppel in an age discrimination case, but specifically stating that the
applicability of judicial estoppel to ADA cases will be “left for another day”).
16
Farther along the continuum lies the Fifth Circuit’s pronouncement on this
issue. In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 518 (5th
Cir. 1997), the court held “that the application for or the receipt of social security
disability benefits creates a rebuttable presumption that the claimant or recipient
of such benefits is judicially estopped from asserting that he is a ‘qualified
individual with a disability.’” The court acknowledged, however, that a person
may simultaneously be a person with a disability under the Social Security Act,
and also a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. Id. In such a
case, the presumption would be rebutted. Id.
At the other end of the continuum from the Third Circuit's decision in
McNemar is the D.C. Circuit’s approach. In Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority, 116 F.3d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the D.C. Circuit
pointed out McNemar’s failure to address the differing purposes of the Social
Security Act and the ADA. The Swanks court was faced with the issue of
“whether appellant, alleging he was fired due to his disability, is barred from
seeking relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act because he receives
Social Security disability benefits.” Id. at 583. The court, focusing on the
fundamental differences between the Social Security Act and the ADA, stated “in
assessing eligibility for disability benefits, the Social Security Administration
gives no consideration to a claimant’s ability to work with reasonable
17
accommodation.” Id. at 584. The court held that “receipt of Social Security
disability benefits does not preclude ADA relief.” Id. at 583. A holding to the
contrary “would force disabled individuals into an ‘untenable’ choice between
receiving immediate subsistence benefits under the Social Security Act or
pursuing discrimination remedies. Forcing such a choice would undermine the
pro-employment and anti-discrimination purposes of the two statutes . . . .
Nothing in either statute requires disabled individuals to make this choice.” Id. at
586.
The D.C. Circuit was careful to point out that a claimant’s statement in
support of a social security disability claim may still be relevant in an ADA suit.
Id. at 587. The court cited the example of a claimant who represents to the Social
Security Administration that he or she is unable to perform the essential functions
of a job even with reasonable accommodation. Id. Such an individual, the court
stated, could well be barred from asserting a claim under the ADA. Id.
Besides the D.C. Circuit, several other circuits have rejected the doctrine of
judicial estoppel in this context. See Johnson v. Oregon, No. 96-36191, 1998 WL
181297, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 1998) ("[N]either application for nor receipt of
disability benefits automatically bars a claimant from establishing that she is a
qualified person with a disability under the ADA."); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc, 135 F.3d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1998) (“'We agree with the D.C. Circuit’s
18
opinion in [Swanks], that holds that the receipt of disability benefits does not
preclude subsequent ADA relief and rejects the doctrine of judicial estoppel, but
does allow the consideration of prior sworn statements by the parties as a material
factor.'” (quoting Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int’l, Inc., 123 F.3d 916, 917 (6th Cir.
1997))); Talavera v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 129 F.3d 1214, 1220
(11th Cir. 1997) (“We agree with the majority of our sister circuits that a
certification of total disability on an SSD benefits application is not inherently
inconsistent with being a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ under the
ADA.”); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 1997) (“the Social
Security Administration’s decision to grant disability benefits to [the plaintiff] is
not determinative as to whether or not she may be considered a ‘qualified
individual’ under the ADA”). 2
After considering the varying views of other circuits, we adhere to
Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 432, 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d at 390, and Chrysler
Credit Corp., 928 F.2d at 1520 n.10, which signaled our refusal to adopt the
doctrine of judicial estoppel. We join the majority of circuits and hold that
statements made in connection with an application for social security disability
benefits cannot be an automatic bar to a disability discrimination claim under the
2
The Eighth Circuit has declared that it has not yet “firmly entrenched itself within
any of the camps of divergent opinions on this issue.” Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124
F.3d 957, 962 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997).
19
ADA. Such statements may, however, constitute evidence relevant to a
determination of whether the plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disability.”
Because Mr. Rascon was on unpaid leave while he was in the Menlo Park
program, he contacted the Social Security Administration for assistance with his
financial difficulties. U S West argues that in connection with his application for
disability benefits, Mr. Rascon stated that he did not plan ever to return to work.
Regardless of what may have been Mr. Rascon’s intentions at one time, there is
no evidence that in connection with his application for disability benefits, Mr.
Rascon indicated that he could not perform the essential functions of his job with
reasonable accommodation. There is, however, evidence that he did, indeed, want
to and expect to return to his job after completing the treatment program. Aplt’s
App. vol. II at 113. There is also testimony from Dr. Canive that Mr. Rascon
would have been able to return to his job had U S West not terminated him.
Aplt’s App. vol. III at 250-51.
Mr. Rascon was committed to an intensive in-patient treatment program. U
S West denied the accommodation that he requested--paid leave to participate in
this program. Therefore, he sought income support via social security disability
benefits. There is nothing inconsistent in Mr. Rascon applying for disability
benefits after having his reasonable accommodation denied. See D’Aprile v.
Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[The plaintiff’s] contention, that
20
she was unable to work because her employer refused to permit a temporary part-
time schedule, is entirely consistent with her claim to have been ‘totally disabled’
within the meaning of the [company’s disability] policy”). In fact, U S West’s
company policy included a statement notifying employees of the option of
applying for social security benefits during periods of disability. Aple’s Supp.
App. at 76.
Nothing in Mr. Rascon’s application for disability benefits precludes a
finding that he was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of
the ADA. Moreover, this court has repeatedly refused to adopt the doctrine of
judicial estoppel. Thus, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that
statements Mr. Rascon made in his social security disability application do not bar
relief under the ADA.
B. Mr. Rascon established a prima facie case of disability
discrimination.
In order to establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must
prove: “(1) that he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that
he is qualified, that is, with or without reasonable accommodation (which he must
describe), he is able to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) that the
employer terminated him because of his disability.” White v. York Int’l Corp., 45
F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1995).
21
U S West argues that even if this court does not adopt judicial estoppel, the
court should nonetheless find that Mr. Rascon failed to establish a prima facie
case of disability discrimination as a matter of law. U S West contends that Mr.
Rascon failed to establish the second element of his prima facie case--that he
could perform the essential functions of his job--because his sworn statements in
his social security application indicate that he could not work. This argument
essentially rehashes U S West’s judicial estoppel argument, which we have
already rejected. We have considered the statements in Mr. Rascon’s social
security application which are relevant to his ADA claim, and we have found that
they do not bar relief under the ADA. The fact that Mr. Rascon was unable to
work and in need of financial assistance while he was receiving long-term care in
Menlo Park simply does not preclude a finding that he is a qualified individual
with a disability.
The district court found that Mr. Rascon was able to perform the essential
functions of his job “with reasonable accommodation of his need for
[posttraumatic stress disorder] counseling and treatment.” Aplt’s App. vol. I at
35. The question of whether Mr. Rascon was able to perform the essential
functions of his job is a mixed question of law and fact involving primarily a
factual inquiry. Thus, we review this finding for clear error. There are various
pieces of evidence in the record that support such a finding. Dr. Canive, Mr.
22
Rascon’s treating psychiatrist, noted that despite the treatment Mr. Rascon
received at the Albuquerque VA, Mr. Rascon was still having significant
difficulty controlling his symptoms. Nonetheless, Mr. Rascon was able to
continue working at U S West. Dr. Canive opined that Mr. Rascon’s ability to
work in spite of severe posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms was due to his
motivation and work ethic. Because of Mr. Rascon’s continuing symptoms, Dr.
Canive recommended long-term in-patient treatment for Mr. Rascon’s condition.
Upon completion of the treatment, Mr. Rascon’s condition had improved. In Dr.
Canive’s opinion, Mr. Rascon could have returned to his job at U S West upon
release from the Menlo Park program.
In addition to Dr. Canive’s opinion, Dr. Finley’s report indicated that Mr.
Rascon’s prognosis was good and that he could expect an improvement in his
work life once he had completed treatment. While there is evidence in the record
that Mr. Rascon was having emotional difficulties at work, U S West has not
pointed to any evidence in the record which would tend to prove that Mr. Rascon
could not perform the essential functions of a Network Technician. We cannot
say that the district court erred in finding that Mr. Rascon was able to perform the
essential functions of his job with reasonable accommodation. As to the other
elements of a plaintiff’s prima facie case, U S West does not raise an argument
with respect to the first element, i.e. whether Mr. Rascon has a disability. As to
23
the third element, i.e. whether U S West discriminated against Mr. Rascon on the
basis of his disability, we shall discuss that below.
C. Mr. Rascon’s requested leave of absence was a reasonable
accommodation.
The district court concluded that the leave of absence Mr. Rascon requested
was a reasonable accommodation. Aplt’s App. vol. I at 41-42. U S West argues
that the district court erred in so concluding. This is a mixed question of law and
fact which primarily involves the consideration of legal principles. Thus, we
review the district court's conclusion de novo.
U S West frames the issue as whether attendance is an essential function of
Mr. Rascon’s job. Aplt's Brief at 29. That simply is not the relevant inquiry
when a reasonable accommodation of disability leave is at issue. Under these
circumstances, the question of whether attendance is an essential function is
equivalent to the question of what kind of leave policy the company has. As we
shall discuss, U S West’s own policies offer various kinds of disability leave,
both paid and unpaid.
“Under the ADA, prohibited discrimination includes failure to make
‘reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability.’” Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian
Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
24
12112(b)(5)(A)). An allowance of time for medical care or treatment may
constitute a reasonable accommodation. Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996). However, an indefinite unpaid leave
is not a reasonable accommodation where the plaintiff fails to present evidence of
the expected duration of her impairment. Id.; see also Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d
278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that “reasonable accommodation does not
require the [employer] to wait indefinitely for [the plaintiff’s] medical conditions
to be corrected”). The Hudson court noted that “[e]xamples of possible
accommodations include ‘permitting the use of accrued paid leave or providing
additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment.’” Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1168
(quoting 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, Appendix to Part 1630--Interpretive Guidance to
Title I of the ADA, § 1630.2(o)). The plaintiff in Hudson failed to present
evidence of the expected duration of her impairment, a course of treatment, or a
prognosis; therefore, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
employer.
Hudson is distinguishable from the case at bar. Before Mr. Rascon left for
Menlo Park, he told Ms. Sullivan that the expected duration of his treatment was
estimated at four months. In early March, Dr. Truitt received a report from Dr.
Finley indicating that Mr. Rascon needed approximately four months to complete
the program. In actuality, Mr. Rascon was a patient in the Menlo Park program
25
for a little less than five months. Furthermore, U S West was aware of the nature
of Mr. Rascon’s course of treatment, and U S West was aware of why Mr. Rascon
was undergoing this treatment. Finally, the prognosis from Mr. Rascon’s doctors
was good. His doctors thought that the program was very likely to improve Mr.
Rascon’s work and home life by assisting him to cope with his posttraumatic
stress disorder.
An employer need not make a reasonable accommodation that would cause
"an undue hardship." Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1087
(10th Cir. 1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(A)). “The employer . . . bears
the burden of persuasion on whether a proposed accommodation would impose an
undue hardship.” Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 866 (6th Cir. 1997).
“Undue hardship” means “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense”
when considered in light of various factors. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). The
factors to be considered in determining whether an accommodation would cause
an employer undue hardship are, among others: the nature and cost of the
accommodation; the number of persons employed by the company; the financial
resources of the company; and the impact of the accommodation upon the
operation of the company. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B). U S West contends that
the leave which it did grant Mr. Rascon was an extraordinary accommodation and
that it met with difficulties because other employees had to cover Mr. Rascon’s
26
responsibilities. Although U S West characterizes the departmental leaves as
“extraordinary,” in actuality, these leaves of absence were less accommodating
than company policy required, and the corresponding conditions U S West
attached to the leaves of absence were more restrictive than company policy
allowed.
When U S West granted Mr. Rascon back-to-back departmental leaves in
increments of thirty days conditioned on receiving information from Mr. Rascon’s
doctors, it was not following its own policies. Under U S West’s leave policy, an
informal departmental leave of less than thirty days could have been granted by
Ms. Sullivan alone without any approval from U S West’s Health Benefits
Committee. Aplt’s App. vol. III at 368. Furthermore, a departmental leave does
not require validation; that is, an employee is not required to give an explanation
to U S West as to why he or she needs the leave. Aplt’s App. vol. IV at 389.
When an employee requests more than thirty days' leave, as Mr. Rascon did,
then more formal extended leave periods are available. U S West’s Anticipated
Disability Leave of Absence provided for up to six months of unpaid leave with
guaranteed reinstatement. The employee must apply for this leave thirty days in
advance; however, the policy provides that an employee may use vacation time
while waiting on a pending application. The only validation required is that the
27
employee provide U S West a doctor’s statement as proof of a “planned medical
treatment.” Aple’s Supp. App. at 53.
Another option available under U S West’s leave policy is a Personal Leave
of Absence. This option provides for up to twelve months of leave. When
requesting personal leave, an employee does not need to share with U S West the
reasons for the leave. A personal leave comes with no compensation and no
guarantee of reinstatement. Aple's Supp. App. at 60.
U S West also had in place, at the time that Mr. Rascon requested an
accommodation of leave, a sickness and accident disability plan. Under this
policy, because of Mr. Rascon’s seniority with the company, U S West was
required to pay Mr. Rascon’s full salary for a period of thirty-nine weeks and fifty
percent of his salary for an additional thirteen weeks. Id. at 72. In order to be
eligible for this paid disability leave, Mr. Rascon was required to report his
disability to his supervisor, place himself under a physician’s care, follow the
recommended treatment, and furnish satisfactory medical certification. Id. at 73.
Thus, Ms. Sullivan was not following U S West's generous leave policy
when she informed Mr. Rascon that she could not grant him a departmental leave
because he had not provided Health Services with the appropriate information.
Ms. Sullivan clearly had the authority to grant a departmental leave on her own
without any explanation from Mr. Rascon. Furthermore, aside from departmental
28
leave, there were various other more appropriate and accommodating options
which Ms. Sullivan could have explored with Mr. Rascon, including paid
disability benefits or an unpaid anticipated disability leave. Ms. Sullivan testified
that the reason she did not explore alternatives was because Mr. Rascon did not
request a particular kind of leave. Aplt’s App. vol. III at 375. However, there is
no dispute that Mr. Rascon stated to Ms. Sullivan that even if U S West denied
paid disability leave, he wanted to attend the treatment program in Menlo Park.
Mr. Rascon was determined to seek treatment even if it meant that U S West
would not pay him during his absence. Any of the alternatives discussed above
would have constituted a reasonable accommodation.
There was no evidence presented to the district court as to U S West’s
overall financial resources. Aplt’s App. vol. I at 50. However, U S West is a
global operation with 50,000 to 60,000 employees. Id. Furthermore, U S West
did not replace Mr. Rascon while he was in Menlo Park, even when it claimed it
could no longer grant departmental leaves that came with guaranteed
reinstatement. Id. Under the circumstances, the fact that Mr. Rascon’s duties
were covered by co-workers while he was on leave does not establish that
granting Mr. Rascon leave until he completed the treatment program would have
caused U S West undue hardship. U S West failed to carry its burden of
demonstrating that any of the alternative accommodations would have caused it
29
undue hardship. Thus, we conclude that leave to attend the Menlo Park treatment
program was a reasonable accommodation.
D. Mr. Rascon provided U S West with sufficient information
regarding his disability.
The question of whether Mr. Rascon provided U S West with sufficient
information about his disability and its treatment is a question of fact, namely,
what information did U S West require, according to its policy, in order to grant
leave to an employee. Thus, we review the district court's determination for clear
error. We have already discussed at length the course of events that took place in
this case. Briefly, we reiterate that Mr. Rascon himself made contact with his
supervisor, Ms. Sullivan, and with Ms. Truitt in Health Services before he left for
Menlo Park. With both of them, he discussed in detail his disability and his need
for treatment. When U S West denied paid disability leave, he asked Ms. Sullivan
for an unpaid leave to attend the entire treatment program. Before he left for
Menlo Park, Mr. Rascon signed two medical releases, one for Dr. Canive and one
for Dr. Finley.
As we discussed above, in order to be eligible for paid disability leave, Mr.
Rascon was required to report his disability to his supervisor, place himself under
a physician’s care, follow the recommended treatment, and furnish satisfactory
medical certification to U S West. Both of Mr. Rascon’s doctors, Dr. Canive and
30
Dr. Finley, provided U S West, at various times before and during Mr. Rascon’s
treatment in Menlo Park, information regarding Mr. Rascon’s disability, his
course of treatment, his prognosis, and the expected duration of his treatment.
Although there is evidence that Mr. Rascon intended to revoke his medical
release, he did not, in fact, do so.
Moreover, as we have discussed above, various leave options available
under U S West’s policy did not require an employee to share any information
whatsoever with U S West. Another option, anticipated disability leave, required
that the employee provide U S West with a doctor’s statement as proof of a
“planned medical treatment.” Aple's Supp. App. at 53. The information provided
by either Dr. Canive or Dr. Finley would appear to satisfy this condition.
Considering the evidence adduced at trial, we cannot say that the district court’s
finding that Mr. Rascon provided U S West sufficient information concerning his
disability and treatment was clearly erroneous.
E. The district court did not err in awarding compensatory damages.
In a case of “unlawful intentional discrimination,” a court may award the
plaintiff compensatory damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. A finding of intentional
discrimination is a finding of fact, which we review for clear error. Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). “We must give great
31
deference to the factual determinations of the original finder of fact, who has the
exclusive ability to assess the demeanor and the tone of the witness’ testimony.”
Thompson v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 811 F.2d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir. 1987).
In ADA cases where a discriminatory practice involves the provision of a
reasonable accommodation, compensatory damages may not be awarded where the
employer “demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with
the disability who has informed the [employer] that accommodation is needed, to
identify and make a reasonable accommodation that would provide such
individual with an equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue
hardship on the operation of the business.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3). U S West
claims that the district court erred in finding that it did not make a good faith
effort to accommodate Mr. Rascon’s disability.
U S West argues that it had accommodated Mr. Rascon’s disability in the
past, when it provided anger management counseling to Mr. Rascon and when it
granted him leave to attend the out-patient treatment program in Albuquerque.
However, what is at issue in this case is Mr. Rascon’s request for an
accommodation to attend an intensive treatment program for his disability when
prior treatment proved ineffective. The district court did not err when it found a
lack of good faith efforts on the part of U S West.
32
U S West claims that it would have granted Mr. Rascon unpaid
departmental leave to attend the entire Menlo Park program had Mr. Rascon
complied with its requests for additional information. However, we do not find
clearly erroneous the district court's findings that Mr. Rascon provided U S West
with minimally sufficient information regarding his disability and its treatment or
that U S West failed to comply with its own disability and leave policies because
validation and explanations were not even required for Ms. Sullivan to grant a
departmental leave.
Taking all of this into consideration, the district court found that U S
West’s explanation as to why it did not grant Mr. Rascon leave--lack of
information--was, in reality, a pretext for discrimination. Aplt’s App. vol. I at 53.
Thus, the court found that U S West intentionally discriminated against Mr.
Rascon on the basis of his disability. Aplt’s App. vol. I at 44. After having
carefully examined the evidence before the district court, we are not left "'with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed'" in its finding
of intentional discrimination. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573 (quoting United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
33
III. CONCLUSION
In summary, the district court correctly refused to apply the doctrine of
judicial estoppel. The district court did not err in concluding that Mr. Rascon
established a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. We agree with
the district court's legal conclusion that Mr. Rascon's requested accommodation, a
leave of absence to attend the treatment program in Menlo Park, was reasonable
and would not have caused U S West undue hardship. The court did not clearly
err in finding that Mr. Rascon provided U S West sufficient information regarding
his disability and its treatment, to the extent that information was even necessary,
for U S West to grant Mr. Rascon either paid or unpaid leave. Neither did the
court err in finding that U S West’s stated reason for denying Mr. Rascon leave
and for terminating him was a pretext for discrimination. Finally, the district
court’s award of compensatory damages for U S West’s intentional discrimination
was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
34