Robertson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh

Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED APRIL 9, 2002

WARREN M. ROBERTSON, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 116276

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

MARKMAN, J.

In this worker’s compensation case, we must determine

whether the Court of Appeals properly vacated the Worker’s

Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) order affirming the

magistrate’s decision denying worker’s compensation benefits.

In part, the magistrate considered plaintiff’s perceptions of

an actual work event in deciding whether plaintiff had

established a compensable mental disability injury under MCL

418.301(2). The Court of Appeals determined that such

considerations by the magistrate were irrelevant to a mental

disability analysis. We vacate the Court of Appeals order and

remand this matter to the magistrate for analysis under the

statutory framework as set forth below.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff began working for defendant employer in 1973,

working at various auto assembly plant locations. In 1984, he

began working at defendant’s Sterling Heights Assembly Plant.

Plaintiff worked on the assembly line in the paint department

on what he described as the “sealer deck or decking job.”

Because plaintiff was also artistically talented, he was

placed in the Product Quality Improvement Partnership (PQIP)

department and given the position of “artist.”

In the early part of 1994, plaintiff was assigned a new

supervisor, George Asher. According to plaintiff, Asher began

“needling” plaintiff to use his artistic abilities and “redo”

some paintings on Asher’s boat. Plaintiff stated that he told

Asher that he would do the work on his own time at his home.

However, according to plaintiff, Asher insisted that it be

done on company time. Plaintiff refused to do this.

Later that year, plaintiff, on his own time, worked on a

personal project for another executive employed by defendant.

Plaintiff completed this project for this executive before a

1995 New Year’s Eve party. According to plaintiff, that is

when “things got out of hand” with Asher. Plaintiff stated

that in February 1995, Asher disciplined plaintiff for having

improperly taken a personal day off two months earlier.

Several days later, plaintiff and a fellow employee, Al Sipes,

were called into Asher’s office. Asher informed the two men

that they would no longer be working in the PQIP department,

and that they were to return to their previous designated

positions. Plaintiff stated that he then “lost it.”

Specifically, plaintiff admitted that he and Asher exchanged

harsh words. Asher claimed that plaintiff backed him into a

corner with a 2 x 2 piece of wood and threatened him and his

family. Plaintiff left work following this incident.

Later that evening, plaintiff’s wife called the plant

manager, Frank Slaughter, to inquire into these events.

Slaughter informed plaintiff’s wife that the PQIP department

had been discontinued and that plaintiff had been asked to

return to his previous position. Slaughter further requested

that plaintiff’s wife have plaintiff return to work the

following Monday morning. However, when plaintiff returned to

work, he was escorted from the building. Plaintiff had been

given a five-day suspension for using abusive language and

disorderly conduct.

Plaintiff later stated that he then went “out of control”

and “would probably have killed someone” if he had not

received help. He admitted himself to an in-patient mental

health facility that same day, and remained in the facility

for about six weeks. Upon release, he continued receiving

psychiatric treatment, and never returned to work. In August

1995, plaintiff filed a claim for worker’s compensation

benefits.

At the hearing on plaintiff’s claim, he testified with

regard to several precipitating factors for his

hospitalization including: “Chrysler Commercial Art Supervisor

wanted me to do work on his boat on company time. I refused

and now I’m in trouble at work. I’m very depressed” and “I

worked hard to get the status and overnight this individual

[Mr. Asher] wiped it out.” Additionally, Dr. Dabbagh,

plaintiff’s mental health provider, concluded that the

conflict between defendant and Mr. Asher was the pivotal

reason for plaintiff’s depression and anger. In part, Dr.

Dabbagh stated that

there was a conflict between him and the

supervisor, and for that reason, he was removed

from his job and put on the line after about

eighteen [years], if I recall, from working on that

job, and that’s what really basically has

precipitated his episode of depression and anger.

Slaughter testified that plaintiff’s transfer from PQIP

to his previous position was the result of the department

having been shut down. Specifically, he stated that in late

1994 and early 1995, new car launches at defendant company

were going poorly. To compound this problem, employees were

working considerable overtime and there were significant

equipment problems. Thus, costs were high. To solve this

problem, defendant reduced overtime and cut “nonstandard”

positions. Plaintiff’s position was “nonstandard”; thus, he

was returned to his prior position. Slaughter asserted that

this decision was his own and that he did not consult with

Asher, who confirmed that he had not been consulted about

plaintiff’s transfer.

The worker’s compensation magistrate determined that

plaintiff “failed to establish that he is or was disabled as

defined by the act.” According to the magistrate, the

evidence showed that “any conflict between George Asher and

plaintiff was clearly the product of plaintiff’s expansive

mind and is a misperception.” The magistrate further stated

that the “credible” testimony of defendant’s witnesses

indicated that there had been no retaliatory intent behind

plaintiff’s reassignment, but instead that it represented a

“simple economic business decision by upper management.”

Because the actual event of plaintiff’s reassignment to the

assembly line could not be “seen as significantly contributing

to, aggravating, or accelerating plaintiff’s mental

disability,” the magistrate concluded that plaintiff had

failed to establish that he was disabled as defined by the

act. Upon review, the WCAC stated that the job transfer had

been the only actual event, and that there was no evidence of

any animus on Asher’s part directed toward plaintiff. Thus,

the WCAC affirmed the magistrate’s decision.

The Court of Appeals vacated the decision of the WCAC and

remanded the case to the magistrate. Robertson v Chrysler

Corp, unpublished order, entered January 11, 2000 (Docket No.

222363). The Court stated that the magistrate’s decision that

the actual work event did not significantly contribute to or

aggravate plaintiff’s mental disability was erroneous because

it “appears to have been influenced by his findings that the

plaintiff misperceived the reason for the reassignment, and

that the reassignment was the result of business

considerations and was not retaliatory.” In the view of the

Court of Appeals, “whether plaintiff correctly or incorrectly

perceived or interpreted the events at work is irrelevant, as

is the existence of a legitimate business reason for the

reassignment.” While such a conclusion is consistent with a

previous decision of this Court, we believe that decision

wrongly interpreted Michigan law and must be overruled.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a worker’s compensation claimant’s perceptions of

actual events of employment are to be considered in deciding

whether a claimant has established a compensable mental

disability under MCL 418.301(2) is a matter of statutory

interpretation. Matters of statutory interpretation are

questions of law. In re MCI Telecom, 460 Mich 396, 413; 516

NW2d 164 (1999). This Court reviews questions of law under a

de novo standard of review. DiBenedetto v West Shore

Hospital, 461 Mich 394, 401; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).

III. DISCUSSION

A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW

From its inception in 1912, Michigan’s worker’s

compensation system has provided benefits for employees who

are injured in the course of their employment. The initial

worker’s compensation act, however, did not expressly provide

compensation for employees who suffered mental disabilities.1

Despite this, our Court determined that coverage existed for

mental disability injuries because such injuries were merely

a variant of personal injury within the scope of the act.

See, e.g., Klein v Len H Darling Co, 217 Mich 485; 187 NW 400

(1922).2 Thus, if the mental disability arose out of, and in

The initial version of the worker’s compensation

statute, compiled at 1915 CL 5431, provided in part:

If an employee . . . receives a personal

injury arising out of and in the course of his

employment by an employer . . . , he shall be paid

compensation in the manner and to the extent

hereinafter provided . . . .

Prior to Klein, this Court decided LaVeck v Parke,

Davis & Co, 190 Mich 604; 157 NW 72 (1916), and Schroetke v

Jackson-Church Co, 193 Mich 616; 160 NW 383 (1916), two cases

(continued...)

the course of, an employee’s employment, that employee would

be covered under the act.

This can first be seen in Klein where the employee died

as a result of severe emotional shock experienced after he

accidentally dropped a radiator on the head of a co-worker.

Id. at 487. The decedent believed, erroneously, that he had

killed the other worker, and this belief caused him such

mental strain that he lapsed into delirium and died. Id. at

488. This Court held that the shock received by the decedent

from witnessing this injury constituted an accidental personal

injury within the meaning of the worker’s compensation act and

2
(...continued)

that have sometimes been categorized as mental disability

cases. See Joseph, Causation in workers’ compensation mental

disability cases: The Michigan experience, 27 Wayne L R 1079,

1095 (1981). However, upon review, it appears that these

cases may be better viewed as physical disability cases. In

La Veck, the claimant suffered a cerebral hemorrhage resulting

in paralysis of one side of his body. This hemorrhage was

apparently caused by heat and overexertion, coupled with

arterial sclerosis. La Veck, supra, at 605. In Schroetke,

the deceased worked as a night watchman at the defendant’s

foundry and shops. Schroetke, supra at 617. His duties

included watching for accidental fires. On the night in

question, a fire broke out, and the decedent sounded the

alarm. Shortly thereafter he suffered a fatal heart attack.

It was determined that the physical exertion and excitement

occasioned by the fire produced a nervous shock that caused

his heart attack. Upon review, this Court determined that the

decedent’s injury was an accidental injury within the scope of

the worker’s compensation act. While it can be reasonably

argued that these cases involved some mental component

leading up to their respective injuries, the resulting

compensable injury was not a mental disability, but instead a

physical one.

that the claimant, the decedent’s wife, therefore was entitled

to compensation for his death. Id. at 494.

The next significant case in the development of

compensable mental disabilities is Rainko v Webster-Eisenlohr,

Inc, 306 Mich 328, 332; 10 NW2d 903 (1943). In Rainko, this

Court expanded the scope of compensability to cases in which

no outward physical injury occurred to either the employee or

to another employee as in Klein. Specifically, this Court

stated that “[i]t is not necessary to establish physical

injury (resulting in) outward evidence of violence or trauma

to justify an award of compensation.” Id. at 332.

In Carter v General Motors Corp, 361 Mich 577; 106 NW2d

105 (1960), this Court again extended the scope of mental

disability coverage. In Carter, the employee suffered an

emotional collapse, later diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia,

resulting from accumulated stress he experienced in trying to

perform his tasks on an assembly line. Upon review, this

Court held that compensation could be awarded for a mental

disability injury that arose out of and in the course of

employment as a result merely of the effects of work place

stresses on a preexisting mental weakness.

In 1978, worker’s compensation coverage for mental

disabilities was again broadened. In Deziel v Difco

Laboratories, Inc (After Remand), 403 Mich 1, 26; 268 NW2d 1

(1978), this Court adopted the “subjective causal nexus”

standard to determine the compensability of a mental

disability claim:

We hold, as a matter of law, that in cases

involving mental . . . injuries, once a plaintiff

is found disabled and a personal injury is

established, it is sufficient that a strictly

subjective causal nexus be utilized by referees and

the WCAB to determine compensability. Under a

“strictly subjective causal nexus” standard, a

claimant is entitled to compensation if it is

factually established that the claimant honestly

perceives some personal injury incurred during the

ordinary work of his employment “caused” his

disability. This standard applies where the

plaintiff alleges a disability resulting from

either a physical or mental stimulus and honestly,

even though mistakenly, believes that he is

disabled due to that work-related injury and

therefore cannot resume his normal employment.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Coleman criticized the

majority’s holding.3 Id. at 46. Justice Coleman believed

that the “subjective causal nexus” standard, in application,

afforded “no standard at all.” Id. at 48. In her view, “the

majority’s test for causal nexus would result in an award of

compensation for virtually all, if not all, claims based on

mental disorders.” Id. That was so because, “[i]f the

claimant perceived that the job caused the problem, even if

this were not true, the employer would be liable.”4 Id.

Justice Coleman was joined by Justices Fitzgerald and

Ryan.

See also Bentley v Associated Spring, 133 Mich App 15,

(continued...)

(emphasis added).

Thus, following Deziel, the controlling law was that

compensation for a mental disability claim would be permitted

if the claimant “honestly, even though mistakenly” perceived

that a disability was related to a precipitating work event.

Apparently, the Legislature was also dissatisfied with

Deziel’s “subjective causal nexus” standard. In 1980, it

reacted to Deziel by enacting, the statutory provision

currently at issue, MCL 418.301(2). Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423

Mich 531, 534; 377 NW2d 300 (1985). Section 301(2) provides:

Mental disabilities and conditions of the

aging process, including but not limited to heart

and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable

if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by

the employment in a significant manner. Mental

4
(...continued)

20-21; 347 NW2d 784 (1984), in which the Court of Appeals

asserted that the “subjective causal nexus” standard of Deziel

unduly emphasizes the testimony of a lay person

with an admitted psychiatric disorder over expert

testimony about the actual cause of the disorder.

As long as the claimant perceives that his disorder

arises from his job, he is entitled to

compensation. In view of the financial

gain—sometimes very substantial—any person who

files a claim based on a psychiatric disorder will

have strong motives to lie about his perception.

. . . The question then becomes whether that

perception is “honest.” The defendants argue that,

under this loose standard for recovery, Michigan

employers are nearly becoming general health

insurers for psychiatric disabilities. This is an

alarming possibility.

disabilities shall be compensable when arising out

of actual events of employment, not unfounded

perceptions thereof.

Section 301(2) constituted a direct response to the

articulation in Deziel of an extraordinarily broad standard

for determining compensability for mental disability claims,

a standard that was the culmination of more than sixty years

of judicial expansion of such claims. The Legislature’s swift

action in this realm following Deziel reflected an unequivocal

desire to address such expansion. As Farrington v Total

Petroleum Inc, 442 Mich 201, 216, n 16; 501 NW2d 76 (1993),

observed, the reason that the Legislature enacted MCL

418.301(2) was to “overturn or modify expansive

interpretations placed upon the act by this Court.”

B. GARDNER V VAN BUREN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

1. MAJORITY OPINION

The first case in this Court to address § 301(2) was

Gardner v Van Buren Pub Schs, 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1 (1994).

Specifically, this Court granted leave to interpret, among

other things, the second sentence of § 301(2). In analyzing

this sentence, the Gardner majority explained that it was

faced with the problem of distinguishing between “actual

events of employment” and “unfounded perceptions thereof.”

Id. at 43. Unable to harmonize these two phrases, the

majority determined that the statute only meant that actual

events of employment must occur as a precondition to a claim,

rather than imaginary or hallucinatory ones. Id. at 44-46.

The Court rejected any perception analysis with regard to

determining the compensability of a mental disability injury.

The Court reasoned that such an analysis was

inappropriate because, in many instances, individuals with

mental disabilities can misperceive or altogether lose contact

with reality. Id. at 43-44. Because “many, if not all,

mental disabilities are based on ‘unfounded perceptions’ of

‘reality’ or ‘actual event[s],’” the majority concluded that

it would be “absurd” to prohibit “compensation for claims

based on unfounded perceptions of actual events, as opposed to

prohibiting compensation for claims based on imagined or

hallucinatory events.” Id. In the majority’s view, it would

make “little sense” to allow compensability for certain work

related disabilities, i.e., those arising out of actual events

of employment, only to then “exclude[] the vast majority of

all mental disabilities,” i.e., those based on unfounded

perceptions of actual events. Id. at 44. Thus, with regard

to its interpretation of the second clause of the second

sentence of § 301(2), the majority concluded that “[t]he

statute, by excluding ‘unfounded perceptions’ of the actual

events of employment, excludes [only] situations in which the

claimed events never occurred, i.e., where they are imagined,

hallucinatory or delusional.” Id. at 49.

As an additional rationale for this interpretation, the

Gardner majority opined that its conclusion was consistent

with the Legislature’s invalidation of Deziel, which had

expressly permitted compensation for imaginary or

hallucinatory events.

Courts and commentators alike realized that

Deziel’s honest perception test permit[ted] a

mental disability claim to be based on imagined,

hallucinatory, or delusional events. In other

words, the honest perception test permits

compensation to be based on “unfounded perceptions”

that actual events of employment did occur.

[Gardner, supra at 45.]

Thus, in the majority’s view, Deziel “established in this

state that even imagined, hallucinatory, or delusional events

could form the basis of a compensable mental disability

notwithstanding the fact that there was no causal connection

between the employment and the disability.” Id. at 46.

Thus, a claimant for mental disability benefits could

secure benefits on the basis of an employment event, no matter

how wrongly the event was perceived. That is, among the

countless events occurring in the course of any normal work

day—the interactions with supervisors and co-employees, the

conversations with customers and suppliers, the mundane tasks

and routines of work—any of these might serve as the basis for

a mental disability claim, no matter how ordinary or

unexceptional, and no matter how much they were misconstrued

or mischaracterized by the claimant.5

2. BRICKLEY DISSENT

In a separate opinion, Justice Brickley took issue with

the interpretation that the majority accorded the “not

unfounded perceptions thereof” language.6 Gardner, supra at

53. He observed that the majority had interpreted the “not

unfounded perceptions thereof” language as merely reiterating

the requirement that actual events of employment had to have

occurred. Id. at 53-54. In his view, such an interpretation

rendered the “unfounded perceptions” language “superfluous,

5
Gardner also addressed the first sentence of § 301(2),

commonly referred to as the “significant manner” inquiry,

which reads “[m]ental disabilities . . . shall be compensable

if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the

employment in a significant manner.” Id. at 46. According to

the majority, this sentence requires that the analysis of the

“significance of [the actual events of employment] to the

particular claimant must be judged against all the

circumstances to determine whether the resulting mental

disability is compensable.” Id. at 47. The majority surmised

that when assessing the reaction of a claimant to objectively

established events, an employer must take the employee as

found. Id. at 49, 50. We do not address this aspect of

Gardner’s analysis in this opinion.

6
Justice Riley wrote a separate dissenting statement, in

which Justice Griffin joined, taking issue with the majority’s

“causal nexus between work-related incidents and their

contribution to a mental disability . . . .” See Gardner,

supra at 63. In Justice Riley’s view, it was erroneous for

the majority to consider all actual employment-related events

under § 301(2). Rather, a claimant must establish not merely

an actual employment event, but a “traumatic” actual

employment event. Id. at 65.

nugatory, and without independent effect,” violating the well

established rule of statutory construction that every word of

a statute be given meaning. Id. at 54.

According to Justice Brickley, the “unfounded

perceptions” language referred “not to the existence of an

event, but to a claimant’s interpretation or perception of an

actual event.” This interpretation “does not reiterate the

‘actual events’ requirement, but instead demands, as an

independent matter and without unnecessary surplusage, that a

claimant’s perception of actual events not have been

unfounded.” Id. He also explained that

this conclusion is consistent with the

Legislature’s decision to abrogate the holding in

Deziel. The Deziel “subjective causal nexus” test

permitted recovery if a claimant honestly perceived

that mental injury resulted from an employment

event. While the majority explains that “Deziel’s

honest perception test permit[ted] a mental

disability claim to be based on imagined,

hallucinatory, or delusional events,” . . . in fact

Deziel did not address “events” but, rather, dealt

exclusively with “causation” determinations.

Accordingly, while the Legislature’s 1982 amendment

of MCL 418.301(2) . . . may have added an “actual

events” requirement, its motivation was to reverse

the causation standard created by Deziel. [Gardner,

supra at 55 (emphasis in original).]

Further, Justice Brickley stressed that analysis of the

second sentence of § 301(2) involved an objective inquiry. In

this regard, he stated:

Objective analysis is reflected in the

requirements that actual events of employment have

occurred and that a claimant’s perception or

interpretation of those events have been well
founded. This analysis demands both procedural and

substantive objectivity. The existence of actual

events and well-founded perceptions must be

discerned by an objective trier of fact, not by the

claimant. The standard of review is also

objective—did the event actually occur, and was

claimant’s perception of it well founded? [Id. at

57.]

However, Justice Brickley emphasized that his

interpretation of MCL 418.301(2) was not a purely objective

approach. Id. He observed that § 301(2) also encompassed a

subjective element of inquiry. He stated that a “subjective

analysis is proper in examining a claimant’s reaction to

actual employment events, perceived in a well-founded manner.

A claimant with a psychiatric disability cannot be expected to

react to certain events, properly perceived, in a manner

entirely consistent with that of a normal, healthy

individual.” Id. at 57-58. In other words, “[w]hile a

claimant’s perception of the event must be objectively well

founded, that same claimant’s reaction to the event can be

very atypical.” Id. at 58. In Justice Brickley’s view, the

subjective component of § 301(2) “insures continued

recognition of employers’ general obligation to ‘take

employees as they find them.’” We believe that Justice

Brickley’s analysis of the statutory language is correct.

C. ANALYSIS OF § 301(2)

When reviewing matters of statutory construction, this

Court’s primary purpose is to discern and give effect to the

Legislature’s intent. Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich

22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). The first criterion in

determining intent is the specific language of the statute.

DiBenedetto, supra at 402. The Legislature is presumed to

have intended the meaning it has plainly expressed, and if the

expressed language is clear, judicial construction is not

permitted and the statute must be enforced as written. Id.

Additionally, it is important to ensure that words in a

statute not be ignored, treated as surplusage, or rendered

nugatory. Hoste v Shanty Creek Management, Inc, 459 Mich 561,

574; 592 NW2d 360 (1999). Unless defined in the statute,

every word or phrase of a statute will be ascribed its plain

and ordinary meaning. See MCL 8.3a. See also Western Mich

Univ Bd of Control v Michigan, 455 Mich 531, 539; 565 NW2d 828

(1997).

Analyzing the language of the second sentence of §

301(2), we note that it contains two principal clauses. The

first clause states that “[m]ental disabilities shall be

compensable when arising out of actual events of employment.”

A review of this clause reveals that the subject, “mental

disabilities,” shall be compensable when they arise out of the

object “actual events of employment.” The noun in the phrase

“actual events of employment” is “events.” This noun is

qualified by two adjectives–“actual” and “employment.” This

indicates that the “events” being described cannot be any sort

of events. Rather, they must be actual events, existing in

“fact” or “reality,” not delusional or imaginary, Random House

Webster’s College Dictionary (2001), and they must be

connected to the claimant’s employment.

However, the sentence does not end there. It goes on to

state “not unfounded perceptions thereof.” This second clause

expressly sets forth an additional precondition that must be

satisfied by claimants under § 301(2), namely, that the

claimant’s personal perception of the actual events of

employment described in the preceding clause is not

dispositive of his claim, but that such perception must not be

“unfounded.” The word “perception” means “the act or faculty

of apprehending by means of the senses or the mind; cognition;

awareness,” and “a single unified awareness derived from

sensory processes while a stimulus is present.” Random House

Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). In turn, “apprehend”

means “to grasp the meaning of; understand, esp. intuitively.”

Id. Before one can have an awareness or understanding there

must be a stimulus present. The stimulus is a condition

precedent to the perception. For purposes of mental

disability claims under § 301(2), that stimulus must be the

actual events of employment. Perception follows from the

event, and involves separate and distinct matters of inquiry.

The specific “perception” on claimant’s part required by

the statute is one that cannot be “unfounded.” Stated without

the double negative, the perception must be “founded”.

“Found,” the present tense of this word, means “to base;

ground.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001).

In turn, “base” and “ground” mean “to establish as a fact or

conclusion” and “[to have] rational or factual support for

one’s position” respectively. Id. Assimilating these

definitions, it is reasonable to conclude that a worker’s

compensation claimant’s perception must be based or grounded

in fact.

The final word in § 301 (2), “thereof” is also

instructive of the statute’s meaning. The word “thereof” is

defined as “of that or it.” Random House Webster’s College

Dictionary (2001). The “of that or it” in this case refers to

the proceeding antecedent word “events.” As already noted,

these “events” are not any sort of events; rather, they are

actual employment events. Thus, it can also be reasonably

concluded that “thereof” is a reference to the preceding

phrase “actual events of employment.”

By focusing on the words “thereof” and “perceptions” in

the second clause of the second sentence of § 301(2), we

believe that the plain language of this provision requires a

distinct analysis concerning a claimant’s perception or

apprehension of the actual events of employment. If the

Legislature only intended that the actual events of employment

be inquired into (without consideration of the claimant’s

perceptions of those events), then it could have simply

inserted a period at the end of the first clause. It did

not.7

We also agree with Justice Brickley that this

conclusion is consistent with the Legislature’s intent to

abrogate the Deziel holding. As stated in note 1, Deziel

adopted the so-called ‘subjective causal nexus’ standard.

This standard, according to the Deziel Court, was to be

utilized only in deciding the third prong of a mental

disability analysis, i.e., “whether the claimant’s employment

combined with some internal weakness or disease to produce the

disability.” This prong was to be analyzed after it was

determined that: 1) the claimant was disabled, and 2) the

disability resulted from a personal injury in the form of “a

precipitating, work-related event.” Deziel, supra at 37

(emphasis added). Thus, Deziel held that a claim could be

based upon an honest though mistaken perception that a work

event caused the disability. The Gardner majority, however,

stated that Deziel permitted compensation on the basis of

“imaginary” or “hallucinatory” events. This is patently not

the case. Deziel’s second prong clearly requires that the

disability be predicated upon “a precipitating, work-related

event.” Thus, the Gardner majority, at best, merely stated a

standard, the existence of actual employment events, that was

already required by Deziel. By doing so, it did not

accomplish what the Legislature intended—the invalidation of

a standard that permitted compensation on the basis of

unfounded perceptions of actual events.

In rejecting any perception analysis, the Gardner

majority observed that, in many instances, individuals with

mental disabilities misperceive or altogether lose contact

with reality.

“In finding solutions to their unconscious

problems, psychoneurotics and psychotics develop

personality problems which make it difficult for

them to adapt to reality as it is encountered by

so-called ‘average’ or ‘normal’ individuals. This

failure of the psychoneurotic or psychotic’s

reactions and adjustment mechanisms can either

distort his perception of reality or, in the worst

psychotic cases, cause the individual to lose

contact with reality . . . .” [Id. at 43-44,

quoting from Deziel, supra at 29 (Riley, J.,

dissenting).]

As stated previously, the Gardner majority surmised that it

would be “absurd” to allow compensation for a mental

disability injury resulting from an actual event of employment

only to subsequently “exclude[] the vast majority of all

mental disabilities, those based on unfounded perceptions of

actual events.” Id. at 44. Although it may be true in many

instances that mentally disabled individuals will misperceive

or lose contact with reality because of some underlying

cognitive weakness, the Legislature clearly has the ability to

define coverage under its statutes as it deems appropriate.

“[O]ur judicial role precludes imposing different policy

choices than those selected by the Legislature . . . .”8

Further, contrary to Gardner’s sense of “absurdity”,

(continued...)

22
People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694-695; 625 NW2d 764

(2001).

We conclude that, to satisfy the mental disability

requirements of the second sentence of § 301(2), a claimant

must demonstrate: (a) that there has been an actual employment

8
(...continued)

it is altogether possible that the Legislature’s differing

treatments of physical and mental injuries, reflected

principally by its separate coverage of the two under the

provisions of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, §§

301(1) and 301(2), are a rational means of limiting an

employer’s worker’s compensation exposure for unique types of

injuries resulting from unique types of diseases. While a

mental disability may be equally as disabling as a physical

disability, such disabilities nonetheless may be distinctive

in certain respects. An employee with a susceptibility to

physical disability, for example, may be more likely to

exhibit outward manifestations of his vulnerabilities, or he

may be more aware of the extent of his own vulnerabilities.

As a result, an employer may be in a better position to

undertake reasonable precautions in an effort to protect such

an employee from unsafe or threatening working conditions. On

the other hand, an employee with a susceptibility to mental

disability may not exhibit the same outward manifestations of

his vulnerabilities, or he may be less cognizant of the extent

of his vulnerabilities. By what conceivable means could an

employer ever undertake to protect such an impaired employee

from any employment event, no matter how innocuous or trivial,

that comes to be misconstrued? Problems of proof may also

conceivably have influenced the Legislature in its crafting of

the statute.

The Gardner majority is correct that some, but not all,

mental disabilities are covered by § 301(2). That the members

of that majority would have drawn this coverage differently,

however, is not a warrant for it to rewrite this provision.

Further, it is, at the very least, subject to debate whether

Gardner’s rendering of § 301(2), in which the employer may be

held responsible for even the most trivial and ordinary

workplace events, produces a less or a more “absurd” result

than that produced by the statute’s plain words.

event leading to his disability, that is, that the event in

question occurred in connection with employment and actually

took place; and (b) that the claimant’s perception of such

actual employment event was not unfounded, that is, that such

perception or apprehension was grounded in fact or reality,

not in the delusion or the imagination of an impaired mind.9

One must be mindful that, while an incorrect

perception of an actual event would not be sufficient to

satisfy this portion of the statute, a correct perception of

a relatively innocuous event could potentially be enough to

satisfy it. This result, as already stated, is compelled by

the language of § 301(2). This, however, does not mean that

an innocuous or ordinary event will often be sufficient to

satisfy the remaining portion of § 301(2). As Justice

Brickley’s dissent noted:

While I acknowledge the probable and

understandable frustration of the Court of Appeals

with “ordinary daily conditions and minutiae of

employment” serving as the basis for a mental

disability claim, it is nevertheless clear that the

Legislature has only demanded that “actual”

employment events, not objectively significant,

abnormal, or uncommon incidents, serve as the basis

for a mental disability claim. The concerns

expressed by the Court of Appeals are more properly

infused and analyzed under the “significant manner”

causation requirement, not the “actual events”

demand of MCL 418.301(2) . . . . [Gardner, supra

at 61, n 8.]

Indeed, there is no indication that Justice Brickley and

the majority were in disagreement with regard to what he

asserts in this final sentence. The majority stated that

“[o]nce actual employment events have been shown to have

occurred, the significance of those events to a particular

claimant must be judged against all circumstances to determine

whether the resulting mental disability is compensable.” Id.

at 47. Additionally, one cannot overlook that an employee’s

testimony concerning an actual event, as a precipitating event

(continued...)

To the extent that Gardner is inconsistent with this

interpretation of § 301(2), we overrule it.

D. OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW

Moreover, in determining whether there has been an actual

employment event leading to a mental disability, and a

perception of that event that is not unfounded, the inquiry

must be conducted under an objective standard.10 The second

9
(...continued)

for a mental disability, must always satisfy traditional

standards of truthfulness. When an employee seeks

compensation for an injury arising out of an innocuous or

ordinary event, that employee will, of course, be required to

demonstrate to the worker’s compensation factfinder that such

event indeed contributed to his injury in a “significant

manner.”

An objective standard of inquiry focuses on how a

reasonable person, under like circumstances, would have viewed

the actual events that occurred. Lowe v Estate Motors Ltd,

428 Mich 439, 456; 410 NW2d 706 (1987). This is different

from a subjective standard in which the focus is on how a

particular individual viewed such events. Fire Ins Exchange

v Diehl, 450 Mich 678, 685; 545 NW2d 602 (1996).

Additionally, although the perception inquiry is to be

undertaken pursuant to an objective standard, we emphasize in

an effort to dispel potential confusion that the “reaction”

inquiry,” i.e., how a potential claimant “reacts” to actual

events of employment, is to be undertaken pursuant to a

subjective standard. As Justice Brickley observed, “[a]

claimant with a psychiatric disability cannot be expected to

react to certain events, properly perceived, in a manner

entirely consistent with that of a normal healthy individual.

. . . While a claimant’s perception of the event must be

objectively well-founded, that same claimant’s reaction to the

event can be very atypical.” Gardner, supra at 58. In sum,

a claimant’s perception is evaluated objectively under the

second sentence of § 301(2), while his subsequent reaction is

evaluated subjectively under the first sentence of this

(continued...)

sentence of § 301(2) modifies “events” with the term “actual,”

and modifies “perceptions” with the term “not unfounded” (or

“founded”). These modifying terms implicate objective

considerations. See, e.g., Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368,

386-387; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). As explained previously,

“actual” means existing in “fact” or in “reality,” not

delusional or imaginary, and “founded” means “to be based in;

to be grounded in.” In turn, “based” and “grounded”

respectively mean “to establish as a fact or conclusion” and

“[to have] rational or factual support for one’s position.”

By the Legislature’s use of these terms in the second sentence

of § 301(2), it is clear, that in determining whether actual

events occurred and whether a claimant’s perceptions were

“founded,” the factfinder must assess the factual

circumstances in terms of how a reasonable person would have

viewed them.11

10
(...continued)

provision.

Application of an objective standard is also

consistent with the underlying purpose of the WDCA, as

reasonably inferred through its text. These have been

invariably understood to be to compensate those who are

injured in the workplace if the injury arose out of the work.

Hills v Blair, 182 Mich 20, 25; 148 NW 243 (1914) (“Under the

provisions of this act, only that employee is entitled to

compensation who ‘receives personal injuries arising out of

and in the course of his employment.’ It is to be borne in

mind that the act does not provide insurance for the employed

workman to compensate any other kind of accident or injury

(continued...)

Thus, in applying the proper statutory test, the

factfinder must first determine whether actual events of

employment indeed occurred. Then, in analyzing whether a

claimant’s perception of the actual events of employment had

a basis in fact or reality, i.e., the claimant’s perception

was “founded”, the factfinder must apply an objective review

by examining all the facts and circumstances surrounding the

actual employment events in question to determine whether the

claimant’s perception of such events was reasonably grounded

in fact or reality.12

E. STARE DECISIS

In partially overruling Gardner, we have considered the

principles of stare decisis. Although application of the

11
(...continued)

which may befall him.”). It would be inconsistent with this

purpose to award compensation to those whose injuries were

merely coincident with a period of employment, but whose

injuries did not “arise out of” that employment. Thus, it is

not surprising that the Legislature that enacted § 301(2)

sought to limit compensation to mental disabilities that arose

out of actual events of employment, not to those that were

attributable to the mere imaginings of the employee.

This standard of review varies slightly from that

articulated by Justice Brickley, namely, that a claimant’s

perception of the actual employment events must be “well
founded.” Gardner, supra at 57. We find nothing in the

language of § 301(2) that qualifies “perception” in this way.

“Well-founded” evinces a standard that may be construed as

more demanding than a reasonableness standard. Thus, we do

not agree that the perceptions at issue must be “well
founded.” Instead, all that is required is that the

claimant’s perception of the actual employment events be

reasonably founded.

doctrine of stare decisis is generally the preferred course of

action by this Court for it “‘promotes the evenhanded,

predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,

fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the

actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,’” it

is not an inexorable command. Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich

439, 463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), quoting Hohn v United States,

524 US 236, 251; 118 S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998).

Indeed, these same values are also furthered by judicial

decisions that are neutrally grounded in the language of the

law, by a legal regime in which the public may read the plain

words of its law and have confidence that such words mean what

they say and are not the exclusive province of lawyers.13

We discussed in Robinson the importance of the

public’s interest in being able to rely on the language of

statutes as written:

[I]t is well to recall in discussing reliance,

when dealing with an area of the law that is

statutory . . . , that it is to the words of the

statute itself that a citizen first looks for

guidance in directing his actions. This is the

essence of the rule of law: to know in advance what

the rules of society are. Thus, if the words of

the statute are clear, the actor should be able to

expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried

out by all in society, including the courts. In

fact, should a court confound those legitimate

citizen expectations by misreading or misconstruing

a statute, it is that court itself that has

disrupted the reliance interest. When that

happens, a subsequent court, rather than holding to

the distorted reading because of the doctrine of

(continued...)

Stare decisis is not to be “applied mechanically to forever

prevent the Court from overruling earlier erroneous decisions

interpreting the meaning of statutes.” Id. at 463.

Before this Court overrules a decision, we must make two

inquiries: (a) whether the earlier decision was wrongly

decided, and (b) whether overruling such decision would work

an undue hardship because of reliance interests or

expectations that have arisen. Id. at 464-68.

With regard to the first inquiry, we believe that

Gardner, in relevant part, was wrongly decided, clearly

misconstruing the plain language of § 301(2) and rendering

superfluous the entire second clause of the second sentence in

violation of the cardinal rule of interpretation that effect

shall be given to every word, phrase, or clause of a statute.

Hoste, supra; People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 285;

13
(...continued)

stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court’s

misconstruction. The reason for this is that the

court in distorting the statute was engaged in a

form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to

the bedrock principle of America n

constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power

is reposed in the people as reflected in the work

of the Legislature, and, absent a constitutional

violation, the courts have no legitimacy in

overruling or nullifying the people’s

representatives. Moreover, not only does such a

compromising by a court of the citizen’s ability to

rely on a statute have no constitutional warrant,

it can gain no higher pedigree as later courts

repeat the error. [Id. at 467-68.]

597 NW2d 1 (1999).

With regard to the second inquiry, we believe that

overruling that erroneous portion of Gardner will not result

in any interference with legitimate reliance or expectation

interests. Here, we examine “whether the previous decision

has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to

everyone’s expectations that to change it would produce not

just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations.”

Robinson, supra at 466. The reliance must be the sort that

“causes a person or entity to attempt to conform his conduct

to a certain norm before the triggering event.” Id. at 467.

This Court’s previous interpretation of § 301(2) could hardly

have caused any person to conform their conduct to a

particular norm. Mental disability injuries of the sort

compensated by this provision arise without planning or

preparation. Instead, persons entitled to compensation under

§ 301(2) become aware of this Court’s interpretations only

after they have suffered injury. Such an after-the-fact

awareness does not implicate the kind of reliance or

expectation interest contemplated by our stare decisis

inquiry.

IV. RESPONSE TO DISSENT

We agree with the dissent that “fundamental principles”

are at issue here that distinguish our two opinions. Unlike

the dissent, however, we do not view these principles as

relating to our alleged disregard for stare decisis, see Part

III(E), but rather as relating to the dissent’s determination

to perpetuate a plainly flawed reading of the law apparently

because it disagrees with the policies that are actually

reflected in such law. Contrary to the dissent, the

“fundamental principles” that we see at stake here implicate

the role of this Court in the constitutional separation of

powers. That is, we believe that it is the constitutional

duty of this Court to interpret the words of the lawmaker, in

this case the Legislature, and not to substitute our own

policy preferences in order to make the law less “illogical”.

In the present case, the dissent reads the second

sentence of § 301(2) in a manner that utterly ignores the

words “not unfounded perceptions thereof.” The dissent

interprets section § 301(2) as if these words did not exist,

as if they were not there at all. The dissent ignores these

words apparently because it disagrees with the limitations

that these words impose upon worker’s compensation benefits.

Thus, the dissent chooses to amend § 301(2) by summarily

reading these words out of the law. In doing so, the dissent

ignores the compromises and the negotiations that may have

preceded the inclusion of these words in the law, it ignores

the concerns of the Legislature in avoiding abuse of the

worker’s compensation system that may have motivated such

language, and it ignores the majorities of each house of the

Legislature, and the Governor, who approved these words, not

those that the dissent prefers. However, our judicial role

“precludes imposing different policy choices than those

selected by the Legislature . . . .”14 People v Sobczak-

Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694-695; 625 NW2d 764 (2001).

Nor is the dissent’s stare decisis analysis persuasive.

It is premised upon little more than the argument that the

misreading of § 301(2) occurred eight years ago and must

therefore be maintained in perpetuity. In support, the

dissent merely reiterates its view that the words of the

statute must be subordinated to what the dissent believes are

better policy choices, in other words, its policy choices.

The dissent offers no argument that the four words that he

would strike from the law are read unreasonably by this

majority, or that a reasonable alternative interpretation

exists.

In support of its stare decisis argument that there are

The dissent “question[s] whether, under the majority’s

approach, compensability for any mental disabilities would

ever exist.” To say the least, we respectfully disagree, see

note 9. Compensability would exist where the Legislature has

deemed there to be compensability, and it would not exist

where the Legislature has not deemed there to be

compensability. Whether such coverage is too broad or too

narrow is not for us to decide.

“reliance” interests that must be considered, the dissent

presents nothing to show that anyone in Michigan, in the eight

years since Gardner, has conducted personal affairs in a

manner that would make it unfair to overrule Gardner. Of

course, such a showing is hardly possible, for the onset of a

mental disability is unlikely to be a function of whether

Gardner was reigning law. Rather, in lieu of such a showing,

the dissent offers the novel argument that a “reliance”

interest has arisen here, not because anyone has ever

conducted personal affairs in accord with Gardner, but because

lawyers will have to relearn the law. That, of course, would

be true of any overruling of precedent, but this has never

before been viewed as raising a “reliance” interest sufficient

to preclude a plainly flawed reading of the law from being

corrected. Further, we are confident that it will not take

long for the legal profession in our state to comprehend an

interpretation of § 301(2) in which its words mean what they

say.15

The dissent raises a similar non sequitur in its

observation that Gardner should not be overruled because it

engaged in the “exact debate” that we undertake in this

opinion. Needless to say, a precedent would never have to be

overruled if a court had not engaged in the “exact debate” at

an earlier juncture. Similarly, the dissent’s “legislative

acquiescence” argument is merely another way of sustaining

forever any precedent, no matter how wrongly decided. Such an

“acquiescence” argument has been squarely rejected by this

Court because it misunderstands the legislative process, and

(continued...)

The dissent is also badly confused in its expressions of

concern about the “unwelcome practice of changing judicially

established statutory interpretations with the makeup of the

Court.” While such a practice is indeed unwelcome, it is only

through the majority’s judicial approach that this practice is

avoidable. It is only when words are interpreted in accord

with their plain meaning, when words are not “written on

water,” in the words of Thomas Jefferson, that the law avoids

interpretations that are a function of shifting judicial

majorities and the ebb and flow of the political process. In

contrast, the dissent’s judicial approach, that courts may

correct laws that they view as inadequate, is a prescription

for “interpretations” of the law that follow the personal

predilections of judges. As judges change in their views of

the substantive merits of laws, so too will their

“interpretations.” It is only by interpretations of the law

that are in accord with the words of the lawmaker—that is,

interpretations in which judges look outside themselves for a

source of law—that the decisions of courts are truly removed

from the realm of politics and policymaking.

The debate between the dissent and the majority is

15
(...continued)

because it would accord greater weight to the silence of a

subsequent Legislature than to the actual product of the

Legislature that enacted a law. Donajkowski v Alpena Power

Co, 460 Mich 243, 258-261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).

perhaps best encapsulated by the dissent’s characterization as

“strange” the majority’s observation that stare decisis values

are furthered by

judicial decisions that are neutrally grounded in

the language of the law, by a legal regime in which

the public may read the words of its law and have

confidence that such words mean what they say and

are not the exclusive province of lawyers.

The dissent is “puzzled” by this observation since, in its

judgment, the majority here is making the words of the law the

“‘exclusive province’ of the makeup of the bench.” In

response, we can offer little more than to ask the reader, and

the citizens of Michigan, in evaluating these opinions, to

reflect upon which circumstances are more conducive to the law

becoming the “exclusive province of the makeup of the

bench”—when the words, all the words, of the law are

interpreted according to their reasonable meanings, or when

the words of the law are discarded when they do not suit the

personal preferences of judges.

The dissent may be correct that worker’s compensation

benefits for mental disabilities ought to be awarded on a more

liberal basis than the Legislature has chosen. The dissent

may also be correct that the four words that the Legislature

placed in § 301(2), “not unfounded perceptions thereof,” have

narrowed coverage for mental disabilities more than is wise or

prudent. Finally, the dissent may be correct that the law

could be enhanced by omitting these four words. However, if

any of this is so, the dissenting justice has the same rights

as any other citizen to “petition the government” for the

redress of his grievances. As a justice, though, he is not

entitled to usurp the prerogatives of the Legislature by

altering the words of a statute to mean something other than

what they plainly mean.

V. CONCLUSION

We conclude that, to satisfy the mental disability

requirements under the second sentence of § 301(2), a claimant

must demonstrate: (a) that there has been an actual employment

event leading to his mental disability, that is, that the

event in question occurred in connection with employment and

actually took place; and (b) that the claimant’s perception or

apprehension of the actual employment event was not unfounded,

that is, that such perception or apprehension was also

grounded in fact or reality, not in the delusion or the

imagination of an impaired mind. In analyzing whether a

claimant’s perception of the actual events of employment had

a basis in fact or reality, the factfinder must apply an

objective review, that is, examine all the facts and

circumstances surrounding the actual employment events in

order to determine if the claimant’s perception of the actual

events was reasonably grounded in fact or reality. Insofar as

Gardner is inconsistent with these requirements, we overrule

it.

Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals order that

vacated the WCAC’s decision and remand this matter to the

magistrate for analysis under the proper statutory framework.

CORRIGAN , C.J., and TAYLOR , and YOUNG , JJ., concurred with

MARKMAN , J.

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

WARREN M. ROBERTSON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 116276

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________

WEAVER, J. (concurring).

I join all but part IV of the opinion. Because part III

already clearly explains how the Gardner majority1 incorrectly

construed the statute by reading the phrase “not unfounded

perceptions thereof” out of the statute, I find part IV to be

unnecessary.

Gardner v Van Buren Pub Schs, 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1

(1994)

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

WARREN M. ROBERTSON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 116276

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________

CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).

This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation

that this Court analyzed and decided eight years ago: the

correct interpretation of MCL 418.301(2). In Gardner v Van

Buren Pub Schs, 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1 (1994), this Court

interpreted § 301(2) in accordance with the applicable rules

of statutory construction and held that a compensable mental

disability claim arises when an actual event of employment,

not an imaginary or hallucinatory one, significantly

contributes to, aggravates, or accelerates a mental

disability. The majority in this case does not disturb the

latter “significantly contributes” portion of the Gardner

holding; however, it erroneously concludes that the Gardner

Court wrongly decided the former “actual event of employment”

portion and thus overrules Gardner in part. In so doing, the

majority once again fails to abide by the fundamental

principles of stare decisis. I, therefore, respectfully

dissent.

In myriad decisions, this Court has expressed the

fundamental principles of stare decisis. In Boyd v W G Wade

Shows, 443 Mich 515, 525, n 15; 505 NW2d 544 (1993), this

Court stated that “[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis,

principles of law deliberately examined and decided by a court

of competent jurisdiction should not be lightly departed.”

Additionally, this Court has said that “[s]tare decisis is

usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more

important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that

it be settled right. . . . This is commonly true even where

the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction

can be had by legislation.” Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452

Mich 354, 365, n 17; 550 NW2d 215 (1996), quoting Burnet v

Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 US 393, 406; 52 S Ct 443; 76 L Ed

815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Furthermore, as the

majority correctly notes, this Court has explained that it

“will not overrule a decision deliberately made unless [it] is

convinced not merely that the case was wrongly decided, but

also that less injury would result from overruling than from

following it.” Brown at 365, quoting Boyd at 524.

The majority first holds that overruling in part the

Gardner Court’s interpretation of § 301(2) is permitted

because Gardner was wrongly decided. One would hope the

majority would not jettison precedent it believed to be

correctly decided, but, then again, one never knows! The

majority claims that the Gardner interpretation makes the

statutory language mere surplusage, as the partial

concurrence/dissent in Gardner argued. The Gardner majority,

however, engaged in the exact debate brought by this case and

clearly rejected the dissent’s viewpoint for numerous reasons.

First, the Gardner Court noted it was faced with

distinguishing between “actual events of employment” and

“unfounded perceptions thereof.” Id. at 43. Explaining that

almost all mental disabilities are based on unfounded

perceptions of actual events, this Court correctly concluded

that reading the statute as the dissent, and the majority

here, suggested would lead to an absurd result.

Thus if one reads MCL 418.301(2) as

prohibiting compensation for claims based on

unfounded perceptions of actual events, as opposed

to prohibiting compensation for claims based on

imagined or hallucinatory events, then one is left

with a statute that makes little sense. Where the

first part of the provision states that certain

work-related mental disabilities shall be

compensable, the last part excludes the vast

majority of all mental disabilities, those based on

unfounded perceptions of actual events. What the

legislative right hand gives, the left hand takes.

This is an absurd result. This Court has

consistently attempted to construe statutes so as

to avoid absurd results, and our construction of

this statute will be no different. [Id. at 44,

emphasis in original.]

Second, the Gardner Court addressed what Deziel v Difco

Laboratories (After Remand), 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978),

established and § 301(2), therefore, invalidated. The Gardner

decision noted that Deziel’s honest perception test had two

major flaws that the Legislature intended to change: (1) it

allowed a compensable disability to be based on imagined

events, and (2) it did away with any need to prove a factual

causal connection between the disability and the employment

events. Id. at 45. Clearly, then, as the Gardner Court

concluded, the Legislature intended to eliminate this test by

requiring objective actual events, not imagined, and a

significant causal connection. I question whether, under the

majority’s approach, compensability for any mental

disabilities would ever exist. It is completely illogical to

conclude that an individual with a mental disability must

comply with an objective reasonableness test when the entire

basis of a mental disability is the inability to reason.

Third, the interpretation of § 301(2) in Gardner supports

the basic premise that employers take employees as they are.

See Sheppard v Michigan Nat’l Bank, 348 Mich 577, 584; 83 NW2d

614 (1957) (Smith, J., concurring). The Gardner Court

correctly recognized that “[a]bsent an explicit legislative

mandate” not only should this premise be followed for physical

infirmities, but for mental disabilities as well. Id. at 48

49.

Accordingly, the Gardner Court deliberately held that the

relevant inquiry under § 301(2) is, “Given actual events and

a particular claimant, with all the claimant’s preexisting

mental frailties, can the actual events objectively be said to

have contributed to, aggravated, or accelerated the claimant’s

mental disability in a significant manner?” Id. at 50. I

continue to adhere to this Court’s sound Gardner decision and

am unconvinced that the majority’s adoption of the dissent’s

approach to compensation for mental disabilities under the

Worker’s Disability Compensation Act is the correct one.1

Not only does the majority err by adopting the Gardner

concurrence/dissent as the correct interpretation of § 301(2),

1
Because I conclude that Gardner was not wrongly

decided, that would end the stare decisis analysis and further

analysis of whether greater harm would exist if precedent

change is unnecessary. However, I refute the majority’s

argument that no harm will occur by overruling Gardner in

part. Those needing to follow § 301(2) for mental disability

compensation and those practicing in that area are likely well

versed in the Gardner analysis, as it has been the established

interpretation of § 301(2) for the past eight years. I,

therefore, fail to see how no harm will result from overruling

Gardner in part and instead assert that less harm would result

by keeping it intact.

the majority also errs by failing to address the legislative

response aspect of stare decisis. As mentioned, this Court in

Brown affirmed the principle that courts should abide by

precedent when the Legislature has not refuted it. The Brown

Court stated:

“When, over a period of many years, the

Legislature has acquiesced in this Court’s

construction of a statute, the judicial power to

change that interpretation ought to be exercised

with great restraint. On more than one occasion

our Court has quoted with approval the statement

that stare decisis ‘is especially applicable where

the construction placed on a statute by previous

decisions has been long acquiesced in by the

legislature, by its continued use or failure to

change the language of the statute so construed,

the power to change the law as interpreted being

regarded, in such circumstances, as one to be

exercised solely by the legislature.’” [Id. at

367-368 (citations omitted).]

The Legislature has not reacted to the Gardner Court’s

interpretation of § 301(2) in the eight years since it was

decided. Thus, I would conclude that the Legislature is

satisfied with the Gardner interpretation and the majority’s

new interpretation is not only incorrect, but unnecessary.2

For these reasons, the doctrine of stare decisis mandates

Gardner’s reaffirmance. The majority’s noble quest to right

the alleged wrongs of the Gardner decision serves to foster an

unwelcome practice of changing judicially established

2
The majority opinion's section entitled, "Response to

Dissent" presents no relevant or novel analysis that

contradicts the sound position I stand behind today.

statutory interpretations with the makeup of the Court. Also,

it fosters the undesired practice of rehashing settled debates

simply because the majority concludes that someone had a

better argument. This is clear because legally, nothing has

changed since Gardner was decided, and no new arguments were

presented to refute its analysis that were not already debated

eight years ago. Strangely, the majority states that stare

decisis values are furthered “by judicial decisions that are

neutrally grounded in the language of the law, by a legal

regime in which the public may read the plain words of its law

and have confidence that such words mean what they say and are

not the exclusive province of lawyers.” Slip op at 24. I am

puzzled by this statement because I question whether the

majority can ascertain any distinction between frowning upon

decisions grounded in the plain meaning of words, but are the

“exclusive province of lawyers,” and supporting decisions that

change an already established plain meaning, and thus are the

“exclusive province” of the makeup of the bench.

Accordingly, I would abide by the Gardner decision and

would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

KELLY , J., concurred with CAVANAGH , J.