United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2020
ROBERT V. ROSSI; LINDA A. ROSSI,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
LEONARD P. GEMMA, individually and in his capacity as President
of Gem Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc.; ROBERT J. LEVINE,
individually and in his capacity as a general partner of Gemma &
Levine; HENRY S. KINCH, JR., in his capacity as Clerk of the
Providence County Superior Court,
Defendants, Appellees.
No. 06-2021
ROBERT V. ROSSI; LINDA A. ROSSI,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
GEM PLUMBING & HEATING CO., INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Patrick J. Dougherty for appellants.
Steven J. Brouillard, with whom Theodore Orson, and Orson and
Brusini Ltd. were on brief, for appellees Leonard P. Gemma and Gem
Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc.
Michael W. Field, Special Assistant Attorney General, and
Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General, on brief for appellee Henry S.
Kinch, Jr.
May 31, 2007
*
Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Robert V. Rossi and Linda A. Rossi
("the Rossis") were named as respondents in a state court lien
enforcement petition brought in May 2002 by Gem Plumbing & Heating
Co., Inc. ("Gem"). In that proceeding, the Rossis raised a due
process argument that the Rhode Island Mechanics' Lien Law, R.I.
Gen. Laws § 34-28-1 et seq., was unconstitutional. Although a
state Superior Court justice accepted the Rossis' argument, this
decision was vacated by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. See Gem
Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, 867 A.2d 798, 800, 818 (R.I.
2005). Undaunted, the Rossis pursued § 1983 actions in federal
court, raising similar -- but not necessarily identical --
constitutional challenges. The state court action remains pending
in Superior Court, on remand from the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
The district court thought that the Rossis were simply
re-litigating a battle they had already lost, and so it dismissed
the Rossis' claims on the bases, inter alia, of issue preclusion
and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Before us, the parties spend
considerable time and energy debating whether or not the Rhode
Island Supreme Court has already rejected the Rossis'
constitutional challenge. We do not decide this question.
Instead, we conclude that Younger abstention is appropriate for the
Rossis' constitutional claims.
-3-
I.
The facts and procedural history are unusually
convoluted. The Rossis' federal complaint alleged that in
September 2001, the Rossis had a conversation with Leonard P.
Gemma, Gem's president, regarding contracting work to be done at an
office building the Rossis owned in Smithfield, Rhode Island.1
Gemma had agreed to provide the Rossis with a written proposal
before he engaged in any actual work, but then his company
proceeded to perform work on the Rossis' property without a
contract.
Gem sent the Rossis an invoice for $35,500, but the
Rossis refused to pay it. On January 28, 2002, Robert J. Levine --
an attorney for Gem -- signed and mailed to the Rossis a "notice of
intention" to perform work on the Rossis' building, and he
simultaneously filed a copy of this notice in the local land
records. This was done in order to perfect a mechanics' lien that
arguably had been created at the time Gem performed work at the
Rossis' property. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-4 (2002);2 Gem, 867
A.2d at 803. Then, 120 days after Levine had mailed the notice of
intention, Gem filed a petition to enforce its purported mechanics'
1
Robert Rossi is a self-employed attorney, and the Rossis
intended that Robert would use the office building for his law
practice.
2
Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the Rhode Island
Mechanics' Lien Law are to the version of the statute that existed
as of January 2002.
-4-
lien in the Providence County Superior Court. See R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 34-28-10. Gem sought to collect the full $35,500 it said it was
owed. The Rossis were named as respondents.
The Rossis concluded that Gem's enforcement action was
encumbering their land and threatening the financing on their
property. One possible course of action for them would have been
to simply contest the validity of Gem's lien, see id. § 34-28-20,
but this would have left their property encumbered until the
contest had been resolved. The Rossis instead chose another course
available to them under Rhode Island law -- they sought a "lien
substitution." Utilizing this procedure, on June 4, 2002, the
Rossis paid $35,8603 into the registry of the Superior Court, and
the Superior Court granted the Rossis' motion to dissolve the
original lien. See id. § 34-28-17.
This substitution had the effect of leaving nearly
$36,000 of the Rossis' money in the court registry. On August 29,
2002, the Rossis filed a second motion in the Superior Court, this
one seeking both to dismiss Gem's enforcement petition and to
secure the release of their funds. In support of their motion, the
Rossis advanced two claims. First, they argued that because
attorney Levine had signed the notice of intention, rather than
Gemma, the lien was invalid under state law. Second, the Rossis
3
This amount reflected the full amount of Gem's claim, plus
costs incurred from the lien's enforcement.
-5-
claimed that the entire Mechanics' Lien Law was unconstitutional
because it violated their due process rights under both the federal
and Rhode Island constitutions.
After significant briefing and argument,4 the Superior
Court concluded that the Mechanics' Lien Law was unconstitutional
under both the state and federal constitutions. To reach this
conclusion, the court relied primarily on federal cases about
procedural due process. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1
(1991); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The court
reasoned that the Mechanics' Lien Law deprived the Rossis of a
significant property interest because it required them to pay the
value of the lien into the court registry in order to avoid the
negative consequences that flowed from owning encumbered property.
Additionally, the Superior Court held that this deprivation
occurred without adequate procedural safeguards: Rhode Island's
statutory procedures did not do enough to promptly remedy erroneous
deprivations. On May 30, 2003, the Superior Court entered judgment
in favor of the Rossis, dismissed the enforcement action against
them, and ordered the release of their funds from the court
registry. The court then temporarily stayed its judgment,
presumably to allow Gem the opportunity to appeal. It does not
4
At the invitation of the Superior Court, the Attorney
General and various building and trade associations filed briefs in
the case.
-6-
appear that the Superior Court ever addressed the Rossis' statutory
arguments for the lien's invalidity.
On June 5, 2003, Gem filed notice of appeal to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court. Gem also asked the Rhode Island Supreme
Court for a longer stay, which that court granted pending further
order.
The proceedings in the case attracted the attention of
the Rhode Island Legislature. On July 17, 2003, while Gem's appeal
in the Rhode Island Supreme Court was pending, the legislature
amended its Mechanics' Lien Law by adding a new provision. See
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws 978 (codified at R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-17.1
(2006)). In pertinent part, the new provision declared:
(a)If any person in interest, including, but
not limited to, an owner or contractor claims:
. . . (2) [that] it appears from the notice of
intention that the claimant has no valid lien
by reason of the character of or the contract
for the labor, materials or equipment and for
which a lien is claimed; or (3) that a notice
or other instrument has not been filed or
recorded in accordance with the applicable
provisions of § 34-28-1 et seq.; or (4) that
for any other reason a claimed lien is invalid
by reason or [sic] failure to comply with the
provisions of § 34-28-1 et seq., then in such
event, such person may apply forthwith to the
superior court for the county where the land
lies for an order to show cause why the lien
in question is invalid, or otherwise void, or
the basis of the lien is without probability
of a judgment rendered in favor of the lienor.
R.I. Gen Laws § 34-28-17.1 (2006). The legislature instructed that
the new provision would "take effect upon passage, and [would]
-7-
apply to all pending mechanics' liens under Chapter 34-28," and
that the law would also apply to future liens, petitions, and lien
substitutions. 2003 R.I. Pub. Laws 978, 979.
On September 16, 2003, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
directed the parties to include in their appellate briefs a
discussion of how the new statute affected the issues on appeal.
The parties complied.
On January 27, 2005, before the Rhode Island Supreme
Court had issued any decision, the Rossis filed a complaint against
Gemma and Levine in federal district court in Rhode Island. The
Rossis brought two main claims. First, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the Rossis asserted that Gemma and Levine had acted under
color of state law to deprive the Rossis of their federally
guaranteed rights to procedural due process.5 Federal jurisdiction
was alleged under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 for this claim.
Second, the Rossis invoked the court's supplemental jurisdiction,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and asserted a state law claim for slander of
title. The complaint sought a variety of remedies: a declaration
that Rhode Island's Mechanics' Lien Law was unconstitutional, a
declaration that Levine's signature was ineffective under state law
(thereby rendering the lien void), an injunction restraining Levine
5
The Rossis also claimed that Gemma and Levine had violated
similar guarantees in the Rhode Island Constitution.
-8-
and Gemma from further depriving the Rossis of their money, and
compensatory and punitive damages.
On February 22, 2005, approximately one month after this
federal complaint had been filed, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Gem and rejected the Rossis' constitutional
challenge. Gem, 867 A.2d at 818. The court first considered
whether it would analyze the constitutional issues with reference
to the old Mechanics' Lien Law, or the amended statute, and it
decided that the amended statute was applicable.6 Id. at 802. The
court then proceeded to analyze the constitutional issues presented
by the new statute in the context of the entire scheme set up by
the Rhode Island Mechanics' Lien Law.7
6
The court wrote:
Statutes are given retroactive effect only
when the legislature clearly expresses such an
application. Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour
Co., 637 A.2d 367, 371 (R.I. 1994). [The
amended Mechanics' Lien Law] . . . clearly
[was] intend[ed] to apply . . . both
prospectively to future mechanics' liens and
retrospectively to pending mechanics' liens.
Based on the clear language of the statute and
our caselaw, we are required to apply the
[amended law] to this appeal.
Gem, 867 A.2d at 802 (footnote omitted).
7
The court stated that this was no easy task because the law,
"having its roots in various predecessor statutes going back to
1847, has 'never been a model of clarity.'" Gem, 867 A.2d at 802
(quoting Faraone v. Faraone, 413 A.2d 90, 91 (R.I. 1980)); see also
id. at 818 (urging the legislature to write a "more plainly written
and user-friendly statute").
-9-
The court ultimately concluded that the statute, as
amended, passed constitutional muster. It held that operation of
the Mechanics' Lien Law constituted state action, notwithstanding
the fact that private parties like Gem are the ones who invoke the
law. Id. 808-09. It also agreed with the Rossis that Gem's use of
the Mechanics' Lien Law effected a deprivation of a significant
property interest because it clouded the Rossis' title. See id. at
809-10. Nonetheless, the court found that the amended statute was
constitutionally sound. It interpreted the amended statute to
allow for a prompt hearing at any time after the notice of
intention had been mailed -- a point in time that is usually before
the contractor obtains the right to sue to enforce the lien. Id.
at 811-12. The court further interpreted the amended statute to
require that this hearing "be given priority on the Superior Court
calendar," and explained that at the hearing a property owner would
have the opportunity to challenge the claimed lien on a number of
grounds. Id. at 812. The court held that this prompt opportunity
for a hearing, when combined with the pre-existing procedural
safeguards in the statute,8 sufficed to insulate the statute from
constitutional attack. See id. at 812-15, 818.
8
These other safeguards included the requirement that the
notice of intention be based on a sworn affidavit, see R.I. Gen.
Laws § 34-28-4(b), the fact that the Superior Court could award
legal and other fees and expenses to the prevailing party in a lien
enforcement action, see id. § 34-28-19, and the owner's opportunity
for a lien substitution, see id. § 34-28-17. See Gem, 867 A.2d at
812-13.
-10-
The court also "pause[d] to acknowledge an especially
peculiar facet of this case." Id. at 812. It observed that while
Rhode Island case law "clearly establishe[d]" that the court had to
apply the amended lien law on appeal, the amended statute had not
existed at the time the Superior Court had ruled on the Rossis'
motion. Id. Despite this acknowledgment, the Gem opinion did not
provide further commentary on this procedural wrinkle -- the
wrinkle that is the rub in this federal case. Instead, the court
vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case "[f]or
the reasons stated herein and because the [Superior Court] did not
have an opportunity to review the Mechanics' Lien Law as amended."
Id. at 818.
The Rossis did not go back to the Superior Court to ask
that they be given the funds held in the registry. Instead, on
March 17, 2005, the Rossis amended their federal court complaint
to add as a defendant Henry S. Kinch, Jr., the Clerk of the
Providence County Superior Court. Clerk Kinch was named a
defendant in his official capacity only, and the amended complaint
asserted only a § 1983 due process claim against him. The
complaint asked that Kinch be ordered to release the Rossis' funds
to them (with interest), as the funds were still being held in the
Superior Court's registry.
Gemma, Levine, and Kinch all filled motions asking the
federal court to dismiss the lawsuit, or in the alternative to
-11-
abstain from exercising jurisdiction. While those motions were
pending, on July 6, 2005, the Rossis filed a separate federal
complaint naming Gem as the sole defendant. This new lawsuit was
filed under a separate docket number, and assigned to the same
district court judge before whom the first federal lawsuit was
pending.
The new federal complaint alleged the same two primary
causes of action that the Rossis had brought against Gemma and
Levine: a § 1983 claim based on procedural due process, and a state
law slander of title claim.9 The Rossis sought the following forms
of relief: a declaration that the unamended version of the
Mechanics' Lien Law was unconstitutional, a declaration that Gem's
continued use of the Mechanics' Lien Law violated the Rossis' due
process rights, a declaration that Levine's signature rendered
Gem's lien void, an injunction to prevent Gem from depriving the
Rossis of the funds in the Superior Court's registry, an injunction
requiring Gem to cooperate with the Rossis in obtaining the release
of their funds, and compensatory and punitive damages.
The motions to dismiss the Rossis' first federal lawsuit
were referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended that the suit
be dismissed. The magistrate judge dealt first with the
defendants' argument that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the
9
As the Rossis did in their other federal complaint, they
also asserted their due process claim under the Rhode Island
Constitution.
-12-
Rossis' § 1983 claim. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine precludes district court jurisdiction in "cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments"); see also D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Citing
the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Exxon Mobil, the magistrate
judge agreed with Clerk Kinch that Rooker-Feldman barred the claim
against him. The judge pointed out that the Rossis did not sue
Kinch until after the Rhode Island Supreme Court had issued its
decision in Gem, and the judge further explained that because the
Rossis wanted Kinch to return the funds from the court registry,
they were seeking to undo a state court decision. However, the
magistrate judge also concluded that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the
claims against Gemma and Levine: since the Rossis had sued them
before the Gem opinion issued, the Rossis had not been "state-court
losers" at the time suit was filed.
The magistrate judge nonetheless concluded that both
claim and issue preclusion barred the § 1983 claims against Gemma
and Levine.10 As to claim preclusion, the magistrate judge found
10
In light of his disposition on the preclusion issues, the
magistrate judge did not reach the defendants' arguments that the
§ 1983 claim failed because the defendants did not act under color
-13-
that the Rossis could have asserted their § 1983 claim as a
counterclaim in the lien enforcement proceeding. Their failure to
do so, in the magistrate judge's view, meant that their claim was
barred.11 As to issue preclusion, the magistrate judge read the
Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Gem to have already
decided the constitutional claims that the Rossis were presenting
in their § 1983 action. Thus the magistrate judge held that issue
preclusion provided an independent reason to bar the constitutional
claims against Gemma and Levine.12
The magistrate judge next turned to the state law slander
of title claim against Gemma and Levine, and he concluded that the
court should abstain from deciding that claim under the doctrine of
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1976). Additionally, the magistrate judge recommended
that the district court decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over this state law claim; the judge explained that he
of state law, because there was no actual violation of a
constitutional right, or because the Rossis' had not shown an
entitlement to compensable damages.
11
The magistrate judge also explained that while the
defendants in the first federal action (Gemma and Levine) were not
parties to the state court action (which involved Gem), Gemma and
Levine were in privity with Gem.
12
In dealing with both issue preclusion and claim preclusion,
the magistrate judge rejected the Rossis' argument that there had
not yet been a final judgment against them in state court. Even
though the Rhode Island Supreme Court had remanded the case, the
magistrate judge reasoned that the opinion in Gem was a final
judgment on the merits as to the issues that it had resolved.
-14-
had recommended dismissal of all federal claims, and that, under
state law, the slander of title claim was not yet ripe.
The Rossis objected to the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation, and the issues from the first federal lawsuit were
presented to the district court. The court adopted the magistrate
judge's analysis and conclusion. Simultaneously, the district
court considered a motion for judgment on the pleadings that Gem
had filed in the second federal lawsuit. The court concluded that
the arguments presented in the lawsuit against Gem were identical
to the arguments presented in the lawsuit against Gemma and Levine,
and it granted Gem's motion.
The Rossis appealed the district court's decision in both
cases, and we consolidated the appeals.
II.
The parties present to us essentially the same arguments
that they made in the district court.13 The defendants argue that
there are a number of reasons why the district court correctly
dismissed the Rossis' claims, while the Rossis contend that each of
these arguments is in error. Nearly all of the dispute surrounds
the dismissal of the Rossis' § 1983 claims.
13
Levine did not a file a brief in this court, and it is
unclear if he continues to be a party to this appeal, and if so,
whether his intent is simply to rely on Gemma's brief. Gemma, for
his part, advances all of the same arguments he advanced in the
district court, with two exceptions -- he has apparently abandoned
his Rooker-Feldman argument, as well as his argument that the
defendants did not act under color of state law.
-15-
We do not reach the merits of these arguments, and we
instead conclude that abstention is the appropriate course.
However, in order to understand our abstention analysis, it is
important to understand the differing ways that the parties read
the Rhode Island Supreme Court's opinion in Gem.
The Rossis explicitly disavow any attempt to undo the
state court decision in Gem upholding the constitutionality of the
Mechanics' Lien Law. Rather, they believe that their § 1983 claims
are targeted towards a narrow issue: the fact that the operation of
the Rhode Island statute deprived them of a prompt opportunity for
a hearing, notwithstanding the fact that the statute now provides
such a hearing for others. The Rossis read Gem as having decided
only a facial attack on the Mechanics' Lien Law. They contend that
when the Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded the case, it intended
for the Superior Court to decide any as-applied claims that the
Rossis might have.
The Rossis also point out that their § 1983 claims
include a request for damages. Thus even if one interpreted Gem as
deciding an as-applied constitutional challenge, the Rossis argue
that one could still read Gem's "retrospectivity determination" --
its decision to evaluate the Rossis' constitutional claims with
reference to the amended Mechanics' Lien Law -- as having been made
solely in the context of the Rossis' motion to dismiss the
enforcement action against them. On this reading of Gem, the Rhode
-16-
Island Supreme Court did not go so far as to hold that the new
statute eliminated a cause of action for any damages suffered from
the operation of the old statute.
The defendants appear to recognize that the Rhode Island
Supreme Court never explicitly analyzed the constitutional issues
presented by the unamended version of the statute.14 Nonetheless,
they place great weight on the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
"retrospectivity determination." In the defendants' view, the
Rossis are essentially trying to undo the Gem opinion because they
want the federal court to decide that the old version of the
Mechanics' Lien Law applies to their claims. Additionally,
defendants Gem and Gemma reject even the Rossis' alternative
reading in which their damages claim is preserved;15 Gem and Gemma
characterize the Rhode Island Supreme Court as having said that the
amended statute "now applies as if it was always in existence."
These differing readings shape many of the arguments that
the parties make on appeal. Because the defendants think that the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has already rejected the Rossis' claims,
they assert that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and issue preclusion
(among other doctrines), bar the Rossis' § 1983 actions. And
14
Clerk Kinch, however, appears to argue that because the
Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's decision,
it necessarily rejected that court's constitutional analysis.
15
Only injunctive relief was sought against Clerk Kinch, and
so the Rossis' claim for damages has no bearing on his arguments.
-17-
because the Rossis read Gem differently, they think that their
§ 1983 claims are viable.
III.
An appellate court may order abstention when the issue
has been raised and briefed and requested by the federal
defendants, even though the issue was not addressed by the district
court in the first instance. See Ford Motor Co. v. Meredith Motor
Co., 257 F.3d 67, 71 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001); cf. Swisher v. Brady, 438
U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978) (declining to consider Younger abstention
in a case where the defendants had not requested it).
Although there are a variety of abstention doctrines,
these doctrines "are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal
courts must try to fit cases." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481
U.S. 1, 11 n.9; see also Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc., v.
Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, "the
categories do matter." Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 68. We think that
abstention is warranted under the rubric of Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), for the Rossis' constitutional claims.
A. Younger Abstention on the Equitable Claims
Younger abstention is most commonly applied to suits
seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, see Rio Grande, 397 F.3d
at 70, and we begin with the Rossis' requests for these remedies.
The Younger doctrine is based on principles of comity,
and unless there are extraordinary circumstances, it instructs
-18-
federal courts not to "interfere with ongoing state-court
litigation, or, in some cases, with state administrative
proceedings." Maymó-Meléndez v. Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 31
(1st Cir. 2004); see also Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). Although the doctrine
is frequently associated with state criminal prosecutions, it has
been extended to certain "coercive" civil cases. See Maymó-
Meléndez, 364 F.3d at 31 & n.3. Following Supreme Court case law,
see Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 432, we have articulated the
basic analytical framework for Younger abstention. Abstention is
appropriate when the requested relief would interfere (1) with an
ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) that implicates an important
state interest; and (3) that provides an adequate opportunity for
the federal plaintiff to advance his federal constitutional
challenge. See Brooks v. N.H. Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 638 (1st
Cir. 1996); Bettencourt v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 904 F.2d
772, 777 (1st Cir. 1990).16
The threshold issue of "interference" is clearly
satisfied here. Granting the Rossis' requests for injunctive
16
The Rossis briefly suggest that Younger is inapplicable here
because the Rhode Island Mechanics' Lien Law is flagrantly
unconstitutional. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611
(1975) (recognizing an exception to Younger when a statute is
flagrantly unconstitutional). We reject this argument out of hand.
Whatever the merits of the Rossis' constitutional challenge, the
Rhode Island statute is not so obviously invalid as to come within
this very narrow Younger exception.
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relief would substantially interfere with the lien enforcement
proceeding: if the Rossis obtain the return of their funds from the
court registry, they will deprive the Superior Court of its ability
to satisfy any claim that Gem may have against those funds. See
Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 70 ("Interference is . . . usually
expressed as a proceeding that either enjoins the state proceeding
or has the 'practical effect' of doing so."); see also Keystone
Elevator Co., Inc. v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 850 A.2d 912, 923
(R.I. 2004) (explaining that once there has been a lien
substitution, the funds in the registry become the sole security
for the former-lienholder's claim). Similarly, if the Rossis
obtain their requested declaratory relief, and it is adjudged that
the old Mechanics' Lien Law is unconstitutional as applied to them,
they will essentially have obtained a judgment that the
continuation of the state proceeding against them violates their
due process rights. This too is interference for Younger purposes.
See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1971); Rio Grande 397
F.3d at 70.
Turning to the three-part test for Younger, it is plain
that the first and third requirements are satisfied. There is an
ongoing judicial proceeding, as the lien enforcement action remains
pending before the Superior Court. And it is clear that the state
proceeding provides an adequate forum for the Rossis to present
their constitutional challenge. Indeed, the Rossis raised a due
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process challenge, had it at least partially adjudicated by the
state courts, and now actively contend that their as-applied
challenge is or will be pending before the Superior Court.17
That leaves the second Younger requirement, that "an
important state interest" be implicated. This requires slightly
more discussion. In several cases, the Supreme Court has
recognized that states "have important interests in administering
certain aspects of their judicial systems." Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at
12-13; see also Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 434-35 (state bar
disciplinary proceedings); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444
(1977) (writ of attachment proceedings instituted by the state);
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (state's process for
enforcing its contempt judgments); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior
Court of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 263 (1st Cir. 1993) (state's process
17
Even if the Rossis have not yet actually raised their as-
applied constitutional claim in state court, a point we do not
decide, there has been no showing that state procedural rules
prevent them from raising such a claim. See Maymó-Meléndez, 364
F.3d at 33 ("[W]hen a state judicial proceeding does occur, federal
judges usually say that the parties ought to raise all of their
claims, defenses[,] and objections. . . . [I]f they don't, they
should not later come and complain to the federal courts."); see
also Duty Free Shop, Inc. v. Administracion de Terrenos de P.R.,
889 F.2d 1181, 1183 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining that for Younger
purposes, all that matters is that the state proceeding give an
opportunity to make a constitutional argument).
The Rossis do seem to suggest that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's rules prevented them from making an as-applied
constitutional argument to that court. But they have not shown
that the argument is unavailable to them on remand in the Superior
Court, and it is their burden to show unavailability in the state
proceeding they wish to interfere with. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at
14.
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for enforcing its civil judgments through the use of civil
contempt). State proceedings can sometimes implicate these
interests even when the proceedings are initiated by private
actors. See Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 777 n.6 (discussing
Pennzoil).
The Supreme Court's decision in Pennzoil is especially
instructive. Pennzoil involved a breach of contract suit in the
Texas state courts between two corporations, Pennzoil and Texaco.
481 U.S. at 4. Pennzoil won a large jury verdict, and if it
recorded this judgment in any Texas county, and followed certain
other procedures, Texas law would have allowed it to enforce the
judgment through forced sale of Texaco property. See id. A
separate Texas rule provided that if Texaco wished to appeal the
trial court judgment, the only way Texaco could stave off
enforcement of the judgment during the appeal was if it posted a
bond. Id. at 4-5. The bond amount would have been prohibitively
large in that case. Id. at 5. But rather than challenge this
procedure in the Texas state courts, Texaco filed a § 1983 suit in
federal court claiming that the Texas procedure was
unconstitutional, and the company sought to enjoin Pennzoil from
enforcing its judgment. Id. at 6-7. The Supreme Court held that
Younger abstention was appropriate, and it decided that important
state interests were affected, even though the Texas procedures
served to vindicate the interests of private litigants. Id. at 10,
-22-
12-13. That was because the procedures stood "in aid of the
authority of the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments
are not rendered nugatory." Id. at 13 (quoting Juidice, 430 U.S.
at 336 n.12) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This case, like Pennzoil, "involve[s] challenges to the
processes by which the State compels compliance with the judgments
of its courts." Id. at 13-14. As in Pennzoil, a federal court is
being asked not only to "interfere with the execution of [a] state
judgment[], but [to] do so on grounds that challenge the very
process" from which that judgment derives. Id. at 14. And just as
Pennzoil involved a bond meant to act as security for Pennzoil's
anticipated final judgment, here the funds in the registry act as
security for Gem's anticipated successful claims.18
It is true, however, that this case differs from Pennzoil
in that the Rossis attack a pre-judgment process, rather than a
post-judgment process. And the Third Circuit, anxious to find a
limiting principle for Pennzoil, has speculated that "in an
appropriate case," Younger may not bar interference with a
18
Pennzoil cannot be distinguished on the ground that Texaco
had never presented its constitutional argument to the state
courts, whereas here the Rossis may have presented the Rhode Island
courts with their constitutional challenge. While the Pennzoil
court did discuss this fact, it was not part of its explanation for
why federal interference implicated an important state interest.
See 481 U.S. at 11-14; see also Kelm v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 420-21
(6th Cir. 1995) (reading this aspect of Pennzoil as pertaining to
whether the state proceedings provided an adequate opportunity for
presenting federal constitutional claims).
-23-
"privately initiated state proceeding in which the state court has
not yet rendered judgment." Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 109 (3d
Cir. 1989).
Whatever the merits of the Third Circuit's concerns, this
is not an "appropriate case" to prevent Younger abstention.
Instead, this case presents special concerns because the state
court proceeding, a petition to enforce a mechanics' lien, is an in
rem proceeding under state law. See Tilcon Gammino, Inc. v.
Commercial Assocs., 570 A.2d 1102, 1107 (R.I. 1990). Consistent
with the in rem nature of the proceeding, the Superior Court has
taken jurisdiction over a res, and the Rossis' funds are in the
court's registry. It is well established that this provides strong
reasons to defer to a state court proceeding. See Colorado River,
424 U.S. at 818; Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412
(1964).19 Thus, we conclude that the Rossis seek to interfere with
a state proceeding in a way that implicates an important state
interest, and so the second test under Younger has been met. Cf.
Kelm v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 419-20 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying
Younger in a pre-judgment civil proceeding based on the unique
19
We note that the Rossis' constitutional challenge goes to
the very authority of the state court to administer the res, and it
is not simply a request to adjudicate a claimed entitlement to a
portion of the res. Cf. United States v. Fairway Capital Corp.,
483 F.3d 34, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2007); Bergeron v. Estate of Loeb, 777
F.2d 792, 798-99 (1st Cir. 1985).
-24-
concerns surrounding interference with a state's domestic relations
law).
We find that Younger abstention is appropriate on the
Rossis' § 1983 claims for equitable relief. We affirm the district
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims insofar
as they seek equitable relief. See Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 781.
B. Younger Abstention on the Damages Claims
The Rossis' claims for damages present a somewhat
different concern. Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided
whether Younger is applicable to § 1983 damages actions, see
Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988) (reserving the
issue), our circuit has determined that Younger can in fact be
applicable to damages actions in appropriate cases. See
Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 777; Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628
F.2d 736, 743 (1st Cir. 1980); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249,
1251, 1253-54 (1st Cir. 1974). This is such a case.
We explained above that the three Younger requirements
are met by the Rossis' equitable claims, and those requirements are
met by their damages claims for the same reasons. However, the
threshold Younger issue, that the requested relief interfere with
an ongoing judicial proceeding, necessitates slightly more
discussion in the damages context.
We have recognized that a § 1983 damages award may
interfere with a state proceeding because it can have the same
-25-
practical effect as a declaratory judgment: the federal court has
produced a ruling on the merits that the federal plaintiff can then
use to alter the state proceeding. See Landrigan, 628 F.2d at 743;
accord Deakins, 484 U.S. at 209 (White, J., concurring). That
logic applies to this case. If the Rossis obtain a § 1983 damages
award based on a successful due process argument, there is little
practical difference than if they had obtained a declaratory
judgment based on the same constitutional claim.
In light of this, we think that abstention is
appropriate on the § 1983 damages claims, in addition to the
abstention on the § 1983 equitable claims. However, there is one
important difference. When a court orders abstention on a damages
claim, it ordinarily may only stay the action, rather than dismiss
the action in its entirety. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996). Without addressing whether Quackenbush
governs this case, we think that a stay is appropriate here. Cf.
Deakins, 484 U.S. at 202 (holding that a court cannot use Younger
to dismiss a damages claim when the state proceeding cannot redress
the claims for monetary relief); Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 781
(suggesting that a stay is appropriate when the state proceeding
does not actually involve a claim for damages). Accordingly, we
remand the case with instructions that the district court stay the
§ 1983 damages actions pending the completion of state court
proceedings.
-26-
IV.
In addition to their federal constitutional claims, the
Rossis brought state law claims for slander of title against Gem,
Gemma, and Levine, and they also sought a declaration that Gem's
lien was invalid under state law.20 The district court dismissed
these state law claims for two reasons: it thought that abstention
was appropriate under Colorado River, and it also exercised its
discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c).
Insofar as the Rossis sought a declaratory judgment that
Gem's lien was invalid under state law, we review the district
20
The magistrate judge treated the Rossis' request for
declaratory relief as part of their slander of title claim, and the
Rossis appear to do so as well. We think it is more appropriate to
treat it as a separate claim for relief arising under state law.
Cf. Peckham v. Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663, 666-67 (R.I. 1990)
(stating the elements for slander of title under state law). We
note that if we treated the claim as the magistrate judge did, it
would not change our analysis.
We also note that the Rossis have apparently abandoned, in
federal court, any claim for relief under the Rhode Island
Constitution. Throughout their brief, the Rossis refer to their
constitutional claims as arising under § 1983, which of course only
applies to the deprivation of rights guaranteed by federal law.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moreover, the Rossis' brief never cites the
Rhode Island constitutional provision that they relied on in their
complaint. In fact, they identify their slander of title claim as
the only state law claim over which the district court should have
exercised supplemental jurisdiction. In these circumstances, we
believe that the Rossis have waived any argument that the district
court erred in dismissing their state constitutional claims. See
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 906 F.2d 25, 40-41 (1st
Cir. 1990) (issues not raised in an appellant's opening brief are
waived); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)
(issues that lack developed argumentation in an appellant's brief
are deemed waived).
-27-
court's dismissal for something akin to abuse of discretion. See
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288-89 (1995) (explaining
that under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a district court has
discretion whether or not to exercise jurisdiction).21 Importantly,
even though the district court concluded that there were
"exceptional circumstances" sufficient to justify abstention under
Colorado River, the Supreme Court has made clear that when
declaratory relief is sought under state law, the rigorous Colorado
River test need not be met, and a much more lenient standard is
applicable. See id. at 287-88.
Here, the district court correctly noted that the
validity of Gem's lien is an issue that has been presented in the
state court proceedings. It was within the district court's
discretion to dismiss the claim for declaratory relief on this
21
Our cases have sometimes used slightly different terms to
describe the appropriate standard of review for dismissal of a
declaratory judgment action. In at least two post-Wilton cases, we
have simply said that review is for "abuse of discretion." See
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth., 233 F.3d 127,
130 (1st Cir. 2000); DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 313 (1st
Cir. 1997). In another post-Wilton case, however, we said that
review "'is conducted under a standard slightly more rigorous than
abuse of discretion.'" Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13,
39 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Providence & Worcester R.R. Co., 798 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1986)).
We need not resolve any apparent inconsistency here, as under
either articulation of the standard the district court acted well
within its discretion.
-28-
ground. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491,
494-96 (1942).22
That leaves only the state law damages claims against
Gem, Gemma, and Levine for slander of title. We bypass the
Colorado River analysis, and go straight to the district court's
declination of supplemental jurisdiction.23 That declination is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Gonzalez-De Blasini v.
Family Dep't., 377 F.3d 81, 89 (1st Cir. 2004).
The Rossis contend that the district court abused its
discretion because, as a matter of state law, it erred in
concluding that the Rossis' slander of title claims were not yet
ripe. But even assuming that the district court erred in its
state-law ripeness determination, it still acted appropriately in
declining supplemental jurisdiction.
22
The Rossis point out that while Gem is a party to the state
court lien enforcement petition, Levine and Gemma are not. Cf.
Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495 ("Ordinarily it would be uneconomical as
well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory
judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court
presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between
the same parties.") (emphasis added). Yet the Rossis have not
disputed the magistrate judge's finding that Gemma and Levine are
in privity with Gem. In this situation, we cannot say that the
district court acted outside its discretion in declining to
adjudicate the Rossis' claim for declaratory relief. Cf. New
Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int'l Union, 946 F.2d 1072, 1073 (4th Cir.
1991) (explaining that suits can trigger Colorado River abstention
when they involve "substantially the same parties"); LaDuke v.
Burlington N. R.R. Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1559 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
23
Gem, Gemma, Levine, and the Rossis are all Rhode Island
citizens, so there is no argument that diversity jurisdiction could
provide an alternative basis for federal jurisdiction.
-29-
At the time the district court made its ruling, it had
dismissed all federal claims on the pleadings, and so dismissal of
the state claims was perfectly reasonable. "As a general
principle, the unfavorable disposition of a plaintiff's federal
claims at the early stages of a suit . . . will trigger the
dismissal without prejudice of any supplemental state-law claims."
Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir.
1995); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
While we have dismissed the Rossis' federal claims for
equitable relief, we have merely stayed their federal claims for
monetary relief. But the distinction makes no difference for the
slander of title claims; we do not believe that Congress meant to
preclude the exercise of the district court's discretion to dismiss
state claims, this early in the litigation, once the court will not
go forward on any federal claims. Cf. United Mine Workers of Am.
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966). That is particularly so in
light of the relative novelty of the state law claim.24 Cf. 28
24
The Rossis argue that it is clear under state law that Gem's
lien is invalid because Levine was not competent to sign the
affidavit which accompanied Gem's notice of intention. See Conti
v. Geffroy, 486 A.2d 579, 581 (R.I. 1985). That may or may not be
correct. But the Rossis' claim for relief is based on slander of
title, a claim which requires a showing that "the defendant
maliciously uttered false statements about the plaintiff's
ownership of real estate which resulted in the plaintiff sustaining
an actual pecuniary loss." DeLeo v. Anthony A. Nunes, Inc., 546
A.2d 1344, 1346 (R.I. 1988). The Rossis' theory is that because
the lien was invalid under the Mechanics' Lien Law, it was
therefore "defamatory from the outset." It is not at all clear
that such a scenario is equivalent to the malicious uttering of
-30-
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). Accordingly, we sustain the district court's
dismissal of the state law slander of title claims, although we
clarify that this dismissal must be without prejudice.
V.
We make a further comment. The sum of money at issue in
this lawsuit is surely not enough to have justified the extensive
litigation in federal court. Plaintiffs initially chose to present
their federal claims to the state courts, and they may wish to
consider whether continuation of a stayed federal action is
worthwhile.
The district court's judgment is affirmed insofar as it
dismissed the Rossis' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief,
vacated as to its dismissal of the Rossis' claims for monetary
relief, and remanded with instructions (1) to stay the Rossis'
§ 1983 claims insofar as they seek monetary damages, and (2) to
dismiss the state law slander of title claims without prejudice
insofar as those claims seek monetary relief. Each side shall bear
its own costs.
false statements.
-31-
Rossi v. Gemma
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date filed: 2007-05-31
Citations: 489 F.3d 26
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