Shook, Karen v. DC Fincl Respsble

                        United States Court of Appeals


                     FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT


Argued November 4, 1997                               Decided January 6, 1998 


                                 No. 97-7087


                            Karen Shook, et al., 

                                  Appellants


                                      v.


               District of Columbia Financial Responsibility  

                    and Management Assistance Authority, 

                                   Appellee


                Appeal from the United States District Court 

                        for the District of Columbia 

                                  (96cv2601)


     Barbara S. Wahl argued the cause for appellants, with 
whom Evan S. Stolove and Ronald C. Jessamy were on the 
briefs.

     Daniel A. Rezneck argued the cause and filed the brief for 
appellee.


     Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for amici curiae 
Missionary Baptist Ministers Conference for Washington 
D.C. and Vicinity, et al.

     Before:  Silberman, Williams, and Garland, Circuit 
Judges.

     Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

      Silberman, Circuit Judge:  Appellants challenge an order 
issued by the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility 
and Management Assistance Authority (Control Board), di-
vesting the District of Columbia Board of Education of con-
trol over the District's public schools and transferring the 
vast majority of the Board of Education's powers to an 
Emergency Transitional Education Board of Trustees.  The 
district court dismissed appellants' claims that the order 
exceeded the scope of the Control Board's statutory authority 
and violated appellants' Fifth Amendment rights.  We affirm 
in part and reverse in part.

                                      I.


     The District of Columbia Board of Education was created 
by Congress in 1906.  At the time of its inception, its nine 
members were appointed by the judges of the Supreme Court 
of the District of Columbia (something of a forerunner to the 
present federal courts).  Congress placed "control" of the 
District's public schools in the Board of Education, giving it a 
wide range of powers, including determination of general 
educational policy, appointment of teachers, and selection and 
supervision of the Superintendent.  In 1968, Congress 
changed the method of selecting the Board of Education to 
election by District citizens.  Five years later, Congress 
passed the District of Columbia Self-Government and Gov-
ernmental Reorganization Act (Home Rule Act), which grant-
ed greater rights of self-determination to District citizens and 
set forth the structural framework of the District government 
in the District Charter.  Similar in certain respects to a state 
constitution, the Charter established the Board of Education 
as one of five independent agencies existing outside the 


control of the executive or legislative branches of the District 
government.  Home Rule Act ' 495, D.C. Code Ann. 
s 31-101 (1981).  Under the Charter, the Board of Education 
retained all authority that previously had been granted to it 
by Congress, including "control of the public schools."  The 
Board of Education is required to appoint a Superintendent 
who "shall have the direction of and supervision in all matters 
pertaining to the instruction in all the schools under the 
Board of Education."  D.C. Code Ann. s 31-107 (1981).  The 
Superintendent may be removed at any time by the Board of 
Education "for adequate cause affecting his character and 
efficiency as Superintendent."  D.C. Code Ann. s 31-110 
(1981).

     In 1995, 22 years after the advent of home rule, Congress 
found that the District government was in the midst of a 
"fiscal emergency," plagued by "pervasive" mismanagement 
and "fail[ing] to deliver effective or efficient services" to 
residents.  District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and 
Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-8, 
s 2(a)(1), (2) & (4), 109 Stat. 97, 98 (1995) (FRMAA).  In 
response, it established what is popularly known as the 
Control Board.  Composed of five members appointed by the 
President of the United States, the Control Board has been 
given wide-ranging powers to improve the District govern-
ment's operations.

     In 1996, Congress amended the FRMAA to strengthen the 
Control Board.  Under section 207(d), it was given the ability 
to issue:

          such orders, rules, or regulations as it considers appro-
          priate to carry out the purposes of this Act and the 
          amendments made by this Act, to the extent that the 
          issuance of such an order, rule, or regulation is within 
          the authority of the Mayor or the head of any depart-
          ment or agency of the District government, and any such 
          order, rule, or regulation shall be legally binding to the 
          same extent as if issued by the Mayor or the head of any 
          such department or agency.  (Emphasis added).
          

The Control Board, exercising power under that section, 
issued an order on November 15, 1996, reorganizing adminis-
tration of the District's public schools.  After finding what it 
perceived as the alarming condition of the school system, the 
November Order "established a 9-member Emergency Tran-
sitional Education Board of Trustees ... to assume immedi-
ate responsibility for the operation and management of the 
District of Columbia public school system." 1  November Or-
der at p 2.  The Board of Trustees was delegated "all the 
authority, powers, functions, duties, responsibilities, exemp-
tions, and immunities of the Board of Education."  Id. at p 6.  
The Order also discharged the Superintendent and re-
designated his position as the CEO-Superintendent, an agent 
of the Control Board.  The Control Board asserted the power 
to appoint the first CEO-Superintendent, but delegated the 
responsibility to appoint his successors to the Board of Trust-
ees subject to the Control Board's approval.  The Control 
Board or the Board of Trustees with the approval of the 
Control Board was empowered to remove the Superintendent 
from office at will.  Id. at pp 7, 21.  The Board of Education 
was left only with authority to license charter schools and to 
provide advice to the Board of Trustees, although its Presi-
dent was made a member of the Board of Trustees.

     The Control Board's order relied on authority under sec-
tion 207(d) to step into the shoes of the Board of Education, 
and with that power it in turn relied on D.C. Code section 
31-107, which reads in part, "[t]he Board of Education is 
authorized to delegate any of its authority to the Superinten-
dent.  The Superintendent is authorized to redelegate any of 
his or her authority subject to the approval of the Board."  
The order, however, provides for a direct delegation from the 

__________
     1  The Board of Trustees is made up of five members appointed 
by the Control Board, a parent with at least one child in the District 
public schools (selected by the Control Board from a list of three 
parents provided by the Mayor), a teacher in the District public 
schools (selected by the Control Board from a list of three teachers 
provided by the Council), the CEO-Superintendent of the public 
school system, and the President of the Board of Education.  No-
vember Order at p 2.


Control Board to the Board of Trustees and a direct delega-
tion from the Control Board to the Superintendent to perform 
all the duties theretofore performed by the old Superinten-
dent as well as any other powers delegated by the Board of 
Trustees.

     Appellants are 11 present and former members of the 
Board of Education who voted in the November 1996 Board 
of Education elections and sued in the district court seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief.  They claimed for a number 
of reasons that the order exceeded the Control Board's 
authority and even violated the Constitution by abridging 
their Fifth Amendment right to vote for school board mem-
bers.  The district court rejected all of appellants' claims on a 
motion to dismiss.  Addressing appellants' argument that 
even if the Control Board had the power to step into the 
shoes of the Board of Education it surely could not, in that 
capacity, delegate the Board of Education's responsibility to a 
Board of Trustees--it could only delegate to the Superinten-
dent--the court said,

          In promulgating the November Order, the Control Board 
          delegated nearly all of the Board of Education's authori-
          ty to the Board of Trustees.  Some of that power has 
          been re-delegated by the Board of Trustees to the CEO-
          Superintendent.  D.C. Code section 31-107 clearly con-
          templates that such a delegation would be lawful if 
          undertaken by the Board of Education itself to the 
          Superintendent, and by the Superintendent to a third 
          party.  Therefore, the delegation, when undertaken by 
          the Control Board, standing in the Board of Education's 
          shoes, must also be lawful under FRMAA section 207(d).

Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility and Management Assis-
tance Auth., 964 F. Supp. 416, 429 (D.D.C. 1997) (emphasis 
added).

                                     II.


     The Control Board contends, prompted by our own request 
that both parties discuss the issue, that we lack jurisdiction to 


review its action because section 207(d)(3) of the statute 
creating the Control Board provides that:  "[t]he decision by 
the [Control Board] to issue an order, rule, or regulation 
pursuant to this subsection shall be final and shall not be 
subject to judicial review."  We certainly respect congression-
al limitations of judicial review, see, e.g., Ayuda, Inc. v. 
Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1339-40 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated, 
498 U.S. 1117 (1991), aff'd on remand, 948 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 
1991), vacated sub nom. Ayuda, Inc. v. Reno, 509 U.S. 916 
(1993), aff'd on remand, 7 F.3d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994), but we are bound to follow the 
Supreme Court's doctrine under which "[t]he presumption in 
favor of judicial review may be overcome only upon a showing 
of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative 
intent."  Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 542 (1988) (citing 
Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (citations 
omitted)).

     With that in mind, we note that the preclusion of review 
language is rather peculiar.  It does not say that an order 
issued by the Control Board is immune from judicial review, 
but rather that the decision to issue such an order is not 
reviewable.  Turning to the legislative history for clarifica-
tion, we find in the Conference Report accompanying the 
1996 Amendments an explanation that the language was 
designed to "waive[ ] all judicial review as to the authority of 
the control board to issue orders, rules, or regulations but 
does not waive judicial review as to the content of the orders, 
rules, and regulations."  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863, at 1182 
(1996).  We confess that we are uncertain as to what line 
Congress was drawing.  It appears most likely that Congress 
meant the Control Board could not be challenged as to its 
basic authority to issue orders, rules, or regulations--it is an 
unpaid voluntary group that was to be recognized as exercis-
ing governmental powers--and that its internal decisionmak-
ing process was not reviewable, but the actual content of 
individual orders could be challenged as exceeding its authori-
ty.  The Control Board's counsel bravely asserted that no 
Control Board order, no matter how outrageous (including, 
hypothetically, taking control of the Prince George's County 


school system), could be challenged in federal court, but we 
simply do not believe that such an awesome delegation of 
unchecked authority can be drawn from Congress' unclear 
statutory wording (and an ambiguous Conference Report).  If 
we had any doubt as to that conclusion--which we do not--we 
would have to consider that preclusion of judicial review is 
particularly disfavored when applied to prevent a plaintiff 
from asserting a constitutional claim.  See Bowen v. Michi-
gan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 
(1986).

                                     III.


     Turning to the merits, appellants present both broad and 
narrow challenges to the Control Board's order.  The broad 
challenge--contesting the Control Board's authority to en-
croach into the domain of the Board of Education--is based 
primarily on the claim that the Control Board's power is 
limited vis-