IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ( FOR PUBLICATION
(
Appellee, ( Filed: September 28, 1998
(
(
v. ( Madison Circuit
(
( Hon. Whit LaFon,
DENNIS KEITH and, ( Judge
TIMOTHY COLLINS
Appellants.
(
(
(
FILED
No. 02S01-9604-CC-00035
September 28, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
For State-Appellee: For Defendants-Appellants:
John Knox Walkup Joe H. Byrd, Jr.
Attorney General & Reporter Jackson, Tennessee
Michael E. Moore
Solicitor General
Elizabeth T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Nashville, Tennessee
James G. Woodall
District Attorney General
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District
Jackson, Tennessee
Nick Nicola
Assistant District Attorney General
Jackson, Tennessee
OPINION
AFFIRMED. DROWOTA, J.
We granted this appeal to consider two issues: 1) whether the investigative
automobile stop in this case was based upon reasonable suspicion, supported by
specific and articulable facts, that a crime was being committed; and 2) whether
the search warrant in this case is invalid because the issuing judge failed to
complete the jurat attesting that the affidavit in support of issuance of the warrant
was executed under oath by the affiant.
Upon careful consideration, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals
that the investigative automobile stop was based upon reasonable suspicion and
therefore constitutionally permissible. We have also determined that although it is
preferable that every affidavit contain a completed jurat, the omission of, or defect
in, the jurat does not affect the validity of a warrant issued upon probable cause
when it is proven by extrinsic evidence that the supporting affidavit was properly
sworn by the affiant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals which reversed the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to
suppress. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further necessary
proceedings.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 9, 1993, Investigator Danny Mullikin of the Drug Task Force
of the 26th Judicial District, received information from a confidential informant that
the defendants, Dennis Keith and Timothy Collins were storing illegal drugs in
their home located at 225 Hollywood in the City of Jackson. The informant also
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provided a physical description of the defendants. This confidential informant
previously had supplied the Task Force with reliable information which had
resulted in five separate arrests for narcotic-related offenses and the seizure of
contraband. Responding to this information, Investigator Mullikin initiated
surveillance of the residence located at 225 Hollywood, and on one occasion, he
observed a red Honda CRX vehicle parked outside the residence.
Approximately three days after receiving the information from the
confidential informant, on the evening of September 12, 1993, Investigator Mullikin
received a telephone call from an anonymous informant who also related that the
residents of the house located at 225 Hollywood were involved in the possession
and sale of illegal drugs. The informant claimed to have observed illegal drugs
inside the residence within four days of the call. The informant further claimed
that shortly before placing the call he observed marijuana in a red Honda CRX
vehicle which was parked outside the residence and saw both suspects present at
the residence. The anonymous informant supplied defendant Collins’ name as
the owner of the Honda and also provided a physical description of both
defendants which matched the descriptions previously given by the confidential
informant. Finally, the anonymous informant said the defendants worked during
the day but used the Honda to sell and deliver illegal drugs late at night.
Less than one hour after receiving the phone call from the anonymous
informant, Investigator Mullikin and another officer again set up surveillance near
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the defendants’ residence. They observed the red Honda vehicle at the
residence, and approximately five minutes after the officers arrived, two
individuals matching the physical descriptions given by both informants came out
of the residence and entered the automobile. When the vehicle left the driveway
and traveled north on Hollywood, the officers followed and stopped it
approximately one-fourth of a mile from the residence.
Defendant Collins was driving the automobile and Keith was the passenger.
After confirming that Collins owned the car, Investigator Mullikin obtained
permission from Collins to search the vehicle. During the search, the officers
discovered a small amount of marijuana and two Lorazepam tablets, a Schedule
IV controlled substance. Collins said the Lorazepam tablets had been given to
him by a female friend and admitted that he did not have a prescription for the
drugs.
The officers placed Collins and Keith under arrest and then sought a
warrant to search the residence. Investigator Mullikin provided an affidavit in
support of issuance of the search warrant, and in it he recounted the fact that
illegal drugs had been found in the defendants’ vehicle during the investigative
stop. A search warrant was issued by Walter Drake, Municipal Court Judge of the
City of Jackson. The officers executed the search warrant and seized from the
residence several pounds of marijuana, marijuana seed, Xanax, LSD, several
other pills, and drug paraphernalia.
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As a result of the search, the defendants were charged by indictment with
possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, possession of Schedule IV
controlled substances with intent to sell or deliver, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. The defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized during the
search of the Honda automobile and during the search of their residence. They
argued that their constitutional rights under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution had
been violated because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the
investigative stop of their automobile. The defendants also argued that the
evidence seized during the search of their residence should be suppressed as
“fruit of the poisonous tree” because a portion of the information contained in the
affidavit supporting issuance of the search warrant was derived from the illegal
investigative stop.
Following a hearing, the trial judge found the investigative stop of the
defendants’ automobile constitutionally invalid and, therefore, granted the motions
to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the vehicle and during the
search of the defendants’ residence. The State sought and obtained an
interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s decision. Finding that the evidence in the
record preponderated against the trial court’s conclusion that the anonymous tip
was not sufficiently reliable to establish reasonable suscipion to support the
investigative stop of the defendants’ vehicle, the Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for further proceedings.
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Thereafter, the defendants filed a joint application for permission to appeal in this
Court, arguing first that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that the
evidence preponderated against the trial court’s decision, and second, that the
search of the defendants’ residence was constitutionally invalid because the
affidavit supporting issuance of the search warrant does not contain a written
certificate of the issuing judge attesting that the affidavit had been sworn. We
granted the defendants’ application for permission to appeal and, for the reasons,
hereafter explained, now affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, “[q]uestions
of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution
of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of
fact.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). We afford to the party
prevailing in the trial court the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all
reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. The
findings of a trial court in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence
preponderates against those findings. Id. The application of the law to the facts
found by the trial court, however, is a question of law which this Court reviews de
novo. State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).
REASONABLE SUSPICION
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In this Court, the defendants initially contend that the investigative
automobile stop was unconstitutional because the anonymous informant’s tip did
not demonstrate the informant’s veracity or basis of knowledge as required by this
Court’s decisions in State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989) and State v.
Pulley, 863 S.W .2d 29 (Tenn. 1993). The State responds that the investigative
stop in this case was constitutionally permissible, considering the totality of the
circumstances, including the information which previously had been provided by
the confidential informant and the independent police corroboration, because the
law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and
articulable facts, to believe that the defendants were committing a crime.
Both the Fourth Amendment 1 to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 72 of the Constitution of Tennessee prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures and direct that search warrants be issued upon probable cause. These
constitutional provisions are designed to “safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions of government officials.” Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967);
1
The F ourth Am endm ent is app licable to the s tates throu gh the F ourteen th Am endm ent.
Map p v. O hio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The text of the
Fourth Amendment is as follows: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warr ants shall is sue , but u pon prob able c aus e, su ppo rted b y oath or aff irm ation , and partic ularly
describ ing the plac e to be se arched , and the p ersons or things to be seized .”
2
Article I, Section 7 provides “that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general warrants,
whereby an officer may be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of the fact
com mitte d, or to seize any pe rson or pe rson s not nam ed, w hos e off enc es ar e not partic ularly
describ ed and suppo rted by evide nce, are dange rous to liber ty and oug ht not to be granted .”
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see also State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997); Sneed v. State,
221 Tenn. 6, 13, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (1968).
Accordingly, under both the federal and state constitutions, warrantless
searches and seizures such as the investigative automobile stop which occurred
in this case are presumed to be unreasonable. Evidence discovered as a result
thereof is subject to suppression unless the prosecution demonstrates by a
preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure was conducted
pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement. Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 654, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971);
Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 630; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn.
1992).
One such exception was announced in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), in which the United
States Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer may temporarily seize a
citizen if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and
articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been, is being, or is about to be
committed. An investigative stop of an automobile is also constitutional if law
enforcement officials have a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and
articulable facts, that the occupants of the vehicle have committed, are
committing, or are about to commit a criminal offense. United States v. Cortez,
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449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Prouse, 440 U.S.
at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401; Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 631; Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 294.
Moreover, the facts forming the basis of an officer’s reasonable suspicion need
not rest upon the personal knowledge or observation of the officer. Indeed, in
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612
(1972), the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument “that reasonable
cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer’s personal
observation”3 and sustained a Terry investigative stop and frisk undertaken on the
basis of a tip given to the officer by a known informant who had provided reliable
information in the past. Id. 407 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. at 1924.4
This Court also has upheld the constitutionality of investigative stops of
motor vehicles based upon reasonable suspicion, and we have approved such
stops even though the specific and articuable facts establishing the reasonable
suspicion were derived from anonymous tips. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 781
(Tenn. 1998); Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 29. However, when law enforcement officials
initiate an investigative stop as a result of information provided by an anonymous
informant, Tennessee law requires some showing of both the informant’s veracity
or credibility and his or her basis of knowledge. Id.; compare Jacumin, 778
S.W.2d at 436 (discussing the showing required when an anonymous informant’s
tip is relied upon to establish probable cause for issuance of a warrant). While
3
Id., 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. at 1923.
4
At the time of the decision in A da m s, the two-pronged veracity and basis of knowledge test
was the standard employed by federal courts to analyze the reliability of an informant’s tip. The
federa l courts did not adop t the “totality of the c ircum stance s” test un til 1983. See Illinois v. Gates,
462 U .S. 213, 10 2 S.Ct. 23 17, 76 L.E d.2d 527 (1983).
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independent police corroboration may be relied upon to make up deficiencies,
“each prong represents an independently important consideration that must be
separately considered and satisfied in some way.” Simpson, 968 S.W.2d at 781;
Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 31.
We have recognized, however, that
[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different in quantity or content
than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense
that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less
reliable than that required to show probable cause.
Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 32, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct.
2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (emphasis added). As a result, the two-
pronged test of reliability is not as strictly applied if the anonymous informant’s tip
is being used to establish reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop rather
than probable cause for a search or seizure. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d at 782. In
evaluating the reliability of an anonymous informant’s tip, the circumstances under
which a tip is given are important and may sufficiently relate the informant’s basis
of knowledge, even in the absence of an explicit statement by the informant. Id.
For example, if an informant reports an incident at or near the time of its
occurrence, “a court can often assume that the report is first-hand, and hence
reliable.” Id. In addition, if a tip is contemporaneously corroborated by police, it is
reasonable to infer eyewitness reliability of the informant. Id. Police corroboration
of several aspects of an informant’s report may also satisfy unknowns about an
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informant’s credibility. Id. Establishing that an anonymous informant’s data is
reliable may also satisfy the credibility prong. State v. Ballard, 836 S.W.2d 560,
562 (Tenn. 1992).
Considering the information provided by the anonymous informant in this
case in light of these well-settled principles of law, we conclude that the proof in
this record preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the veracity and
reliability of the tip were not sufficiently established. The anonymous informant
provided law enforcement officials with the name of one of the defendants, a
physical description of both defendants, a description of the vehicle which they
allegedly were using in drug transactions, a description of their schedule, and the
location of the defendants’ residence in which illegal drugs were being stored. In
addition, the anonymous informant told officers that the two suspects and the
vehicle were then present at the house located at 225 Hollywood. Finally, the
anonymous informant claimed to have observed marijuana inside the vehicle
shortly before placing the call and also claimed to have observed illegal drugs
inside the house within the previous four days.
Some of the information provided by the anonymous informant was
immediately corroborated by the information previously provided by the
confidential informant, including the location of the residence, the physical
description of the defendants, and the presence of illegal drugs inside the
residence within the previous days. In addition, the officers themselves previously
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had observed at 225 Hollywood a vehicle matching the description given by the
anonymous informant.
Other details were corroborated when the officers arrived at the scene
within an hour of the tip. For example, as claimed by the informant, both the
vehicle and two individuals matching the descriptions given by both of the
informants were present at the residence when police arrived. In addition, police
observed the suspects leave the house in the Honda late in the evening, which
was behavior consistent with the pattern of operation described by the anonymous
informant. As previously stated, if a tip is contemporaneously corroborated by
police, it is reasonable to infer the first-hand, eyewitness reliability of the
informant. In our view, the circumstances under which the tip was given, and the
police corroboration of several key aspects of the tip sufficiently satisfy the two-
pronged test of reliability.
As the United States Supreme Court recently has recognized,
[a]rticulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable
cause’ mean is not possible. They are common sense, nontechnical
conceptions that deal with the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L.Ed.2d
911 (1996). In evaluating whether a police officer has a reasonable suspicion,
supported by specific and articulable facts, a court must consider the totality of the
circumstances. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 632; Watkins, 827 S.W.2d at 294; Cortez,
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449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. at 695. Circumstances relevant to the evaluation
include, but are not limited to, the officer’s personal objective observations,
information obtained from other police officers or agencies, information obtained
from citizens, and the pattern of operation of certain offenders. A court must also
consider the rational inferences and deductions that a trained officer may draw
from the facts and circumstances known to him--inferences and deductions that
might well elude an untrained person. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 632; Watkins, 827
S.W.2d at 294; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21,
88 S.Ct. at 1880. Finally, the content, quality, and quantity of information
possessed by police must be assessed in determining whether it is sufficiently
reliable to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Id.
The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more
than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. The
Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective
justification for making the stop. That level of suspicion is
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
the evidence.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (internal citations and quotations
omitted); see also Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 632.
Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, including the
personal observations of the officers, the information provided by the confidential
informant, and the information provided by the anonymous informant, we conclude
that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding and instead
demonstrates that the officers had a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific
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and articulable facts, that the defendants were committing or about to commit a
criminal offense.
VALIDITY OF AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING SEARCH WARRANT
Having determined that the investigative automobile stop was
constitutionally valid, we must next consider the defendants’ contention that the
evidence seized from the residence pursuant to the warrant should be suppressed
because the judge failed to sign the jurat attesting that the affidavit was executed
under oath. This is an issue of first impression in Tennessee.
A brief summary of the relevant facts is necessary to place this issue in
context. Since the trial court in this case suppressed the evidence seized
pursuant to the warrant as “fruit of the poisonous tree” upon finding the initial
investigative stop invalid, the defendants did not seek to have the warrant itself
declared invalid in the trial court. While the defendants mentioned the issue in
their brief to the Court of Criminal Appeals, they did not diligently pursue this issue
until they filed their joint application for permission to appeal in this Court. In that
application the defendants argued both that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court’s judgment with respect to the investigative stop, and also
that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should be suppressed because
the affidavit supporting issuance of the warrant had not been signed by
Investigator Mullikin, the affiant, and also because Judge Drake had failed to
complete the portion of the affidavit known as the jurat, which is the written
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certificate of the issuing judge attesting that the affiant submitted the affidavit
under oath.5
This Court granted the defendants permission to appeal. Thereafter, the
State moved to supplement the record, stating that the unsigned copy of the
affidavit contained in the record on appeal actually was not the affidavit upon
which Judge Drake had based his determination of probable cause. The
defendants filed a response in opposition to the State’s motion. This Court
remanded the matter to the trial judge to determine whether the record should be
supplemented pursuant to Rule 24(e), 6 Tenn. R. App. P.
Following a hearing, the trial court permitted the State to supplement the
record with the affidavit which actually had been presented to Judge Drake and
upon which he had based his determination of probable cause. Though the
affidavit submitted in support of the warrant contained the signature of the affiant,
Investigator Milliken; the jurat attesting that the affidavit had been given under
oath was incomplete. However, the trial court permitted the State to also
supplement the appellate record with affidavits from Judge Drake and Investigator
Mullikin stating that the affidavit had been sworn by Investigator Mullikin before
5
See D.T. McCall & Sons v. Seagraves, 796 S.W.2d 457, 464 (Tenn. App. 1990) (defining
“jurat” and citing case s); see also State v. Colon, 644 A.2d 877, 879 (Conn . 1994).
6
Subsection (e) provides that “[i]f any matter properly includable is omitted from the record,
is improperly included, or is misstated therein, the record may be corrected o r modified to conform
to the truth. Any differences regarding whether the record accurately discloses what occurred in the
trial court shall be submitted to and settled by the trial court regardless of whether the record has
been transmitted to the appellate court. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the determination of
the trial court is conclusive. If necessary, the appellate or trial court may direct that a suppllemental
record be certified and transmitted.” See also Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 868-69 (Tenn.
1993).
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issuance of the warrant even though Judge Drake failed to complete the jurat.
The supplemental record was then transmitted to the Clerk of this Court.
In this Court, the defendants argue that an affidavit supporting issuance of
a search warrant must contain a jurat completed by the issuing judge attesting that
the affidavit was executed under oath. According to the defendants, extrinsic
evidence is not a permissible means to prove that an affidavit was properly sworn.
Because the affidavit in this case did not contain a completed jurat on its face, the
defendants contend that the search warrant issued in reliance upon the affidavit is
invalid and evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should be suppressed.
While conceding that a jurat is the preferred means of establishing that an
affidavit was executed under oath, the State argues that it is not the only
permissible means of satisying the oath requirement. According to the State, an
incomplete or defective jurat does not vitiate the validity of a warrant when it is
proven by extrinsic evidence that the supporting affidavit was properly sworn by
the affiant. The State asserts that the warrant in this case is valid, despite the
incomplete jurat, because the affidavits of Investigator Mullikin and Judge Drake
establish that the supporting affidavit was properly sworn.
We begin our analysis of this issue by reiterating that under both the
federal and state constitutions no warrant is to be issued except upon probable
cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983);
State v. Jacumin, supra; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-103 (1997 Repl.). The Fourth
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Amendment to the United States Constitution explicitly mandates that search
warrants issue only “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”
Though, Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution does not require an
oath or affirmation, it precludes issuance of warrants except upon “evidence of the
fact committed.” Moreover, the General Assembly has expressly directed that a
search warrant may be issued only upon a written and sworn affidavit which
contains allegations establishing probable cause. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-1037
and -1048 (1997 Repl.); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 41(c);9 Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 432.
Likewise, this Court previously has recognized that a written and sworn affidavit
containing allegations from which the magistrate can determine whether probable
cause exists is an indispensable prerequisite to the issuance of a search warrant
in this State. Id.; see also State ex rel. Blackburn v. Fox, 200 Tenn. 227, 230, 292
S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tenn. 1956).
The law in this State is clear that a written and sworn affidavit is an
essential prerequisite to the issuance of a valid search warrant. However, we
have found no constitutional or statutory rule stating that an indispensable
prerequisite to a valid affidavit is a jurat -- a written certificate of the issuing judge
7
Pursuant to that statute “[a] search warrant can only be issued on probable cause,
sup porte d by af fidav it, nam ing or desc ribing the p erso n, an d par ticula rly des cribin g the prop erty,
and the place to be searched .” (Emphasis adde d.)
8
Tha t statu tory pr ovisio n spe cifies that “[ t]he m agis trate , befo re iss uing t he w arra nt, sh all
exa min e on o ath th e com plaina nt an d any w itnes s the com plaina nt m ay pro duc e, an d tak e the ir
affidavits in w riting, and ca use the m to b e subs cribed by the person s ma king the m. T he affida vits
must set forth facts tending to establish the grounds of the application or probable cause for
believing tha t they exist.”
9
In pertinent part the Rule specifies that “[a] warrant shall issue only on an affidavit or
affidavits s worn to b efore the mag istrate and establishin g the gro unds o f issuing th e warra nt.”
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attesting that the affiant executed the affidavit under oath. An affidavit generally
has been defined in case law as “a statement in writing, signed, and made upon
oath before an authorized magistrate.” Watts v. Carnes, 51 Tenn. 532, 534
(1871). Certainly nothing in that definition suggests that a jurat is an essential
component of an affidavit. Moreover, Tennessee decisions addressing issues
similar to the one raised by this appeal lend support to the proposition that a jurat
is not an essential prerequisite to a valid affidavit so long as proof is offered to
establish that the affidavit was properly sworn.
For example, in Wiley v. Bennett, 68 Tenn. 581 (1877), this Court
considered whether an attachment was rendered invalid because the issuing clerk
failed to attest that the supporting affidavit had been sworn. The Court first noted
that “the affidavit was signed, and purports to have been sworn to on its face.” Id.
at 582. Next, the Court observed that the clerk had testified that the affidavit “was
duly sworn to before issuance (of the attachment), but by oversight the attestation
of the fact was omitted.” Id. Finally, in rejecting the challenge, this Court
emphasized that “[t]he fact that it was sworn to is the substantial matter, and the
omission of the clerk to do his duty by attesting it, cannot be allowed to prejudice
the party.” Id. This principle was reaffirmed five years later in Agricultural
Association v. Madison, 77 Tenn. 407, 409 (1882) (“When the affidavit was
actually sworn to and the clerk fails to attest it, it is not fatal. . . .”). Though these
decisions do not address an affidavit that is given in support of a search warrant,
they are persuasive authority for the proposition that a defective or incomplete
jurat does not invalidate an affidavit when it is established by other proof that the
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affidavit was properly sworn.10
Moreover, we observe that a majority of other state courts considering
whether a search warrant is void if based upon an affidavit which contains an
incomplete or defective jurat have concluded that a jurat is not an essential
element of an affidavit but is simply evidence of the fact that the affidavit was duly
sworn by the affiant. In the face of an incomplete or defective jurat, these state
courts allow extrinsic evidence to prove that the affidavit was properly sworn.
State v. Colon, 644 A.2d 877 (Conn. 1994); Bigler v. State, 602 N.E.2d 509 (Ind.
App. 1992); State v. Journey, 562 P.2d 138 (Kan. App. 1977); Powell v. State, 355
So.2d 1378 (Miss. 1978); People v. Rodriguez, 541 N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y.App. Div.
1989); People v. Zimmer, 490 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); State v. Flynn,
235 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. App. 1977); White v. Oklahoma, 702 P.2d 1058 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1985); State v. Nunn, 783 P.2d 26 (Or. App. 1989); Huff v. Commonwealth,
194 S.E.2d 690 (Va. 1973); see also Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority
v. Zitko, 386 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1965) (omission of jurat will not render properly
executed affidavit a nullity); 3 Am.Jur.2d 478 Affidavits §17 (1986); 2A C.J.S. 467
Affidavits § 31 (1972) (“The jurat is not such a part of an affidavit that its omission
will render the affidavit a nullity, at least where the affidavit is otherwise properly
executed. Thus, ordinarily a jurat is not essential to an affidavit if the fact of the
10
In Harve y v. State, 166 Tenn. 227, 60 S.W.2d 420 (1933) and in W att, supra, the
affid avits w ere n ot sw orn n or sig ned until af ter the warr ant o r attac hm ent h ad iss ued . Acc ordin gly,
in those cases, this Court held that the magistrate had no authority to issue the warrant or
attac hm ent b eca use no af fidav it had supp orted its iss uan ce. T his C ourt r efus ed to perm it extrin sic
proof to contradict the express terms of the affidavit and retroactively confer authority upon the
issuing judge. In this appeal, there is no attempt to offer extrinsic proof to contradict the express
terms of the affid avit which re cites on its fa ce that it was being give n unde r oath.
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due administration of the oath is otherwise shown.”) 11 The majority rule is
consistent with prior Tennessee case law on the subject, and it is sound as a
matter of policy and practice.
Tennessee law is clear that in determining whether or not probable cause
supported issuance of a search warrant only the information contained within the
four corners of the affidavit may be considered. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 432.
However, we are not confined to the four corners of the affidavit in determining
whether it has been properly sworn. Accordingly, we conclude that although it is
preferable that every affidavit contain a completed jurat, an incomplete or
defective jurat does not invalidate a warrant issued upon probable cause if it is
proven by extrinsic evidence that the supporting affidavit was properly sworn by
the affiant. Any other conclusion would impose an undue penalty upon law
enforcement for an inadvertent omission on the part of the issuing judge. Colon,
644 A.2d at 883.
Applying that rule to the record in this appeal, we reject the defendants’
claim that the search warrant is invalid. The proof establishes that the affidavit
was given under oath. First of all, the affidavit recites on its face that it was being
given under oath. Investigator Milliken signed the affidavit. The search warrant in
11
The following jurisdictions have held the omission of a jurat to be fatal to the validity of an
affidavit. We note that in these jurisdictions, either the state constitution or a statutory provision
explicitly required that an affidavit contain the signature of the officer administering the oath.
Comm onwealth v. Dozier, 366 N.E .2d 1270 (Mass . App. 197 7); Comm onwealth v. McAfee, 326
A.2d 52 2 (Penn . 1974); Elam v. Yale Clinic , 783 S.W.2d 638, (Tex. App. 1989). Though none
involve an affidavit given in support of a search warrant, the following state courts have held, in the
absen ce of a s tatutory prov ision, that a va lid affidavit requ ires a com pleted jura t. Ex Parte Finance
America Corp., 507 So .2d 458 ( Ala. 1987 ); Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp. v. Skipper, 487 S.E.2d 1
(Ga. Ap p. 1997) ; Hough v. Weber, 560 N.E .2d 5 (Ill. App. 1 990).
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the record recites that it was based upon an affidavit given by Investigator Milliken.
Judge Drake signed the search warrant. Finally, the record contains affidavits
from both Investigator Milliken and Judge Drake stating that the affidavit was given
under oath. Accordingly, despite the incomplete jurat, the other evidence in this
record establishes that the affidavit was properly sworn.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously stated, we conclude that the investigative stop in
this case was based upon reasonable suspicion and therefore constitutionally
permissible. We also conclude that the search warrant issued upon a written and
sworn affidavit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals which reversed the trial court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to
suppress. This cause is remanded to the trial court for further necessary
proceedings.
______________________________
FRANK F. DROWOTA, III,
JUSTICE
Concur:
Anderson, C.J.,
Holder, J.
Birch, J. - See Separate Dissenting Opinion.
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