F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
October 14, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-1387
ANTONE RAYMOND AUSTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 04-CR-32-RB)
John A. Chanin, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Raymond P. Moore, Federal
Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant.
Martha Ann Paluch, Assistant United States Attorney (William J. Leone, Acting
United States Attorney, and Philip A. Brimmer, Assistant United States Attorney,
with her on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant Antone Raymond Austin pled guilty to one count of possession
of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He
appeals the enhancement of his sentence based on his prior Colorado conviction
for sexual assault on a child, which he contends the district court improperly
characterized as a crime of violence, in violation of the Supreme Court’s decision
in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, affirm in part,
and remand in part.
I. Background
In his plea agreement, Mr. Austin agreed to plead guilty to possession of a
firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), but disputed
the government’s contention his sentence should be increased based on his prior
Colorado state conviction for “Attempted Sexual Assault on a Child” under
Colorado Revised Statute § 18-3-405(1), which he asserted did not constitute a
“crime of violence” as proscribed by United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2K2.1(a)(2) and defined under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2
and its commentary. The probation officer who prepared the presentence report
nonetheless recommended a base offense level increase of four levels, from 20 to
24, based on the prior Colorado conviction, which he characterized as a “crime of
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violence” but also noted involved a legal issue for the court to determine. Prior
to the sentencing hearing, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Thereafter, in objecting to the
presentence report, Mr. Austin again objected to the characterization of his prior
conviction as a “crime of violence” and, in light of Blakely, also objected to the
mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines in determining his sentence.
The district court held a sentencing hearing at which it denied Mr. Austin’s
objections to the mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines and the
characterization of his prior state conviction as a “crime of violence.” Rather
than considering any of the alleged facts underlying the prior conviction as
contained in the presentence report and an affidavit submitted in the state case, 1
the district court instead considered only the statutes involved and the charging
documents, including Mr. Austin’s admissions at his state court plea and
sentencing hearing, to determine if his prior conviction met the definition of a
1
Initially, the government asked us to consider several inculpatory
assertions in the arrest warrant affidavit and similarly directed us to a later pretext
telephone call in which Mr. Austin allegedly made inculpatory statements.
However, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shepard v. United States,
___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005), the government now withdraws its request
we consider these “facts” and, like the district court, we will not consider factual
accusations underlying a prior conviction to which a defendant has not admitted.
Id. at 1263.
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“crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1 and 4B1.2.
The statute to which Mr. Austin pled guilty, Colorado Revised Statute § 18-
3-405(1), is titled “Sexual assault on a child” and states: “[a]ny actor who
knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits
sexual assault on a child if the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the
actor is at least four years older than the victim.” Under Colorado law “sexual
contact” is defined as:
[T]he knowing touching of the victim’s intimate parts by the actor, or
of the actor’s intimate parts by the victim, or the knowing touching
of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s
intimate parts if that sexual contact is for the purposes of sexual
arousal, gratification, or abuse.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-401(4). A corresponding statute entitled “Unlawful
sexual contact” states:
Any person who knowingly, with or without sexual contact, induces
or coerces a child by any of the means set forth in section 18-3-402
to expose intimate parts or to engage in any sexual contact, intrusion,
or penetration with another person, for the purpose of the actor’s own
sexual gratification, commits unlawful sexual contact. For the
purposes of this subsection (1.5), the term “child” means any person
under the age of eighteen years.
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-404(1.5). In addition, in Colorado, consent of both
parents is required for a person under the age of eighteen to marry, and a person
must be eighteen years of age to be competent to contract, manage his or her
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estate, sue and be sued, and make decisions regarding his or her own body. See
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-106 (regarding parental consent) and § 13-22-101
(concerning age of competency).
The formal charging document or “information” to which Mr. Austin pled
guilty charged him with a class 4 felony for subjecting another person to “sexual
contact” when that person was less than fifteen years old and Mr. Austin was at
least four years older. During Mr. Austin’s state plea and sentencing hearing, he
pled guilty to attempted sexual assault on a child, a class 5 felony, and made the
following admissions: 1) he touched the child’s vagina; 2) she was at a slumber
party with his sister; 3) he knew what he was doing at the time; 4) he was not
married to the girl; 5) she was less than fifteen at the time; 6) he was at least four
years older than the girl; and 7) he touched her vagina for his own sexual
gratification.
The district court considered the applicable statutes, charging document,
and Mr. Austin’s admissions in light of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines
definition of a “crime of violence,” which, under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, states:
The term “crime of violence” means any offense under federal or
state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
that--
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
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physical force against the person of another, or
(2) ... otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) and (2). In addition, it recognized that commentary note 1
to § 4B1.2 states a “crime of violence” includes “forcible sex offenses.” U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2 cmt. n.1.
In applying this definition, the district court acknowledged attempted
sexual assault on a child under Colorado Revised Statute § 18-3-405(1) does not
have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the victim, or constitute a “forcible sex offense” as specifically
enumerated. However, it found the crime, both “[o]n this record” and “given the
available case law,” presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to the
victim and therefore constituted a “crime of violence” within the meaning of
§ 4B1.2(a)(2).
After determining Mr. Austin’s Colorado conviction met the definition of a
“crime of violence,” the district court refused to grant Mr. Austin’s motion for a
downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, stating it did not “find that the
defendant or his concomitant circumstances, including but not limited to his
criminal history, constitute or qualify as mitigating circumstances of a kind or to a
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degree not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the apposite guideline, citing guideline section 5K2.0 and 18 U.S.C. section
3553(b).” It held that “under the analysis provided by the United States Supreme
Court in Koon [v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996)], ... this case is simply not
such an atypical case where a particular guideline linguistically applies, but where
the conduct significantly differs from the norm.” In denying the motion, the
district court judge also determined Mr. Austin committed two serious prior
felony offenses, and that his “subsequent record convinces me that he has a
philosophy that evinces a disturbing disrespect for the law, and one that includes
a propensity to illegally arm himself with deadly weapons.” The district court
then calculated Mr. Austin’s Sentencing Guidelines range at eighty-four to 105
months imprisonment and, at the government’s request, imposed a sentence at the
bottom of the range at eighty-four months.
Mr. Austin now appeals his sentence on grounds the district court erred in
characterizing his prior conviction as a “crime of violence” and mandatorily
applying the Sentencing Guidelines to determine his sentence. The government
concedes the district court erred in mandatorily sentencing Mr. Austin under the
applicable Sentencing Guidelines, but nevertheless continues to contend Mr.
Austin committed a “violent crime” under the “otherwise ... risk of physical
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injury” prong of the § 4B1.2 definition.
II. Discussion
A. Arguments Concerning Characterization of Prior Conviction
In contesting the characterization of his prior conviction as a “crime of
violence,” Mr. Austin suggests Colorado Revised Statute § 18-3-405(1) is
ambiguous as to whether he committed a violent crime because it covers both
invasive and noninvasive sexual assault conduct. He bases this premise on the
fact the statute contains as an element “sexual contact,” which includes the mere
touching of a child’s intimate parts through “clothing” and which, he contends,
does not otherwise “involve conduct which presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury” to another. In addition, Mr. Austin contends lack of consent
cannot be considered because it is not an element of § 18-3-405(1). While Mr.
Austin acknowledges he admitted at his plea hearing to touching the minor girl’s
vagina, he insists we should only apply a “least culpable” act test and assume he
did the least culpable act possible for conviction under the statute, which would
involve the mere consensual touching of a young girl’s clothing covering her
intimate parts. Mr. Austin further suggests, without supporting evidence in the
charging document or in his admissions, that the facts in this case establish the
age difference between himself and the girl involved was “just barely over ... four
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years” and that the conduct “was somewhat consensual in nature.” Mr. Austin
further asserts no “aggravating” circumstances warrant characterizing his conduct
as a “crime of violence” because the victim was not under the age of twelve, the
act did not involve incest, and he was not an adult family friend or relative. As
an example, he suggests the situation was like “two teenagers in the same high
school engaging in consensual touching of the clothing covering the girl’s
intimate parts” which, he contends, would certainly not constitute a “crime of
violence.” Finally, he contends the government failed to carry its burden in
offering medical or statistical evidence to show a girl of fourteen, or almost
fifteen, could be physically injured by sexual contact involving the mere touching
of her intimate parts through her clothing.
The government relies on this and other circuit court precedent to urge us
to make a per se determination that, by its nature, the statutory conduct for which
Mr. Austin pled guilty constitutes a “crime of violence” or, alternatively, that his
factual admissions establish he committed a “crime of violence.” Based on Mr.
Austin’s own admissions, the government contends he committed a “crime of
violence” and contests his characterization of the offense as “consensual” and
involving the mere touching of the “clothing” covering the girl’s intimate parts.
It also points out that the “least culpable” analysis suggested by Mr. Austin would
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be warranted only in situations where the statutory definition, charging
documents, and defendant’s admissions are all ambiguous.
B. Law Regarding Categorical Characterization of Prior Conviction
During Mr. Austin’s appeal, the Supreme Court issued United States v.
Booker, which applies its ruling in Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
543 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 755-76. In United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220
(10th Cir. 2005), we held that under Booker the government is not required to
charge in an indictment or prove to a jury either: 1) the existence of prior
convictions; or 2) their classification as “violent felonies.” Id. at 1221, 1224-25
& n.2. As to the existence of a prior conviction, Booker expressly reaffirms the
Supreme Court’s holding a prior conviction is an exception to factual jury
submissions by stating, “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant
or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker, 543 U.S. at ___, 125 S.
Ct. at 756 (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. Austin does not contend the “fact” of his
prior conviction needed to be included in the indictment or submitted to a jury.
See Moore, 401 F.3d at 1224.
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Similarly, with respect to the characterization of prior convictions as crimes
of violence, we have determined it involves a question of law and not fact and
therefore does not implicate the Sixth Amendment for the purpose of requiring the
characterization of the offense to be charged in the indictment and proven to a
jury. See Moore, 401 F.3d at 1224-26 & n.2. However, when a defendant
contests whether his prior conviction is a “crime of violence,” we have held that
the trial court is generally required to take a categorical approach by looking only
to the fact of the conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense. See
United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 388 F.3d 779, 782 (10th Cir. 2004)
(relying on Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990)). When the statute
“reaches behavior that may or may not encompass conduct that constitutes a crime
of violence,” we have held an exception exists allowing the district court to “look
to the charging paper and judgment of conviction in order to determine if the
actual offense the defendant was convicted of qualifies as a crime of violence.”
Id. at 782-83 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The categorical approach
allows the sentencing court to examine sources of undisputed information rather
than conduct a fact finding inquiry, thereby sparing it from conducting mini-trials
on prior offenses which have already been adjudicated. See United States v.
Damon, 127 F.3d 139, 145 (1st Cir. 1997).
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Since our decision in Hernandez-Rodriguez and the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Taylor, Blakely, and Booker, the Supreme Court has looked at the
categorical approach and exceptions thereto in the context of situations where,
like here, the defendant pled guilty to a prior offense. See Shepard, ___ U.S. at
___, 125 S. Ct. at 1258-59. In determining whether a prior offense qualifies as a
crime of violence, it explained a court is “generally limited to examining the
statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea
colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the
defendant assented.” Id. at 1257.
Here, the categorical approach begins with an examination of Colorado
Revised Statute § 18-3-405 and its corresponding statutes and, under such an
approach, we determine whether a conviction thereunder constitutes a “crime of
violence” as defined under § 4B1.2. “We review the district court’s interpretation
of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.” United States v. Herrera-Roldan, 414
F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Castro-Rocha, 323 F.3d
846, 848-49 (10th Cir. 2003)). If the statute of conviction is ambiguous, covering
both violent and nonviolent crimes, we rely on the charging documents, as
identified in Shepard, to assist in the determination, which in this case include
Mr. Austin's admissions at the plea and sentencing hearing.
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We agree with the district court that § 18-3-405 does not contain the
elements outlined in § 4B1.2 because it does not require the “use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. The government also does not suggest Mr. Austin's statutory or
admitted conduct fits within the expressly enumerated example of “forcible sex
offenses” and therefore we do not address it. 2 Rather, both parties concentrate on
the second prong of § 4B1.2 to determine whether Mr. Austin's prior conviction
“otherwise involve[s] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
C. Tenth Circuit Court Precedent
In asking us to make a per se determination that the nature of the crime at
2
While the government does not specifically contend Mr. Austin's conduct
meets the enumerated definition of “forcible sex offenses,” it nevertheless directs
our attention to United States v. Munguia-Sanchez, 365 F.3d 877, 880, 882 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 133 (2004). In that decision, we determined sexual
assault or abuse of a child of twelve fits the specially enumerated example of a
“crime of violence” for “forcible sex offenses,” including “sexual abuse of a
minor,” regardless of whether consent or the element of physical force was
involved Id. at 881-82. We note Munguia-Sanchez involved a child of twelve,
and that the § 2L1.2 definition of a “crime of violence,” unlike § 4B1.2, contains
both the enumerated examples of “forcible sex offenses” and “sexual abuse of a
minor.” In addition, since 2001, § 2L1.2 no longer contains the “otherwise”
language in the second prong of § 4B1.2 concerning the potential risk of physical
injury. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1 (2000), with U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt.
n.1 (2001) (omitting definition reference to § 4B1.2).
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issue, sexual contact with a child under the age of fifteen, is inherently a “crime
of violence,” the government relies on an array of Tenth Circuit cases, including
United States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 1998); and United
States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377 (10th Cir. 1993). In Reyes-Castro, this court
determined attempted sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen is a “crime
of violence,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16, because “when an older person
attempts to sexually touch a child under the age of fourteen, there is always a
substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure the child’s compliance.”
Id. at 379 (emphasis added). In that case, the Utah statute at issue stated a person
commits sexual abuse of a child by the touching of “the anus, buttocks, or
genitalia of any child, the breast of a female child younger than fourteen years of
age, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child ... with the intent to arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant.”
Id. at 378-79 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(1)). Another Utah statute on
which the court relied stated that sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen
is without consent. Id. at 379 (relying on Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406). Rather
than applying § 4B1.2, which is at stake here, Reyes-Castro involved application
of 18 U.S.C. § 16, which also defines a “crime of violence” as “an offense that
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another” but, rather than the risk of physical
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injury in § 4B1.2, it considers whether the crime “involves a substantial risk that
‘physical force’ against the person or property of another may be used in the
course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16 (emphasis added).
In Coronado-Cervantes, the defendant admitted, in part, to knowingly
engaging in sexual contact with a girl under the age of twelve by intentionally
touching her genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, and buttocks with an intent
to gratify his sexual desires. 154 F.3d at 1243. The defendant pled guilty to three
federal sex statutes which we determined did not have as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Id. at 1243-44. However, we
held the prior conviction met the “otherwise” prong of § 4B1.2 and constituted a
“crime of violence.” Id. at 1244-45. In so holding, we noted that “[e]very
published appellate decision which has considered applying the ‘otherwise’ clause
in the context of sexual offenses involving minors has found a ‘serious potential
risk of physical injury’ to the minors ... and has held that the offenses at issue are
‘crimes of violence.’” Id. at 1244 (citations omitted). While we recognized a
distinction exists between 18 U.S.C. § 16 and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, we nevertheless
found the reasoning employed in Reyes-Castro “persuasive” in determining the
conduct to which the defendant pled guilty, by its nature, presented an “otherwise
... serious potential risk of physical injury” and constituted a “crime of violence.”
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Id. at 1244-45.
Mr. Austin argues Reyes-Castro and Coronado-Cervantes are both
distinguishable. As he points out, Reyes-Castro involved an incestuous act by the
defendant who sexually abused his own twelve-year-old daughter, see 13 F.3d at
378; and Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d at 1243, similarly pertained to a child
under the age of twelve, and not of fourteen, as Mr. Austin contends was the age
of his victim. 154 F.3d at 1243. Admittedly, these distinctions exist, but we note
our categorical approach in Reyes-Castro involved consideration of a Utah statute
which addressed minors under fourteen, not twelve, and did not specifically
address incest. 13 F.3d at 379. In fact, we have held support exists “in
classifying sexual abuse of a minor, regardless of [the aggravating factor of]
incest, as a crime of violence.” United States v. Passi, 62 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th
Cir. 1995). Moreover, in both cases the statutes at issue are very similar to the
statute of conviction at issue here as they prohibit the touching of a minor’s
private parts in a sexual way, and we determined in those two cases that the
defendants' conduct in touching the girls’ private parts, which is similar to Mr.
Austin's admitted conduct, constituted “crimes of violence” under those statutes.
See Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d at 1243; Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d at 378-79.
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However, as Mr. Austin suggests, both cases rely on 18 U.S.C. § 16, which
defines a “crime of violence” differently than U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. In explaining the
differences, we have determined the § 4B1.2(a)(2) definition involving the “risk
of resulting physical injury” is much broader than the § 16(b) definition involving
the “risk of physical force ... in the course of committing the offense,” which we
held requires “destructive or violent force.” See United States v. Venegas-
Ornelas, 348 F.3d 1273, 1275-77 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
494 (2004). In United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir.
2003), we explained the failure to recognize the difference between § 16 and
§ 4B1.2 would “collapse the distinction between these two differently-worded
definitions.” Thus, Mr. Austin directs us to consider only whether his conduct
presented a serious potential risk of physical injury under § 4B1.2 and not rely on
cases considering the risk of physical force under § 16.
The government counters by pointing out that this court has repeatedly held
§ 16 cases provide persuasive value in § 4B1.2 sexual abuse cases. In support, it
relies not only on Coronado-Cervantes, but United States v. Vigil, 334 F.3d 1215
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1026 (2003). In Vigil, we held a father’s
sexual penetration of his eighteen-year-old daughter constituted a crime of
violence under § 4B1.2. Id. at 1217, 1224. In that case, we also relied on cases
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involving the 18 U.S.C. § 16 definition of a crime of violence, noting the
difference but relying on the underlying reasoning. 334 F.3d at 1221-22. Besides
determining incest was an aggravating factor that evoked a serious potential risk
of physical injury, we also alluded to risk factors such as pregnancy and venereal
disease. Id. at 1222-23. We determined the “risk” of physical injury to the child
under § 4B1.2 means “potential” rather than “actual” risk, so under a categorical
approach, certain statutorily-defined sexual abuse conduct, by its nature, poses a
serious risk of physical injury. Id. at 1223. Finally, we concluded: 1) “the
possibility of factual consent does not obviate the risk of physical injury”; and 2)
“when considering the relationship between lack of consent and the risk of
physical injury, the age of the victim is immaterial.” Id. at 1223-24.
In focusing on § 4B1.2 and the risk of physical injury prong, the
government directs us to United States v. Rowland, 357 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.
2004); and an unpublished opinion, United States v. Daniels, 41 Fed. Appx. 298
(10th Cir. May 20, 2002) (unpublished op.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1140 (2003).
In Rowland, we determined sexual battery under Oklahoma law constituted a
“crime of violence,” because it met the “otherwise” prong of § 4B1.2. 357 F.3d
at 1198. In that case, the Oklahoma statute at issue defined sexual battery as “the
intentional touching, mauling or feeling of the body or private parts of any person
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sixteen (16) years of age or older, in a lewd and lascivious manner and without
the consent of that person.” Id. at 1195. We rejected the defendant’s argument
that mere nonconsensual touching of an arm or leg in a lewd or lascivious manner
could not entail either violence or a serious potential risk of injury, noting the
Oklahoma statute made such nonconsensual touching of any body part a sexual
battery and therefore a “crime of violence.” Id. at 1196-98. Relying on our
decision in McCann v. Bryon L. Rosquist, D.C., 185 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 1999),
cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 529 U.S. 1126 (2000), we
explained that lack of consent to physical sexual abuse, which we held in that
case implicated a substantial risk of physical force, could similarly implicate a
serious risk of physical injury under § 4B1.2. Id. at 1197-98. We further
determined “the possibility that a crime may be completed without injury is
irrelevant to the determination of whether it constitutes a crime of violence within
the meaning of § 4B1.2,” and held “the serious risk of bodily injury is a constant
in cases involving sexual battery.” Id. at 1198.
Comparing the underlying statutory elements in this and the Rowland case,
it is clear the instant case contains more “aggravating” elements than Rowland
because the victim here was at least two years younger than the victim in
Rowland, and the Colorado statutes at issue pertain to the touching of a minor’s
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intimate parts, not merely any body parts, as did the Oklahoma statute. Given we
held in Rowland that the nonconsensual touching of any body part of a person
sixteen years of age or older may entail a serious risk of physical injury under
§ 4B1.2, we find it difficult to reconcile that the touching of the intimate parts
(which in this case was the victim’s vagina) of someone less than fifteen years old
would not likewise potentially cause a risk of physical injury. While Mr. Austin
points out that Rowland was based, in part, on lack of consent, we discern little
difference because Colorado has determined eighteen to be the age of consent;
therefore, under its statutes, a person under the age of fifteen cannot consent. See
Colo. Rev. Stats. § 18-3-404(1.5) (stating that for sexual assault cases “child”
means any person under the age of eighteen); § 14-2-106 (regarding parental
consent required for marriage under the age of eighteen); and § 13-22-101
(identifying eighteen as age of competency).
The government also asks us to consider our unpublished opinion in United
States v. Daniels, in which this court determined that a prior conviction under the
same Colorado statutes at issue here constituted a “crime of violence” under
§ 4B1.2. 41 Fed. Appx. at 301. In this circuit, unpublished orders are not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel, and we have generally determined that citation to unpublished
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opinions is not favored. See 151 F.R.D. 470 (10th Cir. 1993) (containing General
Order of November 29, 1993); 10th Cir. R. 36.3. However, if an unpublished
opinion or order and judgment has persuasive value with respect to a material
issue in a case and would assist the court in its disposition, we allow citation to
that decision. Id.
While Daniels may lack precedential value, it nevertheless has some
persuasive value. Like Mr. Austin, Mr. Daniels asserted his prior conviction
under the identical Colorado statute could not constitute a crime of violence
because his conviction involved “sexual contact,” and such contact with a child
under the age of fifteen does not present a risk of physical injury. 41 Fed. Appx.
at 300. In rejecting Mr. Daniels’s argument, we examined our decision in
Coronado-Cervantes, concluding it was analogous and took the “common sense
approach” that “by its very nature, the act of engaging in sexual contact with a
minor presented a serious potential risk of injury to [the] victim and thus should
be considered a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). More persuasively, we explained:
By statute, the State of Colorado has defined a person under the age
of eighteen variously as a child or a person incapable of consent. In
crafting § 18-3-405, the Colorado legislature has purposefully chosen
to further protect a more narrow group, children under the age of
fifteen. In doing so they recognized the risks present in non-
consensual contact with a child fourteen or younger.
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Id. at 300-01 (footnote omitted).
The government also directs us to our decision in McCann for the purpose
of discussing the injuries sustained by either minors or adults experiencing sexual
abuse. 185 F.3d at 1120. In that case, we discussed not only the requisite
physical force required by 18 U.S.C. § 16, but the resulting injuries of sexual
abuse caused by the inappropriate fondling and rubbing of nonconsenting adult
women’s buttocks, breasts, and genital areas, both clothed and unclothed, stating,
“the imposition of nonconsensual sexual contact, whether brought about by brute
force or ... by trick and abuse of authority, might itself be considered a form of
violence, capable of causing mental and emotional injury no less severe than the
physical injury caused by a blow.” Id. at 1115, 1120. We further determined that
such an act, “by its nature evinces a clear intention to disregard the victim’s
dignity and bodily autonomy” and “creates a substantial risk of more serious
physical intrusion ....” Id. at 1120.
D. Other Circuit Precedent
Having discussed relevant Tenth Circuit decisions, both parties direct us to
decisions of other circuits in support of their arguments. The government relies,
in part, on decisions pertaining to § 16 and the risk of use of physical force.
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Because of our previous concerns with “collapsing the distinction” between the
differently-worded definitions in 18 U.S.C. § 16 and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, see Lucio-
Lucio, 347 F.3d at 1207, we find those cases less persuasive than those involving
§ 4B1.2, but nevertheless recognize their general consensus that sexual abuse in
touching a minor inherently, or by its nature, constitutes a crime of violence
because it involves a risk of substantial physical force. See United States v. Alas-
Castro, 184 F.3d 812, 813-14 (8th Cir. 1999) (pertaining to sexual contact
through the touching of the intimate parts or the clothing covering the intimate
parts of one fourteen or younger by one nineteen or over for sexual gratification);
United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418, 421-23 (5th Cir. 1996)
(regarding sexual contact with a child under the age of seventeen); Ramsey v. INS,
55 F.3d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1995) (concerning handling, fondling, or assault of
a child under the age of sixteen in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner). See
also United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 140-41 (8th Cir. 1992) (concerning
the fondling or touching of a minor child’s pubes or genitals by one eighteen or
older).
On the other hand, as the government points out and we acknowledged in
Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d at 1244, other circuits have also specifically
applied the § 4B1.2 definition to determine that sexual abuse in touching a minor,
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by its nature, or inherently, presents a serious risk of physical injury and thereby
constitutes a “crime of violence,” 3 which we find more persuasive than those
circuit decisions involving § 16. Since our determination in Coronado-Cervantes,
at least four more circuits have considered the § 4B1.2 definition and continued to
conclude that sexual abuse through the inappropriate touching of a minor presents
a serious risk of physical injury and thereby constitutes a “crime of violence.”
See, e.g., United States v. Granbois, 376 F.3d 993, 995-96 (9th Cir.) (determining
conviction under federal statute prohibiting sexual contact, including the
touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of a child between the ages of twelve and sixteen
by one at least four years older, is per se an offense which presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another, and basing its determination on prior
precedent that regardless of which Sentencing Guidelines definition of violent
crime is involved, sexual contact with a minor falls within the category of a
“crime of violence”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 640 (2004); United States v. Pierce,
278 F.3d 282, 287-89 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding conviction under North Carolina
3
In Coronado-Cervantes, the cases we relied on included United States v.
Meader, 118 F.3d 876, 881, 885 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Kirk, 111 F.3d
390, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 387 (7th
Cir. 1997) (en banc); United States v. Taylor, 98 F.3d 768, 772, 774 (3d Cir.
1996); United States v. Wood, 52 F.3d 272, 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1995); and United
States v. Bauer, 990 F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
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statute which prohibits any lewd or lascivious act on any body part of a child age
sixteen or under by another at least five years older is by its nature a “crime of
violence” given, in part, the legislature’s intent to protect impressionable children
from psychological injury or damage from overt sexual acts); United States v.
Campbell, 256 F.3d 381, 396-97 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding conviction under
Michigan statute for sexual contact with a person age thirteen to sixteen of the
same blood affinity presents a serious potential risk of physical injury even
though crime could occur through mere consented touching); and United States v.
Sherwood, 156 F.3d 219, 221 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding conviction under Rhode
Island statute prohibiting “sexual contact,” which includes the intentional
touching of the victim’s intimate parts, clothed or unclothed, for sexual arousal,
gratification, or assault, constituted a “crime of violence”).
Similarly, at least one circuit has determined sexual assault of a minor of a
particular age constitutes a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and
924(e), which, like § 4B1.2, also define a “crime of violence” and “violent
felony” as those crimes that present a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another. See United States v. Mincks, 409 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir.) (holding prior
conviction for second-degree statutory sodomy under Missouri statute prohibiting
someone twenty-one years of age or older from deviate sexual intercourse with
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another person who is less than seventeen years of age is categorically a “crime of
violence” under § 924(e)(1)), petition for cert. filed (Aug. 30, 2005) (No. 05-
6149).
However, as Mr. Austin contends, a few circuits have questioned whether
sexual assault on a minor of a particular age constitutes a “crime of violence”
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 or a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). In those
cases, the courts have refused to adopt a per se or bright line test but appear to
prefer a case-by-case determination, considering all aggravating factors, including
the specific age of the child, the risk of injury to a minor of that age, and the age
difference between the minor and the perpetrator. For instance, in United States
v. Houston, the Fifth Circuit examined a Texas statute prohibiting contact with or
penetration of the sexual organ of a child under the age of seventeen with the
mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another, and the fact that being not more than
three years older than the victim was an affirmative defense. 364 F.3d 243, 247
(5th Cir. 2004). It concluded sexual intercourse between a twenty-year-old male
and a female one day under seventeen, free of aggravating circumstances such as
the victim’s lack of consent or the offender’s use of violence, does not present a
serious potential risk of physical injury under § 4B1.2. Id. at 247-48. Obviously,
in the instant case, we have the aggravating circumstance of a victim who is at
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least two years younger than the victim in Houston and who, by statute, cannot be
deemed to have consented, together with a perpetrator at least four years older
than the victim, rather than someone only three years older, as in Houston.
In United States v. Thomas, the Seventh Circuit determined the government
failed to provide medical or other evidence to establish any risk of physical
injury, as required under § 924, in a case involving a defendant convicted under
an Illinois statute prohibiting sexual intercourse with a woman under the age of
seventeen and more than five years younger than the man. 159 F.3d 296, 298-99
(7th Cir. 1998). While the court recognized that the age difference between the
victim and perpetrator may be an aggravating factor and noted the risk of injury
through sexually transmitted disease or pregnancy, it determined the government
failed to cite any authority to establish such a risk. Id. at 299-300. Similarly, in
United States v. Sacko, the First Circuit considered the § 924 definition of a
“crime of violence,” together with a Rhode Island statute prohibiting sexual
penetration by one over the age of eighteen of a person over the age of fourteen
but under the age of consent, which is sixteen. 178 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999).
Concerned with the physical injury which may occur depending on the various age
characteristics, it remanded the case for the district court to take evidence on the
issue of whether the crime of sexual penetration of a fourteen-year-old by
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someone over the age of eighteen involves conduct presenting a serious potential
risk of injury. 178 F.3d at 6. We note both Sacko and Thomas were decided prior
to Shepard and therefore they do not discuss whether the admission of evidence
concerning the general risk of injury to minors is outside the evidence allowed
when examining a prior conviction. 125 S. Ct. at 1257.
Finally, in Shannon, the defendant was convicted for second-degree sexual
assault under a Wisconsin law prohibiting either sexual contact or intercourse
with a person under the age of sixteen. 110 F.3d at 384. In that case, the
charging documents disclosed the seventeen-year-old defendant had intercourse
with his thirteen-year-old victim. Id. at 384. After noting the government’s
concession that “the goals behind laws forbidding sex with minors are various and
need not include the goal of protecting the minor from a serious risk of physical
injury,” the Seventh Circuit declined to impose a per se “crime of violence” rule.
Id. at 386. Instead, it looked beyond the statute at issue to the charging document
to consider the aggravating factors involved in that particular case. Those factors
included the fact the defendant had actual intercourse with a child who was only
thirteen and unlikely to fully appreciate the disease and fertility risks of
intercourse or have accurate knowledge of contraceptive and disease-preventive
measures; who lacked the maturity to make a rational comparison of the costs and
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benefits of premarital intercourse or to take good care of herself and her fetus;
and who would otherwise constitute a high-risk pregnancy if impregnated. Id. at
387-88. Stating that “statutory rape is more often thought of as a ‘morals offense’
than as a ‘crime of violence,’” it nevertheless determined the aggravating factors
involved in the case established the risk of physical injury which, under § 4B1.2,
would constitute a “crime of violence.” Id. at 388-89. In explaining its rationale,
the court recognized that the statute at issue also covered “sexual contact, which
can be as noninvasive as fondling a breast or buttock through clothing,” which, it
stated, “might disturb a young person, but ... would be highly unlikely to cause
physical injury.” Id. at 387.
It is the latter determination in Shannon on which Mr. Austin relies in
arguing his prior conviction for mere consensual touching of the clothing
covering his victim’s intimate parts cannot constitute a “crime of violence.”
However, when this court decided Rowland, we exhaustively discussed the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Shannon, noting it was instructive but not
controlling, and explaining the distinguishing factors involved, including the fact
the court in Shannon did not consider the “goals or grounds” behind the passage
of the Wisconsin statute, but looked beyond it to the charging document involved
and what it considered aggravating circumstances. See 357 F.3d at 1196-98. See
-29-
also Sherwood, 156 F.3d at 222 (explaining the Seventh Circuit, in Shannon, “did
not hold that sexual touching could not constitute a ‘crime of violence,’” and
explaining “the contrasting views of the Seventh Circuit judges merely evidence
the troubling and complex issues involved in determining what crimes constitute
‘crimes of violence’”).
E. Application of Law to Instant Case
With the exception of the few circuit court decisions favoring Mr. Austin's
position, and without delving further into the underlying rationale of the other
decisions discussed, it is clear the weight of our and other circuits' decisions
favors the government’s position that sexual abuse of a statutorily-protected,
specific age group of minors, including abuse through sexual contact, is generally,
by its nature, considered a “crime of violence.” Regardless of our own beliefs
about whether the touching of a fourteen-year-old’s intimate parts by a person at
least four years older is a “crime of violence,” we are bound by our clear
precedent 4 in Rowland, 357 F.3d at 1197-98, where we determined a prior
4
While admittedly the four decisions on which Mr. Austin primarily relies
and which focus on aggravating factors provide persuasive value, we are bound to
follow our court precedent, absent en banc reconsideration or a superceding
contrary decision by the Supreme Court. See Tootle v. USDB Commandant, 390
F.3d 1280, 1283 (10th Cir. 2004); In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam); United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 709 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990).
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conviction for the nonconsensual touching of the body parts of a victim over the
age of sixteen, as prohibited by state statute, created a risk of physical injury
under § 4B1.2. Arguably then, our only categorical determination in this case, as
posed by Mr. Austin, would be whether the mere touching of a minor child’s
“clothing” covering her intimate parts could pose a serious risk of physical injury
for the purposes of § 4B1.2. 5 Such an inquiry is of first impression in this court
and would no doubt require reconciling this case with our decision in McCann,
where we held nonconsensual sexual touching of the clothing covering even an
adult's intimate parts could cause mental and emotional injury. 185 F.3d at 1115,
1120.
However, we need not make any such determination in the instant case.
Even if we agree with Mr. Austin that the statute of conviction covers a
nonviolent crime because it includes the touching of “clothing” covering a child’s
intimate parts, Mr. Austin's prior conviction still meets the definition of a “crime
of violence” based on his admissions at his plea and sentencing hearing, which
presented aggravating circumstances beyond what he terms the “least culpable”
5
As explained hereinafter, we need not determine whether the touching of
the clothing covering a minor’s intimate parts constitutes a “crime of violence,”
as Mr. Austin's admissions establish he did not merely touch the victim's clothing,
but her vagina.
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conduct under the statute of conviction.
Specifically, Mr. Austin's prior admissions show the encounter involved
more than his description of two high school teenagers engaged in a provocative
form of heavy petting including consensual sexual contact through the mere
touching of the clothing covering the female’s intimate parts. First, neither the
charging document nor Mr. Austin's admissions disclose either his or the victim’s
exact ages, although we accept his assertion he was nineteen. 6 Mr. Austin's
asserted age, together with his admissions at the plea hearing, clearly establish he
pled guilty to attempted sexual assault; his victim was under the age of fifteen; he
was at least four years older than the victim (and, at nineteen, was considered an
adult under Colorado law); the act involved the actual physical touching of the
minor girl’s vagina (and not her clothing) 7 for his own sexual gratification; and
6
Just as we cannot consider underlying facts of the prior conviction which
allege Mr. Austin penetrated his victim with more than his finger, we similarly
cannot rely on Mr. Austin's allegations his victim was fourteen, as those facts are
not contained in the charging documents or his admissions. We know only from
his admission and the charging document that she was under the age of fifteen.
We nevertheless accept his assertion he was nineteen, assuming he knew his own
age at the time of the incident, and given he was not charged as a juvenile.
7
Because Mr. Austin explicitly admitted to touching the child’s vagina,
without further qualifying his admission by stating he touched only her clothing,
his argument that we should consider only the least culpable act of touching only
her clothing is not well taken and is an impermissible attempt to reconstruct his
own admission after the fact. Like his other admissions, we consider only the
plain or literal meaning of the words spoken, which in this case is that he touched
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she was with his sister for the purpose of attending a slumber party and not for a
teenage sexual liaison. It is apparent that, because of his adult age, familial
relationship with his sister, and the fact the slumber party involved his sister's
friend, he was an adult family friend or at least enjoyed a position of trust which
he abused when he sexually assaulted the minor girl. Clearly, when a girl under
the age of fifteen attends something as innocent as a slumber party, no one
expects her to experience sexual assault by someone at least four years her senior
who goes beyond touching her clothing in a provocative, sexual way, to actual,
physical sexual contact with her vagina for his own admitted sexual gratification.
Moreover, we must reject Mr. Austin's assertion the act was consensual,
given Colorado has determined a person under the age of eighteen is incapable of
such consent. Colo. Rev. Stats. §§ 13-22-101; 14-2-106; 18-3-404(1.5). In
addition, our determination is bolstered by the commonly accepted determination
that sexual abuse of children “typically occur[s] in close quarters and [is]
generally perpetrated by an adult upon a victim who is not only smaller, weaker,
and less experienced, but is also susceptible to acceding to the coercive power of
adult authority figures.” United States v. Melton, 344 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 953 (2004); Campbell, 256 F.3d at 396; Sherwood,
her vagina.
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156 F.3d at 221; Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d at 422 (emphasis added). Thus, Mr.
Austin's admissions disclose his conduct went beyond what he himself describes
as the statute’s most nonviolent conduct of consensual touching of the clothing
covering the victim’s intimate parts.
In addition, Mr. Austin fails to reconcile his argument the government must
provide medical or other evidence that touching the vagina of a girl less than
fifteen years old could cause physical injury with our precedent in Rowland,
holding the mere nonconsensual touching of the body parts of a victim over the
age of sixteen, as prohibited by state statute, created a risk of physical injury
under § 4B1.2, see 357 F.3d at 1197-98, and our decision in McCann that
nonconsensual sexual touching of even an adult is capable of causing mental and
emotional injury. 185 F.3d at 1120. His argument the government must provide
medical and statistical proof of injury also ignores the underlying discretion of
each state's legislature to consider such information itself and reasonably decide
the potential risk of injury based on a child’s age and then to pass legislation to
protect that category of minor victims from such injuries. 8 Moreover, none of the
8
This is evidenced not only by the statute under which Mr. Austin was
convicted, which establishes a narrow group of children under the age of fifteen it
intends to protect, but the fact that the Colorado legislature has deemed the age of
consent to be eighteen, which is higher than many other states where courts have
examined statutory law concerning sexual contact with a minor. See, e.g.,
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Colorado statutes at issue require proof of injury for conviction, and to now
require such proof would contravene those statutes and require a fact finding
inquiry into a prior conviction instead of the required examination of undisputed
information. See Damon, 127 F.3d at 145. Given we are not basing our
determination solely on a categorical analysis of the statute, Mr. Austin's
contention we must view statistical or medical evidence concerning the injurious
impact of his past conduct goes beyond our limited scope, under Shepard, of
examining only the charging documents and his admissions. 125 S. Ct. at 1257.
Finally, for the purposes of this case, we reject Mr. Austin's request we
must employ what he calls the “least culpable” act test to assume he did the very
least culpable act possible for conviction under the statute, which he contends
involves the mere touching of the young girl’s clothing over her intimate parts. It
is clear that if we employed such a test to an ambiguous statute without
Rowland, 357 F.3d at 1195 (recognizing age of consent is sixteen under
Oklahoma law); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 60 n.9 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting
age of consent in Arkansas is fourteen); Sacko, 247 F.3d at 22 n.1 (citing to
statute which states age of consent in Rhode Island is sixteen); Thomas, 159 F.3d
at 299 (explaining age of consent in Illinois is seventeen, while in the majority of
states it is sixteen); Shannon, 110 F.3d at 405 (concurring/dissenting op.) (noting
that sixty-eight percent of all states have set the legal age of consent at sixteen or
higher, and that at least twenty-five states utilize a legal age of sixteen, four have
set the legal age of consent at seventeen, and five others at eighteen); Reyes-
Castro, 13 F.3d at 379 (explaining age of consent in Utah is fourteen).
-35-
consideration of the charging and related documents, our review of those
documents and a defendant’s admissions would be superfluous, because the least
culpable act would always likely meet the nonviolent crime provision of any
ambiguous statute. Thus, based on Mr. Austin's admissions, we decline to apply
Mr. Austin's least culpable act test to the circumstances of this case to arrive at a
final disposition of the issues.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Mr. Austin's prior conviction
constitutes a “crime of violence” for the purpose of increasing his sentence under
U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1 and 4B1.2.
F. Sentence Length
Because Mr. Austin raised his claim concerning the mandatory application
of the Sentencing Guidelines during the district court proceedings, we review it
for harmless error. See United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1143
(10th Cir. 2005). We have said that “[i]n non-constitutional harmless error cases,
the government bears the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the substantial rights of the defendant were not affected.” See
United States v. Glover, 413 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005).
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In this case, Mr. Austin contends, and the government concedes, that
despite Mr. Austin's Blakely objection at sentencing, the district court mandatorily
applied the Sentencing Guidelines in determining his sentence length and then
sentenced him at the bottom of the guidelines range. Given he was sentenced at
the bottom of the range, the government summarily concedes our decision in
Labastida-Segura dictates and Mr. Austin's sentence length must be remanded for
consideration in light of both Booker and Blakely.
Because the burden of demonstrating harmless error is on the government
in this case, and it has conceded such error, we are inclined to remand Mr.
Austin’s sentence to the district court for a determination under an advisory
Sentencing Guidelines scheme as to the range and subsequent length of Mr.
Austin’s sentence in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Austin’s sentence with respect
to his prior conviction constituting a “crime of violence” but otherwise
REMAND his sentence for a determination in accordance with Booker and this
decision.
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United States v. Austin
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2005-10-14
Citations: 426 F.3d 1266
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion