FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
October 31, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-4144
ELSA CONTRERAS, a/k/a Elsa
Juaregui, a/k/a Elisa Juarequi, a/k/a
Elsa Taurequi,
Defendant-Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. NO . 2:04-CR-00716-DK W )
Submitted on the briefs:
Roger K . Scowcroft, Salt Lake City, Utah for the Defendant-Appellant.
Stephen J. Sorenson, Assistant United States Attorney (Brett L. Tolman, United
States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah for the Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Before M cCO NNELL, T YM KOVICH, and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges. *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judge.
This case considers a matter of first impression for this circuit: whether the
Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for obstruction of justice, United States
Sentencing Guidelines M anual § 3C1.1 (2002), applies w hen a defendant’s
obstructive conduct occurred during the prosecution of state charges preceding
the federal indictment, but both federal and state charges were based on the same
underlying conduct. W e hold that, in this case, it does. W e also hold that the
search of M s. Contreras’s car did not violate her constitutional rights.
Accordingly, we affirm both the conviction and the sentence.
I. Background
On October 2, 2004, Elsa Contreras was stopped on Interstate 15 in Beaver
County, Utah, for following the car ahead of her too closely. The officer,
Sergeant Bauer, observed that M s. Contreras was pale and “shaking very badly.”
R. Vol. II, at 14. W hile he was examining M s. Contreras’s license and rental car
agreement, he asked about her travel plans. She said that she had left Nebraska
on September 30 and driven to Las Vegas to visit a brother and a relative who had
traveled there from M exico. Although both the officer’s testimony and the
district court order state that M s. Contreras told the officer that she arrived in Las
Vegas on the morning of October 2, that statement is unsupported by the
videotape of the encounter. Instead, the recording reflects that M s. Contreras told
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the officer only that she had left Nebraska on September 30, driven to Las Vegas,
and was now, two days later, on her w ay back to Nebraska. She explained to the
officer that she did not like to fly. The location of the traffic stop was about a
three-hour drive from Las Vegas.
Sergeant Bauer told the defendant that he was not going to give her a ticket
and to “drive safe.” R . Supp. V ol. I, at 4. Then, still standing at her car window ,
he asked, “You wouldn't mind opening your trunk real quick before I let you go,
would you?” Id. The defendant agreed, and the officer opened the trunk and
began to search. He noticed that the spare tire w as not sitting properly in its well
and asked M s. Contreras if he could check it. She agreed. Further inspection
revealed that the tire contained something other than air. Through a series of
negotiations, Sergeant Bauer convinced M s. Contreras, however reluctantly, to
accompany him to a service station to check the tire. At the service center, the
officer broke down the tire and found seven packages of methamphetamine.
M s. Contreras was arraigned on state charges and held at the Beaver
County Jail for five days. She was released on bond on October 7, after which
she fled to M exico. The federal government indicted her on October 20, 2004, on
one count of possessing 500 grams or more of methamphetamine with an intent to
distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
The following day, a federal warrant was issued for her arrest. No testimony or
evidence indicates that the federal government took any additional action to
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investigate the crime or to bring M s. Contreras into custody, other than the
issuance of the indictment and arrest w arrant.
In November, the state court issued a warrant for failure to appear when
M s. Contreras missed a court date. Eight months later, in July 2005, she was
stopped crossing the border, the federal warrant was discovered, and she was
arrested and placed in federal custody. On M arch 20, 2006, M s. Contreras
pleaded guilty to violating §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A ), preserving her right to
appeal.
The Presentence Report (PSR ) recommended a sentencing enhancement
under U nited States Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. A s
a basis for the enhancement, the PSR cites M s. Contreras’s failure to appear at her
state-court hearing. The PSR calculated a total offense level of 25 and a criminal
history category of I, resulting in a sentencing range of 57-71 months. W ithout
the enhancement for obstruction of justice, the range would have been 46-57
months.
At sentencing, the government voiced its support for the enhancement:
W ell, just for the record, Your H onor, I do believe that the issue here is
that she was arrested and charged in this offense and it is irrelevant which
sovereign pursued the investigation. She fled following her arrest and
follow ing a charge being filed in this instant offense. Under the guidelines,
I do believe that that does qualify for obstruction of justice. . . .
The Court: I agree with you on that point.
R. Vol. III, at 8-9.
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The judge sentenced M s. Contreras to 57 months, the bottom of the sentencing
range.
M s. Contreras timely appealed, objecting both to the search of her trunk
and to the sentencing enhancement.
II. Fourth Amendment
M s. Contreras argues on appeal that the search of the trunk of her car was
illegal because her detention was not based on reasonable suspicion and her
consent to the search was tainted. W e find that the officer had reasonable
suspicion to detain M s. Contreras, and that she freely and voluntarily consented to
the search of her trunk.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the factual
findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v.
Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1998). The ultimate determination of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law, which we
review de novo. Id.
A. Initial Traffic Stop
“[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based
on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable
suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring . . . .”
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995). Utah law at
the time of the stop at issue prohibited following “another vehicle more closely
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than is reasonable and prudent.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 (2000) (current
version at Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-711 (2005)). The district court accepted
Sergeant Bauer’s testimony that he stopped Contreras because she was following
a semi-truck too closely. M s. Contreras does not challenge that finding on
appeal, nor does she challenge the district court’s holding that the stop was valid.
Therefore, we turn to the validity of the extended stop following Sergeant Bauer’s
initial detention of M s. Contreras.
B. Extension of Stop
Once an officer has returned the motorist’s license and other papers and
issued any citation he intends to give, he must usually allow her to proceed on her
way without additional questioning. United States v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190, 1193
(10th Cir. 1999). Further detention must be justified by an “objectively
reasonable and articulable” suspicion of illegal activity based on the totality of
the circumstances. U nited States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir.
2001). W e affirm the district court’s conclusion that Sergeant Bauer’s detention
of M s. Contreras beyond the scope of the initial traffic stop was supported by
reasonable suspicion.
Sergeant Bauer’s testimony paints a convincing picture of reasonable
suspicion. The officer reported that the defendant was shaking so badly that she
could not hold on to the papers in her hand. M ore importantly, she offered an
account of her travel plans that seemed suspicious at best and incredible at worst.
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M s. Contreras claimed to have driven more than 1,200 miles to see her family,
only to turn around within a day and begin the 1,200-mile drive back. Add the
presence of food wrappers from a California restaurant and the fact that she was
driving a rental car – which Sergeant Bauer knew to be “often used by narcotics
traffickers . . . [because] it can’t be seized,” R. Vol. II, at 21 – and M s.
Contreras’s conduct begins to strongly resemble that of a narcotics courier
transporting a load between the W est Coast and Nebraska.
W e have noted numerous times that implausible travel plans can form a
basis for reasonable suspicion. United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252,
1260 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kopp, 45 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (10th Cir.
1995). W e have also credited the idea that drug couriers often use third-party
rental cars. William s, 271 F.3d at 1270. Although we have found nervousness to
be “of only limited significance in determining whether reasonable suspicion
exist[s],” United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir. 1997), it does add
to the overall calculus of suspicious behavior, especially when, as here, it is
extreme. Taken as a whole, Sergeant Bauer’s assessm ent that M s. Contreras’s
actions created reasonable suspicion of narcotics activity is more than sufficient.
C. Consent Given to Search Trunk
W hile a warrant is not required to search a motor vehicle, “the search
otherwise [must be such] as [a] magistrate could authorize.” California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 (1985). In other words, an officer must have probable
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cause to search a vehicle without a warrant or he must rely on some other
exception to the warrant requirement. 1 Consent is one such exception to the
warrant requirement. United States v. Zubia-M elendez, 263 F.3d 1155, 1162
(10th Cir. 2001) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)).
The central question in determining whether consent to a search is
voluntary is “whether the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ request . . .
.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991); United States v. Rosborough,
366 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2004). In this case, there is ambiguity as to
whether M s. Contreras’s detention had ceased at the time she consented to the
search. On the one hand, Sergeant Bauer had returned her documents and told her
to “drive safe,” which would ordinarily be an indication that she was free to go.
R. Supp. Vol. I, at 4. On the other hand, after M s. Contreras said “okay” to these
valedictory remarks, the officer stepped back briefly and asked her: “You
wouldn’t mind opening your trunk real quick before I let you go, would you?” Id.
W e interpret this as indicating that she was not yet free to go, or at least that a
reasonable motorist might interpret the words “before I let you go” as
countermanding the dismissal implied by the earlier words, “drive safe.” Yet the
1
The district court in its order and both parties in their appellate briefs
addressed the search issue in terms of reasonable suspicion rather than probable
cause, but we assume they must have meant the latter. Because we resolve the
search issue on the basis of consent, any error that may have occurred in this
respect is inconsequential.
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videotape suggests that M s. Contreras may have interjected her consent before
Sergeant Bauer had reached the end of his sentence— before he uttered the w ords,
“before I let you go.” If so, then at the time she gave her consent, she had been
released from custody and the officer had not yet communicated anything to the
contrary.
The videotape, however, is not entirely audible because Sergeant Bauer and
M s. Contreras were talking at the same time. It is not clear what exactly M s.
Contreras said and whether her interjection was a consent, or if she gave her
consent only after Sergeant Bauer had finished speaking. However, the timing of
her consent is not decisive. A person may voluntarily consent to a search even
while being legally detained. United States v. Flores, 48 3d. 467, 468-69 (10th
Cir. 1995). The detention is only one factor to be considered in determining
whether consent was voluntarily and freely given based on the totality of the
circumstances. United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1993).
On this record, even assuming that M s. Contreras was still under lawful
detention at the time, we agree with the district court that her consent to the
search was voluntary. Factors that support this conclusion include: (1) Sergeant
Bauer’s casual phrasing of the request; (2) his tone of voice; (3) his lack of a
show of force; (4) his stop in broad daylight on an interstate highw ay; and (5) M s.
Contreras’s repeated responses of “okay” when the officer reiterated his requests
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for consent. Nothing in the videotape or the testimony at the hearing provides
any reason to believe that M s. Contreras was acting under compulsion.
M s. Contreras also contends that even if she consented to the opening of
her trunk, she did not consent to a search of it. The general rule is that “when a
suspect does not limit the scope of a search, and does not object when the search
exceeds w hat he later claims w as a more limited consent, an officer is justified in
searching the entire vehicle.” United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1177
(internal quotations and citations omitted). The court determines from the totality
of the circumstances whether a search remains within the boundaries of the
consent, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. W e
ask, “[W]hat would the typical reasonable person have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect?” United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d
1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251
(1991)).
W e agree with the district court that a reasonable person granting consent
to open the trunk would have expected that Sergeant Bauer intended to inspect the
interior of the trunk, not just the trunk’s hinges. Once properly in the trunk, the
officer quickly developed probable cause to believe the spare tire contained
contraband. In any event, Sergeant Bauer returned twice to M s. Contreras and
obtained further permission when he wished to examine the spare tire after he
noticed that it did not fit comfortably under its cover.
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Because we find M s. Contreras voluntarily consented to the search of her
trunk and the extension of the stop was based on reasonable suspicion, there was
no Fourth A mendment violation. W e uphold the district court’s denial of M s.
Contreras’s motion to suppress.
III. O bstruction of Justice
A. Obstruction of State-Court Charges
“[W]e review a district court’s factual findings for clear error, and we
review its legal interpretation of the guidelines de novo.” United States v.
Norman, 129 F.3d 1393, 1398 (10th Cir. 1997).
Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines requires that an offender’s
offense level be increased by two levels
[i]f (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted
to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant’s
offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related
offense. . . .
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The defendant in this case asserts that her conduct
occurred before the investigation or prosecution of the “instant offense of
conviction” was underway. W e disagree.
The Guidelines direct that “[t]he term ‘instant’ is used in connection with
‘offense,’ ‘federal offense,’ or ‘offense of conviction,’ as the case may be, to
distinguish the violation for which the defendant is being sentenced from a prior
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or subsequent offense, or from an offense before another court (e.g., an offense
before a state court involving the same underlying conduct).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1
cmt. n.1(H) (emphasis added). Thus, if M s. Contreras’s flight to M exico had
affected only state prosecution, it w ould not count for purposes of § 3C1.1.
In this case, however, M s. Contreras committed an offense that could have
been prosecuted either by state or by federal authorities. W hen she fled to
M exico, she did not know whether the prosecution she was obstructing was one
that eventually would proceed in federal court or in state court. Indeed, the
record is not clear whether, at the time she fled to M exico, the federal indictment
had yet been entered. She fled sometime after October 7, 2004; the federal grand
jury indicted her on October 20. There is no doubt, however, that her five-month
absence precluded federal authorities from proceeding with prosecution in her
case until she returned to the jurisdiction. Thus, although we agree with
defendant’s argument that the language of the guideline confines the obstruction
enhancement to obstruction of the administration of justice with respect to the
“instant” offense, meaning the federal prosecution, we hold that where a
defendant’s obstructive conduct impedes or delays prosecution by both federal
and state authorities, the enhancement is applicable.
Even if M s. Contreras slipped across the border before the grand jury did
its work, this would not make her flight any less obstructive with respect to the
federal prosecution. In United States v. M ills, this Court upheld the application of
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the obstruction enhancement to a defendant— a federal prisoner— who tampered
with videotape evidence to erase the record of his conduct. 194 F.3d 1108, 1114-
15 (10th Cir. 1999). W e held that the defendant’s action obstructed the federal
investigation even though it took place before the start of that investigation.
“Clearly, M ills knew that an investigation would be conducted, and he understood
the importance of the tape in that investigation.” Id. at 1115. If conduct may
obstruct a federal prosecution when no investigation is underway at all, it surely
must be permissible for the obstruction enhancement to apply here, where a
defendant flees the country after state investigators had uncovered evidence that
would warrant federal prosecution.
A contrary interpretation would have strange consequences. M any, if not
most, federal drug prosecutions occur as a result of state investigations. See, e.g.
Paul G . Cassell, Too Severe?, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1017, 1040 (2004) (noting “the
increasing trend by federal prosecutors to ‘adopt’ what is essentially a state
investigation for federal prosecution”). It would make little sense to determine
the applicability of the guideline by the identity of the officers who conduct the
initial investigation rather than the nature of the ultimate prosecution. As the
Fourth Circuit has noted: “The failure of the guideline to distinguish between an
investigation by federal officials as opposed to state officials undoubtedly is
founded in a recognition that state officers are authorized to and frequently do
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investigate criminal conduct that ultimately is prosecuted under federal law.”
United States v. Self, 132 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1997).
Seven other circuits have considered whether the obstruction of a state
investigation based on the same facts as the eventual federal conviction merits a §
3C1.1 enhancement. Of those circuits, six have held that obstruction of the state
proceeding does qualify for the enhancement; only one held that it did not.
United States v. Perez, 50 F.3d 396, 398-400 (7th Cir. 1995) (obstruction of state
proceeding does not qualify under the enhancement); United States v. Ayers, 416
F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2005) (obstruction of state proceeding qualifies under the
enhancement); United States v. Frasier, 381 F.3d 1097, 1099-1100 (11th Cir.
2004) (same); United States v. Roberts, 243 F.3d 235, 237-38 (6th Cir. 2001)
(same); United States v. Imenec, 193 F.3d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); United
States v. Self, 132 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v.
Adediran, 26 F.3d 61, 65 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Emery, 991 F.2d
907, 911-12 (1st Cir. 1993) (same).
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, we A FFIR M M s. Contreras’s conviction and her sentence.
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United States v. Contreras
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2007-10-31
Citations: 506 F.3d 1031
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion