United States v. Heckenliable

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
April 27, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-4089
DAVID TODD HECKENLIABLE, also
known as David Todd Heckliable,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 2:04-CR-697-PGC)

Diana Hagen, Assistant United States Attorney (Paul M. Wagner, United States Attorney,
with her on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jill M. Wichlens, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Raymond P. Moore, Federal Public
Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
 Section 922(g)(9) of Title 18 makes it unlawful for any person previously convicted

of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a firearm.1 Section 921(a)(33)(A)

defines the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as a federal, state, or tribal

offense that–

(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a
child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the
victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.

The issue raised in this appeal is whether the domestic relationship component of § 922(g)(9)

need be an element of the predicate misdemeanor offense. Although this is an issue of first

impression in our circuit, the nine circuits that have addressed this question have agreed,

albeit for varying reasons, that it need not.2 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

1
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) reads in full:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person–
***
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate commerce or foreign commerce.
2
See United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1065-67 (9th Cir. 2003); White v.
Dept. of Justice, 328 F.3d 1361, 1364-67 (Fed. Cir. 2003);United States v. Shelton, 325
F.3d 553, 561-562 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, 142-145
(2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1358-1366 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
(continued...)

2
Reviewing this question of statutory interpretation de novo, see Hill v. Smithkline Corp., 393

F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 2005), we join our sister circuits, and affirm.

I.

Defendant David T. Heckenliable pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

The district court sentenced Defendant to fifty-seven months imprisonment. Prior to his

guilty plea, the district court ruled in the context of Defendant’s motion in limine that a

“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” does not require a domestic relationship

element. See United States v. Heckenliable, 2005 WL 856389, at * 2 (D. Utah April 13,

2005) (unpublished). On appeal, Defendant challenges his conviction arguing his guilty

plea is constitutionally invalid because the district court misinformed him of the elements

necessary to sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(9).3 See Bousley v. United States, 523

U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (explaining a plea is not voluntary in the sense it constitutes an

admission of guilt unless the accused receives “real notice of the true nature of the

charges against him”). Specifically, Defendant argues that to constitute a “misdemeanor

(...continued)
2

United States v. Ball, 7 Fed. Appx. 210, 213 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United States v.
Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215,
218-21 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619-21 (8th Cir. 1999).
3
Defendant concedes he did not challenge the validity of his plea before the
district court. The Government, however, does not argue Defendant waived his present
challenge, and accordingly, has waived the waiver. See United States v. Reider, 103 F.3d
99, 103 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1996); accord United States v. Woods, 148 F.3d 843, 849 n. 1 (7th
Cir. 1998); Atkins v. New York City, 143 F.3d 100, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1998). We will
consider the merits of Defendant’s challenge.

3
crime of domestic violence” under § 922(g)(9), the predicate misdemeanor offense must

have as an element a domestic relationship between the perpetrator and the victim of the

predicate misdemeanor. In this case, the predicate misdemeanor offense that formed the

basis for Defendant’s § 922(g)(9) prosecution was a prior guilty plea to simple assault

under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102. Simple assault as defined in § 76-5-102 does not have

a domestic relationship element.4 Accordingly, Defendant argues his prior conviction

does not qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, and therefore, he cannot

be guilty of violating § 922(g)(9) as a matter of law.5

II.

While the definition of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” contained in

4
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 provides:

Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence,
to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes
bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another.
5
Defendant also argues his plea lacked a sufficient factual basis. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(3). Defendant argues that “[t]o demonstrate a factual basis for a plea to
violating § 922(g)(9), it must be shown that the predicate offense relied upon had as an
express element a domestic relationship between the victim and the perpetrator” and
because the Utah simple-assault statute does not have this element “[there] could have
been no[] factual basis for Mr. Heckenliable’s plea.” Our holding that a domestic
relationship need not be an element of the predicate misdemeanor offense disposes of
Defendant’s alternative argument.

4
§ 921(a)(33)(A) is not a model of clarity or preciseness,6 we agree with our sister circuits

that neither the syntax nor the grammar of the statute require the predicate misdemeanor

offense to have a domestic relationship element. We agree with the First, Eighth, and

Ninth Circuits that Congress’s use of the singular noun “element” is indicative that the

misdemeanor offense only requires one element, namely, the use of force. As the Ninth

Circuit explained:

The definition says “has as an element,” not, for instance, “has as
elements,” indicating that it speaks only of a single element rather than in
the plural. Immediately following the word “element” is the phrase “use or
attempted use of physical force or threatened use of a deadly weapon.”
This is a discrete attribute that clearly qualifies as an “element” of the
underlying crime. After that comes a second, distinct attribute–the
domestic relationship. The amount of force used and the relationship
between the aggressor and victim are two very different things, and thus
would constitute two different elements. Since the statute only requires one
element, we read it to require only the one immediately following the word
“element” in the statute–i.e. the use of physical force.

United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1065-67 (9th Cir. 2003); accord United States v.

Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 218-21 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[A]bsent evidence that Congress wished

to deviate from customary usage, [the word ‘element’] should be read to refer only to the

immediately following attribute.”); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619-21 (8th Cir.

6
For example, § 921(a)(33)(A) begins with the phrase “except as provided in
subparagraph (C), the term ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ means[.]”
Congress, however, neglected to enact a subparagraph (C). We are not the only circuit
that has noted this discrepancy. See United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1065-67
(9th Cir. 2003)

5
1999) (same).7 This interpretation is reinforced by the observation that the word

“element” as used in the definition of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” is

followed by two distinct sentence fragments, each describing a distinct attribute (the use

of physical force and the domestic relationship requirement), and each separated by a

comma. See United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining

“the ‘committed by’ language is itself separated from the “use of force” language by a

comma . . . reinforc[ing] the separateness of the ‘use of force’ element from the

‘committed by’ language.”).8

7
Defendant argues Congress has previously used the singular noun “element” to
modify two distinct consecutive attributes in a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (defining
“crime of violence” as “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.”). Assuming
§ 16(a) may be construed as containing two distinct elements, we remain unpersuaded.
When defining a crime having more than one element, Congress generally uses the phrase
“has as its elements.” See, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2). In § 3559(c)(2)(A)
Congress defined “assault with intent to commit rape” as “an offense that has as its
elements engaging in physical contact with another person or using or brandishing a
weapon against another person with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual
abuse[.]” (emphasis added). Similarly, in 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(B) Congress defined
“sexually violent offense” as an offense “that has as its elements engaging in physical
contact with another person with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual
abuse.” (emphasis added). In any event, we are persuaded that neither the syntax or
grammar of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) requires that we construe this provision as Defendant
suggests.
8
We also agree with the D.C. Circuit that “an unnatural reading would result if
‘committed by’ were construed to modify ‘use of force.’” Id. at 1360 & n. 7. Properly
construed, a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” requires the domestic
relationship element to be charged and proven as an element of a § 922(g)(9) violation,
not as an element of the underlying misdemeanor. This is because the verb “commit” is
best understood as modifying the word “offense” at the beginning of the definition of a
(continued...)

6
 We further are persuaded in our interpretation of § 921(a)(33)(A), as were the First

and D.C. Circuits, by the fact Defendant’s interpretation would frustrate Congress’s intent

behind the law and would create a “significant practical anomaly,” rendering the law a

nullity in a majority of the states. See Meade, 175 F.3d at 200; Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1364.

Our interpretation must give practical effect to Congress’s intent, rather than frustrate it.

See United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940). The purpose

of § 922(g)(9) was to remedy the disparate treatment nationwide between those persons

convicted of a felony involving domestic assault, who were prohibited from possessing a

firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and those persons convicted of a misdemeanor

involving domestic assault, who were not. A majority of states, including Utah, charge

domestic violence offenders under their general assault statutes. In fact, fewer than half

of the states have misdemeanor “domestic assault” statutes that, in addition to the element

of force, also include a domestic relationship element. See Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1365 n.

12 (noting that only nineteen states have assault statutes directed specifically toward

domestic violence). Under Defendant’s interpretation, § 922(g)(9) would be rendered a

nullity in all of these states. See Meade, 175 F.3d at 220 (noting that requiring a domestic

relationship element for the predicate misdemeanor “would render the statute a dead letter

(...continued)
8

“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” A person is said to “commit” an offense.
But a person cannot commit “use” or commit “force.” Id.; see also Belless, 338 F.3d at
1068.

7
in most jurisdictions”). We do not think Congress intended to create such disparity in the

application of § 922(g)(9). As Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1354, aptly explained: “Under

[Defendant’s] construction, the Congress remedied one disparity – between felony and

misdemeanor domestic violence convictions – while at the same time creating a new

disparity among (and sometimes, within) states.” We decline to ascribe such an intent to

Congress when it enacted § 922(g)(9).9

AFFIRMED.

9
Section 921(a)(33)(A)’s legislative history is consistent with our interpretation.
See e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S11872-01 (Statement from Senator Lautemberg directly
addressing the applicability of § 922 to crimes not having a domestic relationship
element). Defendant conceded at oral argument the legislative history does not favor his
position. Defendant, however, argues we should not resort to legislative history to clear
up any ambiguity, but should instead apply the rule of lenity. We reject this argument.
While we recognize the syntax of the statute is imprecise, we do not find its language
ambiguous. Thus, we do not resort to legislative history to resolve an ambiguity, but cite
to it only to confirm what we have said, namely, that the predicate misdemeanor does not
require a domestic relationship element. See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 539
(1996) (confirming Congress’s intent through principles of statutory construction as well
as legislative history). Moreover, the rule of lenity is reserved for those cases “in which a
reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to the
language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute.”
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990). Such is not the case here.

8