F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAY 24 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
vs. No. 99-4071
PAUL BRADFORD JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 97-CR-06-B)
Brooke C. Wells, Assistant United States Attorney (and Paul M. Warner, United
States Attorney, with her on the briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff -
Appellee.
Reid W. Lambert, Woodbury & Kesler, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant
- Appellant.
Before KELLY, McWILLIAMS, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Paul Bradford Jones appeals from his conviction on
two counts of interference with commerce by threats or violence (Hobbs Act), 18
U.S.C. § 1951, one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), two counts of
armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d), three counts of carrying and
using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), one count of
being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of being a felon in
possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Mr. Jones received a mandatory
life sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1), plus 45 years to run consecutively.
The convictions stem from a several-month crime spree across Utah. Mr.
Jones was first charged in a three-count federal indictment on February 2, 1995.
Superseding indictments were filed over the next two years, during which time
Mr. Jones pursued various motions. Trial was set for March 10, 1997. On March
6, 1997, Mr. Jones moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that his right to a
speedy trial had been violated. The district court dismissed the charges, but
dismissal was without prejudice. Mr. Jones was reindicted on the same charges
the next day, and convicted after a jury trial.
He contends that the district court erred in: (1) dismissing the indictment
without prejudice; (2) admitting evidence seized during a warrantless search of
the residence where he was staying; (3) refusing to sever the “felon in
possession” counts from the other counts; (4) limiting the cross-examination of a
prosecution witness; (5) sentencing him to life imprisonment plus 45 years
because such a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment; and (6) finding that an
earlier robbery qualifies as a “serious violent felony” under the three-strikes
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provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and we affirm.
A. Speedy Trial Act
Based on a finding that Mr. Jones’ rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18
U.S.C. §3161, had been violated, the trial court dismissed the indictment on April
1, 1997. The dismissal was without prejudice, and Mr. Jones immediately was
reindicted. Mr. Jones argues that, because of the egregious nature of the
violation and the lack of prejudice to the public interest, the dismissal should
have been with prejudice.
Mr. Jones previously appealed his convictions. In United States v. Jones ,
No. 97-4153, 1998 WL 777068 (10th Cir. Oct. 27, 1998), we reached only
whether the dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act should have been with or
without prejudice. Finding that the district court had erroneously undercounted
the number of non-excludable days that had passed, the case was remanded to the
district court to recalculate the total number of non-excludable days and to
redetermine, based on that calculation, whether the dismissal should have been
with prejudice. This court did not reach the other issues on appeal.
On remand, the district court recalculated and concluded that dismissal of
the indictment without prejudice was appropriate. Mr. Jones contends that the
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district court’s recalculation still undercounts the proper number of non-
excludable days, and that, given the factors to be considered by the district court,
dismissal with prejudice was required.
The district court’s decision to dismiss an indictment without prejudice for
violation of the Speedy Trial Act is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Taylor , 487 U.S. 326, 335-36 (1988); United States v. Saltzman ,
984 F.2d 1087, 1092 (10th Cir. 1993). We do not need to reach the question of
whether the district court correctly calculated the number of non-excludable days
because we conclude that, even if Mr. Jones’ contention that 414 non-excludable
days passed is correct, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the indictments without prejudice. 1
The relevant factors in determining whether a dismissal should be with or
without prejudice are contained primarily in the statute, 18 U.S.C. §3162, and are
further developed by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor ,
487 U.S. 326 (1988). Under 18 U.S.C. §3162(a)(2), the district court must
consider, among other factors, “the seriousness of the offense; the facts and
circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a
reprosecution on the administration of [the Act] and on the administration of
1
Additionally, on remand the district court noted that it would have
dismissed the indictments without prejudice even if Mr. Jones’ calculation were
correct. See I R. doc. 82 at 13.
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justice.” In Taylor , the Supreme Court determined that prejudice to the
defendant is another factor that should be taken into consideration by the district
court. 487 U.S. at 333-34.
Of course, an appellate court cannot exercise discretion for the district
court. When the district court has exercised that discretion, our function is to
insure that the statute is effectuated, recognizing that “when the statutory factors
are properly considered, and supporting factual findings are not clearly in error,
the district court’s judgment of how opposing considerations balance should not
lightly be disturbed.” Id. at 337. Applying these standards, we uphold the
decision to dismiss the indictment without prejudice.
1. Seriousness of the Crime
Mr. Jones concedes that the offenses he was convicted of are “extremely
serious.” Aplt. Br. at 25. He argues, however, that the seriousness of the
offenses must be weighed against the severity of the delay, citing United States v.
Russo , 741 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 1984) and United States v. Clymer , 25
F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir. 1994). We agree with Mr. Jones that, because of the
significant delay in this case, the seriousness of the charges does not
automatically justify dismissal without prejudice. However, we cannot agree that
“the seriousness of the offenses charged in this case are substantially outweighed
by the severity of the delay.” Aplt. Br. at 25. As the district court detailed on
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remand, some of the crimes of which Mr. Jones was convicted involved
intimidation, violence, and use of a firearm. The indictment charged multiple
robberies. Additionally, Mr. Jones was violating his parole at the time. In short,
we will not say that a particular delay automatically outweighs the seriousness of
the offense, nor will we say that a particular offense is always so serious as to
automatically outweigh any delay. This balancing is to be done by the district
court in conjunction with the other enumerated factors, as was done here.
2. Circumstances Leading to Dismissal
In evaluating the circumstances precipitating the dismissal, the court is to
focus “‘on the culpability of the delay-producing conduct.’” United States v.
Saltzman , 984 F.2d 1087, 1093 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Hastings , 847 F.2d 920, 925 (1st Cir. 1988)). “Where the delay is the result of
intentional dilatory conduct, or a pattern of neglect on the part of the
Government, dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate remedy.” Id. at 1093-94.
Here, no showing was made that the prosecution engaged in a pattern of neglect
or bad faith. Much of the delay was attributable to the court’s method of
disposition of a suppression motion, and while the court and the government are
each partly responsible for effectuating a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, a
defendant that lets the time run without asserting his rights under the Act has less
of a claim to a dismissal with prejudice than a defendant who makes a timely
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assertion, but is unheeded. See id. at 1094.
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3. Impact of Reprosecution on the Speedy Trial Act and the Ends of
Justice
Mr. Jones contends that allowing reprosecution in this case would “send a
message that the Act need not be seen as anything more than a potential
inconvenience” and that dismissal with prejudice is necessary to “demonstrate to
the government the seriousness of the [Act].” Aplt. Br. at 28-29. While district
courts obviously do not want to give the impression that the Speedy Trial Act is a
mere formality that can be violated with impunity, dismissal with prejudice is not
the only method for a court to show that violations must be taken seriously. A
dismissal without prejudice requires the government to re-indict, may work to the
disadvantage of the government on limitations grounds, and may make
reprosecution less likely. See Taylor , 487 U.S. at 342. As the Supreme Court
observed in Taylor , “If the greater deterrent effect of barring reprosecution could
alone support a decision to dismiss with prejudice, the consideration of the other
factors identified in § 3162(a)(2) would be superfluous, and all violations would
warrant barring reprosecution. ” Id. The district court concluded that the
administration of the Speedy Trial Act and the administration of justice would not
be harmed by dismissal without prejudice because of a lack of actual prejudice
occasioned by the delay, the defendant’s likely custody on unrelated matters, and
the timing and manner in which the Speedy Trial Act claim was brought to the
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court’s attention, specifically on the eve of trial. We find no error in the
consideration of this factor.
4. Prejudice to the Defendant
Although not a statutory factor to consider, prejudice to the defendant may
be a significant factor in determining whether to dismiss with prejudice. Id. at
340. Mr. Jones contends that he has suffered the following prejudice: (1)
inability to locate a potential witness who moved during the time between his
arrest and the trial; (2) the inevitable fading of memory of fact witnesses; and (3)
his incarceration for over two years on unproven charges.
These assertions fail to show any material prejudice. The witness Mr.
Jones claims to be unable to find would be a minor witness, and Mr. Jones has not
shown how her testimony would have been at all helpful to him. Because he was
in violation of both federal supervised release and Oregon state parole supervision
at the time he was arrested, Mr. Jones was subject to serving the remainder of
both a previously-imposed federal sentence as well as several unexpired state
sentences during the time he was incarcerated on the current charges. While we
do not say that a defendant who would otherwise be incarcerated can never suffer
prejudice from excessive pre-trial detention, we agree with the district court that
Mr. Jones did not suffer any material prejudice in this case.
The delay in this case, whether 216 non-excludable days as the Government
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contends, or 414 non-excludable days as Mr. Jones contends, is very serious and
suggests a need for case management better attuned to the Speedy Trial Act.
Under different circumstances, such a lengthy delay would likely warrant
dismissal with prejudice. However, given the seriousness of the crimes with
which Mr. Jones was charged, the government’s relative lack of culpability for
the delay, and Mr. Jones’ inability to demonstrate prejudice, we cannot say that
the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment without
prejudice.
B. Admission of Evidence Obtained in Warrantless Search
Mr. Jones challenges the admission of evidence obtained when police
conducted a warrantless search of a condominium where he was staying at the
time of his arrest (“the condo”). Mr. Jones’ initial motion to suppress addressed
three distinct searches: (1) the search of the condo; (2) the search of Mr. Jones’
briefcase which was discovered at the condo; and (3) the development of certain
rolls of undeveloped film discovered at the condo. The district court granted Mr.
Jones’ motion to suppress the contents of the briefcase and the rolls of film, but
denied his motion to suppress other evidence, finding that Mr. Jones lacked
standing to challenge the search because he did not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the condo.
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In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. See United States v.
Patten , 183 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999). We also review the district court’s
findings of fact under a clear error standard, and give deference to the inferences
the court draws from those findings. See id. However, the ultimate question of
whether a person has standing to assert a Fourth Amendment challenge to a
warrantless search is a legal question that we review de novo. See United States
v. Conway , 73 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1995). We agree that Mr. Jones did not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the condo; thus, denial of the motion
to suppress the evidence gathered in the warrantless search was proper.
1. Background
Although there was conflicting testimony on several issues at the
suppression hearing, the following background is taken from the findings of the
magistrate judge which were approved by the district court. These findings are
not clearly erroneous based upon our review of the record. Mr. Jones was
arrested in a condominium in St. George, Utah, owned by Kelly Burton, a friend
of co-defendant Arlene Rhode. On the Tuesday before Thanksgiving, November
22, 1994, Ms. Burton received a telephone call from Ms. Rhode asking her if she
could use the condo to spend Thanksgiving with her children. Ms. Burton
reluctantly agreed, on the condition that Ms. Rhode would first obtain the key to
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the condo from Ms. Burton. Because Ms. Burton lived in Los Angeles, and Ms.
Rhode lived in Salt Lake City, Ms. Rhode asked if she could instead simply use a
locksmith to gain access to the condo. Ms. Burton adamantly refused. The two
women than made arrangements to have the key picked up by a man named
“David Harrison,” which was an alias of co-defendant Tracy Linn Brown, who
was then in southern California. At the time she agreed to let Ms. Rhode use the
condo, Ms. Burton had no idea that Ms. Rhode had invited Mr. Jones and Mr.
Brown, two convicted felons who were violating parole, to stay at the condo as
well. She testified that she never would have granted permission to use the condo
had she known Ms. Rhode had invited the others.
The key was never picked up, and Ms. Burton assumed that Ms. Rhode had
changed her plans. In fact, Ms. Rhode arrived in St. George early in the morning
of Wednesday, November 23, and convinced a locksmith to let her into the condo,
violating the express directions of Ms. Burton. The next day, Ms. Rhode spoke to
Mr. Brown, telling him he did not need to pick up the key as scheduled, because
she had already gained access to the condo. Mr. Brown and Mr. Jones arrived late
Thanksgiving night. Ms. Rhode never called Ms. Burton to let her know that she
or the two men were staying there.
For several days the group stayed at the condo. On the night of Mr. Jones’
arrest, December 1, 1994, the group had packed in preparation for their departure
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the next morning. That same night, Mr. Jones and Mr. Brown robbed a local
grocery store. Following the robbery, police chased the getaway car, which was
eventually abandoned by the two men who ran toward a nearby apartment
complex. The police later encountered Mr. Brown, who subsequently confessed
to the robbery and named his partner as “Peter Birth,” which was Mr. Jones’ alias.
Mr. Brown also told police the address of the condo where he and Mr. Jones were
staying. At approximately 2:30 a.m. the police went to the condo. Ms. Rhode
answered the door and denied knowing Peter Birth. Testimony conflicts on
whether police were granted permission to search the residence for Mr. Jones.
While searching the condo, police found the door to the master bedroom locked.
After being refused permission to enter by Ms. Rhode’s daughter, who was inside,
police broke down the door and found Mr. Jones sitting on the bed. Police
arrested him, and in the ensuing search of the condo found several pieces of
incriminating evidence that were used at his trial.
2. Fourth Amendment Standing
Mr. Jones contends that because the police entered and searched the condo
without a warrant or exigent circumstances, his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated and any evidence collected should be suppressed. The government
responds by arguing that Mr. Jones lacks standing to challenge the warrantless
search because he did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy and was
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wrongfully on the premises. In order to establish standing, Mr. Jones bears the
burden of demonstrating that he had a personal Fourth Amendment interest that
was implicated by the search of the condo. See United States v. Benitez-
Arreguin , 973 F.2d 823, 827 (10th Cir. 1992). The test for determining standing
is well-established, and relies upon two factors: (1) “‘whether the individual, by
his conduct has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,’” and (2)
“‘whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” United States v. Dodds , 946 F.2d 726, 728
(10th Cir. 1991)(quoting Smith v. Maryland , 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979))(internal
quotations omitted).
The district court assumed that Mr. Jones met his burden on the first factor.
We are willing to make that assumption as well, turning the focal point of the
standing inquiry into whether his “subjective expectation of privacy is one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” We agree that it is not. Mr.
Jones was an invitee of Ms. Rhode, not the owner of the condo. He knew that
Ms. Rhode was not the owner. Moreover, both Ms. Rhode’s and Mr. Jones’
presence in the condo was not only contrary to the contingent permission granted
Ms. Rhode, but also unlawful. Ms. Rhode used a locksmith to gain entry, and the
owner of the condo did not and would not grant permission for Mr. Jones to use
the condo. Quite simply, society is not prepared to accept this arrangement as
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conferring a reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States v. Carr , 939
F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cassell , 542 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.
1976). The district court properly refused to suppress the challenged evidence.
C. District Court’s Refusal to Sever Counts
Mr. Jones contends that the district court erred by refusing to sever the
counts charging him as felon in possession of firearms and ammunition from the
other counts. He argues that refusal to sever was unfairly prejudicial because it
allowed the jury to hear about his history as a felon, when that history would
otherwise have been inadmissible on the other counts.
“‘The decision to grant a severance is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and its decision will not ordinarily be reversed in the absence of a
strong showing of prejudice.’” United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 289-90
(10th Cir. 1983)(quoting United States v. Strand, 617 F.2d 571, 575 (10th Cir.
1980)). “The burden of a defendant to show an abuse of discretion in this context
is a difficult one.” Id. at 290.
Joinder of the firearm and ammunition status offenses with the substantive
robbery charges was appropriate under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), which provides that
“[t]wo or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment . . . in a separate
count for each offense if the offenses charged . . . are based on the same act or
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transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” In this case, the felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition charges were connected to Mr. Jones’
participation in the robberies for which he was charged.
Even though counts are properly joined in an indictment, the trial court has
the discretion to order severance under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 if the defendant will
be prejudiced by the joinder. Mr. Jones relies upon Valentine to argue that
severance is compelled in this case. In doing so, he elevates dicta above the
holding of the case. In Valentine, we recognized the “persuasiveness” of a Third
Circuit guideline under which “severance should be granted where evidence of the
prior conviction would be admissible on one or more counts but inadmissible on
others.” Id. However, Valentine undercuts Mr. Jones’ position because, in that
case, involving the joinder of substantive drug offenses with firearms status
crimes, we declined to follow the guideline. We found no prejudicial joinder
because “the charges grew out of the defendant's own conduct” and the “prior
conviction was not given unnecessary or undue emphasis at trial.” Id. Here, the
relationship of the charges clearly grew out of Mr. Jones’ own conduct.
Moreover, Mr. Jones stipulated to a prior felony conviction, thereby shielding the
jury from the prejudicial details of his prior activities. Finally, the district court
issued a limiting instruction to the jury. The district court clearly did not abuse
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its discretion in denying Mr. Jones’ motion to sever.
D. District Court’s Limitation of Cross-Examination
Mr. Jones argues that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to
cross-examine a key prosecution witness, Tracy Linn Brown, on his history of
mental illness. We review a trial court’s limitation on cross-examination of a
witness for an abuse of discretion, and will reverse “only if any error affected the
substantial rights of the accused.” United States v. Begay, 144 F.3d 1336, 1339
(10th Cir. 1998). In this case, the district court’s decision to limit the cross-
examination of Mr. Brown was not an abuse of discretion.
The court allowed Mr. Jones to cross-examine Mr. Brown outside of the
presence of the jury regarding his history of any mental illness and any
medications that he was taking at the time of trial and at the time of the events in
question. Mr. Brown testified that neither his depression nor any medication he
took to combat that illness caused him any problems with memory, perception, or
comprehension. VIII R. at 49-52. According to the district court, Mr. Jones had
failed to establish any nexus between Mr. Brown’s history of depression or use of
medication, and his ability to perceive or remember events. The court noted that
if Mr. Jones could produce a medical expert to demonstrate how depression or
related medications could significantly affect perception or recollection, it would
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reconsider its ruling, but Mr. Jones produced no such testimony. Additionally,
the district court permitted cross-examination on Mr. Brown’s consumption of
drugs and alcohol as it related to his memory, perception, and credibility.
Finally, we note that Mr. Jones’ reliance on the harmless error analysis
outlined in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) is unavailing. Quite
simply, there has been no violation of the confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment in this case. Therefore, analysis under the harmless error standard is
inappropriate.
E. Constitutionality of Life Sentence
The district court sentenced Mr. Jones to a life sentence under the “three
strikes” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) and added a consecutive sentence of 45
years for the firearms convictions. Mr. Jones contends that such a sentence is
disproportionate to the gravity of his crimes and therefore violates the Eighth
Amendment. We review constitutional challenges to a sentence de novo, United
States v. Angulo-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1506, 1508 (10th Cir. 1993), and find that his
sentence is constitutional.
In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983), the Supreme Court enunciated
a three-pronged analysis for reviewing Eighth Amendment proportionality
challenges. The test instructed courts to examine: (1) the gravity of the offense
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and harshness of the penalty; (2) sentences imposed on other criminals in the
jurisdiction; and (3) sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.
We have ruled that Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957 (1991) narrowed Solem and sets forth the applicable Eighth
Amendment test. Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 1999).
Under this test, we first look only at the relation of the sentence to Mr. Jones’
crimes. If we find no “gross disproportionality,” we do not proceed to a
comparative analysis. Id.
We do not find Mr. Jones’ sentence for the commission of five robberies
and assorted firearms violations after multiple convictions for previous armed
robberies to be grossly disproportional. Further, we note that the sentence of life
imprisonment is mandated by Congress under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). We must
“grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily
possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as
to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals.”
Solem, 463 U.S. at 290. Because we do not find the penalty to be grossly
disproportional, we need not proceed further in our inquiry.
F. Was Prior Robbery a Serious Violent Felony?
Under the “three-strikes” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), a sentence of life
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imprisonment is mandated for a person convicted of a serious violent felony if
that person has previously been convicted of two or more serious violent felonies.
Mr. Jones had previously been convicted of two robberies, and robbery generally
qualifies as a “serious violent felony.” See id. § 3559(c)(2)(F). However, a
robbery will not qualify as a serious violent felony for the purposes of the “three-
strikes” statute if “the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that
(i) no firearm or other dangerous weapon was used in the offense and no threat of
use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon was involved in the offense; and (ii)
the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury . . . .” Id. §
3559(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
Mr. Jones contends that one of his previous robbery convictions should be
considered a non-qualifying felony, thereby rendering his current conviction only
his second serious violent felony conviction for purposes of the “three-strikes”
law. He argues that because during the robbery in question neither he nor any of
his co-defendants possessed a gun, there could not have been a “threat of use of a
firearm” despite the fact that one of his co-defendants announced that he had a
gun and made gestures consistent with having a gun.
We review de novo a district court’s enhancement of a sentence pursuant to
the “three-strikes” statute. See United States v. Gottlieb, 140 F.3d 865, 868 (10th
Cir. 1998). In United States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 1997),
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our sister circuit held that the defendant’s written note that stated “I have a gun”
constituted a threat of use under § 3559(c)(3)(A), although no firearm was
present. We agree that the “threat of use” includes a “communicated expression
to a victim that the defendant would use a firearm.” See Gottleib, 140 F.3d at 872
(discussing Washington, 109 F.3d at 337). Cf. United States v. Hawkins, 901
F.2d 863, 865 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that “trial court’s upward departure on
the basis of defendant’s claim that he possessed a gun was improper” because
under USSG Section 5K2.6 “the use of a weapon does not include claimed
possession of a nonexistent weapon”); United States v. Coe, 891 F.2d 405, 411
(2d Cir. 1989). Here, the record indicates that the defendant’s co-conspirator
verbally communicated that a firearm was present, and made gestures to indicate
as much. As such, Mr. Jones’ artificial reading of the statute is rejected. Mr.
Jones entered a conspiracy to rob a store, and one of his co-conspirators
indisputably threatened to use a gun. The fact that no gun was actually present
does not prevent it from being a “threat.” Congress has many logical reasons to
legislate against such threats, including prevention of fear, intimidation, and
violent response. We believe they have done so in this statute.
AFFIRMED.
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United States v. Jones
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2000-05-24
Citations: 213 F.3d 1253
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion