F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
November 8, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-8003
STEVEN JONES, also known as
Smooth,
Defendant-Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF W YOM ING
(D.C. NO . 05-CR-00078-J)
Clifford J. Barnard, Boulder, Colorado, for A ppellant.
James C. Anderson (M atthew H. M ead with him on the briefs), Cheyenne,
W yoming, for Appellee.
Before HA RTZ, M cCO NNELL, and M cW ILLIAM S, Circuit Judges.
M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judge.
Steven Jones was convicted for his part in a conspiracy to manufacture,
distribute, and use cocaine base, and sentenced to 300 months incarceration. His
appeal alleges a host of due process violations, notably prosecutorial misconduct,
in addition to improper jury instructions and sentencing violations. W e find no
reversible error in his trial proceedings, and we AFFIRM the conviction and
sentence.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
On July 13, 2005, M r. Jones and five co-defendants were indicted for
conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Two co-
defendants pleaded guilty prior to trial. A t trial, the tw o were called as witnesses.
The court entered into evidence, without prosecutorial comm ent, their plea
agreements. Each of these conditioned a lower sentence on whether “the
Defendant continues to cooperate with the United States in an honest and truthful
manner.” R. Vol. 2, Doc. 222, at 5.
At trial, an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
testified that a material w itness in the case, James K irby Davis, was kept in jail
prior to his grand jury testimony “to ensure truthful and accurate unbiased
testimony.” R. Vol. 10 at 22. An agent from the D rug Enforcement Agency also
testified that the government uses proffers, in which the government meets w ith
co-defendants to discuss the possibility of plea agreements, as opportunities to
“gauge kind of their truthfulness.” R. Vol. 5 at 16. No objections w ere made to
any of the above.
On the second day of trial, during the afternoon break, a juror was outside
of the jury room, and he briefly viewed the defendants in leg shackles. The
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parties discussed the possibility of a curative instruction, but ultimately the
defendants decided that such an instruction would draw more attention to the
incident. They therefore agreed to allow it to pass unmentioned. M r. Jones’s
lawyer made no objection to that decision, and the court made no inquiry of the
juror in question.
The other three co-defendants pleaded guilty after six days of trial
testimony. After they did so, the judge informed the jury that those defendants
and their charges had been removed from consideration, but gave no more
thorough explanation. The next day, one of the former co-defendants, Levi
W ilson, testified against M r. Jones. The court at that time explained to the jury
that M r. W ilson had pleaded guilty, but instructed the jury not to use that as
evidence of M r. Jones’s guilt. M r. Jones immediately moved for a mistrial, based
on the inference to the jury that defendants had pleaded guilty, and the prejudice
that could result. The motion was denied.
During closing statements, the prosecutor regularly used the terms “I” and
“we,” including “we will ask you,” “we will prove to you,” and “I want to thank
you.” R. Vol. 4 at 38-39. The prosecutor also referred to the defendant as a
“shark,” to drugs as “poison,” and to the defendant’s actions as “preying upon
weak people, addicts, addicted people.” R. Vol. 10 at 65, 97. Defense counsel
did not object.
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After testimony was complete, the judge gave conflicting jury instructions.
W hen detailing the conspiracy charge, he incorrectly told the jury – twice, in
rapid succession – that they could find M r. Jones liable for quantities of drugs
that he could not have foreseen. Defense did not object at trial, and the judge did
not correct himself. He subsequently both read and distributed to the jury a
correct set of instructions, making clear that the defendant could be found liable
only for quantities he could foresee.
The jury found M r. Jones guilty, and the district judge sentenced him to
300 months in prison. The sentence was based in part on a two-level
enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines for possession of a firearm, which
was found by the judge under a preponderance of the evidence standard. M r.
Jones registered an objection to the enhancement at the time of sentencing.
II. Prosecutorial M isconduct
M r. Jones failed to lodge objections with respect to any of the claims of
trial error he now notes on appeal, with the exception of the testimony by M r.
W ilson and the final, sentencing claim. W e review the unpreserved claims for
plain error. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999). In order to grant
relief, we must find error that is plain, that affects substantial rights, and that
“seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A. Vouching for witnesses
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M r. Jones first alleges that the government improperly vouched for the
truthfulness of its witnesses. It is a due process error for a prosecutor to indicate
“a personal belief in the witness’ credibility, either through explicit personal
assurances of the witness’ veracity or by implicitly indicating that information not
presented to the jury supports the witness’ testimony.” United States v. Bowie,
892 F.2d 1494, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990).
But while guaranteeing the truthfulness of a witness’s testimony is
impermissible, presenting evidence of his or her obligation or motivation to
testify truthfully is unobjectionable. Id. Plea agreements fall into the latter
category. It is well established that prosecutors may admit plea agreements, even
those which include truthfulness provisions, without violating the dictates against
vouching. United States v. M agallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 680 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Lord, 907 F.2d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 1990). “Use of the
‘truthfulness’ portions of these agreements becomes impermissible vouching only
when the prosecutors explicitly or implicitly indicate that they can monitor and
accurately verify the truthfulness of the witness’ testimony.” Bowie, 892 F.2d at
1498.
M r. Jones alleges that the plea agreements at issue in this case are different
from those at issue in Lord and M agallanez, because they require the signatories
to “continue[] to cooperate with the United States in an honest and truthful
manner.” R. Vol. 2, Doc. 222, at 5 (emphasis added). Defendant argues that, by
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using such a phrase, the government implied that the witnesses have already
provided some “honest and truthful” information, and therefore is claiming that it
can “monitor and accurately verify” the witnesses’ testimony.
That interpretation does not accord with our precedent. In United States v.
Harlow, 444 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 2006), we upheld the admission of a
nearly identical provision, distinct only in the use of the adjective “ongoing”
rather than the verb “to continue.” W e wrote: “the provision’s language contains
no explicit or implicit requirement that the prosecutor monitor or verify the
truthfulness of the witness’ testimony, it merely requires the witness to testify
truthfully or else the agreement m ay be rescinded.” Id. at 1263. The same logic
applies here. The government merely introduced evidence of a pledge by
defendants that they both had testified truthfully and would continue to testify
truthfully; nothing in that constitutes vouching.
M r. Jones also objects to the testimony of a government witness relating to
proffers. M r. Jones argues that by stating that proffers are used to “gauge
truthfulness” and by stating at other times during the trial that government
witnesses had gone through proffers, the government was vouching for their
veracity. These statements do not meet our standard for vouching for the same
reasons as the statements above: they did not amount to guarantees concerning the
veracity of the witnesses. As we noted in Harlow, “One would hope a prosecutor
had an expectation of truthfulness from every witness he called. [But] verified
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truthfulness is not a precondition to the witness testifying, and the government
does not assume the burden of monitoring for accuracy.” Id. In addition, the
defendant opened the door to such testimony in his opening statements by
implying that the government used a proffer to coerce a witness into giving false
testimony. That left the government the necessity of explaining how it uses
proffers; it did so without impermissibly referring to the credibility of any
witnesses.
Testimony that a witness was kept in jail to ensure his truthfulness fails the
test for vouching for the same reason. The government was not saying that M r.
Davis’s testimony actually was truthful; only that they desired it to be so. None
of these three claims rises to the level of impermissible vouching.
B. Statem ents at closing argum ent
Defendant objects to the prosecutor’s use of “I” and “we” in closing
arguments. W e have held, and the defendant acknowledges, that the use of
personal pronouns in closing argument is not a per se due process violation.
United States v. Carleo, 576 F.2d 846, 851-52 (10th Cir. 1978). The key issue is
not the form but the content of such statements. A prosecutor may not express his
personal opinion, United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1343 (10th Cir. 1979), or
place his own integrity and credibility at issue, United States v. Latimer, 511 F.2d
498, 503 (10th Cir. 1975). But if such statements are merely “mannerism,” or a
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verbal tic, they are improper but not actionable. Carleo, 576 F.2d at 852. The
prosecutor’s occasional use of the first person in this case does not cross the line.
M r. Jones also finds prosecutorial misconduct in the government’s
references in closing arguments to drugs as poison and the defendant as a shark.
The Supreme Court noted in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1985), that
it is improper to use closing argument to inflame the passions and prejudices of
the jury. See also United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1490-91 (10th Cir.
1991). That is balanced, however, by the acknowledgment that in “an
emotionally charged trial,” the prosecutor’s closing argument “need not be
confined to such detached exposition as would be appropriate in a lecture.”
United States v. Lotspeich, 796 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Bishop, 534 F.2d 214, 220 (10th Cir. 1976) (quoting United States v. Isaacs, 493
F.2d 1124, 1164 (7th Cir. 1974).
The language used by the government here is less problematic than
language we have previously deemed permissible. W e have upheld references to
the defendant as “a monster,” M alicoat v. M ullin, 426 F.3d 1241, 1256 (10th Cir.
2005), and other circuits have held it is not plain error when the defendant is
referred to as “a lizard,” “a nine-headed hydra monster,” or “a predator.” See
United States v. Renwald, 889 F.2d 836, 862 (9th Cir. 1989); Byrd v. Collins, 209
F.3d 486, 536 (6th Cir. 2000). Although we have never specifically addressed the
propriety of labeling drugs as “poison,” we have upheld their depiction as
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“destructive” and “dangerous.” United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 592 (10th
Cir. 1984). The Fourth Circuit wrote in an unpublished opinion that referring to
drugs as poison is “within the proper bounds of closing arguments.” United States
v. M cKoy, 129 Fed. Appx. 815, 828 (4th Cir. 2005).
M oreover, when reviewing on a plain-error standard, prosecutorial
misstatements, even if “inappropriate and amounting to error,” must be so severe
“as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a
miscarriage of justice,” in order to amount to a due process violation. Young, 470
U.S. at 16. The prosecutor’s statements may not have been ideal trial practice,
but they were not plain error, and we find no grounds for reversal.
III. View of the defendant in shackles
In itself, a juror’s brief view of a defendant in shackles does not qualify as
a due process violation worthy of a new trial. United States v. Simpson, 950 F.2d
1519, 1522 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1394, 1397 (10th
Cir. 1990). Such an incident must result in prejudice to violate due process, and
the burden is on the defendant to show such prejudice. United States v. Ware,
897 F.2d 1538, 1542 (10th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United
States v. Jones, 235 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2000).
Defendant concedes that he made no objection at trial, and that he makes
no showing of actual prejudice here. M r. Jones also had opportunity to request a
curative jury instruction, and declined to do so. He argues that his burden to
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show prejudice is relieved by the court’s error in not making further inquiries as
to whether the incident biased the juror in question. In fact, any inquiries into
juror bias w ould have been impermissible. Under Fed. R. Evid. 606(b),
questioning of a juror who has been exposed to extraneous information “is limited
to the circumstances and nature of the improper contact,” and questions bearing
on the “subjective effect of the contact on the juror's decision-making” are
prohibited. United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1045 (10th Cir. 1988). The
district court acted properly, and we find no prejudicial error in the incident at
issue.
IV. Co-defendant testimony
W e generally review the denial of a motion for a mistrial or a new trial for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th
Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Duncan, 242 F.3d 940
(10th Cir. 2001). However, when the court’s decision rests on an issue of law, as
here, w e review de novo. United States v. Ailsworth, 138 F.3d 843, 846 (10th Cir.
1998).
In any trial with multiple defendants, it is imperative that a co-defendant’s
guilty plea not be used as substantive evidence of a defendant’s guilt. United
States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453, 455 (10th Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, we have held
that the judge may inform the jury when a co-defendant changes his plea to guilty
in the middle of trial, although it is generally preferable not to. Id. Nor is it
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grounds for a mistrial for the court to allow a former co-defendant subsequently
to testify for the government. United States v. M assey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1569-70
(10th Cir. 1995). In such cases, it is permissible for the court to explain that the
co-defendant has entered into a plea agreement, but “cautionary instructions
limiting the jury’s use of the guilty plea to permissible purposes are critical.”
Baez, 703 F.2d at 455. The judge instructed the jury twice not to draw adverse
conclusions from M r. W ilson’s guilty plea, and we find no error in the denial of
the motion for a mistrial.
V. Jury instructions
Jury instructions must be read and evaluated in their entirety. Cupp v.
Naughten, 414 U .S. 141, 146-47 (1973). W e assess whether “the instructions,
examined in the light of the record as a whole, fairly, adequately, and correctly
state the governing law and provide the jury with an ample understanding of the
applicable principles of law and factual issues confronting them.” United States
v. Denny, 939 F.2d 1449, 1454 (10th Cir. 1991). “[T]he proper inquiry is not
whether the instruction ‘could have’ been applied in an unconstitutional manner,
but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it.” Victor
v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1994) (citing Estelle v. M cGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 &
n.4 (1991)).
In M r. Jones’s trial, the judge gave incorrect oral instructions, followed by
correct oral instructions, correct written instructions, and a correct form for the
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jury to fill out during sentencing. M r. Jones attempts to analogize this situation
to Yates v. United States, in which the Supreme Court overturned a conviction
when the jury was permitted to consider a legally impermissible theory, even
though the conviction could have rested on other, permissible theories. 354 U.S.
298 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18
(1978). The question in this case, however, is not which of two alternate grounds
the jury relied on; it is whether the jury properly understood the one legal theory
placed in front of it.
W e have held in an unpublished opinion that an incorrect oral instruction –
a “slip of the tongue” – without more is not plain error when the jury had correct
written instructions available during deliberations. United States v. Stewart, 16
Fed. Appx. 937, 940 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2001) (unpublished opinion). W e cite
this decision not because it has precedential value, but because we find its
conclusion persuasive. Five other circuits have found such errors to be either
harmless or not plain. United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 189-90 (5th Cir.
2003) (not plain error); United States v. Granados, 142 F.3d 1016, 1022-23 (7th
Cir. 1998) (not plain error); United States v. Ancheta, 38 F.3d 1114, 1116-17 (9th
Cir. 1994) (not plain error); United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 821-22 (11th
Cir. 1984) (harmless error); United States v. Rosa, 493 F.2d 1191, 1195 (2d Cir.
1974) (harmless error). W e adopt those holdings here.
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The matter of jury comprehension is a highly fact-based, circumstances-
dependent one, which the district court is far better positioned to consider than
we. The fact that defense counsel as w ell as the experienced district judge w ere
unperturbed by the error, if they noticed it at all, weighs heavily. M oreover,
“[t]he absence of objection suggests that the mistake was not noticeable or
confusing.” Ancheta, 38 F.3d at 1117. A lack of objection is not always fatal, of
course. W hen there is a real possibility that jury instructions are misunderstood,
such as where incorrect verbal instructions are not corrected by written
instructions, the error may warrant reversal. See Turrentine v. M ullin, 390 F.3d
1181, 1194 (10th Cir. 2004). If there had been an indication that anyone in the
courtroom – counsel, parties, or jurors – w as confused, we might find this a more
difficult question. As there was no such indication, and as we are convinced that
no reasonable juror would have been misled by the instructions, we find that the
district court committed no plain error in allowing the jury instructions to stand.
VI. Sentencing
M r. Jones argues that his sentence could not constitutionally be enhanced
on the basis of a fact found by the judge rather than the jury. W e assume this
argument is put forward for the purposes of preservation. It is inconsistent with
the remedial holding of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which
permits enhancements on the basis of judge-found facts pursuant to the non-
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advisory guidelines system. See United States v. M agallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 684
(10th Cir. 2005).
VII. Cum ulative error
M r. Jones also argues that the cumulative effect of all of the errors alleged
above is a generalized due process violation. “A cumulative-error analysis
merely aggregates all the errors that individually have been found to be harmless,
and therefore not reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect on
the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined
to be harmless.” United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990).
In conducting a cumulative error analysis, we must identify specific rulings or
failures to rule by the trial court that violate a defendant’s constitutional rights,
and assess only the impact of those. Id. at 1470-71; United States v. Smith, 776
F.2d 892, 898-99 (10th Cir. 1985). W e have found no harmless error in the
district court’s rulings and non-rulings above; thus a fortiori we find no
cumulative error.
VIII. Conclusion
Because w e find no error of constitutional magnitude in M r. Jones’s claims,
we A FFIRM both the conviction and the sentence.
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United States v. Jones
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2006-11-08
Citations: 468 F.3d 704
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