United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1104
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JOSÉ PÉREZ-GONZÁLEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch and Howard, Circuit Judges,
and Restani,* Judge.
Jorge L. Armenteros Chervoni, with whom Pedro J. Varela, was
on brief, for appellant.
Sonia Torres, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant
United States Attorney, Senior Appellate Attorney, and Thomas F.
Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for
appellee.
April 14, 2006
*Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Defendant José Pérez-González
appeals his convictions arising from his violent and destructive
conduct at the former U.S. Naval base at Vieques, Puerto Rico. We
affirm.
I.
We present the facts in the light most favorable to the
verdict, see United States v. Boulerice, 325 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir.
2003), reserving a discussion of some facts for our analysis.
The U.S. Navy intended to end its presence in Vieques by
transferring the lands making up its base to the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service ("USFWS") on May 1, 2003. Just prior to the
transfer, the Navy provided the USFWS with several vehicles and
other equipment previously used on the base. Most of the vehicles
and equipment were enclosed in a fenced motor pool area within a
thirty-five acre compound known as "Camp Garcia." Camp Garcia was
approximately one and a half miles from the base's main entrance.
On the night of April 30, 2003, a large crowd gathered
outside the base's main gate to celebrate. The crowd included
political figures, members of the media, and law enforcement
officials on hand to keep the peace. But what began as a peaceful
rally quickly turned into a riot.
Shortly before midnight, a large group armed with wire
cutters and sledgehammers broke down a section of fencing and
entered the base. Nearly simultaneously, others entered (or
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attempted to enter) the base at other points. Several of these
intruders converged on Camp Garcia, broke down the fence, and
commandeered and vandalized vehicles and equipment. With news
cameras capturing the action, the rioters vandalized or destroyed
a number of government vehicles, equipment and buildings. Most
significantly for present purposes, they burned a Boston Whaler
boat and a Humvee, and demolished the guard post at the main gate.
Images and accounts of the riot were widely broadcast in Puerto
Rico and formed the basis for public debate.
Law enforcement officials reviewed photographs and
videotapes of the incident and managed to isolate twelve
significant participants, eleven of whom they could identify by
name. A grand jury returned a six-count indictment against the
twelve individuals (including the unidentified "John Doe" defendant
who later proved to be Pérez-González) for conspiracy, damaging
government property, and damaging government property by fire or
explosive. Four counts named the John Doe defendant: a count
charging conspiracy to damage government property and to damage
government property by fire or explosive, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 371,
1361, & 844(f)(1) (Count I); a count charging aiding and abetting
the destruction of the Humvee by means of fire, see 18 U.S.C. §
844(f)(1)(Count III); a count charging the destruction of the
concrete entrance gate with damages exceeding $1000, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (Count IV); and a count charging the destruction of the
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Humvee with damages exceeding $1000, see 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (Count
VI). An arrest warrant issued for the John Doe defendant. The
warrant included the description "Male, White Hispanic,
Approximately 5 Feet 9 Inches and 210 Pounds" and was accompanied
by a photograph of Pérez-González standing on a Humvee with a
sledgehammer. The photo was provided to the news media and widely
publicized. After seeing it, Pérez-González went to the FBI and
identified himself as both the "John Doe" defendant named in the
indictment and the person in the photo.
Shortly before the scheduled trial, all of Pérez-
González's co-defendants pled guilty. After Pérez-González
unsuccessfully moved for a continuance or a change of venue, he was
tried alone. At the voir dire, the district court questioned the
potential jurors about their exposure to news stories about the
riot and whether they could be impartial. While most had seen or
read about the incident, only ten of the seventy-five potential
jury candidates were excused because they could not be impartial.
At trial, the government called law enforcement officers
who were at the demonstration or involved in the investigation,
government officials involved in the transfer of property between
the Navy and the USFWS, and FBI Agent Amado Vega, the primary
investigator. The government also introduced videotapes of the
demonstration, photographs of the demonstration (some derived from
the videotapes) and aftermath, and various other documentary
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evidence. The videotapes were particularly striking, as they
showed Pérez-González smashing a Humvee with a sledgehammer,
scuffling with police, and repeatedly crashing a government water
truck into the guard post until it collapsed. Pérez-González
presented no evidence and did not take the stand. The jury
convicted him on all counts, and the district court sentenced him
to concurrent terms of sixty months on Count I and fifty-one months
on Counts III, IV, and VI.
II.
Pérez-González first argues1 that his arrest warrant was
illegal because it was a constitutionally inadequate "John Doe"
warrant. See United States v. John Doe, 703 F.2d 745 (3d Cir.
1983) (warrant describing subject only as "John Doe" was
constitutionally insufficient). He also argues that, because of
the inadequate warrant and the further failure to provide him with
Miranda warnings after he turned himself in, his post-arrest
statements identifying himself as the man in the photo should have
been suppressed.
Pérez-González first raised these issues in the district
court by means of a motion to suppress filed on the first day of
trial. The district court denied the motion as to the arrest
1
The government questions whether Pérez-González preserved all
issues for plenary appellate review, but opines that they fail on
the merits in any event. Except where we note otherwise, we will
presume that Pérez-González's contentions were preserved.
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warrant, but held a hearing mid-trial regarding the post-arrest
statements. The court then concluded that the statements were
voluntary.
By waiting until the first day of trial to challenge the
warrant and statements, Pérez-González has forfeited these issues.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e);2 see also United States v. Lopez-Lopez,
282 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Bashorun, 225
F.3d 9, 13-17 (1st Cir. 2000). A court may grant relief from the
forfeiture if a party establishes cause for its failure to file a
timely motion to suppress, see Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d at 10, but
Pérez-González does not even attempt to do so.
"The question whether an appellate court may review for
plain error despite a [Rule 12(e)] waiver, provided that the record
enables review, is open in this circuit." Id. at 10 n.4. But even
if we assume the power to correct a plain error in circumstances
such as these, we would not do so here. The challenged warrant was
never formally executed, as Pérez-González voluntarily surrendered
to authorities. Further, Agent Vega testified that the warrant was
accompanied by a photo, a significant factor in assessing its
adequacy. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (a warrant must "contain
the defendant's name or, if it is unknown, a name or description by
which the defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty").3
2
Rule 12(f) prior to the 2002 amendments.
3
Indeed, Pérez-González identified himself from the photo.
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And Pérez-González has presented us with no reason to question the
district court's conclusion that the statements were voluntary.
Cf. United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 498-99 (1st Cir. 2005)
(defendant's statements made in his offer to cooperate held
voluntary).
Pérez-González next argues that his convictions under
Counts III and VI violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. He maintains
that he is being improperly punished twice for the same offense
because 18 U.S.C. § 1361, the subject of Count VI, is a lesser
included offense of 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1), the subject of Count
III.
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense unless the legislature clearly
intended to impose multiple punishments for the offense. United
States v. Patel, 370 F.3d 108, 114 (1st Cir. 2004). Thus, to
determine whether multiple punishments are authorized, we must
first seek to determine the legislature's intent. Id. If the
legislature's intent is unclear, we apply the Blockburger test, see
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), as a "default
rule of statutory construction." Patel, 370 F.3d at 114. "Under
Blockburger, . . . the test . . . is whether each [statute]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
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Pérez-González asserts that the legislative intent with
regard to the joint application of the two statutes is ambiguous
and proceeds to a Blockburger analysis. We accept arguendo that
Blockburger applies, but a review of the relevant statutes dooms
his argument. While both provisions clearly pertain to the
damaging of government property,4 Section 844(f) includes the
additional element of the use of fire or explosives and Section
1361 includes the additional element of a minimum monetary damage
4
Section 1361 provides, in relevant portion:
Whoever willfully injures or commits any depredation
against any property of the United States, or of any
department or agency thereof, . . ., or attempts to
commit any of the foregoing offenses, shall be punished
as follows:
If the damage or attempted damage to such property
exceeds the sum of $1,000, by fine under this title or
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both; if the
damage or attempted damage to such property does not
exceed the sum of $1,000, by a fine under this title or
by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
Section 844(f)(1) states:
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to
damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any
building, vehicle, or other personal or real property in
whole or in part owned or possessed by, or leased to, the
United States, or any department or agency thereof, or
any institution or organization receiving Federal
financial assistance, shall be imprisoned for not less
than five years and not more than 20 years, fined under
this title, or both.
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amount (to be charged as a felony5), distinctions that Pérez-
Gonzalez's counsel conceded at oral argument. The offenses are
distinct under Blockburger. See Patel, 370 F.3d at 114.6
Pérez-González next maintains that he was entitled to a
continuance of the trial or a change of venue due to pretrial
publicity. He asserts that media coverage was so intense, biased,
and inflammatory -- the media mentioned him by name and directly
commented on the evidence against him -- that it was difficult to
draw an impartial jury. He also argues that the district court
committed reversible error in failing to voir dire each prospective
juror outside the presence of the others.
Motions for continuances are reviewed for manifest abuse
of discretion, see United States v. Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d 33,
39 (1st Cir. 2000), and motions for a change of venue are reviewed
for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Rodriguez-Cardona,
924 F.2d 1148, 1158 (1st Cir. 1991). In assessing the need for a
change of venue or a continuance based on pretrial publicity, "the
court must determine if prejudice exists from the publicity."
Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d at 42. "The test for prejudice
5
We do not address whether a conviction for a misdemeanor Section
1361 violation would raise double jeopardy concerns if paired with
a conviction under Section 844(f)(1).
6
As noted by the government, the two counts are also directed to
different conduct: Count III was directed to the burning of the
vehicle, while Count VI was directed to the initial damage
inflicted on the vehicle with sledgehammers and wire cutters.
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sufficient to justify a change of venue is whether (a) the facts
show that jury prejudice should be presumed, and (b) if prejudice
should not be presumed, whether the jury was actually prejudiced
against the defendant." Rodriguez-Cardona, 924 F.2d at 1158.
"Prejudice may be presumed where inflammatory publicity has so
saturated a community as to render it difficult to draw an
impartial jury or where enough jurors admit to prejudice to cause
concern as to any avowals of impartiality by the other jurors."
Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d at 43. But mere exposure of the
potential jury pool to news reports regarding the crime does not,
in and of itself, result in an inability to select an impartial
jury. See generally United States v. Medina, 761 F.2d 12, 19 (1st
Cir. 1985); United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 29 (1st Cir.
1984) ("Extensive knowledge in the community of either the crimes
or the defendants is not sufficient, by itself, to render a trial
constitutionally unfair.").
There is nothing in the record -- no statements by jurors
indicating animus, no examples of inflammatory newspaper articles
or prejudicial news reports,7 and no evidence whatsoever of the
pervasiveness or tone of the media coverage -- to substantiate
Pérez-González's argument. And with regard to the voir dire, only
7
The government contends that the three articles that Pérez-
González attached to his motion to continue did not mention him and
were objective rather than inflammatory. We concur as to the one
article in English, but cannot tell as to the other two because
Pérez-González has failed to provide us with translations.
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ten of seventy-five potential jurors (less than 14%) stated that
they could not be impartial, and the district court promptly
excluded them. This is far too few potential jurors indicating
bias to warrant any presumption of prejudice. See United States v.
Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725, 734-36 (1st Cir. 1987) (that 25% of
potential jurors believed defendant guilty not sufficient).
Moreover, the district court repeatedly reminded the jurors to keep
an open mind and to avoid media reports or other sources of
information about the case.
Pérez-González also maintains that the district court
erred in questioning potential jurors about bias as a group rather
than individually out of the presence of the others. However, he
failed to raise this argument in the district court. But even if
he had, the court's procedure would not constitute reversible
error. While we have endorsed the concept of individual
questioning in high profile cases, see Medina, 761 F.2d at 20, we
have approved "group" questioning of potential jurors about bias as
within the district court's broad discretion in conducting voir
dire, see Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d at 43.8 Pérez-González has
8
We note as well that this is not a case where juror partiality
would have inevitably worked against Pérez-González. The Vieques
issue is a complicated one, fostering much civil disobedience, see,
e.g., United States v. Ayala, 289 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2002); United
States v. Ventura-Melendez, 275 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2001), and there
might well have been potential jurors predisposed to be sympathetic
to Pérez-González.
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presented no basis for questioning the appropriateness of the
district court's voir dire procedure in this case.
Pérez-González next asserts that the videotapes should
not have been admitted because they were improperly authenticated,
misleadingly edited, misleadingly presented, and unduly prejudicial
within the meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review a district
court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 10 (1st
Cir. 2003). As to prejudice, "[t]rial judges enjoy wide latitude
in making Rule 403 rulings and are only overturned after a showing
of egregious error." United States v. Kornegay, 410 F.3d 89, 96
(1st Cir. 2005). As to authentication, "Federal Rule of Evidence
901(a) requires the trial court to determine if there is a
reasonable probability that the evidence is what it is purported to
be." United States v. Carlos Cruz, 352 F.3d 499, 506 (1st Cir.
2003) (internal citation and quotation omitted); see also United
States v. Alicea-Cardoza, 132 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997)("[I]f the
district court is satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to
allow a reasonable person to believe the evidence is what it
purports to be, Rule 901(a) is satisfied and the jury may decide
what weight it will give the evidence.").
The district court's admission of the videotapes was
within its broad discretion. The news photographers were called as
witnesses and authenticated the videotapes, and Pérez-González
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cross-examined them about their editing procedures. He provides no
inkling why this was inadequate. Pérez-González's claims about
misleading and prejudicial presentation -- an alleged "slowing up"
of the tape and the inclusion of inflammatory audio commentary --
are simply not supported by the record (and would not constitute
reversible error if they were). The videotapes were also highly
relevant, as they showed the offense as it occurred and
corroborated many aspects of the government witnesses' testimony.
Finally, they were prejudicial only in the sense that they were
damaging. This is not "prejudice" within the meaning of Rule 403.
See, e.g., United States v. O'Shea, 426 F.3d 475, 485 (1st Cir.
2005); see also United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1067-68
(10th Cir. 2003).
Pérez-González next argues that certain photographs
admitted into evidence did not accurately depict the objects
photographed at the relevant time, included "visual elements" that
were irrelevant and prejudicial, and should have been excluded
under Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, and 403.
Pérez-González first challenges the admission of exhibit
57a -- which shows a masked individual in front of a damaged Humvee
with its front seat on fire -- on the ground that there is no
indication when the photograph was taken or that any of the
perpetrators wore masks. But the photograph is clearly relevant to
Count III (which involved the initial burning of the Humvee) and
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corroborates the testimony of government witnesses that several
rioters wore masks.
Pérez-González also challenges exhibit 16 (four news
photos on one page) on the ground of "blurriness," and exhibits 56-
60 (news photos) on the ground that they include commentary and
opinion. The former characterization is inaccurate, as the
pictures are sufficiently clear, and the latter is specious, as the
photos do not have captions or any accompanying text.
Finally, Pérez-González makes a generalized "global"
challenge to exhibits 17-51. Again here, his argument is baseless.
All the photos were relevant, properly authenticated, accurately
depicted the damage done, and corroborated the testimony of the
government witnesses.9
Pérez-González next posits that his in-court
identification by various law enforcement officials, who lacked an
adequate opportunity to observe him during the riot, should have
been disallowed because the procedure employed was improperly
suggestive and likely to yield a misidentification. He also argues
that the trial court should have permitted him to sit in the
gallery and ordered an in-court line-up.
In evaluating an identification, the court looks first to
whether an inappropriately suggestive procedure was employed. See
9
To the extent Pérez-González seeks to challenge other photographic
evidence, he has done so too casually to merit further discussion.
See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
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United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 100 (1st Cir. 2003). If
so, the court must "decide whether the identification itself was
reliable under the totality of the circumstances, notwithstanding
the suggestive procedure." Id. (internal citation and quotation
omitted). Exclusion of (or prohibition of) an identification is
only appropriate if the court believes there is a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id.; see also United
States v. Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d 672, 677 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[I]t is
only in extraordinary cases that identification evidence should be
withheld from the jury.")(internal quotation and citation omitted).
The district court acted well within its discretion in
permitting the jury to consider the identification evidence. All
the identifying officers saw videotapes and photographs of Pérez-
González before trial. Indeed, because law enforcement officials
were intently reviewing those materials in an attempt to identify
the perpetrators, a careful review of the visual evidence was an
essential step in the investigation. This is not a situation
involving a dubious photo array or a one-person show-up. See,
e.g., Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d at 677-78. Further, there is no
entitlement to an in-court line-up or other particular procedure.
See Curtis, 344 F.3d at 1063. And in any event, the argument has
a bit of a surreal quality to it because Pérez-González admitted
that he was the individual in the photograph which accompanied the
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indictment and which was generated from the videotape of the riot
that the officers reviewed.
Pérez-González next challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence establishing the conspiracy and the value of the
government property destroyed.10 "We will affirm the conviction if,
after assaying all the evidence in the light most amiable to the
government, and taking all reasonable inferences in its favor, a
rational factfinder could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
prosecution successfully proved the essential elements of the
crime." Boulerice, 325 F.3d at 79 (internal citation and quotation
omitted). The government need not succeed in "eliminating every
possible theory consistent with the defendant's innocence," and
"[w]e will affirm if any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
In challenging his conspiracy conviction, Pérez-González
emphasizes that mere presence or similar actions to other
individuals is insufficient to show membership in a conspiracy. He
points out that there was no evidence of communication by cell
phone or walkie-talkies, and that the incident can only be
10
In his brief, Pérez-González has not challenged his conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) for aiding and abetting the destruction
of the Humvee by fire. He has thus waived the claim.
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considered a riot and not the result of an organized criminal
endeavor.
To prove the elements of the crime of
conspiracy, the government must show the
existence of a conspiracy, the defendant's
knowledge of the conspiracy, and the
defendant's voluntary participation in the
conspiracy. More specifically, to establish
that a defendant belonged to and participated
in a conspiracy, the government must prove two
kinds of intent: intent to agree [with his co-
conspirators] and intent to commit the
substantive offense. Such proof may consist
of circumstantial evidence, such as acts
committed by the defendant that furthered the
conspiracy's purposes.
United States v. Llinas, 373 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal
citation and quotation omitted). The agreement "need not be
express, but may consist of no more than a tacit understanding."
United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1993)
(internal citation and quotation omitted). "[E]ach coconspirator
need not know of or have contact with all other members, nor must
they know all of the details of the conspiracy or participate in
every act in furtherance of it." United States v. Martinez-Medina,
279 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 2002). However, mere presence at the
scene or simple association with the conspirators will not suffice
to establish guilt. Llinas, 373 F.3d at 32.
There was sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy
conviction. Various co-defendants came to the event armed with
sledgehammers and wire cutters -- odd things to bring to a
celebration unless one was planning mischief. In addition, the
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attack appeared coordinated, with participants spilling on to the
base at multiple entry points and nearly simultaneously. Moreover,
the perpetrators covered the mile and a half from the main gate to
Camp Garcia and the motor pool in about twenty minutes, which is
suggestive of a planned assault. And if the evidence of a
conspiracy is sufficient, there can be no doubt that the jury
reasonably found Pérez-González to be a conspirator. He is shown
on videotape smashing the Humvee with a sledgehammer, scuffling
with police, and driving a water truck into the main gate until it
collapsed.11 While the jury conceivably could have reached a
different conclusion, that does not suffice to undermine the
verdict. See Echeverri, 982 F.2d at 678("we require only that a
jury's verdict be supportable, not that it be inevitable"); United
States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1991)("the
factfinder may decide among reasonable interpretations of the
evidence").
Pérez-González next argues that the government failed to
prove that the destroyed Humvee and main gate were valued at over
$1,000 each. He asserts that the government's own records
establish that the Humvee was transferred from the Navy to the
11
Significantly, several individuals rode along with Pérez-González
in the water truck and helped him escape arrest by grabbing the
would-be arresting officer around the neck. A rational jury could
conclude that confederates, rather than mere bystanders, were
involved with Pérez-González in these dangerous activities.
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USFWS at a value of $0, and that the main gate only cost $450 to
build.
These arguments are frivolous. The government called
witnesses who testified that the Humvee was only valued at $0 for
purposes of the transfer because two federal entities (as opposed
to an outside purchaser) were involved. Moreover, the government
presented evidence that the replacement cost and residual value of
the Humvee far exceeded $1000. And, while the gate may have only
cost $450 to construct, it was constructed over forty years ago.
Its current value (or replacement cost) was supportably pegged at
more than $40,000.
Finally, Pérez-González challenges the jury instructions
regarding the conspiracy charge and the value of the government
property destroyed. But he has not explained what was wrong with
the conspiracy charge, and his attack on the instructions is both
inadequately elaborated and, so far as we can tell, based upon the
specious suggestion that the jury could have found the property
destroyed to be worth less than $1000.
Affirmed.
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