United States v. Schmitt Degasso

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAY 12 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Nos. 03-5040, 03-5044
NELLY MARGUERITE SCHMITT
DeGASSO; MARIO RODRIGUEZ-
AGUIRRE,

Defendants-Appellants.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 02-CR-93-P)

Submitted on the briefs:*

David E. O’Meilia, United States Attorney, and Allen J. Litchfield, Assistant United
States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

F.L. Dunn III, Tulsa, Oklahoma for Defendant-Appellant Mario Rodriguez-Aguirre.

Paul D. Brunton, Federal Public Defender, Julia L. O’Connell, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, and Barry L. Derryberry, Research and Writing Specialist, Office of the
Federal Public Defender, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant Nelly Marguerite
Schmitt DeGasso.

*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.

McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.

An officer of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol (OHP) stopped Defendants Nelly

Marguerite Schmitt DeGasso and Mario Rodriguez-Aguirre along I-44 eastbound

between Oklahoma City and Tulsa on the morning of May 27, 2002. During the course of

the stop, troopers recovered forty-eight kilograms of cocaine from a cavity in the bed of

the vehicle in which Defendants were traveling. Following the district court’s denial

of their motion to suppress, Defendants entered conditional pleas of guilty to a five-

count superceding indictment related to drug trafficking. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).1

The district court sentenced Defendants to ten years imprisonment, and they appealed.

We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s

determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment de novo. See United

States v. Cervine, 347 F.3d 865, 868 (10th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

1
Count I charged Defendants with possession with intent to distribute cocaine
in excess of five kilograms in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii). Count II
charged Defendants with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in excess
of five kilograms in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii). Count III
charged Defendants with conspiracy to import cocaine in excess of five kilograms in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 952(a), 960(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii). Count IV charged
Defendants with interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1952. Count V charged Defendants with criminal forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 853 & 970. The district court sentenced Defendants to concurrent terms of 120
months on Count I-III and 60 months on Count IV.

2
 I

Oklahoma State Trooper Colby Cason was working I-44 on an overcast morning

when he noticed a 2002 Chevrolet Avalanche apparently traveling with its fog lamps

illuminated. As the Avalanche passed, Trooper Cason also observed that the truck’s rear

license plate was “mounted too low obscuring the lettering at the bottom on the tag.”

The trooper stopped the vehicle at approximately 9:38 a.m. He approached the vehicle

and was able to identify the lettering on the tag as “Chihuahua,” and the tag as originating

from Mexico. Trooper Cason testified he was unable to run an NCIC check on a foreign

tag.

Trooper Cason asked Defendant Rodriguez, the driver of the truck, to produce

his driver’s license. The trooper further asked Mr. Rodriguez to step out of the truck and

take a seat in the front of the patrol car. Trooper Cason informed Mr. Rodriguez that he

would issue him a warning citation. When the trooper requested proof of registration,

Mr. Rodriguez, who spoke little English, indicated the registration was in the truck. The

trooper, who spoke some Spanish, returned to the truck where he talked with Ms.

DeGasso and retrieved the vehicle’s registration. While Ms. DeGasso spoke better

English than Mr. Rodriguez, neither was fluent. The district court found, however, that

both Defendants readily understood Trooper Cason when he communicated with them.

During his conversations with Defendants, Trooper Cason became suspicious

3
of criminal activity.2 After issuing Mr. Rodriguez a warning citation and returning

his license and registration, the trooper requested permission in Spanish to search the

truck. Trooper Cason’s request to search occurred at approximately 9:49 a.m., eleven

minutes into the stop. Mr. Rodriguez replied “si.” Trooper Cason placed Ms. DeGasso in

the back of the patrol car before beginning the search. While seated in the patrol car,

Defendants engaged in an incriminating conversation. Among other things, Mr.

Rodriguez expressed his wish that Trooper Cason would keep the cocaine and release

them. An OHP canine unit arrived, and the dog promptly alerted to the bed of the truck.

Trooper Cason handcuffed Defendants at approximately 9:58 a.m., twenty minutes into

the stop.

2
The trooper testified as to the bases for his suspicion:

Q Trooper, at the time that you asked to search the Avalanche, did you
have some concerns or suspicions in your mind?
A Yes.
Q And what were they based on, sir?
A Extreme nervousness on both the passenger and the driver. I had
confliction [sic] over ownership of the vehicle; one stated it belonged to a
third party, the other stated it was his. When I viewed the registration, it
was another subject than the driver. I had conflicting accounts of where
they were going; one stated Detroit and the other said Missouri and Detroit.
Then when I went to clarify those inconsistencies, the driver wasn’t even
sure – to me it just seemed like he wasn’t sure about anything about
Missouri. They are coming from Chihuahua, Mexico, which is a known
drug source city, going to Detroit or St. Louis, and both of those are
considered hub cities. Those were my suspicions. . . . I believed the
behaviors displayed by the driver were consistent with drug trafficking,
based on my experience.

4
 Following a suppression hearing, the district court held that the stop and detention

and the search of Defendants’ truck were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The

court further held Defendants’ incriminating statements were admissible because they

had no expectation of privacy while seated in the patrol car. As to the stop, the

court concluded:

[P]ursuant to 47 O.S.Supp. 2001, §§ 1113(A)(2) and 12-217, Trooper
Cason lawfully stopped Defendants’ vehicle when he observed the vehicle’s
fog lamps illuminated during daylight hours when no fog was present, and
because he was unable to read the origin of the license plate as the vehicle
passed his patrol unit. Accordingly, the initial stop of Defendants for traffic
violations was consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

According to the district court, the subsequent detention and search were similarly

reasonable under the circumstances because “the trooper acquired an objectively

reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver was engaged in criminal activity, ”

or in the alternative, Defendant Rodriguez consented to the search.3

II

The law pertaining to routine traffic stops is well established. The Fourth

Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV.

3
We note that although Defendant DeGasso was only a passenger in the vehicle,
the Government apparently has never raised the issue of her Fourth Amendment standing
to challenge any of the contested matters in this case. Because her standing, or lack
thereof, is rooted in substantive Fourth Amendment law rather than Article III, the
Government has waived any objection as to her standing. See United States v. Price, 54
F.3d 342, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496
n.1 (10th Cir. 1994).

5
A traffic stop constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. See United States v. Taverna,

348 F.3d 873, 877 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653

(1979)). Because a routine traffic stop is more akin to an investigative detention than a

custodial arrest, a traffic stop is reasonable if (1) the officer’s action was justified at its

inception, and (2) the officer’s action was reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. See United States

v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).

To determine the initial validity of a traffic stop, we ask whether the stop was

“objectively justified.” Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 788. Generally, a routine stop is

objectively justified when probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion exists

to believe a traffic violation has occurred. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,

810 (1996) (probable cause); Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787 (reasonable articulable

suspicion). The actual motivations or subjective beliefs and intentions of the officer

are irrelevant. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787. In Botero-

Ospina, the en banc Court set forth the standard for examining the constitutionality

of a traffic stop:

[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based
on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable
articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred
or is occurring. It is irrelevant, for purposes of Fourth Amendment review,
whether the stop in question is sufficiently ordinary or routine according
to the general practices of the police department or the particular officer

6
 making the stop. It is also irrelevant that the officer may have had other
subjective motives for stopping the vehicle. Our sole inquiry is whether
this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist
violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment
regulations of the jurisdiction.

Id. (internal quotations, citations, and footnote omitted).

Defendants argue that neither of the grounds accepted by the district court – the

fog lights violation and license plate violation – constituted sufficient grounds for the

traffic stop. As explained below, we agree with Defendants regarding the fog lights

violation but affirm the district court (one member of the panel dissenting) regarding the

license plate. Defendants also argue that their consent to search the vehicle was invalid

because Trooper Cason improperly prolonged the detention after the warning citation was

issued. The district court found that “after the trooper had returned all of the defendant’s

documentation to the defendant, . . . Defendant Rodriguez was free to leave and a

reasonable person would have known he was free to leave. Defendant Rodriguez’s

continued answering of questions by Trooper Cason, at that point in time, became

consensual.” That conclusion is consistent with this Court’s precedents. See, e.g., United

States v. Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998). We therefore affirm

that portion of the district court’s judgment for substantially the reasons stated in the

district court’s Order.

A.

Defendants first challenge the purported fog lamp violation. The statute in effect

7
on the date of the stop stated in relevant part: “Fog lamps shall not be used in substitution

of headlamps, except under conditions of rain or fog rendering disadvantageous the use of

headlamps.” 47 Okla. Stat. § 12-217.D, amended by 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 411, § 34

(effective Nov. 1, 2003).4 At the same time, a separate statute required the use of head

lamps “at any time from a half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise and at any

other time when, due to insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric conditions, persons

and vehicles on the highway are not clearly discernible at a distance of five hundred (500)

feet ahead . . . . ” Id. § 12-201, amended by 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 411, § 21

(effective Nov. 1, 2003). The district court concluded OHP reasonably relied on section

12-217.D to stop Defendants:

Trooper Cason reasonably believed that the Defendant had violated the
Oklahoma statute regarding the use of fog lamps, therefore this Court finds,
after reviewing the videotape of the traffic stop herein, that there is nothing
within the context of the stop of Defendants’ vehicle that appears to be
pretextual or a subterfuge for a legitimate traffic stop. Rather, Trooper
Cason’s actions were taken in good-faith and with a reasonable belief
that they were authorized.

Reviewing the district court’s construction of Oklahoma state law de novo, Salve

Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991), we discern nothing in section 12-201

4
Effective November 1, 2003, the Oklahoma legislature amended section 12-
217.D to read: “A motor vehicle may be equipped with not to exceed two front fog lamps
or two rear fog lamps which shall only be used when visibility . . . is limited to one-
half (½) mile or less.” 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 411, § 34 (amending 12 Okla. Stat.
§ 12-217).

8
or section 12-217.D which forbade the use of fog lamps in Oklahoma at the time of

Defendants’ stop. The videotape of the stop plainly reveals it occurred during daylight

hours when visibility was clear. The only restriction section 12-217.D placed on the use

of the truck’s fog lamps is that such lamps could not be “used in substitution

of headlamps” except under conditions of rain or fog. Section 12-201 required the use of

headlamps from thirty minutes after sunset to thirty minutes before sunrise. Because

Oklahoma law did not require the use of headlamps at the time of the stop,

we fail to see how the truck’s fog lamps were “used in substitution of headlamps.”

The district court’s conclusion that Trooper Cason “reasonably believed” Mr.

Rodriguez violated section 12-217.D or had “a reasonable belief” the statute authorized

the stop misses the mark. An officer’s reasonable mistake of fact, as distinguished from a

mistake of law, may support the probable cause or reasonable suspicion necessary to

justify a traffic stop. See United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 865 (10th Cir.

1992). Trooper Cason’s failure to understand the plain and unambiguous law he is

charged with enforcing, however, is not objectively reasonable. See United States v.

Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1277-80 (11th Cir. 2003); see also United States v.

Ramstad, 219 F.3d 1263, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 2000) (Murphy, J., dissenting).

Moreover, the district court’s factual findings regarding pretext, subterfuge, and

good faith suggests the court applied, at least in part, an improper subjective standard

to evaluate the legality of the initial stop. Whether Trooper Cason initially acted

9
in “good faith,” or suspected criminal activity beyond a routine traffic violation, is

irrelevant. Rather, the dispositive inquiry is whether Oklahoma traffic law regarding

the use of fog lamps provided Trooper Cason with an objectively justifiable basis for

stopping Defendants. See Ramstad, 308 F.3d at 1145 n.3. The short answer to that

question is no.

B.

The next question is whether Oklahoma’s statute requiring license plates to be

“clearly visible at all times,” 47 Okla. Stat. § 1113.A.2, applies to vehicles from states or

nations other than Oklahoma. Section 1113.A.2 provides: “The license plate, decal and

all letters and numbers shall be clearly visible at all times. The operation of a vehicle

upon which the license plate is covered, overlaid or otherwise screened with any material

. . . shall be a violation of this paragraph.” Defendants do not dispute the officer’s

conclusion, accepted by the district court, that their license plate was “mounted too low

obscuring the lettering at the bottom on the tag.” See Dist. Ct. Order 11 (“this Court finds

where an officer can not read a license plate, prior to stopping the vehicle, he clearly has

probable cause, pursuant to 47 O.S. Supp. § 1151, to stop the vehicle and investigate

further.”). Defendants argue, however, that § 1113.A’s plain language applies only to

certificates of registration, license plates, and decals issued by the State of Oklahoma, and

not to out-of-state plates. See Appellant’s Br. 17 (“a violation of Oklahoma law did not

occur, because a Mexican license plate is not required to be plainly visible”).

10
Thus, Defendants submit that once Trooper Cason determined the license plate

was issued outside Oklahoma and appeared valid, the purpose of the stop was satisfied

and their subsequent detention was unlawful.

It is axiomatic that state courts are the final arbiters of state law. See Mullaney v.

Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Rael v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 874, 877 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting

that federal court must interpret latest state pronouncement). “[W]here no controlling

state decision exists, the federal court must attempt to predict what the state’s highest

court would do.” Wankier v. Crown Equipment Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir.

2003). If the state supreme court has not interpreted a provision of the state’s statutory

code, the federal court “must predict how the court would interpret the code in light of

[state] appellate court opinions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, and treatises.”

United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 2002 ).5 In doing so, we are bound to

5
The dissent argues that the principle that, in the absence of an authoritative state
court interpretation of a state statute whose meaning is contested, the obligation of a
federal court is to predict what the state’s highest court would do, applies only in “civil
diversity cases” and not in “the criminal context.” Diss. Op. 8. The dissent’s only
citation of authority for this argument, United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271
(11th Cir. 2003), does not support the claim. Chanthasouxat involved an unambiguous
statute that was misinterpreted by a police officer to provide the basis for a traffic stop.
See id. at 1278 (“Despite the government’s arguments to the contrary, we see no
ambiguity on the face of either the Alabama statute or the Birmingham ordinance”). The
case held that a police officer’s mistake of law, however reasonable, cannot support a
traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1277-80. The opinion does not suggest
that federal courts are under any less obligation to interpret state law in light of a
prediction of how it would be interpreted by the state court in criminal cases than in civil
diversity cases.

11
follow rules of statutory construction of criminal statutes embraced by the Oklahoma

judiciary, including the rule that “criminal statutes be constructed strictly against the State

and liberally in favor of the accused,” Fenimore v. Oklahoma, 78 P.3d 549, 551 (Okla.

Crim. App. 2003), keeping in mind that “rules of statutory construction . . . have as their

primary goal ascertainment of the legislature’s intent,” Nealis v. Baird, 996 P.2d 438, 460

(Okla. 1999); see also State v. Young, 989 P.2d 949, 955 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999)

(“Statutes are to be construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, reconciling

provisions, rendering them consistent and giving effect to each.”) (citation omitted).

Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, we think it far more likely that the Oklahoma

court would interpret its law to apply to out-of-state drivers, rather than to liberate out-of-

state drivers from the obligation of displaying legible license plates.

The statute, 47 Okla. Stat. § 1113.A, provides:

1. Upon the filing of a registration application and the payment of
the fees provided for in the Oklahoma Vehicle License and Registration
Act, the Oklahoma Tax Commission shall assign to the vehicle described
in the application a distinctive number, and issue to the owner of the vehicle
a certificate of registration and one license plate or a yearly decal for the
year that a license plate is not issued. The yearly decal shall have an
identification number and the last two numbers of the registration year
for which it shall expire. Except as provided by Section 1113A of this
title, the license plate shall be affixed to the exterior of the vehicle until a
replacement license plate is applied for. The yearly decal will validate the
license plate for each registration period other than the year the license plate
is issued. The license plate and decal shall be of such size, color, design
and numbering as the Tax Commission may direct. However, yearly
decals issued to the owner of a vehicle who has filed an affidavit with the
appropriate motor license agent in accordance with Section 7-607 of this
title shall be a separate and distinct color from all other decals issued

12
 under this section.

2. The license plate shall be securely attached to the rear of the
vehicle, except truck-tractor plates which shall be attached to the front
of the vehicle. The Tax Commission may, with the concurrence of the
Department of Public Safety, by Joint Rule, change and direct the manner,
place and location of display of any vehicle license plate when such action
is deemed in the public interest. The license plate, decal and all letters and
numbers shall be clearly visible at all times. The operation of a vehicle
upon which the license plate is covered, overlaid or otherwise screened with
any material, whether such material be clear, translucent, tinted or opaque,
shall be a violation of this paragraph.6

The first paragraph of this statute, which is directed to the Oklahoma Tax Commission,

applies only to vehicles registered in the State of Oklahoma, but the second paragraph

conspicuously lacks any such limitation. It provides that “[t]he license plate, decal and all

Effective November 1, 2003, a different section, 47 Okla. Stat. § 12-204.1, was
6

amended to provide:

The operation of a vehicle upon which the license plate is surrounded or
framed, partially or in whole, by any additional lamp or lamps or otherwise
lighted by any additional lamp or lamps, shall be a violation of this section.
In addition, display and visibility of the rear license plate shall be in
compliance with paragraph 2 of subsection A of Section 1113 of Title 47 of
the Oklahoma Statutes.

Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 12-204.1(C) (emphasis added). Because Title 47, section 12-101(A)(3)
of the Oklahoma Statute makes it a misdemeanor for “any person . . . [t]o fail to perform an act
required under this chapter,” this provision resolves the issue in this case for the future. The
legislative history does not reveal whether the amendment was intended as a clarification
of prior law, or as a change. The amendment thus casts no light, either way, on the
meaning of the statute at issue in this case. We should not punish a legislature’s
commendable efforts to make the law clearer by treating the amendment as a “telltale
sign” that the prior statute was unconstitutionally ambiguous, as the dissent suggests.
Diss. Op. 7.

13
letters and numbers shall be clearly visible at all times,” and that “[t]he operation of a

vehicle upon which the license plate is covered, overlaid or otherwise screened with any

material . . . shall be a violation of this paragraph.” By its terms, this portion of the

statute applies to any vehicle equipped with a license plate, whether or not it is from

Oklahoma. This accords with the common-sense proposition that police officers have no

less need to identify out-of-state vehicles than they have to identify those registered in

Oklahoma.

Defendants argue that the use of the definite article (“the”) in the second paragraph

confines application of that paragraph to the license plates already mentioned in the first

paragraph. Depending on the context, that might sometimes be a reasonable linguistic

inference. In this context, however, it would lead to the absurd result that out-of-state

drivers in Oklahoma are free to drive with obscured license plates, or no plates at all. We

think it unlikely that the Oklahoma courts would interpret their statute in so restrictive a

manner.

The dissenting opinion denies that Defendants’ interpretation would lead to this

absurd result, arguing that “[a] vehicle traveling along a public road without a license

plate necessarily gives rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, thereby allowing a

police officer to stop the vehicle and investigate the possibility the vehicle is stolen or

otherwise a part of criminal activity.” Diss. Op. 10. But under the dissent’s analysis, as

soon as the police discovered that the vehicle was from out of state, they would be

14
required to let the occupants go on their way (absent reasonable suspicion based on some

other traffic violation or suspicious circumstance). See id. at 3 (arguing that after the

officer determined there was no violation, “the Fourth Amendment prohibited the officer

from detaining defendant for questioning, but instead required the officer to allow

defendant to proceed without further delay”), citing United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d

550 (10th Cir. 1994). That would plainly hamper the ability of police to determine the

status and identity of out-of-state vehicles.

Moreover, the statute expressly defines the offense of operating a vehicle with an

obscured license plate as “a violation of this paragraph.” 47 Okla. Stat. § 1113.A.2. This

indicates that the second paragraph – as opposed to the entirety of § 1113.A – is the

legally operative provision. While the first paragraph of the section is limited to

Oklahoma vehicles, the second paragraph is not. It would be inconsistent with the

structure of the statute to incorporate limitations from the first paragraph into the second,

when the legislature defined the violation solely in terms of the second paragraph. We

thus cannot accept the dissent’s suggestion that we narrow the plain language of §

1113.A.2 by reference to the “context” of “subsection A in full.” See Diss. Op. 4. The

violation defined by the legislature is not of “subsection A in full” but of paragraph

1113.A.2 in particular.

The parties have not cited, and we have not located, an Oklahoma decision

addressing whether 47 Okla. Stat. § 1113.A.2 applies to out-of-state license plates. But

15
the Court of Appeals of Kansas has interpreted that state’s similar law as applying to out-

of-state plates. See Colin, 314 F.3d at 443 (where state supreme court has not interpreted

a state statute, it is appropriate to look to interpretations by other jurisdictions). In State v.

Hayes, 660 P.2d 1387 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983), a motorist driving in Kansas with a partially

obscured Indiana license plate was stopped by a trooper for violating the Kansas

equivalent of 47 Okla. Stat. § 1113.A.2. In the course of the stop, the troopers spotted

packages of marijuana in plain view in the vehicle. On a motion to suppress, the trial

court held that the Kansas statute did not apply to vehicles with out-of-state plates, and

thus that the stop was not justified. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning:

Taken to its logical extreme, under the restrictive view of our statute taken
by the trial court an out-of-state motorist could drive with obscured tags or
no tags at all. . . . The purpose of requiring display of a tag in the first
place, and legibility of tag displayed, is demonstrated by the very
occurrence here. The obscured tag frustrated the officers in a routine
license plate check. Law enforcement officials frequently must determine
from tag numbers whether a vehicle is stolen; whether it is properly
registered; or whether its occupant is suspected of a crime, is the subject of
a warrant, or is thought to be armed. Out-of-state cars on Kansas highways
are subject to the same police imperative as local vehicles.

Id. at 1389. The same conclusion has been reached by the other state courts that have

addressed the issue. See Nelson v. State, 544 S.E.2d 189, 190 (Ga. App. 2001) (applying

Georgia obstruction statute to car with Texas license plates); People v. Miller, 611 N.E.2d

11, 20 (Ill. App. 1993) (treating Illinois statute requiring visible license plates as

applicable to a Texas vehicle, but affirming grant of suppression motion on other

16
grounds).7 Moreover, while every state has some statute prohibiting the obstruction of

license plates, none has interpreted its statutory scheme to allow out-of-state cars to be

driven with obscured license plates. We find Defendants' argument that Oklahoma courts

would interpret section 1113.A.2 in such a novel way unconvincing. We therefore

conclude that the Oklahoma courts would interpret section 1113.A.2 to apply to out-of-

state vehicles, including Defendants’.

This case is thus easily distinguishable from United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d

558 (10th Cir. 1994), on which the dissenting opinion relies. In McSwain, the traffic stop

was made in order to determine whether a temporary registration sticker was valid; there

was no requirement that it be visible or unobscured. In that case, when the officer

approached the vehicle and found that the sticker was valid, the purpose for the stop was

over. In this case, the violation was that the lettering on the license plate was not “clearly

visible,” which remained true even after the trooper approached the truck and was able, at

7
The dissent objects that because these cases “involved the legality of the stop
itself rather than its duration,” they are “of little help in construing the precise language of
§ 1113A.” Diss. Op. 9. We do not understand the objection. The question is whether the
statutes apply to out-of-state vehicles; the precise procedural context in which the issue
arises has no bearing. The dissent also asserts, without explanation, that “the similarity
between those States’ respective statutes and § 1113.A is that they all address the display
of license plates. That’s as far as it goes.” Diss. Op. 9. The statutes, however, are
substantial equivalents of 47 Okla. Stat. § 1113.A, and present essentially the same
interpretive issue. In each instance, the requirement that the license plate be plainly
visible is expressed broadly, without limitation to in-state vehicles, but the surrounding
statutory context contains provisions applicable only to vehicles registered in state. The
language of the Kansas decision, quoted above, makes it clear that the Kansas court
considered and rejected essentially the same argument Defendants make here.

17
that point, to read it.

Accordingly, having found that the state identification on the Defendants’ license

plate was obscured by the bumper and not “clearly visible” from the highway, Trooper

Cason was justified in making the traffic stop, notwithstanding the fact that the vehicle

was registered in Mexico.

C.

The dissenting opinion argues that our decision “stands an established principle of

criminal due process – that an ambiguous penal statute must be construed in favor of a

defendant – on its head.” Diss. Op. 1. Not so. Both the Supreme Court and this Court

have repeatedly made clear that the rule of lenity applies only in cases of “grievous

ambiguity or uncertainty,” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994),

quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991), “where all other techniques

for statutory construction leave the court in equipoise.” United States v. Ruiz-Gea, 340

F.3d 1181, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003). The premise of the dissent -- that due process requires

any penal statute containing an “ambiguity” to be construed in favor of the defendant -- is

contrary to established precedent. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138

(1998) (“The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity, however, is not sufficient to

warrant application of that rule [of lenity], for most statutes are ambiguous to some

degree.”); Staples, 511 U.S. at 619 n.17; Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463; Smith v. United

States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); United

18
States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805). Rather, a court must first consult “all

available relevant materials,” United States v. Wilson, 10 F.3d 734, 736 (10th Cir. 1993),

and invoke the rule of lenity only as a tie-breaker when ordinary means of discerning

statutory meaning leave the issue in “equipoise.” Ruiz-Gea, 340 U.S. at 1188. See

United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (“‘The rule of lenity applies only if,

“after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,” . . . we can make “no more than

a guess as to what Congress intended”’” (ellipses in original) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515

U.S. 50, 65 (1995), in turn quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 239, and Ladner v. United States,

358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)); accord, United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994).

Among the ordinary sources of statutory meaning to which courts must refer is the

statutory purpose. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he rule of lenity is not

invoked by a grammatical possibility. It does not apply if the ambiguous reading relied

on is an implausible reading of the congressional purpose.” Caron v. United States, 524

U.S. 308, 316 (1998)(citation omitted). In Caron, for example, the Supreme Court

rejected application of the rule of lenity to an admittedly ambiguous statute because this

would “yield[] results contrary to a likely, and rational, congressional policy.” Id. at 315.

Our decision here is based on far more than a “guess” about what the Oklahoma

legislature intended. We rely not only on the plain language of the relevant paragraph of

the statute, which contains no limitation to Oklahoma-registered vehicles, but on the

legislature’s definition of the offense in terms of § 1113.A.2 in particular and not §

19
1113.A in general, on the self-evident statutory purpose, and on the interpretation given

similar statutes by other state courts. The Kansas Court of Appeals in Hayes, supra,

explained why an interpretation that exempts out-of-state vehicles from the requirement

that license plates be visible is highly implausible and would undermine public safety.

The dissent offers no reason – beyond mere grammatical possibility – that a legislature

would exempt out-of-state vehicles from the requirement. As the Kansas court stated,

“out-of-state cars on Kansas highways are subject to the same police imperative as local

vehicles.” Hayes, 660 P.2d at 1689.

The role of due process in this context is to provide “fair warning” to the persons to

whom the statute applies. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). Oklahoma’s

requirement that “[t]he license plate, decal and all letters and numbers shall be clearly

visible at all times,” and that “[t]he operation of a vehicle upon which the license plate is

covered, overlaid or otherwise screened with any material . . . shall be a violation of this

paragraph,” 47 Okla. Stat. § 1113.A.2, meets that standard. Far from being surprised by

application of this language to out-of-state vehicles, as the dissent oddly speculates (Diss.

Op. 6), we suspect that a “nonresident driving along an Oklahoma highway” with an

obscured license plate would be astonished (if pleasantly so) to find that his out-of-state

status exempted him from so universal a requirement as that of mounting the license plate

20
in such a way that police officers can read it without stopping the vehicle.8

It bears mention that the states whose precedents we have found useful9 construe

criminal statutes strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the defendant. State v.

Pollard, 44 P.3d 1261, 1264 (Kan. 2002) (“When construing criminal statutes, it is well

settled that such statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Any

reasonable doubt about meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to the criminal

statute.”); State v. Watson, 547 S.E.2d 789, 791 (Ga. App. 2001) (“[Criminal statutes]

must be construed strictly against criminal liability and, if it is susceptible to more than

one reasonable interpretation, the interpretation most favorable to the party facing

criminal liability must be adopted.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)); People v. Schaeffer, 654 N.E.2d 267, 268 (Ill. App. 1995) (“Criminal

statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused.” (internal quotation marks and

8
The dissent’s speculation that a “nonresident driving along an Oklahoma highway
with a license plate mounted entirely consistent with the design of a vehicle’s unaltered
bumper, unobscured by any foreign material (frame, plastic or otherwise), would [be
unlikely to] understand he or she was violating § 1113.A,” Diss. Op. 6-7, relies for its
plausibility on facts not in evidence here, namely that the defendant’s license plate was
“unobscured by any foreign material.” The district court found as a fact that “[b]ecause
of the configuration of the tag behind the rear bumper, Trooper Cason could not ascertain
the origin of [the] license plate.” Dist. Ct. Order 2. This was in accord with Trooper
Cason’s testimony that “[t]he lettering that spells out Chihuahua on the bottom portion of
the tag is hung lower than that rubber molding that goes across making it unreadable.”
Defendants did not dispute that fact in district court, and they do not challenge it here.
The issue therefore is not whether a motorist with a properly mounted, unobscured license
plate would be surprised by application of Okla. Stat. § 1113.A.2, but whether an out-of-
state motorist with obscured plates would be so surprised.
9
See above at pages 15-16.

21
citation omitted)). They nonetheless have found that statutes requiring license plates to be

clearly visible apply to out-of-state vehicles, despite any statutory language so stating.10

Thus, the dissent’s supposition that the rule of lenity would require the opposite

conclusion is not borne out by the precedents.

It follows that Trooper Cason’s stop of Defendants’ vehicle was lawful, that further

questioning was permissible, and that there was no need to exclude the evidence

or to overturn the resulting conviction. The district court’s order denying Defendants’

motion to suppress should therefore be, and is AFFIRMED.

Although, as the dissent points out, Diss. Op. 10, none of the state decisions on
10

which we have relied expressly alluded to the rule of lenity, we presume that the decisions
were rendered in accordance with those courts’ usual standards of interpretation,
including the rule of lenity.

22
Nos. 03-5040, 03-5044, United States v. DeGasso
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Let me begin by clarifying where the Court and I agree and disagree. We

agree Trooper Cason’s stop of Defendants’ truck was justified based on his reasonable

suspicion the license plate failed to comply with 47 Okla. Stat. § 1113.A. We disagree,

however, on whether the truck’s license plate actually failed to comply with § 1113.A,

thus justifying Defendants’ continuing detention. For reasons which follow, Defendants in

my view did not violate § 1113.A. Instead, Trooper Cason’s reasonable suspicion

that Defendants violated § 1113.A ended once the trooper walked within ten feet of the

truck’s rear bumper and was able to identify the truck’s foreign license plate. At that

point, Trooper Cason’s detention of Defendants was no longer reasonably related in

scope to the circumstances which justified the stop at its inception and violated the

Fourth Amendment. Despite its denial, the Court’s “prediction” as to how Oklahoma’s

highest court might interpret § 1113.A in this case stands an established principle of

criminal due process–that an ambiguous penal statute which fails to provide fair warning

to the accused must be construed in favor of the accused–on its head. Accordingly,

I dissent.

“[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on

an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion

that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” United States v.

Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Once an officer discovers

that a traffic violation has not occurred, however, the law requires the officer to allow
the driver to proceed without further delay. United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558,

561-62 (10th Cir. 1994). “Further delay is justified only if the officer has reasonable

suspicion of [additional] illegal activity or if the encounter has become consensual.”

United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

In McSwain, the officer stopped defendant’s vehicle solely to verify the validity

of a temporary registration sticker which “appeared to be covered with reflective tape.”

McSwain, 29 F.3d at 560 (emphasis added). Upon approaching the vehicle on foot, the

officer observed the sticker was not covered with reflective tape and appeared valid.

We concluded the purpose of the stop was satisfied at that point, and “further detention

of the vehicle to question [defendant] about his vehicle and travel itinerary and to request

his license and registration exceeded the scope of the stop’s underlying justification.”

Id. at 561. McSwain is binding precedent and controls the disposition of this case:

The government nevertheless contends that Tenth Circuit precedent entitles
Trooper Avery to engage in . . . minimally intrusive conduct. Though we
have held in several cases that an officer conducting a routine traffic stop
may inquire about identity and travel plans, and may request a driver’s
license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation,
these cases . . . are inapposite. They all involve situations in which the
officer, at the time he or she asks questions or requests the driver’s license
and registration, still has some objectively reasonable articulable suspicion
that a traffic violation has occurred or is occurring. Such cases stand in
sharp contrast to the facts of the instant case: Trooper Avery’s reasonable
suspicion regarding the validity of Mr. McSwain’s temporary registration
sticker was completely dispelled prior to the time he questioned Mr.
McSwain and requested documentation. Having no objectively reasonable
articulable suspicion that illegal activity had occurred or was occurring,
Trooper Avery’s actions in questioning Mr. McSwain and requesting his
license and registration exceeded the limits of a lawful investigative

2
 detention and violated the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 561-62 (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

The facts of our case are strikingly similar to the facts of McSwain. In McSwain,

the officer had reasonable suspicion the vehicle’s temporary registration sticker might

not be valid. After stopping the vehicle, however, the officer discovered the sticker

appeared valid. At that point, the Fourth Amendment prohibited the officer from detaining

defendant for questioning, but instead required the officer to allow defendant to proceed

without further delay. Id. at 561.1 Similarly, in our case, Trooper Cason had reasonable

suspicion Defendants’ license plate was obscured. After stopping the vehicle, however,

the trooper discovered the properly mounted license plate was issued in Mexico. To

illustrate the point, a photograph of the truck’s rear license plate as it appeared at the time

of the stop is included as an Appendix.

The Court reasons that because the license plate was not “clearly visible,” the

plate failed to comply with 47 Okla. Stat. § 1113.A. The Constitution requires me to

conclude otherwise. On its face, § 1113.A applies only to Oklahoma license plates, not

1
In McSwain, the Government asserted “that not allowing an officer to request
a driver’s license and registration in this type of case will require the officer to ‘stop the
vehicle, approach the vehicle on foot, observe it, then walk away, get in his police car,
drive away and wave, leaving the stopped citizen to wonder what had just occurred.’”
29 F.3d at 562. We explained our holding did “not require such absurd conduct by police
officers. As a matter of courtesy, the officer could explain to drivers in Mr. McSwain’s
circumstances the reason for the initial detention and then allow them to continue on
their way without asking them to produce their driver’s license and registration.” Id.

3
out-of-state or foreign plates. Because the portion of subsection A on which the Court

rests its case must be read in context to best understand the Court’s legal quandary,

I quote subsection A in full, italicizing the Court’s focus:

§ 1113. Issuance of certificate of registration, license plates and
decals–Requirements and specifications for license
plates–Issuance of license plates without documentary
evidence of ownership . . .

A. 1. Upon the filing of a registration application and the payment of
the fees provided for in the Oklahoma Vehicle License and Registration Act,
the Oklahoma Tax Commission shall assign to the vehicle described in the
application a distinctive number, and issue to the owner of the vehicle a
certificate of registration and one license plate or a yearly decal for the year
that a license plate is not issued. The yearly decal shall have an
identification number and the last two numbers of the registration year
for which it shall expire. Except as provided by Section 1113A of this
title, the license plate shall be affixed to the exterior of the vehicle until a
replacement license plate is applied for. The yearly decal will validate the
license plate for each registration period other than the year the license plate
is issued. The license plate and decal shall be of such size, color, design and
numbering as the Tax Commission may direct. However, yearly
decals issued to the owner of a vehicle who has filed an affidavit with the
appropriate motor license agent in accordance with Section 7-607 of this title
shall be a separate and distinct color from all other decals issued under this
section.

2. The license plate shall be securely attached to the rear of the
vehicle, except truck-tractor plates which shall be attached to the front of the
vehicle. The Tax Commission may, with the concurrence of the Department
of Public Safety, by Joint Rule, change and direct the manner, place and
location of display of any vehicle license plate when such action is deemed
in the public interest. The license plate, decal and all letters and numbers
shall be clearly visible at all times. The operation of a vehicle upon which
the license plate is covered, overlaid or otherwise screened with any
material, whether such material be clear, translucent, tinted or opaque, shall
be a violation of this paragraph.

4
 3. Upon payment of the annual registration fee provided in Section 1133
of this title, the Tax Commission or a motor license agent may issue a
permanent nonexpiring license plate to an owner of one hundred or more
commercial motor vehicles and for vehicles registered under the provisions
of Section 1120 of this title. Upon payment of the annual registration fee,
the Tax Commission shall issue a certificate of registration that shall be
carried at all times in the vehicle for which it is issued.

(emphasis added).

Construing § 1113.A consistent with principles of due process, McSwain

makes the illegality of Trooper Cason’s continuing detention of Defendants in this

case apparent. Only Trooper Cason’s initial suspicion that the truck’s license plate

was obscured justified the stop. Trooper Cason testified and the district court found,

however, he was able to read the truck’s license plate and identify its foreign origin

once he walked to within ten feet of the truck’s rear bumper. The license plate appeared

properly mounted consistent with the design of the truck. At that point, Trooper

Cason no longer had reasonable suspicion that illegal activity had occurred or was

occurring. Bound by McSwain, the nearly identical facts of this case require me to

conclude Trooper Cason’s continuing detention of Defendants exceeded the scope

of the circumstances which justified the stop at its inception. See Florida v. Royer,

460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (An investigative detention “must be carefully tailored to

its underlying justification . . . [and] must . . . last no longer than is necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop.”).

5
 Reading § 1113.A’s proscription against “covered, overlaid or otherwise

screened” license plates in a vacuum, however, the Court holds such language applies

to both resident and nonresident plates and provided Trooper Cason with the traffic

violation he needed to detain Defendants for questioning. The Court, in effect, takes

refuge in an ambiguous Oklahoma penal statute and construes the statute in favor of

the Government. In so doing, the Court snubs the fundamental principle that due process

requires a penal statute provide reasonable notice to the accused that his or her conduct is

forbidden: “[T]he touchstone is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed,

made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant’s conduct was criminal.”

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 (1997).2 To better understand the Court’s

predicament, one need only ask whether a nonresident driving along an Oklahoma

highway with a license plate mounted entirely consistent with the design of a vehicle’s

unaltered rear bumper, unobscured by any foreign material (frame, plastic or otherwise),

would understand he or she was violating § 1113.A.

2
In Lanier, the Court explained that “as a sort of junior version of the vagueness
doctrine, the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures
fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct
clearly covered.” 520 U.S. at 266 (internal quotations and citations omitted). See
State v. Patton, 837 P.2d 483, 484-85 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (strictly construing a
misdemeanor offense statute); see also United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 278-79
(5th Cir. 1998) (strictly construing a misdemeanor offense statute to invalidate a
traffic stop).

6
 Because no Oklahoma court has interpreted § 1113.A, we have only the statute’s

language, viewed in the proper context, to guide us. Section 1113.A’s plain language,

considered in its entirety, applies only to certificates of registration, license plates, and

decals issued by the State of Oklahoma–a proposition the Government, according to

my reading of its brief, does not address. I concede Oklahoma courts might construe

§ 1113.A consistent with this Court’s view. The Court concedes Defendants’ construction

of § 1113.A “might sometimes be a reasonable linguistic” interpretation. Court’s Op. at

14. Our differing views demonstrate that § 1113.A is at the very least ambiguous. Again,

despite the Court’s denial, another telltale sign that the subject provision of § 1113.A is

ambiguous is the Oklahoma legislature’s recent amendment to 47 Okla. Stat. § 12-204.1

(effective November 1, 2003). As the Court recognizes, § 12-204.1 applies § 1113.A’s

rear license plate “display and visibility” provision to all vehicles traveling on Oklahoma

highways. Court’s Op. at 13 n.6; see also 47 Okla. Stat. § 12-101.1.B (“No person shall

knowingly equip or operate on the highways of this state any vehicle with equipment

unless it complies with the requirements of this chapter.”) (emphasis added). That § 12-

204.1’s “legislative history does not reveal whether the amendment was intended as a

clarification of prior law, or as a change” is unimportant. See Court’s Op. at 13 n.6. What

is important is the amendment “casts light” on the obvious uncertainty as to § 1113.A’s

application to nonresident vehicles such as Defendants’. Compare id.

According to the Court, my interpretation of § 1113.A is “novel.” Court’s Op.

7
at 18. My reliance upon established constitutional principles and standard rules of

statutory construction to construe § 1113.A–an ambiguous penal statute–is hardly “novel.”

Given the entirety of § 1113.A addresses the “[i]ssuance of certificate[s] of registration,

license plates and decals” in the State of Oklahoma, my interpretation is not only

reasonable, but correctly based upon the statute’s language and context. Moreover, the

Court could not (and does not) assert that all of § 1113.A.2 applies to nonresident vehicles;

otherwise, under the sentence directly preceding the Court’s focus, the Oklahoma Tax

Commission would have plenary authority to burden interstate commerce by “direct[ing]

the manner, place and location of display of any vehicle license plate” present upon its

public roads, regardless of the origin of the plate.

Absent any Oklahoma decision construing § 1113.A, the Court declares, to quote

a civil diversity case, “‘the federal court must attempt to predict what the state’s highest

court would do.’” Court’s Op. at 11 (quoting Wankier v. Crown Equipment Corp., 353

F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2003)). And according to the Court, “we think it far more likely”

that Oklahoma’s highest court would interpret § 1113.A.2 consistent with this Court’s

view that a § 1113.A.2 violation actually occurred in this case. Id. at 12. The Court’s

approach to statutory interpretation is appropriate for civil diversity cases, but in the

criminal context, due process requires more. See United States v. Chanthasouxat,

342 F.3d 1271, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2003). The Court cites to cases that simply do not

support the proposition that courts may “sweep behavior into [a penal] statute which

8
the authors of the statute may have had in mind but failed to put into the plain language

of the statute.” Id. at 1278. “Far more likely” is not the standard for construing a penal

statute. The fundamental principle that due process requires a penal statute to provide

reasonable notice of what conduct it forbids requires us to strictly construe § 1113.A. Due

process does not permit a court to simply “predict the outcome,” lest courts construe a

vague or ambiguous penal statute in favor of the Government. See id. Rather, reasonable

notice to the accused that his or her conduct is unlawful is the benchmark.3

The Court’s reliance on three cases from intermediate state appellate courts

outside Oklahoma, all of which involved the legality of the stop itself rather than its

duration, are of little help in construing the precise language of § 1113.A. See Nelson

v. State, 544 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. App. 2001); People v. Miller, 611 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. App.

1993); State v. Hayes, 660 P.2d 1387 (Kan. App. 1983). Without belaboring the point,

the similarity between those States’ respective statutes and § 1113.A is that they all

address the display of license plates. That’s as far as it goes. Yet the Court proclaims

3
The Court cites one federal criminal decision, a Ninth Circuit case which
held an officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle for lane
straddling, for the proposition that in criminal cases “the federal court ‘must predict
how the court would interpret the code in light of [state] appellate court opinions,
decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, and treatises.’” Court’s Op. at 11 (quoting
United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 2002)). The other two cases the
Court cites simply acknowledge a state court’s prior construction of its own penal laws
is binding on a federal court. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 960-91 (1975);
Rael v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 874, 877 (10th Cir. 1990). Absent an authoritative
interpretation of § 1113.A itself, due process requires me to rely on its language
and context.

9
“[t]he same conclusion has been reached by the other [three] state courts that have

addressed the issue.” Court’s Op. at 16. My review of the three cases cited by the

Court reveals no mention of the rule of lenity. My research further reveals that no

court has construed a statute with language and context similar to § 1113.A’s.

The Court claims my construction of § 1113.A “would lead to the absurd result that

out-of-state drivers in Oklahoma are free to drive with obscured license plates, or no plates

at all.” Court’s Op. at 14. Nothing could be further from the truth. A vehicle traveling

along a public road without a license plate presents a suspicious circumstance necessarily

giving rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, thereby allowing a police officer

to stop the vehicle and investigate the possibility the vehicle is stolen or otherwise a part of

criminal activity. Further, as this case illustrates, a police officer is justified in stopping

any vehicle traveling within Oklahoma which appears to have an obscured license plate.

If upon closer inspection, a license plate is in fact “covered, overlaid or otherwise

screened” and its origin is unascertainable, the officer could detain the vehicle’s driver for

proper questioning and investigation.

But this Court fails to persuade me Defendants’ properly mounted foreign license

plate failed to comply with 47 Okla. Stat. § 1113.A. This case is not about “predicting”

how Oklahoma’s highest court might interpret § 1113.A. This case is about due process of

10
law which requires fair warning–warning Defendants did not receive.4 Because the

Court’s opinion sets a dangerous precedent by construing a state penal statute based

upon little more than individual predilections, I dissent. I would reverse the decision

of the district court and order the evidence suppressed.

The Court mischaracterizes the premise of my dissent as “due process requires
4

any penal statute containing an ‘ambiguity’ to be construed in favor of the defendant.”
Court’s Op. at 18 (emphasis added). I have never endorsed such a proposition and
never will.
12
13