Williams v. State

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

SEAN P. HILGENDORF KAREN M. FREEMAN-WILSON
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ARTHUR THADDEUS PERRY
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

JESSIE B. WILLIAMS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
) Supreme Court Cause Number
v. ) 71S00-9909-CR-461
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable William H. Albright, Judge
Cause No. 71D01-9804-CF-155

ON DIRECT APPEAL

February 2, 2001

RUCKER, Justice

Jessie B. Williams appeals from his convictions for murder, attempted
murder, and robbery for his role in the shooting deaths of Bennie Spears
and James Edison and the attempted murder of Almeka Dodds. In this direct
appeal, Williams raises four issues for our review which we rephrase as
follows: (1) did the trial court err by admitting evidence that Williams
was known by a nickname; (2) did the trial court err by refusing to strike
the entire testimony of a State’s witness; (3) was the evidence sufficient
to support the convictions; and (4) did the trial court err by imposing
consecutive sentences?
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Facts

The record shows that Bennie Spears and Almeka Dodds lived in South
Bend with their two children, Jasmine, age two, and James, age one. James
Edison, a friend of Spears, was visiting their home on the afternoon of
January 30, 1997. As Dodds was preparing to leave with her children,
there was a knock at the door. Dodds recognized the two visitors as
“Flint” and “Gill.” Flint was a friend of Spears who had been to their
home several times before; however, Dodds had met Gill only a couple times,
and Gill had never been to their home before. The four men were in the
living room talking. Dodds, who was with her children in the dining room,
overheard Spears tell Flint not to point the gun at him. Dodds then heard
a gunshot. When she turned around, she saw that Spears had been shot and
Flint was holding a gun.
Flint grabbed Dodds by the hair and demanded money. Dodds retrieved
approximately $5,000, which was hidden in the couch. Flint then instructed
Gill to lock James and Jasmine in the bathroom and cut Edison’s throat with
a knife. After Gill locked the children in the bathroom, he retrieved a
knife from a kitchen drawer and began to comply with Flint’s request.
Flint told Gill that he was not doing the job properly and that he would do
it instead. Flint then ordered Gill to take Dodds to the basement and
shoot her twice in the head. Once in the basement, Dodds begged Gill not
to shoot her. Flint, believing Edison was dead, went to the basement to
see what was taking so long. Meanwhile, Edison, still alive, jumped
through a window. When Flint and Gill heard the breaking glass they ran
upstairs and fired at Edison twice as he was attempting to escape. Dodds
hid in the basement. Either Flint or Gill returned to the top of the
stairs and fired shots into the basement. None of the shots hit Dodds.
When the gunfire ceased, Dodds ran to her neighbor’s house and called
police. When police arrived, they found James and Jasmine locked in the
bathroom. Autopsies later revealed that Spears and Edison both died of
gunshot wounds to the head.
Dodds immediately went to the police station to give a statement.
She told police that she knew the two gunmen and that their names were
“Flint” and “Gill.” She then looked at several photo arrays. Dodds
positively identified Flint as Freddie Byers. Although she was unable to
make a positive identification, Dodds told police that one of the pictures
looked like Gill. That picture was of the defendant, Jessie B. Williams.
Over a year and a half later, in September 1998, police compiled another
photo array. Dodds positively identified Williams in that photo array as
the person she knew as Gill.
Kenyata Blackwell, Dodds’ sister, also went to the police station on
the evening of the crimes. Although Blackwell was not present during the
crimes, police asked her to identify
individuals known to her as Flint and Gill. Blackwell looked at several
photo arrays and positively identified Flint as Freddie Byers and Gill as
Jessie Williams.
A jury convicted Williams of two counts of murder, two counts of
felony murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count of robbery.
The trial court vacated the felony murder convictions. The trial court
then ordered Williams to serve consecutive sentences of sixty-five years
for each murder conviction, fifty years for the attempted murder
conviction, and twenty years for the robbery conviction, for a total
sentence of 200 years. This direct appeal followed. Additional facts are
set forth below where relevant.[1]

Discussion

I.

Williams first challenges Blackwell’s testimony. Blackwell testified
to the following at trial: She knew two men who went by the nicknames
Flint and Gill, and she often saw them together; Spears introduced her to
Gill approximately six months before the night of the crimes; she had seen
Gill three or four times in the six months prior to trial; and she was not
present during the crimes, but she went to the police station shortly
thereafter to look at several photo arrays and identified Flint as Byers
and Gill as Williams. R. at 479, 480, 481-82, 483, 484, 493. Williams
asserts this testimony was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and
unduly prejudicial.
Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Generally speaking, relevant evidence
is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Evid. R. 402.
However, relevant evidence may nevertheless be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Evid.
R. 403.
Williams argues that Blackwell’s testimony is irrelevant because
“[t]he fact that Williams was known to Blackwell as ‘Gill’ does not tend to
make his involvement on the evening of January 30, 1997, more probable or
less probable than it would be without such evidence.” Brief of Appellant
at 11. We disagree. Identity was a key issue at trial. R. at 434-51.
Dodds told police that she knew the two gunmen and they went by the names
of Flint and Gill. Although Dodds was unable to identify Gill on the night
of the crimes, she told police that Blackwell knew Gill better and
Blackwell should view the photo arrays. R. at 445-46. That Blackwell then
identified Gill as Jessie Williams indeed makes it more probable that
Williams was involved in these crimes. See Ealy v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1047,
1056 (Ind. 1997) (holding that testimony that the defendant went by a
nickname was “irrelevant to any issue in the case other than to show that
defendant was involved in the crime.”).
Additionally, Williams argues that even if Blackwell’s testimony is
relevant, it is unfairly prejudicial because “[t]he State was attempting to
coerce the jury into deducing that if Blackwell knew Williams as ‘Gill,’
and Dodds testified that ‘Gill’ was the name of the perpetrator of the
crimes, then Williams must be the ‘Gill’ that Dodds was referring to . . .
.” Brief of Appellant at 12. Again we disagree. Although Blackwell’s
testimony was undoubtedly prejudicial to Williams, in light of the fact
that identity was a key issue at trial, its probative value was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
A decision concerning relevance and prejudice is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its decision is afforded a great deal of
deference on appeal. Bacher v. State, 686 N.E.2d 791, 793 (Ind. 1997),
appeal after remand, 722 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. 1997). We will only reverse a
trial court upon a showing that the trial court manifestly abused its
discretion and the defendant was denied a fair trial. Henderson v. State,
455 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ind. 1983). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting Blackwell’s testimony.
II.
Williams next contends the trial court erred by refusing to strike
the testimony of
State’s witness Marcus Bradshaw. The essential facts are these. Mishawaka
Police Detective Michael Samp was assigned to investigate this case.
During the course of his investigation, Samp received information
concerning a Marcus Bradshaw. The detective spoke with Bradshaw and took a
statement from him, which Bradshaw apparently signed. At trial, the State
called Bradshaw to the stand. After a few preliminary questions, the
answers to which caught the State by surprise, the prosecutor was granted
permission to treat Bradshaw as a hostile witness. Quoting from Bradshaw’s
statement and facts surrounding how and when it was taken, the State
proceeded to ask Bradshaw several questions regarding his knowledge of the
facts in this case. The State attempted to elicit from Bradshaw that he
had signed a written statement declaring, among other things, that Bradshaw
knew Williams as Gill and that Williams had told Bradshaw he was present at
the scene on the night of the shootings. R. at 583. However, Bradshaw
consistently denied any conversation with Williams and denied he gave any
such information to Detective Samp. When shown the written statement with
his signature, Bradshaw acknowledged that the signature was his but denied
signing the statement. R. at 584-85.
After Bradshaw testified, the State called Detective Samp to the
stand. The State questioned the detective regarding the written statement
he had taken from Bradshaw. The State then attempted to admit the written
statement into evidence. Williams objected, and the trial court sustained
his objection. R. at 643. The trial court then instructed the jury as
follows:
Before we took our break the State offered [the] statement of Marcus
Bradshaw, Exhibit 57. The Court has ruled that that statement will
not be admitted. And I’ll remind you of one of the instructions that
you were read when we began the trial that you must not consider
exhibits or testimony to which an objection was sustained. That is []
not a part of this case ladies and gentlemen.

R. at 643. After the State rested, Williams moved to strike Bradshaw’s
testimony in its entirety and to instruct the jury to disregard it. R. at
691. Williams argued that all of Bradshaw’s testimony was irrelevant and
overly prejudicial in light of the trial court’s ruling regarding the
inadmissibility of the written statement. R. at 692. The trial court
denied the motion, stating “I don’t think there’s much in it, if anything,
helpful to the [S]tate, but I’m not going to strike the testimony.” R. at
693.
Williams contends that all of Bradshaw’s testimony was rendered
irrelevant by the trial court’s ruling that Bradshaw’s written statement
was inadmissible. Even assuming Williams is correct, we fail to see how he
was harmed. When inadmissible evidence has been presented to the jury,
reversal of a conviction is required only if the erroneous admission
prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights. Dockery v. State, 644
N.E.2d 573, 580 (Ind. 1994). In determining whether error in the
introduction of evidence warrants reversal, the court must assess the
probable impact of the evidence on the jury. Hardin v. State, 611 N.E.2d
123, 131-32 (Ind. 1993), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds
by Swanson v. State, 666 N.E.2d 397 (Ind. 1996). Nothing in Bradshaw’s
testimony prejudiced Williams. Instead it actually helped him. Bradshaw
specifically denied that Williams told him anything; denied knowing
Williams as Gill; and declared that any knowledge he received of the crime
came from police officers reading from a newspaper account. R. at 603-04.
Thus, even if the trial court erred in this case, the error was harmless.
III.
Williams next contends the evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions. More specifically he complains that the identification
testimony of Almeka Dodds, the only eyewitness to the event, was incredibly
dubious. We first observe that testimony from a single eyewitness is
sufficient to sustain a conviction. Hubbard v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1219,
1220 (Ind. 1999). Further the “incredible dubiosity rule” is limited to
cases where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony
which is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack
of circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Tillman v. State, 642
N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994).
In this case, Williams cites Dodds’ inability to identify him in a
photo array on the night of the crimes but her ability to identify him in a
photo array in September 1998 as evidence that Dodds’ testimony is
incredibly dubious. Although Dodds was unable to conclusively identify
Williams on the night of the crimes, she told police that one of the
pictures in the photo array looked like Gill. R. at 431, 662. That
picture was of Williams. R. at 665. That Dodds was unable to positively
identify Williams on the night of the crimes but was later able to
positively identify him is not inherently contradictory. See Hubbard, 719
N.E.2d at 1220 (holding that the victim’s initial inability to name his
attacker, who was an acquaintance, was not inherently incredible).
Further, the facts surrounding Dodds’ identification of Williams were
fully presented to the jury at trial. Williams extensively cross-examined
Dodds regarding her inability to identify him on the night of the crimes.
R. at 442-51. Nevertheless, Dodds held firm in her position that she was
100% positive that Williams was involved in these crimes. R. at 442, 443,
448, 450. When asked why she was able to identify Williams a year and a
half later, Dodds responded, “When something like that happens to you, you
can’t take that out [of] your mind. You can’t --- that picture [doesn’t]
go away.” R. at 450. We conclude that Dodd’s eyewitness testimony was
sufficient to support Williams’ convictions.
IV.
For his last allegation of error, Williams challenges his sentence.
The trial court found one aggravator, Williams’ prior criminal record, and
no mitigators. R. at 193. It then imposed the maximum sentence for each
of the four convictions and ran the sentences consecutively for a total
sentence of 200 years imprisonment. R. at 193. The trial court
specifically found that the consecutive sentencing was based “upon these
four different counts being separate acts, not all part of one event that
might be seen to be available for concurrent sentencing.” R. at 193.
Williams contends this was error because the four offenses constitute an
“episode of criminal conduct” under Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(b), thereby
precluding consecutive sentencing.
Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(b) defines “episode of criminal conduct” as
“offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in
time, place, and circumstance.” Here, the murders, attempted murder, and
burglary occurred in the same house and within minutes of each other.
Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the four offenses qualify as an
episode of criminal conduct. See Ballard v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1276, 1280
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (finding episode of criminal conduct where crimes were
at same location and occurred within a half hour of each other). Although
we agree with Williams on this point, he is still not entitled to relief.
Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(c) places limitations on consecutive
sentencing for an episode of criminal conduct: “except for crimes of
violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment . . . to which
the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode
of criminal conduct shall not exceed the presumptive sentence for a felony
which is one (1) class of felony higher than the most serious of the
felonies for which the person has been convicted.” (emphasis added).
Crimes of violence are delineated in the statute and include such crimes as
murder and robbery. See Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a). It does not include
attempted murder. Id.; Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. 2000).
Because murder and robbery are not subject to these limitations, the trial
court did not err by ordering the two sentences for murder and the sentence
for robbery to run consecutive to each other. As for the sentence for
attempted murder, limitations on consecutive sentencing do not apply
between crimes of violence and those that are not crimes of violence.
Ellis, 736 N.E.2d at 737. As such, the trial court also did not err by
ordering the sentence for attempted murder to run consecutive to the other
sentences.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.

-----------------------
[1] In a separate trial Freddie Byers, Williams’ accomplice in this
case, was also convicted of two counts of murder, one count of attempted
murder, and one count of robbery. He too was sentenced to a total term of
200 years imprisonment. Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. 1999).