PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-4232
NAKIE HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-4233
RICHARD ROYAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-4234
TERRENCE SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(1:05-cr-00061-JFM-1; 1:05-cr-00061-JFM-5; 1:05-cr-00061-JFM-6)
Argued: May 25, 2007
Decided: August 22, 2007
2 UNITED STATES v. HARRIS
Before TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges, and
T. S. ELLIS, III, Senior United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by published opin-
ion. Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Senior
Judge Ellis joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Martin Gregory Bahl, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Kwame
Jangha Manley, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt,
Maryland, Denise C. Barrett, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore,
Maryland; Randolph Gregory, Sr., Baltimore, Maryland; Mary E.
Davis, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, A. David Copperthite, Assistant United States Attor-
ney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
OPINION
TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:
Nakie Harris, Richard Royal, and Terrence Smith (Appellants)
appeal their convictions for several crimes relating to the firebombing
of Edna McAbier’s home to prevent her from continuing to contact
law enforcement regarding the sale of illegal drugs in her area. Smith
also appeals his sentence. We affirm Appellants’ convictions but
vacate Smith’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS 3
I.
On January 15, 2005, at about 1:30 a.m., McAbier was lying on the
couch in her home when she heard several "thuds" on her roof. J.A.
97. Scared, she jumped up, grabbed her telephone, and walked toward
her front window. As she approached the window, she could smell
gasoline, and she realized what was happening: Gang members were
firebombing her house.
At the time of the attack, McAbier was serving as president of the
Harwood Community Association and had lived in the Baltimore,
Maryland, community for more than 30 years. In the last several
years, the neighborhood had declined as crime and drugs became
increasingly prevalent. McAbier had begun emailing and telephoning
Baltimore City Police concerning drug-related activity in her neigh-
borhood. As a result of these communications, in 2003 McAbier
began to suffer retaliation in various forms. Her door was spray
painted, her steps urinated upon, and her flowers torn up. Subse-
quently, her car was scratched, drawn on with magic markers, and
pelted with food. Her tires were slashed and "bitch" was scratched on
the trunk of her car. Because of these events, the Baltimore City
Police began sending officers to McAbier’s house, bringing McAbier
a reprieve that lasted until her home was firebombed.
On the night before the attack, Terrence Smith, the leader of a
group of the "Bloods" gang, called a meeting at his house and
announced that he wanted to bomb McAbier’s house because Mc-
Abier was calling the police too much and interfering with the
Bloods’ drug dealing in that area. After the meeting, Andre Wilkins
drove Brian Harrison, Cedric Bowman, Jackie Brewington, Harris,1
Royal, and Isaac Smith (no relation to Terrence Smith) in his minivan
to two different gas stations to purchase gasoline and lighters. At the
second gas station, Royal exited the van, went to a bar across the
street, and purchased six bottles of beer. Wilkins then drove the men
to a house where they emptied the beer bottles. Harris proceeded to
soak rags in the gasoline, pour gasoline into the bottles, twist the rags,
and place them in the bottles. Wilkins had another person call the
1
Harris was not a member of the Bloods, but he supplied drugs to sev-
eral Bloods members to sell.
4 UNITED STATES v. HARRIS
police and report a crime to direct them away from McAbier’s home.
After Wilkins received word that the call had been made, each of the
other six men took a bottle. Harris and Isaac Smith went to the front
of McAbier’s home, and Royal, Bowman, Brewington, and Harrison
went to the back. They lit their gasoline-filled bottles and threw them
at McAbier’s home, scorching its exterior, the outer landing, and the
sidewalk. They then fled the scene.
Appellants were subsequently indicted for one count of conspiring
to commit witness tampering, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 2000),
two substantive counts of witness tampering, see 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1512(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(C) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007), one count of
using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, see 18
U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West Supp. 2007), one count of using fire or an
explosive to commit a felony, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 844(h)(1) (West
2000), and one count of manufacturing a firearm, see 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5861(f) (West 2002).
At trial, the government presented testimony from several wit-
nesses to the events of the morning of the firebombing and the night
before, including Wilkins, Brewington, and Isaac Smith. Royal and
Harris moved unsuccessfully to sever their trial from Smith’s when
the government moved to introduce a DVD depicting Bloods gang
members wearing gang colors and making gang hand signs and Smith
speaking about the importance of not "snitching" to the police.
At the close of the government’s evidence, Appellants moved for
a judgment of acquittal on all counts. As is relevant here, they main-
tained that the government had failed to establish the federal nexus
required to prove the witness tampering offenses because the govern-
ment failed to show that McAbier had contacted federal authorities or
was likely to do so. The government took the position that the federal
nexus was established as a matter of law by virtue of the fact that drug
trafficking is a federal offense. After much debate, the district court
denied Appellants’ motion and granted a motion by the government
to reopen its case to present evidence regarding the likelihood that the
crimes that McAbier complained about would have been referred to
federal authorities. The district court denied a request by defense
counsel for discovery, ruling that the "issue ha[d] been present the
whole time" and that the government would not be presenting any
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS 5
expert testimony. J.A. 558. The court also ruled that it would not
"allow contrary evidence in rebuttal" although it would allow cross-
examination of the government’s witness. J.A. 562. The government
then presented the testimony of Special Agent Robert Brisolari of the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Brisolari testified that the
Baltimore City Police Department was the "biggest source" of their
information and that it contributes the most officers to DEA task force
groups. J.A. 576. He went on to testify that the DEA sometimes
accepts cases that "are considered street level trafficking." J.A. 580.
Following closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury
regarding the applicable law. With regard to the witness tampering
counts, the court charged that to establish the necessary mens rea, the
government must prove that Appellants "acted knowingly and with
the unlawful intent to induce Mrs. McAbier to hinder, delay, or pre-
vent the communication of information to a law enforcement officer
of the United States." J.A. 708. Contrary to Appellants’ argument that
the government was required to show that McAbier had contacted
federal authorities or was likely to do so, the court instructed:
In order to satisfy [the intent] element, it is not necessary
for the government to prove that the defendant knew he was
breaking any particular criminal law nor need the govern-
ment prove that the defendant knew that the law enforce-
ment officer is a federal law enforcement officer. What the
government must prove is that there was a possibility or
likelihood that the information being provided by Ms. Mc-
Abier about drug activities would be communicated to a law
enforcement officer of the United States, irrespective of the
governmental authority represented by the officers to whom
she personally communicated information.
Also, I shall instruct you that drug trafficking is a federal
offense. Again, however, it is not necessary for the govern-
ment to prove the defendant knew that drug trafficking is a
federal offense. The law does not require that a federal pro-
ceeding be pending at the time or even that it was about to
be initiated when the attempted action, threat, intimidation
or corrupt persuasion was made, nor does the law require
that the recipient of the intimidation must be involved in an
6 UNITED STATES v. HARRIS
ongoing federal investigation or in an investigation of a fed-
eral crime.
J.A. 708-09 (emphasis added).
Appellants were subsequently convicted on all counts. Harris and
Royal were each sentenced to 720 months’ imprisonment. Smith
received a 960-month sentence.
II.
Appellants first challenge the validity of their witness tampering con-
victions.2
The code sections that Appellants were convicted of violating are
part of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, as amended,
which Congress enacted for three reasons: to protect the critical role
that victims of crimes and witnesses to crimes play in the justice sys-
tem, to protect those victims and witnesses both from criminals and
from the negative effects of participating in the justice system, and to
provide a model for state and local legislation. See Victim and Wit-
ness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), Pub. L. 97-291 § 2, 96 Stat.
1248, 1248-49 (1982) (Congressional Findings and Purposes) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512-15 (West 2000 & Supp.
2007)); see also 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Authorization Act, Pub. L. 107-273 § 3001, 116 Stat. 1758, 1803-04
(2002) (amending VWPA to add § 1512(a)(2) and redesignate former
(a)(2) as (a)(3)). Appellants were convicted of one count of violating
§ 1512(a)(1)(C) and one count of violating § 1512(a)(2)(C). As is rel-
evant here, § 1512(a)(1)(C) makes it a crime to "kill[ ] or attempt[ ]
to kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication
to a law enforcement officer . . . of information relating to the com-
mission or possible commission of a Federal offense . . . ." 18
U.S.C.A. § 1512(a)(1)(C). Section 1512(a)(2)(C) prohibits "us[ing or
attempting to use] physical force or the threat of physical force
2
Appellants maintain that this issue affects the validity not only of their
witness tampering convictions but also their convictions for conspiracy,
using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and using
fire or an explosive to commit a felony.
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS 7
against any person . . . with intent to . . . hinder, delay, or prevent the
communication by any person to a law enforcement officer . . . of
information relating to the commission or possible commission of a
Federal offense . . . ." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(a)(2)(C). "Law enforce-
ment officer" is defined both for § 1512, which is at issue here, and
18 U.S.C.A. § 1513, which concerns retaliatory obstructions of jus-
tice, as
an officer or employee of the Federal Government, or a per-
son authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal Govern-
ment or serving the Federal Government as an adviser or
consultant—
(A) authorized under law to engage in or supervise the
prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of an
offense; or
(B) serving as a probation or pretrial services officer
under this title.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1515(a)(4). Section 1512(g)(2) further provides that
[i]n a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state
of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance . . .
that the law enforcement officer is an officer or employee
of the Federal Government or a person authorized to act for
or on behalf of the Federal Government or serving the Fed-
eral Government as an adviser or consultant.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(g)(2).3
Appellants do not dispute that the evidence here was sufficient to
prove that they acted with the intent to prevent communication to Bal-
timore City Police about the commission or possible commission of
a federal offense. Nevertheless, they point out that the evidence in the
record established that in all the time McAbier was in contact with
law enforcement concerning her complaints of drug activity in her
3
Formerly 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(f)(2).
8 UNITED STATES v. HARRIS
neighborhood, she had communicated only with local police, who, in
turn, had never referred her information to federal authorities. Appel-
lants argue that, to prove the charged offenses, the government had
to prove either that it actually is likely that had Appellants not inter-
fered, McAbier would have communicated her information to a fed-
eral officer, or that Appellants believed that if they did not interfere,
McAbier might communicate her information to a federal officer.
We review the correctness of jury charges concerning the elements
of an offense de novo. See United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 923
(4th Cir. 1997). "The elements of a criminal offense are as defined by
the statutory language, which we interpret according to the traditional
canons of statutory interpretation, including preeminently the plain
meaning canon." United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 482 (4th
Cir. 1997).
A.
Appellants’ primary claim is that the government was required to
prove that it actually was likely that had Appellants not interfered,
McAbier would have communicated her information to a federal offi-
cer. Appellants claim to draw support for their interpretation of the
relevant statutory language from United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316
(4th Cir. 2003), but we do not read Perry as supporting Appellants’
reading. There, Perry challenged his conviction for witness tamper-
ing, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(b)(3) (West Supp. 2007), a
statute requiring a mens rea identical to that required by
§ 1512(a)(2)(C).4 Perry had been arrested by Montgomery County,
Maryland police for various weapons violations stemming from his
possession in his vehicle of, among other things, a loaded handgun
4
Section 1512(b)(3) makes it unlawful, as is relevant here, to mislead
another person with intent to "hinder, delay, or prevent the communica-
tion to a law enforcement officer . . . of information relating to the com-
mission or possible commission of a Federal offense . . . ." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1512(b)(3) (West Supp. 2007). Because this mens rea requirement is
identical to that of § 1512(a)(2)(C), and closely similar to that in
§ 1512(a)(1)(C), courts have often referred to cases interpreting
§ 1512(b)(3) when applying § 1512(a), and vice versa. See, e.g., United
States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 680 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000).
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS 9
with an obliterated serial number. See Perry, 335 F.3d at 318. Perry
told the officers that if they would "throw away the gun," he would
give them certain information. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Perry also lied to the officers about his name and birth date, and this
conduct comprised the basis for his eventual § 1512(b)(3) conviction.
See id. at 319.
Perry argued on appeal of his conviction that the government failed
to prove that in lying to the MCPD about his name and birth date, he
intended to prevent the communication of information to federal offi-
cers relating to the possible commission of a federal offense. See id.
at 320. In analyzing this contention, we explained that the jurisdic-
tional basis for § 1512(b)(3) is "the federal interest of protecting the
integrity of potential federal investigations by ensuring that transfers
of information to federal law enforcement . . . relating to the possible
commission of federal offenses be truthful and unimpeded." Id. at 321
(internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). We con-
cluded that the statute required the government only to "establish that
the defendants had the intent to influence an investigation that hap-
pened to be federal." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We held
that the government had met that standard because it showed that a
portion of the potential investigation that Perry intended to impede—
the "investigation into Perry’s status as a felon in possession of a
firearm"—was federal in nature. Id. Indeed, we noted that after
MCPD officers learned Perry’s true identity, they referred his case to
federal authorities for a possible federal prosecution. See id. We thus
determined that even though no federal investigation had begun at the
time Perry committed his obstructive act and even assuming that he
was not aware "that a portion of the firearms investigation would be
federal," the government’s evidence was sufficient to support his con-
viction. Id. at 321-22.
In so holding, we rejected Perry’s argument that "the Government,
in order to obtain a conviction . . ., was required to show that the
MCPD was, at the time of the arrest, cooperating in an ongoing fed-
eral investigation or in the investigation of a federal offense." Id. at
322 n.9. We added that § 1512(b)(3) "does not require that . . . com-
munication with federal officers be . . . imminent." Id. We also
rejected Perry’s suggestion that § 1512(b)(3) requires "that federal
officials actually receive the misleading information," noting that the
10 UNITED STATES v. HARRIS
statute "applies to one who engages in misleading conduct with an
intent to ‘hinder, delay, or prevent’ communication with federal law
enforcement officers. It does not require that the individual have suc-
ceeded." Id.
Appellants recognize that while Perry was charged with providing
misleading information to authorities in violation of § 1512(b)(3),
Appellants were charged with using force with the intent to prevent
communication of information in violation of § 1512(a)(1)(C) and
(a)(2)(C). In light of this distinction, Appellants concede that it would
"make no sense [here] to require that the prevented communication
actually be shared with a federal officer." Brief of Appellants at 39.
Appellants nevertheless contend that the government was required to
prove that "some of the information previously provided by Ms. Mc-
Abier to the local police regarding the drug activity in her neighbor-
hood [was] shared with some federal law enforcement officer." Id.
Absent such proof, Appellants maintain, the evidence would not be
sufficient to show that the investigation that Appellants intended to
prevent "happened to be federal." This argument demonstrates a mis-
understanding of Perry. In Perry, no actual federal investigation
existed at the time Perry lied to the MCPD. Thus, when we held that
the evidence was sufficient to prove that Perry lied with the intent to
disrupt an investigation that happened to be federal, we were referring
to a potential investigation relating to the information he sought to
suppress. And, we determined that a portion of this potential investi-
gation happened to be federal because Perry’s firearm possession vio-
lated federal law. See Perry, 335 F.3d at 321. Similarly, Appellants
were charged here with using force with the intention of disrupting
McAbier’s future communication of information relating to drug traf-
ficking in her neighborhood. A portion of the potential investigation
that they sought to prevent "happened to be federal" because drug
trafficking is a federal offense. That McAbier had communicated pre-
viously with local law enforcement and that those communication had
not spawned a federal investigation are red herrings here.
Perry aside, Appellants’ argument fails for another reason. The
statutes Appellants were charged with violating prohibit the commis-
sion of certain obstructive acts "with intent to" affect the communica-
tion to a law enforcement officer of information relating to the
commission or possible commission of a federal offense. 18 U.S.C.A.
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS 11
§ 1512(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(C). Because the defendant need only "in-
ten[d]" his obstructive actions to have that effect, the issue of whether
the victim, in the absence of the tampering, would have actually com-
municated his information to any authority, federal or otherwise, is
completely irrelevant to his guilt. See United States v. Aguilar, 515
U.S. 593, 599, 602 (1995) (explaining that a defendant can be guilty
of "corruptly . . . endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede" a
grand jury proceeding by lying to a subpoenaed witness who ulti-
mately is not called to testify or who does not transmit the defendant’s
account (internal quotation marks omitted)); see Perry, 335 F.3d at
322 n.9 (holding that the government need not prove that the defen-
dant successfully hindered, delayed, or prevented communication with
federal law enforcement to prove guilt under § 1512(b)(3), but only
that he intended to do so). So long as the information the defendant
seeks to suppress actually relates to the commission or possible com-
mission of a federal offense, the federal nexus requirement is estab-
lished.5
5
Appellants also argue that even if the district court correctly
instructed the jury that the government was required to prove only a
"possibility" that the information that McAbier would have provided
would have been communicated to federal authorities, see United States
v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1998), the government failed
to do that. We disagree. The district court instructed the jury that drug
trafficking is a federal offense. Regardless of the fact that McAbier had
chosen in the past to contact only Baltimore City Police, the federal
nature of the offense at issue at least created the possibility that she might
have decided in the future to contact federal authorities. Similarly,
although the local police had not referred to federal authorities informa-
tion that McAbier had provided in the past, the federal nature of the
offenses created the possibility that they would decide to refer future
information. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1203 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
"possibility" as "[a]n event that may or may not happen"). But see United
States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that mere theo-
retical possibility was not sufficient when "no evidence in the record
connect[ed that] possibility with reality"), vacated for reconsideration on
other grounds, 544 U.S. 902 (2005).
Appellants also maintain that the district court erred in two additional
ways: first, in allowing the government to reopen its case to present evi-
dence on the likelihood that the Baltimore City Police would have
referred information from McAbier to federal authorities, and second, in
12 UNITED STATES v. HARRIS
B.
Perry and the applicable statutory language also foreclose Appel-
lants’ suggestion that the government was required to prove that they
specifically intended to interfere with communication to federal offi-
cers. As we have noted, section 1512(g)(2) provides that
[i]n a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state
of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance . . .
that the law enforcement officer is an officer or employee
of the Federal Government or a person authorized to act for
or on behalf of the Federal Government or serving the Fed-
eral Government as an adviser or consultant.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(g)(2). This language clearly applies regardless of
whether a defendant has contemplated any particular officer, federal
or otherwise, with whom his victim might communicate.6 Thus, under
the plain meaning of the applicable statutory language, the govern-
refusing to allow Appellants to rebut this evidence. Assuming that the
district court erred in either or both of these rulings, any error was clearly
harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) ("Any error . . . that does not affect
substantial rights must be disregarded."). As we have explained, the gov-
ernment was not required to prove that the federal authorities would
likely have received any information had Appellants not interfered. And,
the evidence that Appellants claim they were denied the opportunity to
present did not tend to negate the possibility that McAbier’s information
would eventually be communicated to federal authorities.
6
Reading § 1512(g)(2) to apply only to a defendant who has contem-
plated a particular officer would produce absurd results. See Aremu v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 450 F.3d 578, 583 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting "set-
tled rule that a court must, if possible, interpret statutes to avoid absurd
results"). For example, under such a reading, a defendant who killed a
witness to prevent her from communicating with any law enforcement
officer, without contemplating any particular officer, could not be prose-
cuted, since (g)(2) would not apply and he would lack the intent to affect
communication with a federal officer; yet, the same defendant could be
prosecuted if he intended to affect communication with a particular state
officer because § 1512(g)(2) would apply and excuse the government
from proving a belief that the affected officer would be federal.
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS 13
ment need not prove any state of mind regarding whether the potential
investigation that a defendant sought to affect would be conducted by
federal officers. See Perry, 335 F.3d at 321-22; United States v.
Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that § 1512 did not
require proof that defendant knew the federal nature of the investiga-
tion with which he was interfering); United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d
338, 348 (6th Cir. 1984) (rejecting argument that § 1512 required
proof that defendant knew that witness was going to testify before
federal grand jury or that he was trying "to communicate information
regarding a federal offense to a federal law enforcement officer" and
holding that § 1512 only "requires the government to prove knowing
use of, or a knowing attempt to use, intimidation or physical force").7
Perry and the plain language of § 1512(g)(2) notwithstanding,
Appellants maintain that Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544
U.S. 696 (2005), supports their reading of the statute. Their reliance
is misplaced, however. In Arthur Andersen, the Court considered the
proof necessary to demonstrate under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(b)(2)(A)
and (B) (West 2000) a defendant’s guilt of "knowingly . . . corruptly
persuad[ing] another person . . . with intent to . . . cause" that person
to "withhold" documents from, or "alter" documents for use in, an
"official proceeding." Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 703 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted, second alteration added). At issue was whether
Enron Corporation’s auditor, Arthur Andersen, knowingly corruptly
persuaded its employees within the meaning of § 1512(b) when it
instructed them to destroy documents pursuant to its then-existing
document retention policy after Enron’s financial difficulties became
public. See id. at 698. The Court held, as is relevant here, that "[a]
‘knowingly . . . corrup[t] persuade[r]’ cannot be someone who per-
suades others to shred documents under a document retention policy
when he does not have in contemplation any particular official pro-
ceeding in which those documents might be material." Id. at 708
(alterations in original).
7
Supporting Appellants’ position is United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d
639 (7th Cir. 1994), which held that proving guilt under § 1512(a)(1)(C)
requires proof that "the defendant believed that a person might furnish
information to federal officials." Id. at 645 (emphasis in original).
Edwards is unpersuasive, however, as it simply relies on a case interpret-
ing 18 U.S.C.A. § 1510 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007), which contains no
language comparable to § 1512(g)(2). See Edwards, 36 F.3d at 645.
14 UNITED STATES v. HARRIS
Arthur Andersen has no application to the crimes charged in the
present case, however. Simply put, the statutory language at issue
here is completely different than that which the Arthur Andersen
Court interpreted. Most elementally, § 1512(g)(2), which specifically
excuses the government from proving any state of mind of the defen-
dant with regard to whether the communication interference will be
with federal officers, has no application to § 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B).
In any event, Congress clearly did not intend that a defendant, to be
guilty of the crimes at issue here, would need to contemplate a "par-
ticular" officer from whom he hoped to keep the victim’s information.8
Appellants also maintain that requiring proof of a defendant’s
awareness of the likelihood that the victim would have communicated
with federal authorities absent the defendant’s interference is neces-
sary to avoid making surplusage of the portion of § 1515(a)(4) that
defines "law enforcement officer" in part as "an officer or employee
of the Federal Government, or a person authorized to act for or on
behalf of the Federal Government or serving the Federal Government
as an adviser or consultant." See United States v. Childress, 104 F.3d
47, 52 (4th Cir. 1996) ("A well-recognized canon of construction
requires courts to read statutory provisions so that, when possible, no
part of the statute is superfluous."). The claim that our reading makes
surplusage out of this language is simply not correct. Although
§ 1512(g)(2) essentially negates any effect in § 1512 of that part of
the definition contained in § 1515(a)(4), the definition also applies to
§ 1513, which, as is relevant here, criminalizes various conduct
undertaken "with intent to retaliate" against any person for providing
information relating to the commission of a federal, or possible fed-
8
If anything, Arthur Andersen might be relevant to the question of
whether a defendant, to be guilty of the crimes at issue here, must have
some particular state of mind with regard to whether the information he
sought to suppress related to the commission or possible commission of
a federal crime. But see United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 677 n.9
(1975) ("[T]he existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need
not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made
criminal by the federal statute."); Perry, 335 F.3d at 321-22 ("Whether
Perry was aware that a portion of the firearms investigation would be
federal is irrelevant."). We do not address this question, however, as
Appellants’ argument concerns only the federal officer requirement.
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS 15
eral, offense to a "law enforcement officer." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1513(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2007). Because § 1513 contains no pro-
vision equivalent to § 1512(g)(2) that would negate the effect of the
identified portion of the definition of "law enforcement officer," no
portion of the definition is superfluous.
C.
We recognize that Appellants’ interpretation of § 1512(a)(1)(C)
and (a)(2)(C) is not without support from some decisions from other
circuits. In United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 1996),
the Third Circuit held that to obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1512(a)(1)(C), the government must prove that
(1) the defendant killed or attempted to kill a person; (2) the
defendant was motivated by a desire to prevent the commu-
nication between any person and law enforcement authori-
ties concerning the commission or possible commission of
an offense; (3) that offense was actually a federal offense;
and (4) the defendant believed that the [victim] might com-
municate with the federal authorities.
Id. at 918 (emphasis in original). The court held that the fourth ele-
ment "may be inferred by the jury from the fact that the offense was
federal in nature, plus additional appropriate evidence [such as evi-
dence] that the defendant had actual knowledge of the federal nature
of the offense." Id. The court explained that its framework was "an
appropriate reconciliation between the constraint that the government
must prove the defendant’s specific intent to hinder a federal investi-
gation and the fact that, by virtue of [§ 1512(g)(2)], it need not prove
that the defendant knew the federal status of any particular law
enforcement officer involved in an investigation." Id. at 919.
In United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir. 1997), the court
clarified Stansfield’s rule. Despite the fact that the fourth element as
described in Stansfield clearly concerned the subjective belief of the
defendant, the Bell court recognized that such an interpretation of the
applicable statutory language could not be squared with § 1512(g)(2).
See id. at 1349. Accordingly, the court refused to read Stansfield "as
requiring proof that the defendant believed the victim might commu-
16 UNITED STATES v. HARRIS
nicate with law enforcement officers whom the defendant knew or
believed to be federal officers." Id. (emphasis in original). Rather, the
court read it "as recognizing that what the statute mandates is proof
that the officers with whom the defendant believed the victim might
communicate would in fact be federal officers." Id. (emphasis in orig-
inal). The court explained that, as Stansfield had announced, proof of
the fourth element could be evidence of the defendant’s knowledge
that the information he sought to suppress concerned a federal
offense, as long as the government also presented "additional appro-
priate evidence." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).9 The court
did not attempt to explain how its interpretation could be reconciled
with the applicable statutory language.
Viewing Stansfield and Bell together, we conclude that the genesis
of Bell’s requirement that the government prove that the officers with
whom the defendant believed the victim might communicate would
in fact be federal officers was not the applicable statutory language,
but rather, the Stansfield court’s mistaken belief that the government
was required to prove a subjective belief by the defendant that "the
[victim] might communicate with the federal authorities," Stansfield,
101 F.3d at 918, and the Bell court’s attempt to reduce the effect of
that erroneous conclusion. Unlike the Bell court, we are not bound by
the interpretation announced in Stansfield and need not allow conclu-
sions in that opinion that we do not find persuasive to affect our own
analysis of the statute.10
9
Several other circuits have followed Bell and Stansfield. See United
States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2004); United
States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407, 422-23 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 91 (2d Cir. 1999).
10
We recognize, of course, that the case we quoted in Perry for the
proposition that § 1512(b)(3) requires only "‘that the government estab-
lish that the defendants had the intent to influence an investigation that
happened to be federal’" was a Third Circuit case applying Bell and
Stansfield. See Perry, 335 F.3d at 321 (citing United States v. Apple-
white, 195 F.3d 679, 687 (3d Cir. 1999)). As we have explained, how-
ever, we did not decide in Perry that the government, to meet that
standard, was required to prove anything more than the federal nature of
the offense to which the information in question pertained.
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS 17
D.
Appellants suggest that Congress lacked the power to enact
§ 1512(a)(1)(C) and (a)(2)(C) if the offenses do not include the ele-
ments Appellants have identified. Although Appellants have likely
waived this argument by presenting it in wholly conclusory fashion,11
see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (noting that Appellant’s brief must
contain "contentions and the reasons for them"); 11126 Baltimore
Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George’s County, Md., 58 F.3d 988, 993 n.7 (4th
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that arguments not discussed in appel-
late briefs are deemed abandoned), even assuming it is properly
before us, we hold that Congress did not exceed its authority.
The Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress "[t]o make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion" its Article I powers. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This Clause
authorizes "legitimate" legislation that is "plainly adapted" to a consti-
tutional end. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819). An element of a crime sufficiently creates a federal jurisdic-
tional nexus if it "implicates factors that are an appropriate subject for
federal concern." United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 n.9
(1975); see United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 394 (1798)
(explaining that Congress is authorized to "create, define, and punish
crimes and offenses, whenever they shall deem it necessary and
proper by law to do so, for effectuating the objects of the govern-
ment"). "[T]he existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction
need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the
act made criminal by the federal statute." Feola, 420 U.S. at 677 n.9.
In Feola, the Court held that to prove the offense of assault on a fed-
eral officer in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 111, the government need
11
Appellants argue that
permitting a federal obstruction conviction to rest on nothing
more than proof that the victim might have communicated with
federal law enforcement officers, regardless of whether the vic-
tim’s information would in fact have been communicated to fed-
eral officers, is contrary to the limited criminal jurisdiction of the
federal courts . . . .
Brief of Appellants at 42 (emphasis in original).
18 UNITED STATES v. HARRIS
prove only that the defendant acted with criminal intent to assault a
person who happened to be a federal officer and need not prove that
the defendant was aware that the victim was a federal officer. See id.
at 684. The Court concluded that Congress’s goals in enacting § 111
were to protect federal officers as well as federal law enforcement
activities and that not requiring knowledge by the defendant that the
victim was a federal officer served both goals. See id. at 678-79.
Similar reasoning dictates that Congress acted within its powers in
enacting § 1512. The jurisdictional basis for § 1512(a)(1)(C) and
(a)(2)(C) is the federal interest in enhancing and protecting the critical
role that witnesses play in the federal criminal justice process and
protecting those witnesses themselves. See Pub. L. 97-291 § 2, 96
Stat. at 1248-49; see Applewhite, 195 F.3d at 688 ("It is the integrity
of the process and the safety of those involved that Congress was
seeking to protect in enacting § 1512."). Clearly, threats and uses of
force against witnesses, executed with the intent to suppress informa-
tion relating to the commission or possible commission of federal
crimes, constitute direct assaults on this interest. Congress was there-
fore authorized to enact § 1512(a)(1)(C) and (a)(2)(C), as those sub-
sections are written, without including the additional elements that
Appellants would have us read into the statute. See Feola, 420 U.S.
at 676 n.9 ("[W]here Congress seeks to protect the integrity of federal
functions and the safety of federal officers, the interest is sufficient
to warrant federal involvement."); cf. United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d
84, 92-93 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that § 1512 exceeds
Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to the
extent it allows convictions "when no federal proceeding is contem-
plated and when a victim did not intend to cooperate with a federal
officer").
III.
Royal and Harris next argue that the district court erred in denying
their motion to sever their trial from Smith’s when the government
introduced a particular DVD. One segment of the DVD showed
Bloods members wearing gang colors and making gang hand signs.
Another depicted Smith speaking about drug dealing and the impor-
tance of not "snitching" to the police. Royal and Harris maintain that
the admission of the DVD prejudiced them because it was "replete
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS 19
with profanity, vulgarities, threats and total depravity." Brief of
Appellants at 44. We find no error.
When defendants have been properly joined, severance is proper
"only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a
specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from
making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Zafiro v.
United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538 (1993). Absent special circum-
stances, defendants indicted together should be tried together, see
United States v. Brugman, 655 F.2d 540, 542 (4th Cir. 1981), and this
presumption is especially strong in conspiracy cases, see United
States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 114 (4th Cir. 1990). We review a
district court’s decision to deny a motion to sever for abuse of discre-
tion, see United States v. Jones, 356 F.3d 529, 535 (4th Cir. 2004),
which we will find "only where the trial court’s decision to deny a
severance deprives the defendants of a fair trial and results in a mis-
carriage of justice," Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 665 (4th Cir.
1988) (alteration & internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the segment showing Smith speaking about "snitching" and
drug dealing was admitted against Smith only. The district court
admitted the second segment to show "general relationships" between
the gang members. J.A. 257. In order to minimize any unfair preju-
dice, the court instructed the jury regarding the limited purpose of the
DVD’s admissibility and added that "there’s absolutely no evidence
that either Mr. Harris or Mr. Royal appears in any of the scenes . . .
of the DVD." J.A. 257.
Although Appellants maintain that "allowing the jury to consider
any part of the video as evidence against them was improper," Brief
of Appellants at 47, they offer no reason why the behavior captured
on tape would be particularly prejudicial to them, especially since the
jury was specifically instructed that there was no evidence that they
appeared in the video. Moreover, we know of no reason why any prej-
udice to them from the video would have affected their opportunity
to receive a fair trial. We therefore hold that the district court acted
within its discretion in denying their motion.
20 UNITED STATES v. HARRIS
IV.
Appellants next contend that the district court committed plain
error in allowing improper rebuttal argument from the government.
We disagree.
Royal’s defense counsel argued in closing that the prosecutor had
essentially blamed Appellants for the decline of McAbier’s neighbor-
hood, "like Martians came in and took over the area." J.A. 602. Coun-
sel contended that the prosecutor was "demonizing" Royal and
"making him look like a . . . monster . . . so that [the jury could] con-
vict him without feeling bad about it." J.A. 611. He argued that what
had happened in the neighborhood was terrible, but there would be
"no winners in this case" regardless of whether Appellants were found
guilty. J.A. 603-04. The prosecutor responded on rebuttal:
[Royal’s counsel] mentioned that . . . these aren’t Martians
that attacked the community. Well, I agree with that. But
they are a cancer on the community. Drug dealing, violent
drug dealing, these defendants were involved in that. They
were involved in the violence. They’re involved in the drug
trafficking.
He said no winners in this case. I think that’s absolutely
wrong. I think there’s [a] winner sitting right up there. Ms.
Edna McAbier is a winner in this case. And justice will pre-
vail in this case. It is for you to decide, justice will prevail
in this case.
We have to send a message back to the people, can’t do
this any more, it’s not acceptable, we won’t stand for this.
J.A. 671-72.
Appellants maintain that the prosecutor’s argument was improper
because it "could suggest to the jury that they should convict the
defendants not for their participation in [the charged] crimes, but
merely to make a statement against narcotics crimes in general or to
prevent future crimes." United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235, 1240
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS 21
(4th Cir. 1988) (en banc). They also contend that the argument was
misleading because "Appellants were not charged with drug dealing"
and "[t]he argument was an attempt . . . to take the jury’s focus off
the charged offenses." Brief of Appellants at 49.
Because Appellants made no contemporaneous objection to the
argument they now challenge, we review for plain error only. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35
(1993). In order to prevail under that standard, Appellants must show
that an error occurred and that the error was plain and affected their
substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. Even if they succeed
in making such a showing, we would not exercise our discretion to
correct the error unless the error "seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States
v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 324 (4th Cir. 2003).
Whether improper argument by the government has prejudiced the
trial process to such a degree as to require reversal depends on the
facts of each trial. See United States v. Harrison, 716 F.2d 1050, 1051
(4th Cir. 1983). In determining whether such improper remarks
require reversal we consider:
(1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s remarks have a ten-
dency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2)
whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent
the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to
establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the com-
ments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert
attention to extraneous matters.
Id. at 1052.
We conclude there was nothing improper about the prosecutor
emphasizing Appellants’ drug dealing because drug dealing was an
important part of the trial even though drug offenses were not
charged. It was information concerning drug dealing that Appellants
were attempting to prevent McAbier from communicating to law
enforcement; thus, emphasizing Appellants’ status as drug dealers
was certainly appropriate in response to the argument that Appellants
were being unfairly "demoniz[ed]."
22 UNITED STATES v. HARRIS
The "send a message" comment was at least arguably improper for
the reason urged by Appellants, however. Even so, it clearly does not
justify reversal of Appellants’ convictions. The case against Royal
here was strong and the remark at issue was isolated. There is no indi-
cation that it was a deliberate attempt on the part of the prosecutor to
remove the jury’s attention from the legal issues before it. Indeed, in
his relatively short rebuttal, the prosecutor repeatedly admonished the
jury to decide the case before it and not allow itself to get distracted
by extraneous issues. See, e.g., J.A. 667 ("Stay focused on the evi-
dence. Stay focused on the facts and focused on the testimony."); J.A.
675 ("You decide this case on the facts and the evidence . . . .").
Under these circumstances, we conclude that "the degree to which the
remarks could have misled and prejudiced the jury was relatively
small," and thus, reversal is not warranted. Pupo, 841 F.2d at 1240.
V.
Smith finally argues that the district court failed to properly justify
its 187-month variance from the applicable guidelines range. Calcu-
lating the appropriate sentencing guidelines range for Smith, the dis-
trict court determined the base offense level to be 33 since the object
of the offense would have constituted first degree murder. See
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(1) (2005). That level and a Criminal History Cat-
egory of VI yielded a range of 235-293 months’ imprisonment.12 The
court then added a 360-month mandatory minimum consecutive pen-
alty based on Smith’s use of a destructive device during and in rela-
tion to a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii);
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(2)(A), resulting in a range of 595-653 months.
Finally, the court also added a 120-month consecutive sentence for
Smith’s use of fire or an explosive to commit a felony, resulting in
a final guidelines range of 715-773 months. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 844(h)(1); U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(a). Noting the serious nature of the
crime, and citing the need to protect the community, the district court
imposed a variance sentence of 960 months.
12
The court also determined that Smith was a career offender, see
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), but that determination did not affect his offense
level or his Criminal History Category.
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS 23
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which rendered the
federal sentencing guidelines advisory, effected a significant change
in the way that federal sentences are determined, leaving much uncer-
tainty in its wake. Since Booker was issued, and since the district
court sentenced Smith, we have decided many important issues
regarding how the advisory sentencing guidelines scheme should be
applied, including the process courts must employ in incorporating
the advisory guideline range into its analysis of what sentence to
impose, see United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432-33 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006), and whether courts should
continue to consider the appropriateness of departures in determining
the defendant’s advisory guidelines range, see United States v. Dan-
venport, 445 F.3d 366, 372 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006), both of which bear
on Smith’s sentence. In order to give the district court the benefit of
these and other recent decisions, we vacate Smith’s sentence and
remand for reconsideration. In so doing, we make no comment on the
reasonableness of the sentence imposed.
VI.
In sum, we affirm Appellants’ convictions but vacate Smith’s sen-
tence and remand for resentencing.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART