PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL,
INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-1046
SHARI T. WILSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(1:06-cv-00615-JFM)
Argued: December 4, 2007
Decided: March 5, 2008
Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges,
and James P. JONES, Chief United States District Judge for the
Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Jones joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Mark John Hardcastle, Rockville, Maryland, for Appel-
lant. Adam Dean Snyder, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Mary-
land, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Terry B. Blair, Baltimore, Maryland,
2 LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON
for Appellant. Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
OPINION
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc., a mining corporation, appeals from the
district court’s dismissal of its claims on the basis of res judicata and
abstention. Since Laurel raised and adjudicated the same claims in a
state court proceeding and failed to exhaust its administrative reme-
dies before filing suit in federal court, we affirm the district court’s
decision.
I.
In 1991, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Surface Mine
Dewatering Act ("Dewatering Act") to protect property owners in
counties where karst terrain1 is located from the dewatering of surface
mines. The Dewatering Act established zones of dewatering influence
for all mines and imposed remedial measures on a miner if a well
within the zone of influence failed due to declining ground water or
if damage was caused by subsidence. Md. Envir. Code § 15-812(c).
Specifically, the Dewatering Act provides that a licensed miner within
the zone of influence must:
(1) Replace, at no expense to the owner of real property that
is affected by the surface mine dewatering, a water supply
that fails as a result of declining ground water levels; and (2)
upon a determination by the Department of proximate cause
after the permittee has received proper notice and an oppor-
tunity to respond and provide information, pay monetary
1
"Karst terrain" is defined as an irregular topography that is: (1) caused
by a solution of limestone and other carbonate rock; and (2) character-
ized by closed depressions, sinkholes, caverns, solution cavities, and
underground channels that, partially or completely, may capture surface
streams. Md. Envir. Code § 15-813(a)(3).
LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON 3
compensation to the affected property owner or repair any
damage caused as a result of the sudden subsidence of the
surface of the land.
Md. Envir. Code § 15-813(c). However, the Maryland Department of
Environment ("MDE") may not require a licensed miner to replace
water supplies if the miner demonstrates to the MDE by clear and
convincing evidence that pit dewatering is not the proximate cause of
the loss water supply. Id. § 15-813(f). The MDE must also provide
the licensed miner the opportunity for a contested hearing. Id. § 15-
813(g).
The day after the Dewatering Act became law, Laurel Sand &
Gravel, Inc. ("Laurel"), a Maryland corporation, engaged in the busi-
ness of mining limestone and other aggregates in Maryland and West
Virginia, along with nine other licensed miners, formed the Maryland
Aggregates Association and challenged the constitutionality of the
Dewatering Act. In Maryland Aggregates, Inc. v. State of Maryland,
655 A.2d 886 (Md. 1995), Laurel facially attacked the constitutional-
ity of the Dewatering Act. Laurel contended that the Dewatering
Act’s statutory procedures for resolving claims were constitutionally
deficient and that the contested case hearing process violated proce-
dural due process. The Maryland Court of Appeals rejected Laurel’s
constitutional claims and dismissed the case.
In February 2002, eleven years after the law’s enactment, the MDE
notified Laurel that a shallow residential well in its zone of influence
was dry due to declining ground water. The well belonged to David
Thomas ("Thomas well"). MDE informed Laurel that, under the
Dewatering Act, it was required to replace the well or lose its mining
license for noncompliance. Laurel replaced the well at a cost of
$3,000 and initiated a contested case hearing.
At a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), Laurel
argued that a recent severe drought — not its dewatering operations
— was the proximate cause of the Thomas well’s failure. In addition,
Laurel argued that Maryland Aggregates violated federal constitu-
tional law. (J.A. 33.) The ALJ found that because Laurel failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was not the proximate
cause of water supply loss to the Thomas well, it had violated the
4 LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON
Dewatering Act. Laurel filed exceptions to the ALJ’s proposed deci-
sion. However, the MDE’s Final Decision Maker adopted the ALJ’s
findings and conclusions. Laurel did not seek judicial review of the
final decision in the Maryland state courts.
In lieu of seeking judicial review of the administrative decision, a
year later, Laurel filed suit in federal district court against Maryland’s
Secretary of the Environment, Shari T. Wilson, arguing that the
Dewatering Act violates the Due Process and Takings Clause of the
United States Constitution. The district court dismissed Laurel’s
action on the grounds that: (1) res judicata precluded Laurel from
raising the same claims litigated in Maryland Aggregates; (2) Laurel
lacked a property interest to sustain a due process and takings claim
under the Constitution; and (3) Younger abstention applied.
II.
We review a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem,
85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996). A district court’s decision to abstain
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), however, is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Nivens v. Gilchrist, 319 F.3d 151, 153 (4th
Cir. 2003).
III.
A. Res Judicata
Laurel challenges the constitutionality of the Dewatering Act argu-
ing that § 15-813(c) improperly requires it to immediately replace
another’s dry well in an established zone of influence. Since this pro-
cess occurs without a pre-deprivation hearing, Laurel argues that the
Dewatering Act violates its procedural due process rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. In addition,
Laurel contends that the Dewatering Act enforces strict liability by
improperly shifting the burden of proof to the miner and that the
$3,000 expended in replacing the Thomas well constitutes an uncon-
stitutional taking. Laurel seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief, and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court held
LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON 5
that because these claims were litigated in Maryland Aggregates, res
judicata and collateral estoppel precluded Laurel from raising them
again.
Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars a party from
relitigating a claim that was decided or could have been decided in
an original suit. Pueschel v. United States, 369 U.S. 345, 355 (4th Cir.
2004). The doctrine was designed to protect "litigants from the burden
of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and
[to promote] judicial economy by preventing needless litigation."
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Generally,
the preclusive effect of a judgment rendered in state court is deter-
mined by the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered.
Under Maryland law, the elements of res judicata are: (1) that the par-
ties in the present litigation are the same or in privity with the parties
in the earlier dispute; (2) that the claim presented in the current action
is identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication; and (3)
that there has been a final judgment on the merits. Anne Arundel
County Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 887 A.2d 1029, 1037 (Md. 2005)(cit-
ing Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Comm. Ass’n., 761 A.2d 899, 910
(2000)).
Laurel argues that res judicata is inapplicable because an as-applied
challenge to the Dewatering Act’s constitutionality is a different
claim than the facial challenge raised in Maryland Aggregates. The
MDE argues that the claims are not different and were raised in Mary-
land Aggregates. Because it is undisputed that this case involves the
same parties and a final judgment on the merits was rendered in
Maryland Aggregates, the only issue is whether the two causes of
action are the same for purposes of res judicata.
The test for deciding "whether the causes of action are identical for
claim preclusion purposes is whether the claim presented in the new
litigation ‘arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions
as the claim resolved by the prior judgment.’" Pittson Co. v. United
States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1999)(quoting Harnett v. Billman,
800 F.2d 1308, 1313 (4th Cir. 1986)). "Newly articulated claims
based on the same [transactional] nucleus of facts may still be subject
to a res judicata finding if the claims could have been brought in the
6 LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON
earlier action." Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003).
To determine whether res judicata applies, we must compare the
allegations set forth in Maryland Aggregates with the allegations set
forth in Laurel’s Amended Complaint. In Maryland Aggregates, Lau-
rel sought a declaratory judgment holding the Dewatering Act uncon-
stitutional on a number of grounds and an injunction against the
enforcement and implementation of the Dewatering Act. Specifically,
Laurel argued: (1) the Dewatering Act violated its right to substantive
due process because there was no rational basis for the legislation; (2)
the statute denied equal protection of the law to resident counties
unaffected by the Dewatering Act; (3) the Dewatering Act interfered
with the mine operators’ constitutional rights to a jury trial; (4) the
Dewatering Act deprived them of property without just compensation;
and (5) that the statutory procedures for establishing zones of
dewatering influence and for resolving claims under the Dewatering
Act were constitutionally deficient.
Laurel maintains that it was denied due process by not receiving a
pre-deprivation hearing before being found liable to replace the
Thomas well. Although Laurel also emphasizes that its current claim
is an as-applied challenge to the Dewatering Act, this claim is not suf-
ficiently different from the substantive due process claim raised in
Maryland Aggregates challenging the enactment of the statute.
In Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, the Ninth Circuit noted that
"[o]ften, an as-applied challenge will not be precluded by an earlier
facial challenge because the ‘transactional nucleus of facts’ surround-
ing the enactment of the regulation will be different from the nucleus
of facts involved when that regulation is applied to a particular prop-
erty." 322 F.3d at 1080. However, the Ninth Circuit went on to stress
that when the conduct now alleged to cause harm involves the same
nucleus of facts addressed in the prior complaint, and any claim con-
cerning the conduct could have been brought in the prior action, res
judicata applies. Id.
Similarly, in Walgreen Co. v. Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospital, Walgreens brought an "as applied" challenge to the consti-
tutionality of Louisiana’s Department of Health regulations governing
LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON 7
prescription drug reimbursements. 220 Fed. Appx. 309, 312 (5th Cir.
2007)(unpublished). Since Walgreens had previously challenged the
facial validity of the regulations, the Fifth Circuit held that Walgreens
could have raised its arguments in the prior challenge and, therefore,
the claims in the subsequent suit were barred by res judicata.
Indeed, Laurel could have raised its procedural due process claim
in Maryland Aggregates along with its substantive due process claim.
Even though the MDE had not promulgated regulations establishing
an administrative process to the resolution of water or property dam-
age claims at the time of Maryland Aggregates, Laurel was aware that
the Dewatering Act provided the MDE with the authority to initially
determine a mine operator’s liability2 and that a mine operator
aggrieved by the determination is entitled to demand a contested hear-
ing at the administrative level, which is subject to judicial review.
Thus, at the time of Maryland Aggregates Laurel could have chal-
lenged the lack of a pre-deprivation hearing.3 As a result, Laurel’s "as
applied" claim itself was subsumed by the decision in Maryland
2
In footnote 18 of Maryland Aggregates, the Court notes that:
In its reply brief, Maryland Aggregates also objects to the proce-
dures for establishing claims to compensation under the Act. The
Act provides that "[t]he Department shall adopt regulations to
establish an administrative process to expedite the resolution
water supply loss or property damage claims arising under this
section." The Department has not yet promulgated any such reg-
ulations because of the injunction against enforcement of the
Act. Furthermore, while Maryland Aggregates argues that a mine
operator is not entitled to judicial review of decisions relating to
compensation, we agree with the State that a mine operator or
property owner is entitled to review of a ‘decision of [the
Department of Natural Resources] regarding a finding of proxi-
mate cause relating to water supply failure or property damage
within a zone of dewatering influence. This decision is review-
able first as a contested case hearing . . . .’ A party aggrieved by
the result of the contested case hearing may seek judicial review
in the circuit court.
(J.A. 27.) (internal citations omitted)
3
The MDE argues that in fact Laurel raised these claims in Maryland
Aggregates but that they were unsuccessful.
8 LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON
Aggregates. Laurel’s challenge to the lack of a pre-deprivation hear-
ing, essentially challenges the Maryland Aggregates Court’s determi-
nations that the Act provides all the due process that is necessary to
comport with the state and federal constitution. See Mears v. Town of
Oxford, Md., 762 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1985)(claim preclusion applies
if the cause of action is the same and if the same evidentiary facts
would sustain both actions).
Nevertheless, Laurel contends that res judicata is also inapplicable
because Maryland Aggregates was a declaratory action. Laurel argues
that declaratory actions, under Maryland law, are exceptions to the res
judicata doctrine, which only applies if the matter contested was actu-
ally raised and decided and not as to matters which could have been
decided. In support, Laurel cites Bankers and Shippers Insurance Co.
of New York v. Electro Enterprise Inc., 415 A.2d 278 (Md. 1980). In
Bankers, the Maryland Supreme Court adopted the Restatement Sec-
ond of Judgments approach holding that the preclusive effect of
declaratory judgments was limited to matters actually declared by the
judgment. Bankers, 415 A.2d at 654. As to matters not declared, a liti-
gant who solely sought a declaratory judgment in the prior proceeding
is not precluded from bringing those claims. However, the Court nota-
bly declined to decide whether the same would be true if "the original
request for a declaratory judgment also include[d] a claim for coer-
cive or other relief." Id.
MDE argues that Bankers is inapplicable here because: (1) Mary-
land Aggregates did not solely seek declaratory relief; and (2) Lau-
rel’s present claims are not based on the rights determined by the
judgment in Maryland Aggregates. While it is true that courts have
limited the preclusive effect of declaratory judgments, declaratory
judgments have no limiting effect if coercive relief such as damages
or an injunction is also sought. Federal courts have consistently held
that the declaratory judgment exception applies only if the prior
action solely sought declaratory relief. "By asking for coercive relief
(the injunction) in the first suit, the plaintiff lost the right to invoke
the declaratory judgment exception." Stericycle, Inc. v. City of
Delavan, 929 F.Supp. 1162, 1164 (E.D.Wis. 1996)(citing Cimasi v.
City of Fenton, 838 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1988) and Mandarino v. Pol-
lard, 718 F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1983)). It is undisputed that, in
Maryland Aggregates, Laurel sought both declaratory relief and an
LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON 9
injunction against enforcement and implementation of the Dewatering
Act. Thus, the declaratory judgment exception is inapplicable. Since
the Maryland Supreme Court’s finding that the statute was not consti-
tutionally deficient constitutes a final judgment on the merits and
Laurel’s current claim could have been brought in the prior action, the
district court properly found that res judicata bars Laurel’s claims.
B. Takings Claims
Laurel also challenges the district court’s dismissal of its takings
claim. MDE argues that Laurel’s "as applied" takings claim fails as
a matter of law. The district court found that "the Dewatering Act’s
imposition of a duty upon mine owners to pay the costs of construct-
ing new wells on adjacent property [did] not itself deprive the mine
owners of any interest in their own real property." (J.A. 200.) The dis-
trict court further noted that the cost of replacing the Thomas well
was only $3,000 and, thus, the cost did not deny Laurel use of its own
real property.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
the taking of private property without just compensation. Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). To determine whether a
constitutional taking has occurred, we focus on three factors: the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation, the extent to which the regulation
interferes with the investment-backed expectations, and the character
of the governmental action. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The aim of the takings clause "is to
prevent the government ‘from forcing some people alone to bear pub-
lic burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.’" Id. at 520 (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). Therefore, the party challenging the govern-
mental action as an unconstitutional taking bears a substantial burden
of showing that "justice and fairness" requires that the government
compensate for any economic injuries caused by public action. E.
Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
The Dewatering Act’s remedial scheme provides compensation to
injured landowners when miners’ dewatering causes injury. Mary-
land’s desire to require miners to compensate injured landowners is
a valid interference with property to adjust the benefits and burdens
10 LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON
of economic life as well as promote the common good. It is not unrea-
sonable, unfair, or unjust to require Laurel to pay for damages caused
by its mining. Despite Laurel’s arguments, the Dewatering Act’s
remedial scheme is a far cry from the government "short-changing"
a property owner to improve the public condition. See Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Instead, the character of the
government action here is both legitimate and equitable.
Moreover, Laurel fails to identify any property taken for public use
or specify a property interest taken by the Dewatering Act. This fact
alone is enough, as the district court found, to dismiss Laurel’s tak-
ings claim. Even still, there is no doubt that the Dewatering Act has
not forced a considerable economic impact upon Laurel. In eleven
years, Laurel has had to replace one well for $3,000. Proportionally
speaking, Laurel realized its investment-backed expectations without
being substantially burdened by the Dewatering Act.
Thus, the district court properly found that an unconstitutional tak-
ings has not occurred.
C. Younger Abstention
Finally, Laurel argues that the district court erred in abstaining
from deciding its claims under Younger v. Harris. The district court
found that Laurel "prematurely terminated" the state proceedings by
not appealing the adverse administrative decision to the Maryland
Circuit Court. Laurel maintains that the doctrine of abstention is inap-
plicable because: (1) its claim concerns matters essentially legislative
in nature; (2) it seeks wholly prospective relief; (3) the administrative
hearing was not coercive; (4) this matter is not a case of vital or para-
mount state concern; and (5) there is bias at the administrative level.
The doctrine of abstention articulated in Younger requires a federal
court to abstain from interfering in state proceedings, even if jurisdic-
tion exists, if there is:
(1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding, instituted prior to
any substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2)
implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests; and
LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON 11
(3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise
the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federal law-
suit.
Moore v. City of Asheville, 396 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing
Nivens, 319 F.3d at 153). "Younger abstention represents an accom-
modation between a state’s pursuit of important interests in its own
forum and the federal interest in federal adjudication of federal
rights." Telco Comm’ns, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1229 (4th
Cir. 1989).
In arguing that Younger is inapplicable, Laurel claims that there are
no ongoing state proceedings and that the administrative adjudication
of its claim was a non-coercive legislative action. While Younger
does not require abstention in deference to a state judicial proceeding
reviewing a legislative or executive action, this case does not concern
a legislative action. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the
City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989). The administrative
hearing procedures are clearly coercive and "judicial in nature" — not
legislative. See Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 291 F.Supp. 2d 443,
455 (S.D.W.Va. 2003), aff’d 396 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding
that "there can be little doubt that the proceedings before the PSC
were ‘judicial in nature’" when they were conducted in an adversarial,
trial-like setting, with discovery, witness testimony and exhibits). The
important issue here is whether a party must exhaust his state appel-
late remedies before seeking relief in federal district court.
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 406 U.S. 592, 608 (1975), the Supreme
Court stated that "a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party
must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the
District Court." Thus, "a party may not procure federal intervention
by terminating the state judicial process prematurely — forgoing the
state appeal to attack the trial court’s judgment in federal court." New
Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 369; see also Ohio Civil Rights
Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627
(1986)(applying Younger to state administrative proceedings).
Relying on the principles articulated in Huffman and Ohio Civil
Rights Commission, we have similarly held that "a defendant to a
coercive administrative proceedings must exhaust his state adminis-
12 LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON
trative and judicial remedies and may not bypass them in favor of fed-
eral court proceeding in which he seeks effectively to ‘annul the
results’ of a state administrative body." Moore v. City of Asheville,
N.C., 396 F.3d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 2005).
In an attempt "to short-circuit[ ] both the agency’s ability to inter-
pret its statutes in conformity with the Constitution and the state
court’s ability to correct constitutionally infirm agency decisions,"
Laurel forwent state court judicial review of its administrative order
simply because it wanted to litigate in a federal forum. Id. at 396.
Younger abstention was created to prevent such disruption of state
administrative and judicial processes.
Indeed, the purpose of abstention is to ensure that state courts may
construe state law in a way that avoids unwarranted determinations of
federal constitutional questions and to maintain comity between the
state and federal courts. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S.
1 (1987). Hence, "federal intervention before a state court has had the
opportunity to review an agency’s decision is no less an ‘aspersion on
the capabilities and good-faith of state appellate courts,’ and no ‘less
a disruption of the State’s efforts to protect interests which it deems
important." O’Neil v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 791 (3d Cir.
1994) (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608).
Federal intervention with Laurel’s claim would not only cast asper-
sions on the MDE process of determining liability but would also
annul the results of MDE’s determination that Laurel is in fact liable
for the Thomas well failure. Although Laurel purports to fall within
an exception to Younger by seeking wholly prospective relief — a
declaration that the Dewatering Act as applied violates constitutional
requirements and an injunction against future application of the
Dewatering Act — this claim is without merit. See Wooley v. May-
nard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977) (holding Younger abstention inappli-
cable where the suit is in no way "designed to annul the results of a
state trial" and the relief sought is wholly prospective). Laurel seeks
attorney fees incurred in this suit as well as at the administrative level.
Laurel also requests a declaration that the Dewatering Act "as
applied" to the Thomas well violated its constitutional rights.
We fail to see how Laurel’s requested relief may be characterized
as "wholly prospective." Laurel seeks to not only be compensated for
LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON 13
an injury that has already occurred but also to annul the results of the
administrative proceedings. Moore, 396 F.3d at 397. Therefore, we
hold that whereas here Laurel seeks to invalidate a state judgment by
filing a federal action and circumventing state-court judicial remedies,
the state proceedings remain "pending" within the meaning of Youn-
ger abstention. And based on the relief Laurel requests the "wholly
prospective relief" exception is also inapplicable.
Next, we must examine whether the proceedings at issue implicate
an important state interest. Laurel argues that the state’s regulation of
water resources, particularly groundwater is not a paramount or vital
state concern. We disagree. Matters relating to property law, land use,
and zoning ordinances have frequently been held to be "important"
state interests justifying Younger abstention. Harper v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of WVA, 396 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2005).
Maryland enacted the Dewatering Act "[i]n order to conserve, pro-
tect, and use water resources of the State in accordance with the best
interest of the people of Maryland." Md. Envir. Code § 5-501. More-
over, "it is the policy of the State to control, as far as feasible, appro-
priation or use of surface waters and groundwaters of the State." Id.
Hence, the district court properly found that regulation of ground
water effected by the Dewatering Act implicates important, substan-
tial, and vital state interests.
Further, Laurel was provided an opportunity to raise its constitu-
tional challenges at the administrative level. The final prong of Youn-
ger’s abstention test is whether the claimant is afforded an adequate
opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in the state forum. Lau-
rel was not only afforded the opportunity but did in fact raise its con-
stitutional claim at the administrative level. (J.A. 33.) Thus, in sum,
the three prong test for Younger abstention is met.
Because Laurel failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and
could have asserted its constitutional claims in the state proceedings
and the state has a legitimate interest in regulating the groundwater,
we hold that principles of comity demand application of Younger
abstention. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse it discretion
in abstaining from hearing Laurel’s federal claims in deference to the
State of Maryland’s vital interest in regulating dewatering.
14 LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON
IV.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED