PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-4904
VESELIN VIDACAK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., District Judge.
(1:06-cr-00278-NCT)
Argued: October 29, 2008
Decided: January 23, 2009
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges,
and Richard D. BENNETT, United States District Judge for
the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Bennett wrote the opin-
ion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Duncan joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: J. Scott Coalter, MCKINNEY & JUSTICE, P.A.,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Patrick Auld,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greens-
2 UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK
boro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anna Mills
Wagoner, United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Caro-
lina, for Appellee.
OPINION
BENNETT, District Judge:
Veselin Vidacak appeals his conviction on four counts of
making materially false statements orally and on his United
States immigration applications in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1546(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), specifically failing to
report any military service in the Army of the Republika Srp-
ska (the "VRS") during the Bosnian Civil War. At trial, the
district court received into evidence certain military records
and the testimony of two government witnesses concerning
translated statements made by Vidacak. All three sources of
evidence indicated that Vidacak had in fact served in the
VRS. Vidacak contends that the district court erred in admit-
ting these sources of evidence. Because the district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence at issue, we
affirm.
I.
Veselin Vidacak was born in present-day Bosnia, on July
3, 1974. (J.A. 393.) In the late 1990s, Vidacak was residing
with his family in Serbia when he decided he would attempt
to emigrate to the United States. With the assistance of the
International Organization of Migration (IOM), a refugee aid
organization, Vidacak filed a Registration for Classification as
Refugee Application (Form I-590). (J.A. 414-16.) In March
2002, Vidacak was interviewed by U.S. Immigration Officer
Susan Tierney in Belgrade, Serbia, as part of the refugee
application process. (J.A. 417.) The interview was conducted
with the assistance of a Serbian translator named Dusanka
UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK 3
Bucou, or "Duchka," who was employed by the IOM. (J.A.
321.) After the interview, Vidacak and his family were
granted refugee status and they arrived in the United States on
July 8, 2002. (J.A. 418-19.) In August of 2003, Vidacak sub-
mitted his Application to Register Permanent Residence or
Adjust Status (Form I-485). (J.A. 420.) In both of his refugee
applications, Forms I-590 and I-485, Vidacak failed to report
any military service in the Army of the Republika Srpska (the
"VRS") during the Bosnian Civil War. (J.A. 315-25; Gov’t
Exh. 15.)
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (the "ICTY") in The Hague investigates alleged war
crimes that occurred during the civil war fought between the
ethnic Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and the Federation
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (led by Muslims and ethnic Cro-
atians). (J.A. 33-39.) The ICTY launched an investigation into
the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre, wherein elements of the
VRS, primarily from the Zvornik and Bratunac Brigades,
over-ran a United Nations safe-area and executed thousands
of Bosnian Muslims. (J.A. 39-41.) In the spring of 1998,
ICTY agents executed a search warrant at the Zvornik Bri-
gade headquarters and seized various military records. (J.A.
44, 254.) ICTY analysts used the records to catalogue the
names of VRS soldiers who were connected to the events at
Srebrenica and the results were provided to the Department of
Homeland Security’s Department of Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement ("ICE"), to be cross-referenced against a
database of refugees. (J.A. 264-65.) As a result of its inquiry,
ICE determined that Vidacak served in the Zvornik Brigade
of the VRS. (J.A. 185-92, 271-78.)
On December 11, 2006, ICE agents arrested Vidacak at his
home in Guilford County, North Carolina. (J.A. 341-46.)
Vidacak was taken into custody and questioned by ICE Spe-
cial Agent Rodney Coulston through a U.S. government-
contracted interpreter named Carmen Ess. (J.A. 341-88.)
Vidacak waived his Miranda rights and admitted that he had
4 UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK
served in the VRS during the Bosnian Civil War and that he
knowingly had falsified his immigration applications to con-
ceal his service. (J.A. 345-53, 356-65, 383-84.)
Vidacak was charged in a four count indictment for mis-
stating orally and on his Forms I-590 and I-485 immigration
applications that he had never served in the military when he
had served as a soldier in the Zvornik Brigade of the VRS
from May 1, 1993, to July, 1995. (J.A. 9-12.) Vidacak pled
not guilty and the matter was set for trial.
Vidacak filed a motion in limine objecting to the introduc-
tion of his statements made through interpreters to Officer
Tierney on March 11, 2002, and to Agent Coulston on
December 11 and 12, 2006, contending that the interpreters
should be available for cross-examination at trial. (Paper No.
12.) In addition, Vidacak moved to exclude the military docu-
ments seized from the Zvornik Brigade headquarters for being
improperly authenticated pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 901 and
for being inadmissible hearsay. The district court held a joint
pretrial hearing for Vidacak and two similarly-situated defen-
dants.1 (J.A. 17-176.) During the trial, the district court held
that the military records and testimony concerning Vidacak’s
statements to Tierney and Coulston were admissible. (J.A.
155-56, 166.)
The Government presented testimony from four witnesses
that are relevant to this appeal. Richard Butler, a military ana-
lyst at the ICTY, testified to demonstrate the authenticity of
the military records from the Zvornik Brigade headquarters
and explained his involvement in their seizure, cataloguing,
and storage. (J.A. 41-51, 74-126, 212-42, 247-302.) Immigra-
tion Officer Susan Tierney testified about her 2002 interview
with Vidacak in Belgrade. (J.A. 303-37.) Officer Tierney
identified her interpreter, Duchka, and attested to her honesty
1
The appeal of one of these defendants is decided in the related case of
United States v. Pantic, No. 07-4926 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2009).
UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK 5
and ability; however Duchka did not appear in person. (J.A.
320-21, 331-36.) ICE Special Agent Rodney Coulston testi-
fied with respect to a Miranda waiver executed by Vidacak
and the process of the interview which was conducted with
the assistance of interpreter Carmen Ess. (J.A. 345-47.) Ess
testified that she accurately translated the comments made
during Vidacak’s post-arrest interview. (J.A. 383-84, 388.) On
May 3, 2007, a jury returned verdicts of guilty on all four
counts. (J.A. 486.) Vidacak timely filed his notice of appeal
on September 14, 2007. (J.A. 493.)
II.
We "review decisions to admit evidence for abuse of dis-
cretion." United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 79 (4th Cir.
2005). Accord United States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474, 480 (4th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th
Cir. 1992). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, this Court
may not substitute its judgment for that of the district court;
rather, [it] must determine whether the [district] court’s exer-
cise of discretion, considering the law and the facts, was arbi-
trary or capricious." United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286,
1289 (4th Cir. 1995).
III.
At trial, over defense objection, the Government introduced
several foreign military documents. (J.A. 276.) Government’s
exhibit #2 (with corresponding English translation as Govern-
ment’s exhibit #1) reflects a list of individual soldiers from
the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade for
the month of July, 1995. (J.A. 275.) Government exhibit #5
(along with a one page extract as Government’s exhibit #3) is
a personnel administrative log of the 2nd Infantry Battalion of
the Zvornik Infantry Brigade. (J.A. 275, 289.) Government’s
exhibit #4 is a mobilization card from the former Yugoslav’s
People’s Army ("JNA"), now the Army of the Republic of
6 UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK
Srpska. (J.A. 275.) These documents were introduced for pur-
poses of proving that Vidacak served in the VRS.
Each of these exhibits was introduced through the testi-
mony of Richard Butler of the ICTY who participated in a
search of the Zvornik Brigade headquarters in the spring of
1998. (J.A. 254, 276.) Butler described his role in the execu-
tion of a search warrant that authorized the seizure of "all mil-
itary documents created during the course of the [Bosnian
Civil War] from April 1992 through December 1995." (J.A.
43.) Butler testified as to how numerous documents were
seized and taken to the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague,
where they were later catalogued. (J.A. 254-63.) Butler identi-
fied each of the Government’s exhibits as being seized during
the 1998 search of the Zvornik Brigade headquarters. (J.A.
273.) However, Butler stated that the first time he saw Vida-
cak’s name was in the summer of 2004, and that he could not
remember specifically seeing these documents when he
searched the headquarters. (J.A. 88, 286-87.) He testified that
the documents were present in Zvornik during the search,
based on the electronic registration number ("ERN") system
and ICTY document cataloguing procedures. (J.A. 94-95.) On
cross-examination, Butler acknowledged he could not "talk
about [the history of these documents prior to their seizure by
the ICTY in 1998] in first person terms." (J.A. 287.)
Vidacak argues that the district court abused its discretion
by admitting at trial the three exhibits of VRS military docu-
ments seized from the Zvornik Brigade headquarters.2 He
claims that the Government did not submit evidence sufficient
to make a prima facie case that the "documents were created
prior to July 1995 having some relevance as to whether Vida-
cak was in the military." (Appellant Br. 15-16.) He notes that
the Government failed to account for the approximate three
2
The related case of United States v. Pantic, No. 07-4926 (4th Cir. Jan.
23, 2009), concerns this same issue with respect to the admissibility of
military documents seized from the Zvornik headquarters.
UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK 7
year gap between the creation of the documents and their sei-
zure in 1998. (Id. at 16.) In addition, Vidacak claims that the
records constituted inadmissible hearsay under Fed. R. Evid.
802 with no applicable exception. (Id. at 16-17.)
A.
To establish that evidence is authentic, a proponent need
only present "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims." Fed. R.
Evid. 901(a). The factual determination of whether evidence
is that which the proponent claims is ultimately reserved for
the jury. United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370 (4th
Cir. 1992). The district court’s role is to serve as gatekeeper
in assessing whether the proponent has offered a satisfactory
foundation from which the jury could reasonably find that the
evidence is authentic. See id. at 1371; United States v.
Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006) ("[t]he Court
need not find that the evidence is necessarily what the propo-
nent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that the
jury ultimately might do so") (emphasis in original). The bur-
den to authenticate under Rule 901 is not high—only a prima
facie showing is required. See United States v. Caldwell, 776
F.2d 989, 1002 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Once that prima facie
showing has been made, the evidence should be admitted,
although it remains for the trier of fact to appraise whether the
proffered evidence is in fact what it purports to be."); United
States v. Goichman, 547 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976) ("There
need only be a prima facie showing, to the court, of authentic-
ity, not a full argument on admissibility"). See also, Wein-
stein’s Federal Evidence § 901.02[3] (2008) ("Generally
speaking, the proponent of a proffered exhibit needs only to
make a prima facie showing that the exhibit is what the pro-
ponent claims it to be.").
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
the Government had satisfied its burden of authentication.
Richard Butler’s testimony was independently sufficient to
8 UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK
support a prima facie case that the military documents were
authentic Zvornik Brigade records. Butler testified in detail
about his role in the seizure of these documents from the
Zvornik Brigade headquarters. (J.A. 41-47.) He recognized
the exhibits based upon the evidence control numbers that his
team affixed to the documents and he described their subse-
quent indexing, computer-scanning, and storage. (J.A. 43-51,
48-49, 94-95.) Butler also outlined the VRS’s administrative
practices and explained how the VRS "almost wholesale
maintained the general practices and procedures and regula-
tory methods that the JNA had used . . . since the end of
World War II, so in most cases . . . the documents [the ICTY
found] with the [VRS], you can actually trace them back to
administrative or operations manuals, tactical or doctoral [sic]
manuals of the former JNA." (J.A. 69-70.)
The methods employed by the Government to support the
records’ authenticity comport with several of the illustrative
examples provided in Fed. R. Evid. 901(b). Butler’s testimony
fits the "broad spectrum" of Rule 901(b)(1)’s provision for
"[t]estimony of [a] witness with knowledge" that the docu-
ments are what they are purport to be, i.e., VRS records from
the Bosnian Civil War period. Fed. R. Evid. 901 Advisory
Note to Subdivision (b). In addition, the "[a]ppearance, con-
tents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive charac-
teristics" of the records, "taken in conjunction with
circumstances" of their seizure, reinforce the authentication
ruling pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4). Finally, the exhib-
its constitute "[p]ublic records or reports under Fed. R. Evid.
901(b)(7) in that they are "purported public record[s],
report[s], statement[s], or data compilation[s], in any form . . .
from the public office where items of this nature [were] kept."
Vidacak argues that the authenticity of the records was
never established since the Government never accounted for
the history of the documents prior to the date of their seizure.
In support of his case, Vidacak relies primarily upon United
States v. Perlmuter, 693 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1982), in which
UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK 9
certain foreign documents were held to be improperly authen-
ticated. In Perlmuter, the United States sought to authenticate
documents created by Interpol that purported to represent the
defendant’s criminal history in Israel. The testifying U.S.
immigration officer had requested the documents but was not
personally familiar with them. The district court held that
while the records did not comply with Rules 901 or 902(3),
they were admissible based upon their "aura of authenticity."
Id. at 1292. The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence permit authentication under either
Rule 901 or 902, but "offer no third means of authentication;
certainly it is not enough that the documents present an ‘aura
of authentication.’" Id. at 1293.
The facts in Perlmuter are clearly distinguishable from the
facts in Vidacak’s case, where the district court properly
found that the records were admissible under Rule 901.
Unlike the records in Perlmuter, which were produced in
response to an inquiry related to the defendant, the records in
this case were seized directly from the office of a foreign gov-
ernment and, both on their face and through the testimony of
a person familiar with such records, were identifiable as
records of that foreign government. Because the issue of
authenticity is very fact-specific, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in
Perlmuter is of negligible import in our analysis.
Moreover, the burden of authentication is not as demanding
as suggested by Vidacak—a proponent need not establish a
perfect chain of custody or documentary evidence to support
their admissibility. United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528,
1531 (10th Cir. 1989) ("deficiencies in the chain of custody
go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility; once
admitted, the jury evaluates the defects and, based on its eval-
uation, may accept or disregard the evidence."). Indeed, the
prima facie showing may be accomplished largely by offering
circumstantial evidence that the documents in question are
what they purport to be. See, e.g., United States v. Dumeisi,
424 F.3d 566, 575-76 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that documents
10 UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK
of the Iraqi Intelligence Service were properly authenticated
by circumstantial evidence and witness testimony); United
States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 785 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Use of
circumstantial evidence alone to authenticate a document does
not constitute error.").
Sufficient circumstantial evidence exists in this case,
despite the fact that the Government could not trace the pre-
cise history of the documents prior to their seizure. See, e.g.,
United States v. Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d 623, 631-32 (6th Cir.
2004) (holding that foreign documents were sufficiently
authenticated by supporting circumstantial evidence, even if
their origin could not be proven); Elkins, 885 F.2d at 785-86
(holding that circumstantial evidence of where documents
were found (in West Germany, in the briefcase of a Libyan
arms dealer) was sufficient to authenticate documents in the
absence of any evidence of forgery). The documents at issue
were discovered in a place where they would be expected to
be found—the Zvornik Brigade headquarters that was still
functioning at the time of the search. (J.A. 113-117.) They
bore unique indexing numbers that rendered them readily
identifiable as VRS records that dated to the period of the
Bosnian Civil War. (J.A. 94-95, 276-78.) Moreover, Butler
explained that the VRS, like most military entities, had a
vested interest in keeping records on its soldiers for account-
ability purposes and to determine eligibility for benefits. (J.A.
263.) Vidacak, on the other hand, has offered no basis for
inferring that the exhibits were forged or altered that would
arouse this Court’s suspicion as to their authenticity.
B.
Vidacak’s hearsay objection also falls short as the records
clearly fall within the hearsay exception of Fed. R. Evid.
803(8) in that they constitute "[r]ecords, reports, statements,
or data compilations, in any form, of public offices of agen-
cies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency
UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK 11
. . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). Courts regularly admit foreign
records pursuant to this exception. See, e.g., Demjanjuk, 367
F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 2004) (Nazi German Service Identity
Card); United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328, 334-35 (6th
Cir. 1993) (Ghanian judgment); United States v. Grady, 544
F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976) (Northern Ireland constabulary
firearms report).
No foundational testimony is required in order to admit evi-
dence under Rule 803(8). See, e.g., United States v. Doyle,
130 F.3d 523, 546 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Loyola-
Dominguez, 125 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1997). Neverthe-
less, Butler’s testimony not only supported the records’
authenticity, but also reinforced their qualification under the
hearsay exception. As noted, Butler attested to how these doc-
uments were seized from the Zvornik Brigade headquarters,
where documents of this sort were expected to be found. But-
ler also explained how the VRS maintained and organized
such records in accordance with the procedures it adopted
from the JNA. Finally, the records on their face reflect that
they were created by the VRS to memorialize its activities.3
IV.
Officer Susan Tierney testified in detail about her role in
the refugee application process in Belgrade in 2002 and Vida-
cak’s refugee interview. (J.A. 307-14.) Tierney identified: (1)
Vidacak’s I-590, "that [she] went over when [she] was inter-
viewing [him]" (Gov’t Exh. 12); (2) his "sworn statement of
refugee applying for admission into the United States . . . that
[she] had every applicant go over" (Gov’t Exh. 13); and (3)
3
Vidacak argued that because the foreign military documents were inad-
missible, his confession was also inadmissible because "an extrajudicial
confession must be corroborated as to the corpus delicti." (Appellant Br.
17 (quoting United States v. Sapperstein, 312 F.2d 694, 696 (4th Cir.
1963))). However, because we hold that the district court did not err in
admitting the VRS records, Vidacak’s corpus delicti claim is moot.
12 UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK
the "Refugee Application Assessment . . . where [she] put
[her] notes during the interview [with Vidacak]" (Gov’t Exh.
14). (J.A. 315-23.) Tierney pointed out notes that confirmed
that she "questioned Mr. Vidacak about whether he had
served in the military." (J.A. 323.) Interpreter Duchka, who
assisted Tierney in interviewing Vidacak, was identified on
his I-590. (J.A. 320-21.) Tierney testified that Duchka
"seemed extremely honest" and "was one of the best transla-
tors that [she] had come across." (J.A. 335, 467.)
Vidacak contends that Officer Tierney’s testimony about
the 2002 interview was inadmissible double hearsay since she
was not relating the statements of Vidacak but instead the out
of court statements of the IOM interpreter, Duchka, who did
not testify at trial. (Appellant Br. 19.) However, Duchka’s
translations did not create double hearsay because Duchka
was merely a "language conduit" and not a declarant under
the hearsay rule.
Both parties rely upon United States v. Martinez-Gayton,
213 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2000) as the central case dealing with
the hearsay rule and interpreters. In Martinez-Gayton, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that
"except ‘in unusual circumstances, an interpreter is no more
than a language conduit and therefore his translation does not
create an additional level of hearsay.’" Id. at 892 (quoting
United States v. Cordero, 18 F.3d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir.
1994)). From this general rule, some courts have carved out
a narrow exception that is applied "where the particular facts
of a case cast significant doubt upon the accuracy of a trans-
lated confession." Four factors have been identified by courts
to determine whether this exception applies: "1) which party
supplied the interpreter; 2) whether the interpreter had a
motive to mislead or distort; 3) the interpreter’s qualifications
and language skills; and 4) whether actions taken subsequent
to the conversation were consistent with the statements trans-
lated." Martinez-Gayton, 213 F.3d at 892 (citing United States
v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 525-27 (9th Cir. 1991)). The Fifth
UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK 13
Circuit concluded that "where the particular facts of a case
cast significant doubt upon the accuracy of a translated con-
fession, the translator or a witness who heard and understood
the untranslated confession must be available for testimony
and cross-examination" before the statement can be admitted.
Id. at 891.
Applying the factors set forth in Martinez-Gayton to the
record, we hold that application of the narrow exception is not
warranted in this case and the translation did not create an
additional level of hearsay. Duchka was an employee of the
IOM, which is an independent United Nations-funded agency
that assists refugees; there is no indication that she was
selected by the United States government. In addition, there
is no evidence suggesting that Duchka harbored any bias
against Vidacak, or that she had any motive to mislead or dis-
tort. The record reflects that Duchka was highly skilled and
reliable and Officer Tierney testified that Duchka was one of
the best interpreters with whom she had ever worked. Finally,
Vidacak later confessed in his post-arrest interview that he
had served in the VRS and that he had knowingly omitted any
mention of his military background on his immigration appli-
cations. (J.A. 350-53.) Accordingly, we conclude that the
interpreter Duchka was, under the circumstances of this case,
no more than a "language conduit" and that Officer Tierney’s
testimony was not double hearsay.
Finally, we hold that Vidacak’s statements to Officer
Tierney were not hearsay for two independent reasons: (1)
they qualified as party admissions under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2); and (2) they were not offered "to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Indeed, the state-
ments that Officer Tierney testified Vidacak made through the
interpreter were offered for the falsity of the matter assert-
ed—in other words, they were introduced to show that Vida-
cak had lied during his application interview. See Anderson v.
United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219-20 (1974) (concluding that
statements were not hearsay when "the point of the prosecu-
14 UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK
tor’s introducing [the] statements was simply to prove that the
statements were made so as to establish a foundation for later
showing, through other admissible evidence, that they were
false.").
V.
ICE Agent Coulston testified that after he arrested Vidacak,
he obtained a Miranda waiver and conducted an interview
with the assistance of interpreter Ess. (J.A. 345-47.) Agent
Coulston read from a prepared question form and Ess inter-
preted his questions and Vidacak’s answers. (J.A. 347.) Vida-
cak stated that he had served as a soldier in the VRS, and
acknowledged knowing that it was illegal to lie about or to
omit information from United States immigration documents.
(J.A. 350, 353.)
Ess stated that she accurately performed her translation ser-
vices during Vidacak’s post-arrest interview. (J.A. 383-84,
388.) Ess testified as to her professional experience, and
explained that she had worked for the "U.S. Department of
State Language Services" since 1977, and also had served as
an interpreter in the federal courts since 1990. (J.A. 379.)
In his motion in limine and in his arguments at the pretrial
hearing, Vidacak argued that Agent Coulston’s testimony
should be excluded unless interpreter Ess was available for
cross-examination at trial. (Paper No. 12, at 1-2; J.A. 23.)
Because Ess did testify at trial, and there was no showing that
Ess should be treated as anything other than as a "language
conduit," the district court properly admitted Agent Couls-
ton’s testimony.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in
receiving into evidence the military records in question and
the testimony of government witnesses concerning translated
UNITED STATES v. VIDACAK 15
statements made by Vidacak. Accordingly we affirm the ver-
dicts of guilty on all four counts of the indictment.
AFFIRMED