PRESENT: All the Justices
HARLAN ANTHONY PHELPS,
S/K/A HARLAN ANTHONY PHELPS, II
OPINION BY
JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN
v. Record No. 070399 January 11, 2008
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal of a judgment from the Court of Appeals, we
consider whether a defendant is “a person” as that term is used
in Code § 46.2-817(B), a penal statute.
The statute states in relevant part:
B. Any person who, having received a visible or
audible signal from any law-enforcement officer
to bring his motor vehicle to a stop, drives such
motor vehicle in a willful and wanton disregard
of such signal so as to interfere with or
endanger the operation of the law-enforcement
vehicle or endanger a person is guilty of a Class
6 felony.
Harlan Anthony Phelps was tried upon an indictment charging
him with a felony of eluding and endangerment in violation of
Virginia Code § 46.2-817(B). At trial, Phelps moved to strike
the Commonwealth's evidence, claiming that his actions did not
interfere with or endanger a law enforcement vehicle or endanger
a person, as required by Code § 46.2-817(B). Phelps was found
guilty in a bench trial and sentenced to five years
imprisonment, with two years suspended. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction in a published opinion. Phelps v.
Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 265, 639 S.E.2d 689 (2007). Phelps
appeals.
In the early morning hours of February 9, 2005, Officer J.
Shadrix, of the James City County Police Department, was
traveling in a patrol car behind Phelps' vehicle when Phelps
committed a traffic infraction. Officer Shadrix activated his
vehicle's emergency lights, but Phelps continued to travel at
the posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour for about 100 yards.
After Phelps failed to heed the visible emergency lights, the
officer activated his vehicle's siren. Upon activation of the
siren, Phelps' vehicle accelerated rapidly; Officer Shadrix
followed. The officer was unsure of how fast the vehicles were
traveling, but upon reaching a curve in the road, Phelps lost
control of his vehicle, crossed the oncoming lane, and went into
and traveled along a ditch on the left hand side of the road
before striking a driveway culvert. His vehicle then
overturned, landing upside down beside a telephone pole. Phelps
crawled out of the vehicle and was apprehended a short time
later.
The officer, traveling behind Phelps, was not endangered
nor was the operation of his law enforcement vehicle interfered
with or endangered. Although the incident occurred in a
residential area, there were no other vehicles or pedestrians on
or near the roadway when the accident occurred. Phelps argued
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in the Court of Appeals, and argues in this Court, that the
charge against him must be dismissed because his actions did not
interfere with or endanger a law enforcement vehicle or any
person. He argues that the term “a person” used in Code § 46.2-
817(B) does not include the defendant himself.
The construction of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo on appeal. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 45,
51, 645 S.E.2d 470, 473 (2007); Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273
Va. 177, 180, 639 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2007); Dowling v. Rowan, 270
Va. 510, 519, 621 S.E.2d 397, 401 (2005). When construing
criminal statutes, “a court must not add to the words of the
statute, nor ignore its actual words, and must strictly construe
the statute and limit its application to cases falling clearly
within its scope.” Robinson, 274 Va. at 51, 645 S.E.2d at 473.
The primary objective of statutory construction is to
determine legislative intent. Melanson v. Commonwealth, 261 Va.
178, 183, 539 S.E.2d 433, 435 (2001); Harward v. Commonwealth,
229 Va. 363, 365, 330 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1985). In determining that
intent, words are to be given their ordinary meaning, unless it
is apparent that the legislative intent is otherwise. Lovisi v.
Commonwealth, 212 Va. 848, 850, 188 S.E.2d 206, 208 (1972);
Spindel v. Jamison, 199 Va. 954, 957, 103 S.E.2d 205, 208
(1958); see Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d
637, 639 (2007).
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The ordinary meaning of the word “person” is “an individual
human being . . . a human being as distinguished from an animal
or thing.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1686
(1993). “A” is an indefinite article “[u]sed as a function word
before most singular nouns . . . when the individual in question
is undetermined, unidentified, or unspecified.” Id. at 1. The
ordinary meaning of the word “a” means “any” or “each.” Id.
Because the term “a person” means any individual human
being, the term encompasses the entire universe of people,
including the defendant. There is no authority for excluding
the defendant from that universe. If the legislature had
intended to exclude the defendant from the class of persons
whose endangerment is prohibited by Code § 46.2-817(B), the
legislature would have said so.*
*
When the General Assembly intends that the conduct or harm
be directed at or applied to another, it clearly knows how to
express that intent. See e.g., Code § 46.2-357(B)(2) (driving
must endanger “the life, limb, or property of another”); Code
§ 46.2-865.1(A) (defendant is liable under the statute when he:
“1. Causes serious bodily injury to another person who is not
involved [in reckless driving during a vehicular race]; or 2.
Causes the death of another person”); Code § 46.2-868.1(A)(ii)
(defendant is guilty of aggressive driving if he is “a hazard to
another person or commits an offense in clause (i) with the
intent to harass, intimidate, injure or obstruct another
person”). The legislature’s use of “a person” rather than
“another” is, therefore, highly probative of its intent to
include the defendant within the protected class of § 46.2-
817(B).
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Phelps, after receiving visible and audible signals from a
police officer, disregarded those emergency signals. Instead of
stopping, he increased his vehicle's speed while the police
officer continued to pursue him. Phelps’ speed and driving,
losing control of his vehicle, crossing over the oncoming lane
of traffic, striking a ditch on the left-hand side of the road
and overturning his vehicle, endangered Phelps' person.
Therefore, we hold that Phelps is "a person" within the meaning
of Code § 46.2-817(B) and his endangerment of himself was
sufficient evidence to support his conviction under that
statute.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
Affirmed.
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