IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
June 2, 2004 Session
CHRISTOPHER A. EADIE v. COMPLETE CO., INC., ET AL.
An Appeal from the Supreme Court Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel
Circuit Court for Williamson County
No. I-98373 R. E. Lee Davies, Judge
No. M2002-02010-SC-WCM-CV - Filed August 27, 2004
We granted review in this case to consider whether an employee is barred from seeking workers’
compensation benefits in Tennessee because the employee made a binding election of remedies by
pursuing benefits for the same injury in another state. We hold that the employee’s filing of a claim
in South Carolina, his request for a hearing there, and the taking of depositions in that matter
constitute affirmative acts to obtain benefits in another state sufficient to constitute a binding election
of remedies that bars the employee’s Tennessee claim. Therefore, we reject the conclusion of the
Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel on this issue and affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e) Appeal as of Right; Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel Rejected;
Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed
JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON , ADOLPHO
A. BIRCH , JR., and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., and JERRY L. SMITH , SP .J., joined. FRANK F.
DROWOTA , III, C.J., not participating.
James R. Tomkins, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants-defendants, Complete Company, Inc.
and Westfield Insurance Companies.
Phillip R. Newman, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellee-plaintiff, Christopher A. Eadie.
OPINION
Factual and Procedural Background
In June of 1997, Christopher A. Eadie (“the employee”), a South Carolina resident, sustained
serious and permanent injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Georgia. At
the time of the accident, the employee was working for Complete Company, Inc. (“Complete”), a
Tennessee corporation. Complete had an agreement with The Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (“Home
Depot”) to make concrete repairs to its stores in multiple states. When the accident occurred, the
employee was hauling a load of cement through Georgia to be used in a concrete repair job at a
Home Depot store in North Carolina.
In the fall of 1997, the employee filed an original and an amended claim in South Carolina
seeking “any and all rights he is entitled to under the workers’ compensation laws of South
Carolina.” He specifically requested a hearing in that proceeding. Depositions were taken in the
South Carolina matter in February of 1998, with employee’s counsel deposing the owner of
Complete. In June of 1998, the employee filed a claim with the Georgia State Board of Workers’
Compensation. Shortly thereafter, the employee filed suit in Tennessee seeking workers’
compensation benefits from both Home Depot and Complete. After the Tennessee claim was filed,
the employee filed an additional claim in the North Carolina Industrial Commission seeking medical
and disability benefits under that state’s laws. There has been no activity in the Georgia and North
Carolina cases beyond the filing of claims. The employee has not received benefits as a result of his
claims in any of the four states.
Complete and its workers’ compensation insurance carrier, Westfield Insurance Companies
(“Westfield”), filed a motion for summary judgment in this case, contending: 1) the employee was
an independent contractor; and 2) the employee was precluded from pursuing benefits in Tennessee
because he made a binding election of remedies by seeking benefits in other states. Home Depot
also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the employee was an independent contractor
of Home Depot.
The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismissed the
case. The trial court determined that the employee was an independent contractor of Home Depot
and that Home Depot was not liable for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court did not rule
on Complete and Westfield’s assertion that the employee was also an independent contractor of
Complete.1 Instead, the trial court found that the employee made a binding election of remedies and
therefore was barred from recovering benefits from Complete or Westfield in Tennessee. The
employee appealed.
The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the trial court’s finding that the
employee was an independent contractor of Home Depot. The employee does not contest this
determination. The Panel reversed the trial court’s finding that the employee made a binding
election of remedies by pursuing benefits in other states and remanded the case to the trial court.
Complete and Westfield filed a motion for review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section
50-6-225(e)(5)(B). We granted full Court review.
1
This case has been pending since 1998. Given the importance of expediting workers’ compensation cases, see
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(f) (Supp. 2003), we encourage trial courts to address each ground alleged in a motion for
summary judgment. If the trial court addresses each ground that is raised, an injured worker’s case will not be
unnecessarily delayed due to a remand for findings on alternate grounds.
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ANALYSIS
A trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment presents a question of law. Goodloe
v. State, 36 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tenn. 2001). An appeal from a grant of summary judgment is governed
by Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 56”). Id. Under Rule 56, an appellate
court must review the record without a presumption of correctness to determine whether the absence
of genuine and material factual issues entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. See
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Goodloe, 36 S.W.3d at 65.
The material facts in this case are not in dispute. There is no question that the employee filed
claims for benefits in three states in addition to the claim filed in Tennessee. In the South Carolina
matter, the employee requested a hearing and participated in depositions, including the deposition
of Complete’s owner. There has been no activity in furtherance of the claims in Georgia or North
Carolina. None of these claims has been denied, and the employee has received no workers’
compensation benefits.
The employee contends that his actions with regard to his claims for workers’ compensation
benefits in other states are not sufficient to constitute a binding election. We disagree.
An employee who suffers a compensable injury in another state may be barred from
recovering benefits under Tennessee law through the election of remedies doctrine. This doctrine
is designed to prevent forum shopping, vexatious litigation, and double recovery for the same injury.
Bradshaw v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 922 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Gray v. Holloway
Constr. Co., 834 S.W.2d 277, 282 (Tenn. 1992)). For the doctrine to apply, it is not necessary that
the employee actually receive benefits in another state. See id. at 507. Rather, the employee is
precluded from receiving benefits in Tennessee if the worker “(a) affirmatively acted to obtain
benefits in another state; or (b) knowingly and voluntarily accepted benefits under the law of another
state.” Id. “[T]he circumstances of each case must be considered in determining whether the
employee has made a binding election.” Perkins v. BE & K, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tenn.
1990).
In this case, it is clear that the employee “affirmatively acted to obtain benefits in another
state.” Bradshaw, 922 S.W.2d at 507. In particular, he actively initiated proceedings seeking to
obtain benefits by filing a claim in the State of South Carolina, requesting a hearing, and
participating in depositions in that matter. We construe these actions of the employee as affirmative
conduct constituting a binding election of remedies.
The election of remedies doctrine is not intended either as a trap or a penalty for a mere
mistake. Id. This is not a case of an employee mistakenly proceeding or signing documents without
adequate notice or knowledge. See, e.g., Gray, 834 S.W.2d at 282; Hale v. Fraley’s Inc., 825 S.W.2d
690, 692 (Tenn. 1990). The employee was represented by counsel at all times; each filing was a
conscious decision to pursue benefits, and in one of the claims affirmative action was taken to obtain
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these benefits. Thus, the present case is unlike cases in which we have held that there was no
binding election of remedies.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the filing of a claim in South Carolina, the request for a hearing there, and the
taking of depositions in that matter constitute affirmative acts to obtain benefits in another state
sufficient to constitute a binding election of remedies that bars the employee’s Tennessee claim.
Therefore, we reject the conclusion of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel on this
issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Costs are taxed to the appellant, Christopher A.
Eadie, and his surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
___________________________________
JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE
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