City of Chesapeake v. STATES SELF-INSURERS

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and
Lemons, JJ., and Compton,∗ S.J.

CITY OF CHESAPEAKE

v.   Record No. 051986        OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
                                        April 21, 2006
STATES SELF-INSURERS
RISK RETENTION GROUP, INC.

               UPON A QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED BY
              THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
                 THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

      Pursuant to Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of

Virginia and our Rule 5:42, the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia (“district court”), by

its order entered September 22, 2005, certified to this Court

a single question of law relating to coverage questions under

an insurance policy:

      Was coverage excluded under the pollution
      exclusion in the Policy for claims made in suits
      filed by 213 women who alleged that they suffered
      one or more miscarriages resulting from exposure
      to THMs in the City's water supply?

By order entered on November 1, 2005, we accepted the

certified question.

                         I.   Background

      This certified question is the epilogue to City of

Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 268 Va. 624, 604 S.E.2d 420 (2004).

Helen Cunningham ("Cunningham") was the lead plaintiff of a


      ∗
       Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and
decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006.
combined group of 214 plaintiffs who alleged that their

miscarriages were caused by exposure to trihalomethanes

("THMs") in the City of Chesapeake's water system on various

dates from 1984 through 2000.   These cases were combined for

pretrial proceedings under the Virginia Multiple Claimants

Litigation Act, Code §§ 8.01-267.1 through -267.9.    Cunningham

sought recovery for, among other things, an alleged bodily

injury due to the consumption of toxic drinking water provided

by the City of Chesapeake ("the City").   Cunningham, 268 Va.

at 627, 604 S.E.2d at 422.   We held that the alleged claims

against the City were barred by sovereign immunity.   Id. at

640, 604 S.E.2d at 430.   The certified question now before the

Court addresses whether the City may obtain insurance coverage

and reimbursement for its legal fees incurred as a result of

the litigation in Cunningham.   These fees and costs totaled

$2,413,959.08.

     The case is currently pending in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Norfolk

Division), awaiting resolution of the motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) filed by States Self-Insurers Risk Retention Group,

Inc. ("States Insurance").   If the certified question is

answered in the affirmative, there is no coverage and the City

is not entitled to reimbursement of its legal fees and costs.


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If the certified question is answered in the negative, then

the federal district court must determine various issues,

including the amount to which the City may be entitled from

States Insurance.

                         II.   Analysis

     The City contracted with States Insurance for a "Public

Entity Excess Liability Insurance Policy."   The dispute, and

the certified question, involve the exclusion provision in

Section I.B.9.a of that Policy, which states in relevant part

that coverage does not apply to any damages for:

     Bodily injury or property damage arising out of
     the actual, alleged or threatened discharge,
     dispersal, seepage, migration, release or
     escape of pollutants:

          (1) at or from any premises, site or
          location which is or was at any time owned
          or occupied by, or rented or loaned to,
          any "Insured";

          (2) at or from any premises, site or
          location which is or was at any time used
          by or for any "Insured" or others for the
          handling, storage, disposal, processing or
          treatment of waste;

          (3) which are or were at any time
          transported, handled, stored, treated,
          disposed of, or processed as waste by or
          for any "Insured" or any person or
          organization for whom any "Insured" may be
          legally responsible; or

          (4) at or from any premises, site or
          location on which any "Insured" or any
          contractors or subcontractors working



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            directly or indirectly on any "Insured's"
            behalf are performing operations:

                 (a) if the pollutants are brought on
                 or to the premises, site or location
                 in connection with such operations by
                 such "Insured", contractor or
                 subcontractor; or

                 (b) if the operations are to test
                 for, monitor, clean up, remove,
                 contain, treat, detoxify or
                 neutralize, or in any way respond to,
                 or assess the effects of pollutants.

The policy defines "bodily injury" as "bodily injury, sickness

or disease sustained by a person, including death by any of

these at any time."   The policy defines "pollutants" as "any

solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant,

including but not limited to smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids,

alkalis, chemicals and waste.   Waste includes materials to be

recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed."

       The interpretation of a contract presents a question of

law.   Bentley Funding Group, L.L.C. v. SK&R Group, L.L.C., 269

Va. 315, 324, 609 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2005).    The contract is

construed as written, without adding terms that were not

included by the parties.   Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184,

187, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984).     When the terms in a contract

are clear and unambiguous, the contract is construed according

to its plain meaning.   Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Prince

William Square Assocs., 250 Va. 402, 407, 463 S.E.2d 661, 664



                                 4
(1995).   "Words that the parties used are normally given their

usual, ordinary, and popular meaning.   No word or clause in

the contract will be treated as meaningless if a reasonable

meaning can be given to it, and there is a presumption that

the parties have not used words needlessly."   D.C. McClain,

Inc. v. Arlington County, 249 Va. 131, 135-36, 452 S.E.2d 659,

662 (1995).

     By definition, the THMs involved in Cunningham are

"contaminants."   See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (2000); 40 C.F.R.

§§ 141.2 and 142.2 (2005); see also Cunningham, 268 Va. at

628-29, 604 S.E.2d at 423 (explaining that THMs have been

regulated as contaminants under the Federal Safe Drinking

Water Act and its implementing regulations since 1979).

Therefore, according to the plain language of the insurance

policy in the instant case, because they are "contaminants,"

THMs are "pollutants."

     The parties have engaged each other and this Court in

analysis of the meaning of the various words used in their

contract: "discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release

or escape."   For example, the City argues that THMs are

"created" by the chemical combination of chlorine and organic

matter contained in the water.   Because THMs are "created,"

they are not pre-existent and, consequently, cannot be subject

to "discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or


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escape."   However, the City did concede at oral argument that

the THMs, however created, were "released" by the City when a

customer turned on the faucet in a residence or business.

     While the City's concession alone would resolve this

controversy, we need look no further than the underlying

motion for judgment in Cunningham to reach the same

conclusion.   In her motion for judgment, Cunningham alleged

bodily injury due to exposure to THMs because "THMs are a

poisonous byproduct of disinfection that are disposed of and

released into the domestic water at or about the City's water

treatment facility or facilities as a result of the process of

water treatment and disinfection employed by the City."

Cunningham also alleged a "discharge" of THMs by the City.

These allegations bring the underlying suit, and its

associated legal fees and costs at issue in this certified

question, into the ambit of the exclusion provision now before

the Court because the legal fees and costs were from a suit

involving "[b]odily injury . . . arising out of the actual,

alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage,

migration, release or escape of pollutants."   (Emphasis

added.)

                        III.   Conclusion

     In their respective arguments, the parties asked the

Court to examine how other jurisdictions have resolved similar


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insurance contract disputes.   It is unnecessary to do so,

however, because the law of this Commonwealth and the plain

language of the insurance policy provide the answer to the

certified question.   We hold that coverage was excluded under

Section I.B.9.a of the Policy for claims made in suits filed

by 214 women who alleged that they suffered one or more

miscarriages resulting from exposure to THMs in the City of

Chesapeake's water supply.   Accordingly, we answer the

certified question in the affirmative.

                Certified question answered in the affirmative.




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