Present: All the Justices
SALVATORE CANGIANO
v. Record Nos. 050699 and
051031
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
JANUARY 13, 2006
LSH BUILDING COMPANY, L.L.C.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Michael C. Allen, Judge
In these appeals, we consider whether the trial court
erred in granting specific performance of a real estate
purchase agreement and awarding attorney's fees. For the
reasons discussed below, we will affirm the judgment of the
trial court in both appeals.
I. Facts and Proceedings Below
On August 20, 2003, LSH Building Company, L.L.C. ("LSH")
and Salvatore Cangiano ("Cangiano") signed a "Purchase
Agreement" wherein Cangiano agreed to sell an approximately
1,898-acre tract of land known as Lower Magnolia Green in
Chesterfield County to LSH for 39 million dollars. LSH
planned to develop Lower Magnolia Green by constructing 2,370
single-family units, 1,180 multi-family units, a golf course,
and a 212-acre commercial center.
As part of the "Warranties of Seller" in the Purchase
Agreement, Cangiano warranted and represented "to the best of
his knowledge and belief" in Paragraph 15(h) that he will have
1
purchased/settled on all additional land and easements
required for all offsite utilities, road widenings, turn lanes
and any other offsite improvements required of this project.
All land and easements to be transferred to [LSH] at
'settlement.'
In the event of default by Cangiano, Cangiano agreed in
Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement that
[LSH] shall be entitled to all remedies
available to [LSH] at law or in equity,
including specific performance, all of such
remedies shall be cumulative and not exclusive
of each other. Further[,] in the event of
default hereunder, the defaulting party shall
be liable for all costs incurred by the non-
defaulting party in enforcing this Agreement
through court action or otherwise, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
After entering into the Purchase Agreement, a dispute
arose between Cangiano and LSH concerning the number of
easements Cangiano was required to acquire and convey to LSH
pursuant to Cangiano's "Warranties of Seller." Cangiano
contended that he agreed only to acquire and convey easements
necessary for the development of an initial phase consisting
of 200 lots. Cangiano then informed LSH that he was declaring
their agreement null and void because LSH failed to provide,
pursuant to Paragraph 16 of the Purchase Agreement, "proof of
ability to perform financing."
2
LSH filed a bill of complaint seeking declaratory
judgment, specific performance, damages resulting from breach
of contract, and attorney's fees and costs pursuant to
Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement. Prior to trial, LSH
withdrew its claim for breach of contract and the case
proceeded on LSH's claims for declaratory judgment, specific
performance, and attorney's fees and costs. The parties
agreed, and obtained the approval of the trial court, to
bifurcate the issues and try LSH's claims for declaratory
judgment and specific performance, and then try LSH's claims
for attorney's fees and costs post-trial, if necessary. See
Lee v. Mulford, 269 Va. 562, 567-68, 611 S.E.2d 349, 352
(2005).
During its opening statement to the trial court, LSH
framed the issues before the trial court as follows:
We believe the evidence will show that LSH is
entitled to a declaratory judgment, that the
contract is in full force and effect, and that
Mr. Cangiano is obligated to perform his
obligations under the contract, including his
obligation to not only convey the property, but
to convey additional property and easements, if
necessary, for the development of the property.
LSH is also entitled, we submit, to a decree of
specific performance requiring Mr. Cangiano to
specifically perform his obligations.
During Cangiano's opening statement to the trial court, he
maintained that LSH failed to provide proof of financing, and
raised for the first time his contention that the Purchase
3
Agreement was unenforceable because there was neither a
meeting of the minds nor an offer and acceptance:
And I believe not only is the contract void, it
never really was in fruition, but there was
never a meeting of the minds; there was never a
true offer and acceptance because of the
difference of the attachments with this
contract; and that the contract should fail,
and that the [parties] should go their own
ways.
LSH objected to this change in position and argued that
Cangiano had conceded that the Purchase Agreement was valid in
Cangiano's answer and interrogatory responses.
After the presentation of evidence, LSH restated its
request for declaratory judgment and specific performance.
Cangiano responded:
So for all of those reasons, I don't believe
this contract can stand. I believe that we are
in equity here. They are asking for specific
performance. I honestly don't know, if the
Court feels this contract should be
specifically performed, how many years it is
going to take to get these easements and if
they are going to be happy with the easements
because . . . it's a changing situation.
Continuing, Cangiano concluded, "So for those reasons, I would
ask that this contract be held to be unenforceable . . . . And
I would ask that the plaintiff not be granted their relief
. . . ."
In announcing its ruling, the trial court held that
Cangiano was bound by his statements in his answer and
4
interrogatory responses that the Purchase Agreement was a
valid contract. The trial court then held that the Purchase
Agreement was unambiguous and granted declaratory judgment in
favor of LSH and decreed specific performance. The trial
court stated: "The Court's decision grants complete relief to
the plaintiff as requested in the bill of complaint . . . ."
The trial court instructed the attorneys for LSH to
prepare the final decree and circulate it to the attorney for
Cangiano. Subsequently, Cangiano obtained new counsel. Prior
to the post-trial hearing on attorney's fees, a dispute arose
concerning the wording of the final decree. Cangiano objected
to the language employed by LSH in the draft version of the
final decree, contending for the first time in the course of
the litigation that LSH sought to have the trial court order
Cangiano to perform "the impossible." Cangiano asked the
trial court, referring to the language used in Paragraph 15(h)
of the Purchase Agreement, to require him only to use his
"best efforts" to obtain the additional easements. While LSH
agreed to the insertion of Cangiano's "best efforts" language
in the final decree, LSH objected to Cangiano's attempt to
raise, for the first time and after the conclusion of the
trial, the defense of impossibility. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.
5
Upon further consideration of the briefs submitted by the
parties, the trial court entered its final decree granting
LSH's request for declaratory judgment and specific
performance. The trial court held that LSH did not breach the
Purchase Agreement, that Cangiano did not properly terminate
the Purchase Agreement according to its terms, and that LSH
"did provide sufficient proof of ability to perform
financing." The final decree also ordered Cangiano
to use his best efforts to specifically perform
his obligations under the Purchase Agreement,
including but not limited to his obligation
under [Paragraph] 15(h) of the Purchase
Agreement to use his best efforts to acquire
and convey at closing all additional land and
easements required for all offsite utilities,
road widenings, turn lanes, and any other
offsite improvements required to develop the
entire property being conveyed under the
Purchase Agreement, time being of the essence.
On February 4, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on
LSH's request for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to
Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement. Cangiano acknowledged
that LSH "won" at trial, but argued that LSH's fees were
unreasonable and that they should be no more than $120,000.00,
double the attorney's fees Cangiano incurred. The trial court
disagreed. In announcing its ruling, the trial court stated:
[I have] considered the fee application with
reference to the language in the default
provisions in the contract and based on any
considerations that I believe I am obligated to
take into account in making this determination.
6
Those, I think, have been identified by the
parties and include time and effort to have
been expended, the nature of the services, the
nature of the case, the complexity of the case,
the value of the services to the client, the
results, the skill and experience brought there
by the attorneys involved, and the question of
whether the rates charged were consistent with
the rendering of similar services in the
context of this area or this market.
In considering all of those circumstances,
taking into account the arguments that have
been adduced this morning, the [trial court]
concludes that [LSH's] attorneys' fees are
reasonable and cannot be categorized as
unreasonable and will grant [LSH's] motion.
Pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement, the trial
court awarded LSH $258,256.26 in attorney's fees and costs:
$235,679.26 for those incurred in litigating the underlying
dispute and $22,577.00 for its post-trial "Motion for Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs."
Cangiano filed two appeals, which we granted. Cangiano
maintains the trial court "erred in granting specific
performance requiring the seller to convey what he did not
own” and “erred in granting specific performance of a contract
provision which was not an affirmative duty but rather a
representation of current conditions, made ‘to the best of
[the seller’s] knowledge and belief.’ ” Cangiano further
argues that the trial court erred:
(1) “in granting attorney’s fees to LSH under a
contractual provision that required a ‘default
7
hereunder,’ where no party was in default or determined
by the trial court to be in default”;
(2) “in granting attorney’s fees to LSH pending
Cangiano’s timely appeal from the declaratory judgment”;
(3) “in awarding fees at the unreasonable level of
400% of the fees incurred by the opposing side for the
same litigation, where the contractual provision was only
for ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fees”;
(4) “in awarding LSH’s attorney’s fees for post-
trial briefing and hearings, at which post-trial
proceedings LSH did not prevail”; and
(5) “in awarding LSH’s attorney’s fees for post-
trial briefing and hearings, where the parties’ contract
provided for attorney’s fees only with respect to the
enforcement of the duties in the Purchase Agreement and
does not allow for such compound recovery of attorney’s
fees.”
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
"[T]he decision whether to award specific performance of
a contract rests in the sound discretion of a trial court; it
is not a matter of right." Shepherd v. Davis, 265 Va. 108,
124, 574 S.E.2d 514, 523 (2003); see also Walker v. Henderson,
151 Va. 913, 927-28, 145 S.E. 311, 315 (1928). Specific
8
performance "may be granted or refused under established
equitable principles and the facts of a particular case. The
chancellor's discretion must be exercised with a view to the
substantial justice of the case." Chesapeake Builders v. Lee,
254 Va. 294, 300, 492 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1997) (citations
omitted).
Likewise, the amount of recoverable attorney's fees rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Coady v.
Strategic Resources, Inc., 258 Va. 12, 18, 515 S.E.2d 273, 276
(1999) (citing Ingram v. Ingram, 217 Va. 27, 29, 225 S.E.2d
362, 364 (1976)). As a general rule, " 'absent a specific
contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, attorney's
fees are not recoverable by a prevailing litigant from the
losing litigant.' " Mulford, 269 Va. at 565, 611 S.E.2d at
350 (quoting Mullins v. Richlands Nat'l Bank, 241 Va. 447,
449, 403 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1991)). While expert testimony may
be necessary to assist the fact finder in determining an award
of attorney's fees, such testimony is not required in every
case. Mulford, 269 Va. at 565, 611 S.E.2d at 350-51
(citations omitted).
The trial court's interpretation of written documents
like the Purchase Agreement involved in this case is reviewed
de novo. VEPCO v. Northern Va. Regional Park Auth., 270 Va.
9
309, 315-16, 618 S.E.2d 323, 326 (2005); Perel v. Brannan, 267
Va. 691,698, 594 S.E.2d 899, 903 (2004).
B. Specific Performance
In the course of this litigation, Cangiano has taken at
least four different positions regarding the interpretation of
the Purchase Agreement and its potential enforcement. First,
during the pre-trial phase, Cangiano admitted in his answer
that he entered into the Purchase Agreement, which the trial
court characterized as a valid contract, but argued that the
Purchase Agreement was terminated because LSH never furnished
"proper proof of ability to perform financing."
Second, during the trial phase, in addition to his
termination argument, Cangiano argued that the Purchase
Agreement was ambiguous, inconsistent, and unenforceable.
Cangiano ultimately asked the trial court to rule in his favor
because he alleged there was no meeting of the minds and thus
no contract.
Third, during the post-trial hearing to resolve the
dispute as to the wording of the final decree, Cangiano argued
for the first time that a party cannot be ordered to
specifically perform an act that is "impossible." It was
during this hearing that Cangiano asked for the "best efforts"
language to be included in the final decree. LSH had no
10
objection to this language and it was incorporated by the
trial court in the final decree.
Fourth and finally, Cangiano advances the arguments on
appeal contained in his assignments of error now before the
Court: (1) the trial court "erred in granting specific
performance requiring the seller to convey what he did not
own”; and (2) the trial court “erred in granting specific
performance of a contract provision which was not an
affirmative duty but rather a representation of current
conditions, made ‘to the best of [the seller’s] knowledge and
belief.’ ”
Simply stated, Cangiano's first assignment of error
concerning the interpretation of the Purchase Agreement and
its enforcement does not accurately state what the trial court
ordered. The trial court ordered Cangiano to use his "best
efforts" to acquire and convey the easements at issue.
Cangiano is correct when he states that equity will not compel
that which is impossible to perform. Here the trial court
only required Cangiano's "best efforts" to perform.
Cangiano's first assignment of error regarding specific
performance is therefore without merit.
In his second assignment of error, Cangiano argues that
the Purchase Agreement merely contained a "representation of
current conditions" and that the trial court erred in
11
concluding that he was contractually obligated by the terms of
the Purchase Agreement to obtain the additional easements. As
already stated, on appeal we review a trial court's
interpretation of a contract de novo. VEPCO, 270 Va. at 315-
16, 618 S.E.2d at 326.
In its final decree granting declaratory judgment, the
trial court stated:
Under [Paragraph] 15(h) of the Purchase
Agreement, [Cangiano] is obligated to use his
best efforts [to] acquire and convey to [LSH]
at closing all additional land and easements
required for all offsite utilities, road
widenings, turn lanes[,] and any other offsite
improvements required to develop the entire
tract of land being conveyed pursuant to the
Purchase Agreement, time being of the essence.
In ordering Cangiano to specifically perform his contractual
obligations, the trial court held that Cangiano must
use his best efforts to specifically perform
his obligations under the Purchase Agreement,
including but not limited to his obligation
under [Paragraph] 15(h) of the Purchase
Agreement to use his best efforts to acquire
and convey at closing all additional land and
easements required for all offsite utilities,
road widenings, turn lanes, and any other
offsite improvements required to develop the
entire property being conveyed under the
Purchase Agreement, time being of the essence.
For two reasons, we agree with the judgment of the trial
court.
First, Cangiano conceded below that Paragraph 15(h) of
the Purchase Agreement affirmatively required him to obtain
12
additional easements – but maintained that he was required to
obtain only those easements necessary to develop an initial
phase consisting of 200 lots. In this concession, Cangiano
implicitly agreed that the language is that of contractual
obligation. He merely contested the scope of the obligation.
Additionally, Cangiano's own expert testified on direct
examination that, while it would cost him as much as $850,000
and require 12 to 18 months, Cangiano could obtain the
additional easements. A party may not approbate and reprobate
by taking successive positions in the course of litigation
that are either inconsistent with each other or mutually
contradictory. Nor may a party invite error and then attempt
to take advantage of the situation created by his own wrong.
Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 144, 590 S.E.2d 537, 560
(2004); Cohn v. Knowledge Connections, Inc., 266 Va. 362, 367,
585 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2003); Smith v. Settle, 254 Va. 348, 354,
492 S.E.2d 427, 431 (1997); Leech v. Beasley, 203 Va. 955,
961-62, 128 S.E.2d 293, 297-98 (1962).
Second, a de novo review of the Purchase Agreement
indicates that it unambiguously imposes upon Cangiano the
affirmative obligation of using his best efforts to obtain the
contested easements. In Paragraph 15(h), as part of his
"Warranties of Seller," Cangiano agreed that he
13
will have purchased/settled on all additional
land and easements required for all offsite
utilities, road widenings, turn lanes and any
other offsite improvements required of this
project. All land and easements to be
transferred to [LSH] at "settlement."
Furthermore, at the conclusion of Paragraph 15, Cangiano
agreed that
[i]n the event any of the representations,
warranties, additional undertakings of Seller
in this paragraph 15 and/or other
responsibilities of the Seller, as set forth in
this Agreement, are not accurate and cannot be
or are not ratified or fulfilled prior to
Settlement, then the Purchaser shall have the
right at its sole option, to take any or none
of the following actions: (i) waive the
inaccurate, unratified or unfulfilled
representation, warranty, additional
undertakings and/or responsibility of Seller,
and proceed with Settlement hereunder,
provided, however, that such waiver shall be in
writing, or (ii) terminate this Agreement,
whereupon all rights and responsibilities
hereunder shall be null and void, and neither
party shall have any further obligation
hereunder, other than the obligation of Escrow
Agent to return the Deposit, or (iii) have such
other remedy as may be available to Purchaser
at law or in equity.
Thus, it is clear from the plain and unambiguous language of
the Purchase Agreement that Cangiano agreed it was his duty to
"have purchased/settled on all additional land and easements"
required for the project. This is reinforced by the
conclusion of Paragraph 15, which reflects that Cangiano
clearly understood that the Purchase Agreement obligated him
to perform "additional undertakings of Seller in this
14
paragraph 15." In the event Cangiano failed to perform, LSH
possessed the "right at its sole option" to take any or none
of three options, one of which being "such other remedy as may
be available to Purchaser at law or in equity." Obviously,
LSH's request for specific performance falls within this
clause.
For these reasons, Cangiano's second assignment of error
regarding specific performance is without merit. As reflected
in its decree, the trial court correctly concluded that the
Purchase Agreement unambiguously imposes upon Cangiano the
affirmative obligation of using his best efforts "to acquire
and convey at closing all additional land and easements
required for all offsite utilities, road widenings, turn
lanes, and any other offsite improvements required to develop
the entire property being conveyed under the Purchase
Agreement, time being of the essence."
C. Attorney's Fees
Cangiano failed to argue below his first, second, and
fifth assignments of error regarding the trial court's award
of attorney's fees to LSH. Because these arguments were not
preserved below, Cangiano is barred by Rule 5:25 from raising
them for the first time on appeal.
In his third assignment of error, Cangiano argues that
LSH's fees incurred up to and including the trial were
15
unreasonable because they were 400% greater than those he
incurred. We do not agree.
In determining whether attorney's fees are reasonable,
a fact finder may consider, inter alia, the
time and effort expended by the attorney, the
nature of the services rendered, the complexity
of the services, the value of the services to
the client, the results obtained, whether the
fees incurred were consistent with those
generally charged for similar services, and
whether the services were necessary and
appropriate.
Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 623, 499 S.E.2d
829, 833 (1998). In reaching its conclusion, the trial court
specifically considered these factors in awarding attorney's
fees to LSH pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the Purchase
Agreement. In assessing the reasonableness of attorney's
fees, the issue is not how the fees incurred by one party
compare directly with those incurred by an opponent. Instead,
the issue is "whether the fees incurred were consistent with
those generally charged for similar services" and "whether the
services were necessary and appropriate." Chawla, 255 Va. at
623, 499 S.E.2d at 833. The trial court held that the fees
requested by LSH were consistent with those generally charged
for similar services, and necessary and appropriate.
In his fourth assignment of error, Cangiano argues that
LSH should not receive attorney's fees for the post-trial
hearing regarding the wording of the final decree granting
16
declaratory judgment and specific performance because LSH did
not "prevail" at the hearing. At the conclusion of the trial
on LSH's bill of complaint for declaratory judgment and
specific performance, the trial court held in favor of LSH and
stated that its "decision grants complete relief to [LSH] as
requested in the bill of complaint." Paragraph 18 of the
Purchase Agreement, which addresses the award of attorney's
fees in this case, states in relevant part that "in the event
of default hereunder, the defaulting party shall be liable for
all costs incurred by the non-defaulting party in enforcing
this Agreement through court action or otherwise, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."
Clearly, LSH prevailed in its efforts to enforce the
Purchase Agreement and at the post-trial hearing concerning
the wording of the final order. The issue is the "costs
incurred" by LSH in enforcing the Purchase Agreement.
Cangiano takes the post-trial dispute regarding the wording of
the final decree out of context. Looking at the post-trial
dispute in context, it is clear that LSH was the prevailing
party at trial and Cangiano was therefore liable for "all
costs" resulting from the necessity to seek judicial remedies
in order to enforce the Purchase Agreement.
In his two assignments of error regarding the award of
attorney's fees that were properly preserved below, Cangiano
17
does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court
in making its award of attorney's fees to LSH. Additionally,
because the parties agreed in Paragraph 18 of the Purchase
Agreement that "the defaulting party shall be liable for all
costs incurred by the non-defaulting party in enforcing this
Agreement through court action or otherwise, including a
reasonable attorney's fee," we will remand these cases to the
trial court for determination of an award of reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred by LSH in the course of
this appeal and upon remand.
III. Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
specific performance of the Purchase Agreement or in awarding
LSH attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the terms of the
Purchase Agreement. We will affirm the judgment of the trial
court in both appeals and remand them for an additional award
of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to LSH, pursuant to
Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement, incurred by LSH in
defending its judgment on appeal and upon remand.
Record No. 050699 – Affirmed and remanded.
Record No. 051031 – Affirmed and remanded.
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the chancellor
erred, under the particular facts of this case, in fashioning
18
the award of specific performance so as to require the seller
to use his “best efforts . . . to acquire and convey . . . all
additional land and easements required for all offsite
utilities, road widenings, turn lanes, and any other offsite
improvements required to develop” the tract of land to be
conveyed to the buyer.
Reduced to its essential context, this case arises from a
purchase contract for a large tract of land for residential
and commercial development. The buyer sought to have the land
fully engineered at the time of closing and, thus, ready for
the commencement of the intended development without the usual
delays of obtaining the necessary offsite easements, such as
water and sewer easements. The agreed purchase price included
the anticipated costs for those easements. The seller agreed
to acquire and convey those easements, but breached the
contract by failing to do so within the time specified for
closing the transaction, and that breach continued until the
matter came before the chancellor on the buyer’s request for
an award of specific performance of the purchase contract.
The majority correctly acknowledges “that equity will not
compel that which is impossible to perform,” which in the
applicable context of this case is merely another way of
saying that equity will not require a seller to convey land
which he does not own. See, e.g., Hawks v. Sparks, 204 Va.
19
717, 720, 133 S.E.2d 536, 539 (1963); see also Shepherd v.
Colton, 237 Va. 537, 541, 378 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1989) (holding
that “a court may not decree specific performance when it is
impossible for a party to comply with a contractual
condition.”). The majority, however, resolves the issue here
by noting that the chancellor merely required the seller to
use his “best efforts” to acquire and convey the necessary
easements contemplated by the parties’ contract. That
resolution leaves unresolved the merits of the issue.
There is no dispute that the “best efforts” limitation
was adopted by the chancellor at the request of the seller,
and that limitation facially would appear to support the
chancellor’s award of specific performance regarding the
acquisition and conveyance of the land and easements in
question. It takes little reflection, however, to reasonably
conclude that “best efforts” is a requirement under the
circumstances of this case that lacks certainty and portends
future litigation before the chancellor and additional expense
to the parties. Adjoining landowners may or may not be
willing to convey their land or grant easements over their
land so as to permit the seller to comply with the
chancellor’s order. The possible complications are practical
and boundless. Such need not be the case. Specific
performance should not be awarded where “enforcement of the
20
decree would be unusually difficult for the court.” Perel v.
Brannan, 267 Va. 691, 700, 594 S.E.2d 899, 904-05 (2004).
“Generally, when there is a deficiency in title,
quantity, or quality of an estate, the purchaser has the
option to require the seller to convey such part as the seller
is able, with an abatement of the purchase price for any
deficiency.” Chesapeake Builders, Inc. v. Lee, 254 Va. 294,
300-01, 492 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1997). The chancellor is to
exercise sound discretion in deciding whether to award
specific performance. Shepherd v. Davis, 265 Va. 108, 124,
574 S.E.2d 514, 523 (2003). However, “[t]he chancellor’s
discretion must be exercised with a view to the substantial
justice of the case.” Chesapeake Builders, 254 Va. at 300,
492 S.E.2d at 145. The facts of a particular case are always
paramount in the proper exercise of that judicial discretion.
Firebaugh v. Hanback, 247 Va. 519, 526, 443 S.E.2d 134, 137
(1994).
In the present case, I have no quarrel with the
majority’s conclusion that the chancellor did not err in
deciding to award specific performance of the parties’
purchase contract. In my view, however, the chancellor should
have been guided by Chesapeake Builders in doing so. There is
no question that there was a deficiency in the title and
quantity of the estate the seller had contracted to convey to
21
the buyer. The remedy fashioned by the chancellor was
incomplete because it is uncertain in its requirement that the
seller use his “best efforts” to rectify the deficiency or
when that might be expected reasonably to be accomplished.
Indeed, such incompleteness and uncertainty left future
litigation a probable expectation.
The record reflects that the monetary cost of acquiring
the necessary land and easements was a matter capable of
determination at the time of the hearing before the
chancellor. Had the chancellor required that determination to
be made, an award of specific performance requiring the seller
to convey the land and whatever easements he had acquired, and
granting the buyer an abatement of the purchase price for the
deficiency in that which was contemplated by the parties’
contract, would have afforded complete relief to the buyer and
not left the seller with the uncertainty that his “best
efforts” would not satisfy the requirements of the
chancellor’s order. Clearly, such an award would have
accomplished “substantial justice [for] the case.” Chesapeake
Builders, 254 Va. at 300, 492 S.E.2d at 145.
For these reasons, I would reverse that part of the
chancellor’s award of specific performance requiring the
seller, Salvatore Cangiano, to use his best efforts to acquire
and convey interests he did not own, and remand the case for
22
further proceedings to determine the amount of an appropriate
abatement in the purchase price as of the date of the future
hearing before the chancellor.
23