Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J.
CHEV R. CARTER OPINION BY
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL
v. Record No. 032208 June 10, 2004
MEADOWGREEN ASSOCIATES,
TRADING AS COVENTRY GARDENS
APARTMENTS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
George F. Tidey, Judge
This appeal turns on the question whether a tenant's
family member, residing in leased property with the consent of
the landlord, succeeds to the tenant's rights upon the death
of the tenant.
The material facts are undisputed. In 1997, Meadowgreen
Associates owned and operated a rental apartment complex in
Henrico County subject to a "Housing Assistance Payments
Contract" between Meadowgreen and the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) pursuant to the federal
"Section 8 housing program," 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 through 1437z-7
(2000 & Supp. I 2003). The contract provided that apartments
be leased by Meadowgreen directly to tenants on a HUD-approved
form of lease. HUD would then subsidize the rent by paying
Meadowgreen that portion of the contract rent in excess of the
amount the tenant was able to pay, subject to certain
limitations.
Meadowgreen leased a three-bedroom apartment to Martha
Carter for a one-year term beginning in November, 1997. The
lease provided that it would become a month-to-month lease at
the expiration of the original term, but that Meadowgreen
could not terminate the lease except under specific
circumstances, not pertinent here, or for "other good cause."
The lease further provided that termination for "other good
cause" could only be effective at the "end of any initial or
successive term."
After the expiration of the initial term, Martha Carter
continued to live in the apartment as a month-to-month tenant.
Although she was the sole tenant, her son, Chev R. Carter, who
was 17 years old in 1997, lived there with her and was named
in the lease as one of the tenant's household, along with a
daughter then 14 years old. Martha Carter died on November
30, 2002. The lease was silent as to the effect of a tenant's
death.
Chev Carter reported his mother's death to Meadowgreen on
December 2, 2002. On the same day, Meadowgreen mailed to and
posted on the front door of the apartment a notice addressed
to "Martha Carter (deceased)" stating in part: "Due to the
death of Martha Carter her lease will end on December 31,
2002." Chev Carter, who was then the sole occupant of the
apartment, told Meadowgreen's manager that he would like to
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remain. He was informed that he did not qualify for a three-
bedroom apartment by himself, but that he might apply for a
smaller unit. He filled out an application but Meadowgreen
denied it because of Carter's poor credit reports.
Martha Carter had paid her portion of the rent through
November 2002, but no rent was received from anyone on the
tenant's behalf for the seven months from December 2002
through June 2003. Meadowgreen continued to list Martha
Carter as the tenant during that period and continued to
collect HUD's subsidy for the federal share of her rent.
On January 31, 2003, Meadowgreen filed an unlawful
detainer proceeding in the general district court against
Chev R. Carter. On February 14, 2003, the court entered
judgment for possession. Carter appealed to the circuit
court, where the case was tried to a jury, resulting in a
verdict for Meadowgreen. The court entered judgment on the
verdict, granting Meadowgreen possession, costs, and seven
months accrued rent amounting to $2,105.00, to be paid out of
the bond posted to perfect Carter's appeal from the general
district court.1 We awarded Carter an appeal.
1
The evidence at trial was that Carter remained in
possession of the apartment, but that during his mother's
lifetime he was there "rarely" and that "he comes and goes."
3
Carter contends that he succeeded to his mother's rights
under the lease upon her death, becoming a month-to-month
tenant; that the notice given by the landlord was defective
because it gave him 29 days notice instead of the 30 days
required by the lease; that the notice failed to inform him of
certain rights granted to a tenant under the lease; that the
landlord had waived the right to terminate the lease by
accepting subsidy payments from HUD after Martha Carter's
death and failing to notify HUD of her death; and that the
trial court erred in applying part of his appeal bond to rent
and court costs.
Carter argues that federal law entitles him to succeed to
his mother's rights under the lease. He bases this contention
upon the "Declaration of policy" and the definition of
"families" contained in Subchapter I of Title 42, U.S.C.:
It is the policy of the United States −
(1) to promote the general welfare of the Nation by
employing the funds and credit of the Nation, as
provided in this Act −
(A) to assist States and political subdivisions of
States to remedy the unsafe housing conditions and
the acute shortage of decent and safe dwellings for
low-income families;
(B) to assist States and political subdivisions of
States to address the shortage of housing affordable
to low-income families. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (2000); and
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When used in this chapter:
. . . .
(3) . . .
(A) SINGLE PERSONS. The term "families" includes
families consisting of a single person in the case
of . . . (iv) the remaining member of a tenant
family. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(3)(A)(iv) (2000).
Carter contends that, regardless of any state or common
law to the contrary, the foregoing provisions result in the
succession of a "remaining member of a tenant family" to the
rights of a deceased tenant in "Section 8 housing." We do not
agree.
Congress included many provisions in the statutes
governing "Section 8 housing" to regulate landlord-tenant
relationships, but made no express provision for the
devolution of a tenant's leasehold interest upon the tenant's
death. The "Declaration of policy" quoted above sets forth
the constitutional foundation for the decision by Congress to
"employ[] the funds and credit of the Nation . . . to assist
States" for the purposes enumerated. The definition of
"families" sets forth the classes of persons intended to be
benefited by the statutory scheme. Congress did not, however,
undertake a total re-writing of state landlord-tenant law as
it may apply to "Section 8 housing." We may assume that where
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the federal law is silent, the intent of Congress was to leave
the applicable state law undisturbed.2
In Virginia, the death of a tenant for a fixed term does
not terminate a lease in effect at the time of death. The
deceased tenant's interest passes to her estate, and her
personal representative becomes liable for the rent until the
end of the term. Hutchings v. Commercial Bank, 91 Va. 68, 77,
20 S.E. 950, 953 (1895). Therefore, Chev Carter did not
succeed to his mother's rights under the lease and was not
entitled to the notice provisions that the lease afforded to a
tenant. He made no showing of authority to hold the premises
as a subtenant under his mother's estate. Because he
unlawfully detained possession of the apartment for the seven-
month period from December, 2002 through June, 2003, the trial
court correctly applied his appeal bond to the resulting
damages sustained by the landlord. Accordingly, we will
affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.
2
See generally Ayers v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 908
F.2d 1184, 1189 (3rd Cir. 1990) (preemption of state law
occurs in one of three ways: When Congress explicitly states
that it is doing so, when Congress uses language indicating
its intention to completely occupy a field, or when Congress
enacts a law in actual conflict with state law).
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