Present: All the Justices
KRISTY L. CHASE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 022575 JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
October 31, 2003
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Arthur B. Vieregg, Judge
On appeal, we consider whether, under the Virginia Motor
Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, Code §§ 59.1-207.9 to -
207.16.1, a consumer who settles with a defendant is entitled
to attorney’s fees as a “successful” party.
I. Facts and Proceedings Below
On June 9, 1999, Kristy L. Chase (“Chase”) purchased a
new Chrysler Cirrus. The car had a number of mechanical
problems. On August 16, 2001, Chase filed a motion for
judgment against DaimlerChrysler Corporation
(“DaimlerChrysler”), the car’s manufacturer, for breach of
warranty, violation of the Virginia Motor Vehicle Warranty
Enforcement Act (the “Act”), and violation of the federal
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. She sought total damages of
$40,951.59.
Chase and DaimlerChrysler eventually reached a settlement
agreement that was memorialized in a “Repurchase Release
Agreement.” In the agreement, Chase received $13,242.04 from
DaimlerChrysler. DaimlerChrysler also agreed to assume loan
payments remaining on the car. In return, Chase released
DaimlerChrysler from all further claims except attorney’s fees
and court costs.
With respect to attorney’s fees and court costs, the
agreement provided that if the parties failed to make a
suitable compromise at a June 25th settlement conference,
attorney’s fees and court costs would be litigated. The
parties failed to reach an agreement on attorney’s fees and
costs. At trial, DaimlerChrysler argued that Chase had not
prevailed in her action by receiving a favorable judgment in
court and was not entitled to attorney’s fees under the
Virginia statute because she was not a “successful” party as
the term was used in Code § 59.1-207.14. The trial court
entered judgment in favor of DaimlerChrysler.
Chase appeals the judgment of the trial court that she is
not entitled to attorney’s fees. She maintains that in
achieving a repurchase agreement with DaimlerChrysler, she
accomplished the remedies provided in the Act and was a
“successful” party entitled to attorney’s fees.
II. Analysis
The issue before us concerns only the attorney’s fees and
costs provisions of Code § 59.1-207.14 * which provides:
*
We did not award a writ of error to consider the trial
court’s denial of fees and costs under the Magnuson-Moss
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Any consumer who suffers loss by reason of a
violation of any provision of this chapter may
bring a civil action to enforce such provision.
Any consumer who is successful in such an
action or any defendant in any frivolous action
brought by a consumer shall recover reasonable
attorney’s fees, expert witness fees and court
costs incurred by bringing such actions.
The so-called “Virginia Lemon Law” provides for a
consumer to receive a replacement motor vehicle or a full
refund for a purchase of a motor vehicle that cannot be
brought into conformity with the manufacturer’s express
warranty. Code § 59.1-207.13. Although the terms of the
settlement agreement clearly compromised the amount of damages
claimed, Chase maintains that her settlement with
DaimlerChrysler included return and refund. Accordingly,
Chase argues that she is a “successful” claimant under the Act
and that the trial court erred in denying her fees and costs.
DaimlerChrysler argues that it denied liability but
compromised the claim in a settlement agreement; consequently,
neither party can claim to be a “successful” party under the
statute. Further, DaimlerChrysler emphasizes that the final
order in this civil action awards judgment to the defendant.
The question before us is simply stated: what is
“successful” for the purposes of an award of fees and costs
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. Additionally, we note
that Chase did not present to the trial court a claim based
upon breach of the settlement agreement.
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under the Virginia Lemon Law? Our analysis begins, as it
should, with the text of the statute itself. As we have
stated:
While in the construction of statutes the
constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the
legislature, that intention must be gathered
from the words used, unless a literal
construction would involve a manifest
absurdity. Where the legislature has used
words of a plain and definite import the courts
cannot put upon them a construction which
amounts to holding the legislature did not mean
what it has actually expressed.
Signal Corp. v. Keane Federal Systems, 265 Va. 38, 46-47, 574
S.E.2d 253, 257 (2003); Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat’l
Bank, 262 Va. 91, 99-100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001); Watkins
v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934).
Code § 59.1-207.14 refers to a “civil action to enforce”
the provisions of the Act. Furthermore, the award of fees and
costs is expressly reserved to any “consumer who is successful
in such an action.” As the Code of Virginia provides,
“‘Action’ and ‘suit’ may be used interchangeably and shall
include all civil proceedings whether at law, in equity, or
statutory in nature and whether in circuit courts or district
courts.” Code § 8.01-2(1). Consequently, being “successful”
in this statutory “civil action,” by definition, means that
the action terminates in favor of the claimant. Under the
terms of the Act, we look to the order terminating the action
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to determine whether the plaintiff was “successful.” The
final judgment order in this case expressly states that
judgment is awarded to the defendant, DaimlerChrysler.
Chase maintains that the repurchase of the automobile in
question defines a “successful” outcome for the purpose of an
award of fees and costs. At oral argument, when presented
with the hypothetical case of a claim for $50,000, compromised
by repurchase for $1, Chase insisted that the claimant would,
nonetheless, be “successful” for the purpose of an award of
fees and costs. The statutory scheme does not suggest such a
radical interpretation. Neither does it suggest that courts
should engage in evaluation of the relative success of either
party in their compromise. The language of the statute
requires that the civil action itself be resolved in favor of
the consumer.
Such an interpretation of the statute is consistent with
the reasoning of the Court in the recent case of Sheets v.
Castle, 263 Va. 407, 559 S.E.2d 616 (2002). In Sheets, we
considered the interpretation of a contractual attorney’s fee
provision in favor of the “prevailing party” in litigation
that concluded with a nonsuit. In reaching an interpretation
of the term, “prevailing party,” we stated: “We need not go
farther than Black's Law Dictionary for its common meaning: ‘A
party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the
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amount of damages awarded.’ Black's Law Dictionary 1145 (7th
ed. 1999).” Id. at 413, 559 S.E.2d at 620. While unnecessary
to the opinion in Sheets, for the purposes of this case it is
important to note that the definition of “prevailing party”
upon which we relied in Sheets includes its synonym,
“successful party.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed.
1999).
Finally, Chase argues that requiring the consumer to
obtain an order terminating the civil action in their favor
would discourage settlements. We are not persuaded by this
concern. Lawyers and litigants will factor this requirement
into their settlement negotiations and govern themselves
accordingly. Presumably, the risk of trial and an award of
fees and costs will not change with the application of this
standard in assessing whether a party has been “successful.”
What will most certainly change is the manner in which
settlement agreements are memorialized. A consent order
reciting that the consumer was the prevailing party and
reserving the amount of fees and costs for judicial
determination would sufficiently demonstrate which party was
“successful” in the civil action.
The civil action in this case did not conclude with an
order or judgment in favor of the consumer. Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in denying Chase an award of fees and
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costs pursuant to Code § 59.1-207.14. We will affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed
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