Present: All the Justices
JAMES EARL PATTERSON
v. Record No. 001798 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
September 14, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY
James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge
James Earl Patterson received a death sentence upon a
plea of guilty to a charge of capital murder in the commission
of a rape, Code § 18.2-31(5), in the death of Joyce Sneed
Aldridge. 1 Although Patterson has waived his right of appeal,
Code § 17.1-313 mandates that we review the imposition of the
death sentence. We must consider and determine whether the
sentence of death was imposed "under the influence of passion,
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor," and whether the
sentence is "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant." Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) and (C)(2).
BACKGROUND
On October 11, 1987, the Prince George County Police
Department received a telephone call at approximately 11:35
1
Patterson also pled guilty to charges of abduction with
intent to defile, Code § 18.2-48, and rape, Code § 18.2-61,
and entered an "Alford plea," North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25 (1970), to a charge of forcible sodomy, Code § 18.2-
67.1. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of life
imprisonment for the abduction and sodomy convictions.
Patterson has not appealed those convictions.
p.m. from a person identifying herself as Joyce Aldridge. Ms.
Aldridge stated that she had been raped and stabbed. When the
police arrived at Ms. Aldridge's home, they found the front
door ajar and a screen "knocked out" of the bathroom window at
the rear of the house. The officers announced themselves and,
when there was no reply, they entered the house. They found
Ms. Aldridge's partially clothed body on the floor of the
bathroom. Her dress had been ripped from the neck, and cloth
ligatures, cut from bedding in the room, remained tied to her
right wrist. She had been stabbed multiple times and could
not be resuscitated by the emergency medical crew.
The police discovered signs of a struggle in the kitchen
of the home with a chair knocked over, a drawer containing
knives left open, and Ms. Aldridge's eyeglasses on the floor.
The door to Ms. Aldridge's bedroom had been kicked open and
footprints were found on the door. Footprints of the same
type were found in the blood on the floor of the bedroom. The
contents of Ms. Aldridge's purse had been dumped on the floor,
dresser drawers were open and ransacked, and the nightstand
had been knocked over. There was a large amount of blood on
the bed and pillows and "[c]ast-off" blood spatters were on
the wall next to the bathroom. The telephone cord had been
pulled from the wall and the doorknob to the bathroom door had
been pulled off the door. Ms. Aldridge's blood was found on
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the telephone, the bathroom doorknob, and the latch on the
window screen found in the backyard. These conditions
indicated that she had attempted to flee her attacker by
escaping through the window in the bathroom.
The medical examiner found seventeen stab wounds. Eight
of the wounds were to Ms. Aldridge's neck, four to her upper
back, one in her chest and several clustered in her abdominal
area. The wounds ranged in depth from two to six inches. Two
stab wounds to her aorta were fatal. The medical examiner
also found a number of defensive wounds.
Seminal fluid was recovered from the victim's rectum and
vagina and a semen stain was found on the bed. This evidence
was preserved for testing. However, the perpetrator of the
crime was not identified until over ten years later, when in
1998, the evidence was resubmitted to the Virginia DNA
Laboratory. The subsequent testing yielded a "cold hit" – a
match with a DNA profile maintained by the Virginia DNA Data
Bank. The tested DNA matched that of James Earl Patterson who
was serving a twenty-five year sentence at the Greensville
Correctional Center for a rape unrelated to the rape of Ms.
Aldridge.
The police obtained a search warrant for a fresh sample
of Patterson's blood and additional testing confirmed that the
DNA material found at Ms. Aldridge's house and that of the
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defendant were consistent. The probability of finding someone
else with the same DNA profile was less than 1 in 5.5 billion.
When confronted with this information by the police, Patterson
denied knowing Ms. Aldridge or ever being in her house.
In March 2000, Patterson agreed to discuss the crime with
one of the police officers who had been involved in the
Aldridge investigation if an agreement could be reached
regarding his ability to see his family at the prison. After
the family visit was arranged, Patterson confessed to raping
and murdering Ms. Aldridge. Patterson said he knew Ms.
Aldridge and went to her home on October 11, 1987 to steal
money for drugs. He had planned to enter through a basement
window but the window was locked. While he was looking for a
utility knife he had dropped in the yard, Ms. Aldridge let her
dog out in the yard. Patterson went to the door and asked Ms.
Aldridge if he could borrow a flashlight on the pretext of
needing it to search for lost car keys. When Ms. Aldridge
opened the door, he forced his way into the house, kicked the
door shut and demanded her pocketbook. He pushed her to the
bedroom to get the purse. When the purse contained only
coins, Patterson became "even more violent." After tying her
hands behind her back with strips cut from the bed linen, he
raped her.
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Patterson went to the kitchen looking for a knife because
he "wasn't going to leave any witnesses behind." He found a
knife and stabbed Ms. Aldridge three times in the abdomen.
Patterson went back outside to find the lost utility
knife, but reentered the house to make sure "she's gone." He
kicked in the bedroom door which was shut and saw a telephone
cord leading to the bathroom. He forced the bathroom door
open and Ms. Aldridge came out. Patterson "hit[] her with the
knife 4 or 5 times." After she "went down the wall," he left
by way of the front door.
Prior to the entry of the guilty pleas, Patterson was
examined by two psychologists, both of whom determined that
Patterson was competent to tender a guilty plea and to make
his own decisions in the case. Against the advice of counsel,
Patterson entered the guilty plea. The trial court found
Patterson guilty of capital murder and ordered a pre-sentence
report.
At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth asserted that
the killing of Ms. Aldridge was vile in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, and aggravated battery. In
support of this contention, the Commonwealth relied on the
testimony given at the guilt phase, that the victim did not
die instantaneously, that the knife attack was carried out in
a "savage[,] methodical manner," and that many more stab
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wounds were inflicted than necessary to accomplish the murder
of the victim. Chabrol v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 327, 335, 427
S.E.2d 374, 378 (1993); Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303,
316, 377 S.E.2d 595, 603, cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989).
The Commonwealth also asserted that Patterson would be a
future danger to society. In support of this position, the
Commonwealth presented evidence of felony convictions for rape
and grand larceny based on a 1988 incident in which Patterson
asked two women for a ride home from a party. When the driver
exited the car, Patterson shoved her to the ground, got back
in the car, and broke the handle of the passenger door to trap
the other woman in the car. Patterson "punched" the passenger
in the face, drove the car to another location, and then raped
her. According to the Commonwealth, these crimes, committed
after the rape and murder of Ms. Aldridge, along with the
defendant's extensive juvenile record and fourteen instances
of institutional offenses, including fighting, assault, and
possession of drugs and intoxicants, support the conclusion
that Patterson is a continuing danger to society.
Patterson refused to present evidence in mitigation of
his sentence and instructed his attorney not to do so. In
exercising his right of elocution, Patterson expressed his
sorrow and remorse for his actions and requested a sentence of
death, stating that if he received a life sentence he could
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not promise that "sometime that I may not spark out and ruin
more lives." In imposing the death sentence, the trial court
found that the aggravating factors of vileness in the
commission of the crime and of future dangerousness to society
were both supported by the evidence.
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C), we must consider "any
errors in the trial enumerated by appeal" in any case where a
sentence of death is imposed. Accordingly, the trial court is
required to forward the trial record of such a case to this
Court where an appeal of right will be heard. Code § 17.1-
313(B). On October 16, 2000, Patterson through counsel filed
a Motion Not to Pursue Appeal with this Court. By order dated
November 15, 2000, this Court ordered the matter returned to
the trial court for a determination whether Patterson's
decision not to appeal was made voluntarily and intelligently.
At a competency hearing held on January 4, 2001 in
accordance with this Court's order, Patterson signed a waiver
under oath, stating he did not want his case reviewed for "any
alleged errors of the trial" and waived his right "to file an
opening brief and to have my attorney present any oral
arguments or to otherwise in any manner pursue appellate
review." The trial court entered an order finding that
Patterson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his
right to appeal.
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DISCUSSION
While a defendant may waive his rights of appellate
review and instruct his attorneys to refrain from seeking a
commutation of his death sentence, a defendant may not waive
the review process mandated by Code § 17.1-313(C). "[T]he
purpose of the review process is to assure the fair and proper
application of the death penalty statutes in this Commonwealth
and to instill public confidence in the administration of
justice." Akers v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 358, 364, 535 S.E.2d
674, 677 (2000). Accordingly, pursuant to our order of
November 15, 2000, Patterson's counsel has filed a brief
limited to the issues we must consider pursuant to Code
§ 17.1-313(C) and participates in this process as an officer
of the Court. Id.
We first consider whether the death sentence in this case
"was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any
other arbitrary factor." Code § 17.1-313(C)(1). This crime
was brutally executed. The victim was bound, raped, and then
repeatedly stabbed so that there would be no witness to the
crime. The evidence shows that the victim apparently
attempted to survive her attack by hiding in the bathroom,
placing a call to the police, and then, when her attacker
returned, trying to escape out a rear window in the bathroom.
We find no indication in the record that, in imposing the
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death sentence for these acts, the trial court's sentencing
decision was influenced by passion, prejudice, or any
arbitrary factor, but rather we find that it was based
entirely upon a reasonable evaluation of the evidence.
We next focus our evaluation on whether the sentence of
death in this case is "excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime
and the defendant." Code § 17.1-313(C)(2). We have
accumulated the records of all capital murder cases reviewed
by this Court. Code § 17.1-313(E). The records include not
only those capital murder cases in which the death penalty was
imposed, but also those in which the trial court or jury
imposed a life sentence and the defendant petitioned this
Court for an appeal.
In making this proportionality review, we have focused
specifically on cases in which the facts are similar to those
of this case – where the predicate offense is rape and the
death sentence was imposed upon a finding that both
aggravating factors, vileness and future dangerousness, were
present. We conclude that, in considering both the crime and
the defendant, Patterson's sentence is neither excessive nor
disproportionate to the penalties imposed by other sentencing
bodies in the Commonwealth for comparable acts. See, e.g.,
Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 509 S.E.2d 293
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(1999) (forced entry into victim's home; robbery, rape, and
murder of excessive beating with a hammer); Beck v.
Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 484 S.E.2d 898 (1997) (beat, raped,
and murdered victim in her home; sentence imposed upon a plea
of guilty); Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 450 S.E.2d
365 (1994) (forced entry into victim's home and committed
robbery, rape, murder, and arson); Hoke, 237 Va. 303, 377
S.E.2d 595 (1989) (victim bound, stabbed, raped, and murdered
in home); Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 254 S.E.2d 116
(1979) (beat, tortured, raped, and murdered victim in her
home; sentence imposed upon a guilty plea).
Having found no error below and perceiving no other
reason to commute or set aside the sentence of death, we will
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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