Dearing v. Commonwealth

Present:   Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and
           Kinser, JJ. and Poff, Senior Justice

ALFRED DEARING
                                             OPINION BY
v.   Record No. 992215             SENIOR JUSTICE RICHARD H. POFF
                                          November 3, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA


                 FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA


      Alfred Lovell Dearing, Jr., was convicted by a jury of

robbery and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.

The Circuit Court of Arlington County imposed the jury's

verdict, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in an

unpublished opinion.     Dearing v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1233-

98-4 (August 17, 1999) [hereinafter Dearing I].     We awarded

Dearing an appeal.    The Commonwealth now concedes that the trial

court erred in admitting into evidence a co-defendant’s

statements to police.     Cf. Dearing v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 117,

123, 524 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1999)(addressing similar issue from a

different conviction).    Thus, the dispositive issue is whether

the Court of Appeals erred in holding that any error in

admitting these statements was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.

      "Applying well-established principles of appellate review,

we must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences

fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth [the prevailing party in the circuit court]."     Derr

v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424, 412 S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991).

     At approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 7, 1997, Danny Neil, a

pedestrian, was stopped on the sidewalk by two men in a white

Honda automobile.   The passenger in the front seat pointed a gun

at Neil and commanded Neil to give him all his money.   When Neil

emptied his pockets to show that he had no money, the gunman

required Neil to give him a gold chain fastened around his

Neil’s neck.   After the men in the Honda drove away, Neil placed

a 911 emergency call.

     Police officers on night patrol in the community, who had

been following a white Honda automobile occupied by Dearing and

Leroy Vernoise Dorsey, learned that a car matching that

description may have been involved in the robbery and stopped

the car.   When an officer brought Neil to the place where

Dearing and Dorsey were being detained, Neil identified Dearing

as the Honda passenger with a gun and noted that his gold chain

was around Dearing's neck.   Neil testified that a gun found by

the officers on a shoulder of a road traveled by the white Honda

was the weapon Dearing had pointed at him.

     Dearing and Dorsey were tried jointly.   Over Dearing's

objection, Detective Paul Larson was allowed to testify that

Dorsey first denied any involvement in the crime, but after

Larson told him that "honesty is always the best policy", Dorsey


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stated that he had come over "from Maryland into Virginia to

commit a robbery with his cousin . . . Alfred Dearing".      Larson

also testified that Dorsey had told him that he saw his cousin

using a small black handgun to perform the crime.

     The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United

States provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the

witnesses against him", and this provision was held applicable

to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v.

Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).       "[B]efore a federal

constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be

able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt."     Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967); accord Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576 (1987).

     "Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case

depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to

reviewing courts.    These factors include the importance of the

witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the

testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence

corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on

material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise

permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the

prosecution's case."     Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684

(1986); accord Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999).


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     Significantly, the Chapman–Van Arsdall harmless error

standard has been applied expressly by the Supreme Court of the

United States in appeals in which the constitutional

Confrontation Clause had been violated.   Brown v. United States,

411 U.S. 223 (1973); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972);

Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).   We apply that

standard here.

     While it is true that the challenged testimony was

incriminating, this testimony was merely cumulative of the other

evidence adduced by the Commonwealth.   The Commonwealth's

cardinal witness at the jury trial, an eyewitness to the robbery

and criminal use of a gun, was the victim of the crime.   In the

presence of investigating officers, and later at trial, Danny

Neil identified Dearing as the principal criminal agent, the gun

found discarded on the shoulder of the road as the criminal

instrument, and the victim's necklace as the fruit of the crime.




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     We declare, therefore, that the evidentiary error committed

at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ∗   Accordingly,

we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

                                                          Affirmed.




     ∗
       Appellant contends on brief that his assignments of error
raise a question presented "whether admission of co-defendant's
statements as a declaration against appellant's penal interest
constitutes reversible error under Virginia law." We agree with
the following ruling in the opinion of the Court of Appeals:

          Having concluded that any error was harmless
     under the more rigorous "beyond a reasonable doubt"
     standard applicable to constitutional error, we need
     not consider whether the admission of Dorsey's
     statement violated Virginia's hearsay rule and, if
     error, whether that error was harmless under the less
     exacting standard applicable to errors of state law.
     See generally Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App.
     1003, 1005, 407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991) (en banc)
     (finding that the "federal standard is not required
     . . . for non-constitutional error"). Dearing I, slip
     op. at 6 n.1.

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