Present: All the Justices
ALFRED DEARING, JR.
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 982401 January 14, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
The primary issues in this appeal are whether a circuit
court violated a criminal defendant's federal constitutional
right to confrontation by admitting in evidence a co-
defendant's confession and, if so, whether such error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I.
Alfred Lovell Dearing, Jr., was indicted by a grand jury
in Alexandria for the robbery of Andre Moore and use of a
firearm during the commission of a robbery. He was tried
jointly with Leroy Vernoise Dorsey, a co-defendant who
participated in the robbery. At the conclusion of a bench
trial, the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria convicted
Dearing of the charged crimes and sentenced him to a term of
ten years imprisonment, with six years suspended, for the
robbery conviction and three years imprisonment for the
firearm conviction. After the Court of Appeals denied
Dearing's petition for appeal, we awarded Dearing an appeal.
II.
Applying well-established principles of appellate review,
we must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences
fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court. Derr
v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424, 410 S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991).
On August 7, 1997, between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m., as Andre
Moore was walking on Seminary Road in Alexandria, he observed
a white four-door Honda Civic automobile with Maryland license
plates. Two people were in the car, which traveled past
Moore. The car stopped briefly. Moore observed that the
car's right taillight "was out." Even though Moore could not
see the face of the driver of the car, Moore "could tell [that
the driver] had on a hat turned backwards." The other man was
seated on the passenger side of the car.
Suddenly, Moore saw Dearing standing on the opposite side
of Seminary Road. Moore was able to see Dearing's face
clearly because Dearing was standing under a street light.
Dearing, who had a gun in his hand, "motioned" with his finger
towards Moore. Dearing "raised the gun up," "cocked the gun
[and] started walking across the street."
Moore "emptied [his] pocket[s]" and "dropped to the
ground." Dearing walked over to Moore, cursed at him, and
directed him to "get up, get up." Moore stood up, and as
Dearing pointed the pistol, Moore stated, "I don't have
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nothing. I don't have nothing. . . . Don't kill me. Don't
kill me." Dearing checked Moore's pockets, took his wallet,
and told Moore "[w]elcome to D.C. Welcome to D.C." Dearing
took three one dollar bills from Moore.
Dearing walked across the street and got into the Honda
Civic. Dearing, who was a passenger in the Honda Civic,
"yelled out the window" and laughed at Moore as the two men in
the car rode away.
After the robbery, Moore continued to walk on Seminary
Road. The men who had robbed Moore minutes earlier, returned
in the Honda Civic. Dearing opened a car door, "hopped out of
the car," and accused Moore of concealing money from the
robbers. Moore "immediately dropped to the ground." Dearing
kicked Moore and stated, "[h]e's lying. He's lying. He ain't
walking this late at night. Got more than $3 on him. He's
lying. He's lying." When a driver of another vehicle
traveling on Seminary Road approached the men, Dearing ran
back to the Honda Civic, and Dearing and the driver fled.
Sergeant Joshua Paige, an employee with the Defense
Protective Service Police who was driving a van about 1:00
a.m., observed Moore lying in the street. Sergeant Paige
assisted Moore and contacted the Alexandria Police Department.
A police dispatcher issued an "area lookout" to various
jurisdictions in northern Virginia and requested that they
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"lookout" for a white, four-door Honda Civic bearing Maryland
license plates, which had a broken rear taillight and which
was occupied by two males.
Officer Larry Agne, an Alexandria police officer, went to
the robbery scene to assist Moore. When Officer Agne arrived
at the scene of the robbery, Moore provided him with a
description of the assailants and their car. Moore told
Officer Agne that the assailants were traveling in a white
Honda Civic bearing Maryland license tags. Moore stated that
the driver of the car wore a baseball cap which was "on
backwards." The person who robbed Moore was armed with a
dark-colored semi-automatic pistol, and was wearing a gray
tee-shirt, baggy blue pants, "some kind of necklace," and
brown or tan work boots.
Shortly after 1:00 a.m. that morning, James Wassom, a
police officer with Arlington County, along with several other
police officers, had been following a white, four-door Honda
Civic because that car had been situated "the wrong way" in a
parking lot, and the car's lights were turned off.
Additionally, one occupant left the car, approached another
individual, and then ran back to the car. After Officer
Wassom followed the car for about 30 minutes, he learned that
the car he had been following matched the description of the
car that had been used in the robbery of Moore. The officers
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followed the car from Arlington County into Washington, D.C.,
and then back into Arlington County.
Several police officers, in at least three unmarked
police cars, stopped the Honda Civic. At that time, Dearing
was driving the car, and Dorsey was in the passenger seat.
The police officers removed the men from the car and searched
them. Dearing had a five dollar bill and three one dollar
bills in his pockets. He was wearing navy blue sweatpants, a
gray tee-shirt, and two gold necklaces. When Officer Wassom
read Dearing his Miranda rights, Dearing stated, "this was the
first time that he had been in Virginia that night."
Officer Agne took Moore to the location in Arlington
County where the police officers had apprehended Dearing and
Dorsey. Moore was unable to identify Dorsey. Moore
identified Dearing as the man who robbed him. Moore stated,
"[t]hat's him. That's the guy that robbed me, but he's got
different pants on."
Paul Larson, a detective with the Arlington County Police
Department, interviewed Dorsey. According to Detective
Larson, Dorsey stated "that he and his cousin, Mr. Dearing,
had come into Virginia from Maryland in order to rob somebody.
They drove around, saw a man walking down the street. . . .
Mr. Dearing pointed a black handgun at him, at the victim, and
took a small amount of money, which Mr. Dorsey believed to be
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five one-dollar bills. Then they left the victim there and
drove around some more." Detective Larson wrote the statement
in his handwriting, and Dorsey signed the statement.
Later that morning, Larson searched the area where the
defendants had traveled and found a semi-automatic pistol. At
trial, Moore testified that the pistol that Larson found
appeared to be the same pistol that Dearing used during the
robbery.
III.
Code § 19.2-262.1 states:
"On motion of the Commonwealth, for good cause
shown, the court shall order persons charged with
participating in contemporaneous and related acts or
occurrences or in a series of acts or occurrences
constituting an offense or offenses, to be tried
jointly unless such joint trial would constitute
prejudice to a defendant. If the court finds that a
joint trial would constitute prejudice to a
defendant, the court shall order severance as to
that defendant or provide such other relief justice
requires."
The defendant contends that the circuit court erred by
granting the Commonwealth's motion for a joint trial because
the Commonwealth failed to establish good cause required by
Code § 19.2-262.1. The defendant also claims that he was
prejudiced because he could not compel his co-defendant,
Dorsey, to testify as a witness in a joint trial. The
defendant's contentions are without merit.
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Code § 19.2-262.1 requires the circuit court, upon a
showing of good cause, to order joint trials for persons
charged with participating in contemporaneous and related acts
or occurrences. Here, the defendant and Dorsey were charged
with participating in contemporaneous acts. The Commonwealth
demonstrated good cause for the joinder of the defendants'
trials because the trials required the presence of numerous
witnesses who would have had to appear at two separate trials
had the motion been denied. Moreover, the record is devoid of
any evidence of any actual prejudice to the defendant.
The defendant claims that he would have compelled Dorsey
to testify if the defendants had been tried separately.
Continuing, the defendant says that his right under the Sixth
Amendment to the federal Constitution "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . " was violated by
the joint trial. The defendant's arguments are meritless.
The defendant had no right to compel Dorsey, his co-defendant,
to testify in either a joint trial or a separate trial if
Dorsey elected to invoke his right against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 126 (1980)
(absent grant of immunity, witness has privilege against
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compulsory self-incrimination); see also Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
IV.
A.
The defendant asserts that the judgment confirming his
convictions must be reversed because his co-defendant's
statement was improperly admitted in evidence against the
defendant, thereby violating his right to confrontation
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. The Commonwealth responds that
the statement against the defendant was admissible and any
error that the circuit court committed should be deemed
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution guarantee a defendant in a criminal prosecution
the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06
(1965). The United States Supreme Court has stated that
"[t]he central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to
ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal
defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context
of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
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The Supreme Court in Lilly v. Virginia, ___ U.S. ___,
___, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1894 (1999), held that the admission in
evidence of an accomplice's confession against a defendant
violates the defendant's right to confrontation if the
confession does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception or contain particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness such that the adversarial testing of the
statement would be expected to add little, if anything, to the
statement's reliability. Here, we cannot conclude that
Dorsey's confession contained particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness or that the statement was within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception for the Confrontation Clause as
discussed by the Supreme Court in Lilly. Therefore, we hold
that the circuit court erred by admitting Dorsey's statement
in evidence. Thus, we must consider whether this error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court, in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1967), held that "before a federal constitutional error
can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." As
the Supreme Court stated in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 681 (1986), "an otherwise valid conviction should not be
set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the
whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless
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beyond a reasonable doubt." See Neder v. United States, ___
U.S. ___, ___, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1837 (1999).
A court, when determining whether federal constitutional
error is harmless, must consider several factors, including
the importance of the tainted evidence in the prosecution's
case, whether the evidence was cumulative, the presence or
absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the tainted
evidence on material points, and, of course, the overall
strength of the prosecution's case. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at
684; see also Lilly v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 548, ___, ___
S.E.2d ___, ___ (1999); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432
(1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
Applying the aforementioned principles, we hold that the
Confrontation Clause error in this case was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Moore, who was able to see the defendant's
face about five to seven minutes during their first encounter,
testified unequivocally that the defendant was the man who
robbed him. Moore was also able to observe the defendant
during the second encounter. Moore identified the defendant
as the perpetrator of the crimes within an hour of the
robbery. When the defendant was apprehended, he was driving
the same car that the defendant and Dorsey used during the
robbery. The defendant was wearing a necklace described by
Moore, and the co-defendant who was in the car when the police
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apprehended the defendants had a baseball cap in his
possession. The robber took three one dollar bills from
Moore, and when the defendant was apprehended, he had three
one dollar bills on his person. Moore testified that a gun
found by the police officers looked like the gun that the
defendant used to rob him.
B.
The defendant's argument that the evidence was not
sufficient to support the convictions for robbery and use of a
firearm to commit robbery is without merit. The facts
summarized in section IV.A. of this opinion are more than
sufficient to support the convictions.
V.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
Affirmed.
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