Present: All the Justices
SHERNETTE L. RIVERA
v. Record No. 980712 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
February 26, 1999
JOHNNY LEE WITT
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY
J. Samuel Johnston, Judge
In this appeal involving the uninsured motorist statute,
we consider whether John Doe and an insured motorist later
identified as John Doe are considered the same entity for
purposes of the statute of limitations.
Shernette L. Rivera (Rivera) filed a motion for judgment
on August 13, 1993 against John Doe, an unknown driver, for
injuries she sustained in an automobile accident on January
23, 1992. Pursuant to Code § 38.2-2206 (the uninsured
motorist statute), Rivera served a copy of the motion for
judgment on Colonial Insurance Company of California
(Colonial), her uninsured motorist insurance carrier. Rivera
subsequently learned that the John Doe motorist was "in all
probability" Johnny Lee Witt, and she filed a motion to join
Witt as a defendant on January 19, 1996. The trial court
entered an order granting Rivera's motion. The court also
non-suited Rivera's action against John Doe on the agreement
of counsel for Rivera and Colonial.
Witt then filed a plea in bar asserting that Rivera's
cause of action against him was barred because it was filed
beyond the two-year limitations period established by Code
§ 8.01-243. Rivera responded that under this Court's holding
in Truman v. Spivey, 225 Va. 274, 302 S.E.2d 517 (1983), her
amended motion for judgment was not time barred. Following a
hearing, the trial court determined that Truman was not
applicable and entered an order granting Witt's plea and
dismissing Rivera's motion for judgment with prejudice.
Rivera appealed.
Both parties acknowledge that the issue presented in this
case was not resolved in Truman. The Court in Truman held
that, for statute of limitations purposes, an unidentified
John Doe motorist and the later-identified uninsured motorist
are considered the same entity under Code § 38.1-381, the
predecessor of Code § 38.2-2206. 225 Va. at 279, 302 S.E.2d
at 519. Because they were the same entity, the Court
concluded, an amended motion for judgment adding the
identified uninsured motorist as a defendant was not barred by
the limitations period, even though the amendment was filed
after the expiration of that period. The Court specifically
declined to determine whether it would reach the same result
if the subsequently identified motorist were an insured
motorist. Id. at 281, 302 S.E.2d at 520.
Rivera argues we should apply the same analysis the Court
employed in Truman to the facts of this case. She contends
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that by applying that analysis we would reach the conclusion
that John Doe and the later-identified motorist, Witt, should
be considered the same entity for statute of limitations
purposes. We disagree.
Rivera's conclusion is premised on her contention that
the Court's analysis in Truman was concerned primarily with
considerations of prejudice. She argues that in resolving the
limitations issue, the Court in Truman determined that John
Doe and the later-identified uninsured motorist, Charles
Spivey, should be considered the same entity because doing so
would not offend the purposes of the statute of limitations
and because the actions of the plaintiff's uninsured motorist
insurance carrier in defending the John Doe "afforded a
substantial measure of protection" to Spivey. Id. at 280, 302
S.E.2d at 520. In this case, she asserts, Witt likewise has
suffered no prejudice and Colonial's actions in defending John
Doe afforded Witt and his insurer a substantial measure of
protection.
However, the analysis in Truman was not as limited as
Rivera characterizes it. Indeed, such an analysis, as
described by Rivera, would effectively create an exception to
the statute of limitations whenever a plaintiff could show
that a defendant is not prejudiced by permitting suit against
him after the limitations period has expired. This would be
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contrary to the established principle that statutes of
limitations are strictly enforced and must be applied unless
the General Assembly has clearly created an exception to their
application. Arrington v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 250 Va.
52, 55, 458 S.E.2d 289, 290-91 (1995); see, e.g., Code § 8.01-
6 (providing that addition of new defendant relates back to
date of original filing under certain conditions). 1 While
prejudice may be a factor to be considered in applying these
statutory exceptions, a court is not free to generally engage
in considerations of prejudice to determine whether a statute
of limitations should be applied.
The Court's analysis in Truman did not focus on
prejudice, but on whether the uninsured motorist statute
treated the unidentified uninsured motorist, Doe, and the
subsequently identified uninsured motorist, Spivey, as the
same entity. The statute, as the Court observed, treated Doe
and Spivey as the same entity in some respects and as
different entities in other respects. The Court concluded,
however, that on the facts of that case, Spivey and Doe should
be treated as the same entity for statute of limitations
purposes on two primary grounds: first, the uninsured
motorist statute imposed liability on the plaintiff's
uninsured motorist insurance carrier for any judgment against
1
Rivera did not claim that she was entitled to relief
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an uninsured motorist, regardless of whether the identity of
the motorist was known or unknown; and second, the statute
afforded the uninsured motorist insurance carrier timely
notice of and the opportunity to defend against the claim in
which liability was sought to be imposed. Truman, 225 Va. at
279, 302 S.E.2d at 519-20. The Court in Truman then reviewed
the purposes of the statute of limitations to insure that
treating John Doe and Spivey as the same entities in that case
did not offend the traditional goals of such statutes. Id.
It was in this context that considerations of prejudice were
discussed.
If we apply the Truman analysis to resolve the
limitations questions in this case, our initial inquiry is
whether the uninsured motorist statute requires or supports
treating John Doe and Witt as the same entity for statute of
limitations purposes. The crucial distinction in our
consideration of the statute in this case is that, unlike the
later-identified motorist in Truman, Witt is an insured
motorist. 2
under Code § 8.01-6.
2
Rivera asserts that Witt's insurer is defending the case
under a reservation of rights and that it may eventually deny
Witt coverage, thereby making Witt an uninsured motorist under
the definitions contained in Code § 38.2-2206(B). We,
however, must consider this case in the factual posture
presented and, therefore, do not address the speculative
factual circumstance suggested by Rivera. Rivera does not
assert Witt is an underinsured motorist.
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The uninsured motorist statute addresses the liability of
a plaintiff's uninsured motorist insurance carrier when an
uninsured or underinsured motorist as defined in the statute
is the alleged tortfeasor. It does not address personal
injury actions against an insured motorist and, for that
reason, there is nothing in the statute that imposes liability
on or provides procedural protections for the insured motorist
or his automobile liability insurance carrier. An insured
motorist may be affected by the provisions in subsection G of
the statute allowing suit to be filed against a subsequently
identified John Doe motorist during or after the conclusion of
the John Doe personal injury action; however, the statute
neither tolls nor extends the limitations period for bringing
subsequent suits. We conclude that there is nothing in the
uninsured motorist statute which suggests that, under the
facts of this case, Doe and Witt should be treated as the same
entity; therefore, the statute of limitations applies to each
of them individually.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial
court dismissing Rivera's amended motion for judgment against
Witt because it was filed beyond the limitations period.
Affirmed.
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