IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES C. NICHOLS
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
No. 95-A-73 Thomas H. Shriver, Judge
No. M1997-00260-SC-R11-CD - Decided June 30, 2000
We granted this appeal to determine whether the jury instruction given pursuant to a previous version
of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b) during the guilt phase of the trial of James C. Nichols, the
defendant, violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and under Article I, § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. We consider also whether the
evidence is sufficient, as a matter of law, to support Nichols’s conviction for first degree murder. We
hold that the jury instruction given is constitutional. Thus, Nichols’s due process rights were not
violated. Additionally, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Nichols’s conviction
for first degree murder. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.
Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission from Appellate Court to Supreme Court; Judgment
of Conviction of the Court of Criminal Appeals is Affirmed
BIRCH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDERSON, C.J., and DROWOTA , HOLDER ,
and BARKER, JJ., joined.
Jeffrey A. Devasher, Assistant Public Defender, Robert M. Robinson, Assistant Public Defender,
Mary Griffin, Assistant Public Defender, for the appellant, James C. Nichols.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael Moore, Solicitor General, Elizabeth B.
Marney, Assistant Attorney General, Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General, Nicholas D.
Bailey, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
I
We granted this appeal to determine whether the jury instruction1 given pursuant to a
previous version of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b) during the guilt phase of the trial of James C.
Nichols, the defendant, violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and under Article I, § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. We consider also
whether the evidence is sufficient, as a matter of law, to support Nichols’s conviction for first degree
murder.
After a careful review of our own precedent, and an exhaustive reading of the entire record,
we hold that the jury instruction given is constitutional. Thus, Nichols’s due process rights were not
violated. Additionally, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Nichols’s conviction
for first degree murder. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.
II
The salient facts of record indicate that Nichols lived with Barbara Sue Oakley, albeit
intermittently, for approximately eleven years prior to the incident herein involved. On September
24, 1994, during a confrontation, Nichols stabbed Oakley several times; she died six days later from
the wounds inflicted.
Several witnesses testified about Nichols’s excessive use of alcohol and his propensity to
threaten to kill Oakley. Nichols was heard to have made several such threats on the day of the
altercation. In summary, the relationship between Nichols and Oakley was, according to the
testimony, quite stormy because of the threats and physical abuse by Nichols and the heavy
consumption of alcoholic beverages by both parties.
Approximately one week before Oakley’s death, her niece saw Nichols point a knife at
Oakley and tell Oakley that he was going to kill her. Although Nichols had not been drinking prior
to the above-described incident, he was upset because Oakley had recently informed him that she
planned to move out of his residence to live with another man. On this occasion, as on others,
Oakley ignored Nichols’s threats and did not appear frightened.
During the (approximately) eight hours immediately preceding the stabbing, Nichols and
Oakley had consumed two half-gallon jugs of Wild Irish Rose wine. According to Nichols, the two
were seated at Nichols’s kitchen table when they began to argue in the late afternoon of September
24, 1994. Nichols then rose from the table, went toward the kitchen sink, and retrieved a knife from
the drain rack. He then stabbed Oakley three times--twice in her abdomen and once in her upper left
chest. Each stab wound was potentially life threatening. Oakley fled the kitchen and managed to
reach a neighbor’s house. Oakley was taken to Vanderbilt Hospital, where she died six days later.
Two freshly washed knives were later discovered behind the kitchen sink.
1
“When a charge as to possible penalties has been requested . . . the judge shall also include
in the instructions for the jury to weigh and consider the meaning of a sentence of imprisonment
. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b)(2)(A)(i)(Supp. 1994); see also Section III infra.
-2-
At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury as to the range of punishment for
the charged and lesser included offenses pursuant to the applicable statutory provisions.2
Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
The jury will not attempt to fix any sentence. However, you may
weigh and consider the meaning of a sentence of imprisonment.
You are further informed that the minimum number of years a person
sentenced to imprisonment for this offense must serve before
reaching the earliest release eligibility date is 25 years.
Whether a defendant is actually released from incarceration on the
date when first eligible for release is a discretionary decision made by
the Board of Paroles and is based on many factors. The Board of
Paroles has the authority to require a defendant to serve the entire
sentence imposed by the Court.
After considering the evidence and the trial court’s jury instructions, the jury convicted the
defendant of first degree murder. The trial court then imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. The
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Nichols’s conviction and sentence. On appeal, Nichols insists
that his due process rights were violated when the trial court instructed the jury that it could weigh
and consider the meaning of a sentence of imprisonment and then informed the jury of the minimum
years that Nichols would have to serve before reaching his parole eligibility date. Nichols also
contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of first degree murder.
III
A. Jury Instruction Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b)
We first address Nichols’s contention that his due process rights were violated when the trial
judge instructed the jury to weigh and consider the meaning of a sentence of imprisonment pursuant
2
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b)(1) (1994 Supp.); see also Section III infra.
-3-
to a previous version of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b).3 This issue is resolved by our decision
in State v. King. 973 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. 1998).
In King, the defendant contended that the previous version of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
201(b) violated his due process right to a fair trial because the statute permitted the trial judge to
inform the jury as to the defendant’s parole eligibility date; information which, the defendant
contended, was irrelevant to the jury’s determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 591-92. We held
that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b) violated neither the Due Process of Clause of the United States
Constitution nor the Tennessee Constitution. Id. at 592. In determining that the statute was
constitutional, we reasoned that such information “does have a measure of relevance” and that “the
legislature has determined for us the relevancy of sentencing and parole information.” Id. at 591.
We also noted that:
The people of this State, through the members of the General
Assembly, have indicated a desire for truth in the sentencing process.
Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-201(b)(2) is a reflection of that
desire. As a matter of policy, the legislature has decided that the
sentencing information is relevant because jurors are better off having
concrete information on these issues rather than being left to
speculate on their own. The rationale for permitting an instruction on
the range of punishment, even though the jury does not impose the
sentence, is that in reality, “jurors will consider punishment anyway
and without direction may speculate to the possible detriment of a
defendant. If nothing else, the instruction impresses upon the jurors
3
This version of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b) provided that:
(b)(1) In all contested criminal cases . . . upon the motion of either
party, filed with the court prior to the selection of the jury, the court
shall charge the possible penalties for the offense charged and all
lesser included offenses.
(b)(2)(A)(i) When a charge as to possible penalties has been
requested pursuant to subdivision (b)(1), the judge shall also include
in the instructions for the jury to weigh and consider the meaning of
a sentence of imprisonment . . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b) (Supp. 1994)(emphasis added). In 1998, this statute was repealed;
Tennessee juries are no longer allowed to consider sentencing options at the same time they decide
a defendant’s innocence or guilt. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b) (Supp. 1994) with
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b) (Supp. 1998)(“In all contested criminal cases . . . the judge shall
not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys be permitted to comment at any time to the jury, on
possible penalties for the offense charged nor all lesser included offenses.”).
-4-
the consequences of a guilty verdict.” . . . While some may prefer a
“pure” system where juries are wholly unaffected by considerations
other than those strictly relevant to guilt or innocence, the reality is
that jurors bring their experience and knowledge into the courtroom
with them. We do not quarrel with those who feel it is better for them
to be accurately informed rather than left to speculate. . . . [A]n
instruction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b) does not permit
a jury to impose a sentence based on how much time they speculate
that a defendant will actually serve.
Id. at 591-92 (internal citations omitted). Under King, therefore, we hold that Nichols’s due process
rights were not violated when the trial judge instructed the jury pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
35-201(b).
Nichols contends, however, that this case is distinguishable from King because in King the
trial court instructed the jury that the defendant’s parole eligibility date was provided for the jurors’s
information, as opposed to the “weigh and consider” language used in the trial court’s instruction
in this case. We find Nichols’s contention without merit. As noted above, we held in King that an
instruction containing sentencing information given pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b)
was relevant and thus constitutional. A slight difference in the language of the instruction does not
constitute a due process violation. Moreover, we find no significant distinction between the
language “for your information” and “weigh and consider.” Finally, the Court of Criminal Appeals,
when presented with this exact question, relied on our decision in King and held that Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-201(b) was constitutional despite the trial judge’s instruction that the jury could
“weigh and consider” the meaning of a sentence of imprisonment. State v. Green, 995 S.W.2d 591
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998), perm. appeal denied April 12, 1999.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We next turn to Nichols’s contention that there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for first degree murder. When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting
evidence, the standard of review by an appellate court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.
Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979)(emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also State
v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276, 286-87 (Tenn. 1998); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). Additionally, we note that
“[a] guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses
for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493
S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Moreover, a verdict of guilt at the trial court removes the
presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt. See State v. Tuggle, 639
S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).
-5-
At the time of the crime, first degree murder was defined as “[a]n intentional, premeditated
and deliberate killing of another . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (1991).4 In analyzing
whether the State presented sufficient proof of deliberation and premeditation to support Nichols’s
first degree murder conviction, we are guided by the statutory definitions in effect at the time the
events underlying this case occurred:
(1) “Deliberate act” means one performed with a cool purpose; and
(2) “Premeditated act” means one done after the exercise of reflection
and judgment. Premeditation may include instances of homicide
committed by poison or by lying in wait.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-201 (1991).
Additionally, the Sentencing Commission Comments to the above-quoted statute provide
that:
The definition of “a premeditated act” . . . permits that “premeditation
may be formed in an instant.” (Citation omitted). The definition of
“a deliberate act” is that the act be one committed with “a cool
purpose” and without passion or provocation. This latter phrase is
designed to allow the defendant who kills another with passion or
provocation to be adjudged guilty of either second degree murder or
voluntary manslaughter, as defined in those sections.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-201 (1991), Sentencing Comm’n Cmts. (emphasis added). Thus,
deliberation and premeditation are similar, but distinct, elements of the offense of first degree
murder. See id.; see also State v. Brooks, 880 S.W.2d 390, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
In a case previously decided by this Court, we have distinguished the element of
premeditation from the element of deliberation by emphasizing that although the element of
premeditation is capable of instantaneous formation, deliberation requires “some period of reflection,
during which the mind is ‘free from the influence of excitement, or passion.’” State v. Brown, 836
S.W.2d 530, 540 (Tenn. 1992) (emphasis added)(citation omitted). In Brown the element of
deliberation was defined as:
“deliberation” is the process of carefully weighing such matters as the
wisdom of going ahead with the proposed killing, the manner in
which the killing will be accomplished, and the consequences which
may be visited upon the killer if and when apprehended.
4
In 1995, this statute was amended to reflect its current version; first degree murder is now
defined as “[a] premeditated and intentional killing of another . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
202(a)(1) (1995).
-6-
“Deliberation” is present if the thinking, i.e. the “premeditation,” is
being done in such a cool mental state, under such circumstances, and
for such a period of time as to permit a ‘careful weighing’ of the
proposed decision.
Id. at 541 (citation omitted).
The elements of premeditation and deliberation are questions for the jury that may be
established by proof of the circumstances surrounding the killing. See State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d
904, 915 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997). There are several factors
that tend to support the existence of these elements, which include: declarations by the defendant
of an intent to kill, evidence of procurement of a weapon, the use of a deadly weapon upon an
unarmed victim, the particular cruelty of the killing, infliction of multiple wounds, preparation
before the killing for concealment of the crime, destruction or secretion of evidence of the murder,
and calmness immediately after the killing. See Pike, 978 S.W.2d at 914; Bland, 958 S.W.2d at
660; Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 541-42.
Viewing the evidence and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the State, this
Court finds sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of both premeditation and deliberation.
The evidence showed that Nichols and Oakley had a violent and physically abusive relationship.
Nichols threatened Oakley with death on prior occasions and, on at least one of those occasions, had
pointed a knife at her. In committing the murder, Nichols rose from the table at which the couple
were arguing, went toward the kitchen sink, selected a knife from the drain rack, and stabbed Oakley
three times, each time inflicting a life threatening injury.5 Afterward, Nichols apparently washed
the victim’s blood from the knife.
Each of these factors is relevant to either premeditation, deliberation, or both. See Pike, 978
S.W.2d at 914-15; Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660. Thus, the evidence before the jury, while not
overwhelming, was sufficient to support findings of both premeditation and deliberation.
IV
For the reasons articulated above, we hold that Nichols’s due process rights were not violated
by the jury instruction given pursuant to a previous version of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b)
during the guilt phase of his trial. Additionally, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support
his conviction for first degree murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.
Costs of this appeal are assessed to Nichols.
5
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Nichols had retrieved the knife from a
kitchen drawer. Such a conclusion could be drawn from the record and such an act, if true, would
be sufficient to satisfy the elements of premeditation and deliberation.
-7-