I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T E N N E S S E E FILED
A T K N O X V I L L E
( H E A R D A T M O R R I S T O W N ) October 6, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
S T A T E O F T E N N E S S E E ) F O R P U B L I C A T I O N
)
) F I L E D : O C T O B E R 6 , 1 9 9 7
A p p e l l a n t )
) S U L L I V A N C O U N T Y
v . )
) H O N . R . J E R R Y B E C K ,
) J U D G E
B E T T Y D . L E V A N D O W S K I )
) N O . 0 3 - S - 0 1 - 9 6 1 1 - C R - 0 0 0 1 1 6
A p p e l l e e )
F o r A p p e l l a n t : F o r A p p e l l e e :
K E N N E T H F . I R V I N E , J R . J O H N K N O X W A L K U P
K n o x v i l l e , T N A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l a n d R e p o r t e r
M I C H A E L E . M O O R E
S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l
E L I Z A B E T H T . R Y A N
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l
N a s h v i l l e , T N
H . G R E E L E Y W E L L S , J R .
D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l
N A N C Y S T A L L A R D H A R R
B A R R Y P . S T A U B U S
A s s i s t a n t D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y s
G e n e r a l
B l o u n t v i l l e , T N
O P I N I O N
A F F I R M E D B I R C H , J .
In this appeal,1 we must determine whether a false
response from an individual to an inquiry made by a law enforcement
officer constitutes a false report within the meaning of Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-16-502(a)(1) (1991). After careful review, we hold that
§ 39-16-502(a)(1) applies to statements volunteered or initiated by
an individual but does not apply to statements made in response to
inquiries by law enforcement officers. Accordingly, the judgment
of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
Betty Levandowski, the defendant, was convicted of
aggravated child abuse and making a false report. On appeal,
Levandowski argued that the false report statute was “overly broad
and vague.” The intermediate court affirmed the conviction for
aggravated child abuse and reversed the conviction for making a
false report. We granted the State’s application for permission to
appeal and limited the grant to the “false report” issue.
I
On May 19, 1994, an officer with the Kingsport Police
Department went to Levandowski’s home to investigate a report of
1
Oral argument was heard in this case on May 7, 1997, in
Morristown, Hamblen County, Tennessee, as part of this Court’s
S.C.A.L.E.S. (Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for Students)
project.
2
suspected child abuse. Upon arrival, the officer spoke with
Levandowski and asked to see the child. Levandowski responded that
she had put the boy on a bus to Chicago and if the officer did not
believe her, he could look around. Later, however, the child was
found in a neighboring residence. Levandowski was subsequently
indicted for and convicted of a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
16-502(a)(1) for her false response to the officer’s question as to
the child’s whereabouts.
II
The construction of a statute is a question of law, and
thus, our review is de novo. Roseman v. Roseman, 890 S.W.2d 27, 29
(Tenn. 1994); The Beare Co. v. Tennessee Dept. of Revenue, 858
S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tenn. 1993); Comdata Network, Inc. v. Tennessee
Dept. of Revenue, 852 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn. 1993).
A statute must be construed so as to ascertain and give
effect to the intent and purpose of the legislation considering the
statute as a whole and giving words their common and ordinary
meaning. Crowe v. Ferguson, 814 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tenn. 1991);
Marion Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Marion Cty. Election Comm'n, 594
S.W.2d 681, 684-85 (Tenn. 1980). The Court should assume that the
legislature used each word in the statute purposely and that the
use of these words conveyed some intent. Crowe, 814 S.W.2d at 723;
Anderson Fish & Oyster Co. v. Olds, 197 Tenn. 604, 277 S.W.2d 344,
346 (1955). Furthermore, this Court may review previous
legislation on the subject in an effort to learn the present
3
intention of the legislature. Id. In construing statutes, courts
must presume that the legislature has knowledge of its prior
enactments and knows the state of the law at the time it passes
legislation. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995).
Finally, penal statutes are construed strictly and
against the State. State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945, 952 (Tenn.
1987). As a general rule of statutory construction, any ambiguity
in a criminal statute is construed in favor of the defendant.
State v. Blouvett, 904 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Tenn. 1995)(citing Key v.
State, 563 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tenn. 1978)).
With these caveats in mind, we turn to the statute at
issue. Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-16-502(a) provides in
pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person to:
(1) Report to a law enforcement
officer an offense or incident
within the officer’s concern:
. . . .
(C) Knowing the information
relating to the offense is false
. . .
At the outset, we note that the previous version of this
statute was worded more broadly:
(a) A person commits the offense of
false reporting to authorities if
he:
. . . .
4
(3) Makes a report, purposely causes
the transmission of a report or
furnishes information to law
enforcement authorities concerning a
crime or other incident within their
official concern if he knows that he
has no such information relating to
such crime or incident or he knows
that the information is false
. . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-5-524 (1983)(emphasis added). Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that in amending the statute, the
legislature intended to narrow the situations in which it applies.
We have also carefully reviewed the legislature’s use of
the term “report” in other sections of the criminal code. The
legislature has consistently used the term “report” in contexts
where the individual initiates the provision of the information,
not in contexts where an individual is responding to an inquiry.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-525(b)(Supp. 1996)(“the district
attorney general shall conduct a criminal history check . . . .
[and] report the results of such criminal history check to the
court . . . .”); § 39-14-209 (1991)(upon receiving information that
a horse is footsore, the manager of the horse show “shall report
the same in writing to the district attorney general . . . .”); §§
39-14-902(2)(C)(i) & -903(c)(2)(A)(Supp. 1996)(money laundering
statute does not apply to suspicious transactions “whether
reportable or not under any state or federal currency transaction
reporting or recording requirements, where: [s]uch person or
corporation reports such suspicious transaction . . . .”); § 39-14-
909 (Supp. 1996)(“[t]he reporting of a financial transaction by a
corporation or other business entity to a regulator shall not
5
create a cause of action . . . .”); § 39-15-203 (1991)(a doctor
performing an abortion “shall make a report to the commissioner of
health . . . .”); § 39-16-606 (1991)(whenever a person escapes from
custody, the appropriate warden “shall immediately report the
escape . . . .”); § 39-17-1312 (Supp. 1996)(“It is an offense if
the parent . . . knows that such minor is in illegal possession of
a firearm . . . [and] fails to report it to the appropriate school
or law enforcement officials.”). In contrast, the perjury statute
uses the phrase “make a false statement,” which is obviously
intended to include responsive statements. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-16-701 et seq. (1991). Thus, while “report” can, according to
some of its dictionary definitions, be used in the context of a
response to a question, the legislature has not utilized the term
in this manner. Arguably, the statute is ambiguous. We believe
the better course is to construe “report” as used in Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-16-502 consistent with its use in the other sections of
the criminal code. As a criminal statute, § 39-16-502 is also
subject to strict construction in favor of the defendant.
We also note that the legislature defined the term
“statement” in the subsection immediately preceding the subsection
at issue here. Had the legislature intended § 39-16-502 to apply
to responsive statements, the obvious term to use would have been
“statement.” The court in People v. Smith, 281 P.2d 103 131 Cal.
App.2d Supp. 889(Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1955) reached a similar
conclusion:
we have concluded that if it had
been the intent of the City Council
to proscribe conduct such as that
6
disclosed by the evidence here, it
would have used language
substantially different from that
which it did. It seems reasonable
that in such circumstances it would
have provided that it should be
unlawful for any person to willfully
make a false statement to a police
officer for the purpose stated--
rather than using the word “report,”
which in its context, at least,
seems to connote a statement written
or oral made upon the initiative of
one who resorts to the police
department or a member thereof for
the specific purpose of having some
action taken with respect thereto
rather than by way of response to
questions by an officer . . . .
Id. at 104.
We hold today that “report” as used in Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-16-502 applies to a written or oral statement initiated by a
person. In this context, “report” does not apply to a person’s
response to an inquiry by a law enforcement officer.
It results that the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed. Costs are taxed to the State, for which
execution may issue if necessary.
____________________________________
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice
CONCUR:
Anderson, C.J.
Reid, J.
DISSENT:
Drowota, Holder, JJ.
7
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
(HEARD AT MORRISTOWN) FILED
October 6, 1997
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) FOR PUBLICATION
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate C ourt Clerk
Appellant, ) Sullivan County
)
v. ) Hon. R. Jerry Beck,
) Judge
BETTY D. LEVANDOWSKI, )
) No. 03S01-9611-CR-
00116
Appellee )
DISSENTING OPINION
I dissent from the majority decision interpreting Tenn. Code
Ann § 39-16-502(a)(1) (1991 Repl.) as applying only to false statements
initiated by an individual to the exclusion of false statements given in
response to inquiries by law enforcement officials. For the reasons
explained below, the majority’s interpretation is contrary to the plain
language of the statute. Therefore, I would reverse the Court of Criminal
Appeals’ decision and affirm the defendant’s conviction for making a
false report.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The most basic principle of statutory construction is to
ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. Owens v. State, 908
S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995). Legislative intent is to be ascertained
whenever possible from the natural and ordinary meaning of the
language used, without forced or subtle construction that would limit or
extend the meaning of the language. Carson Creek Vacation Resorts,
Inc. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993) (emphasis
added). Courts must presume that the General Assembly intended that
every word used in a statute would have a purpose and convey a
meaning. Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tenn. 1996). The
presence of words of limitation in one part of a statute indicates that the
absence of such words from other parts of the same statute is an
intentional legislative choice. State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn.
1992). If the legislative intent is expressed in a manner devoid of
contradiction and ambiguity, there is no room for interpretation or
constructions, and courts are not at liberty, on consideration of policy or
hardship to depart from the words of the statute. Carson Creek Vacation
Resorts, Inc., 865 S.W.2d at 2. Where the language contained within the
four corners of a statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, the duty of the
courts is simple and obvious, “to say sic lex scripta, and obey it.” Id.,
quoting Miller v. Childress, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 319, 321-22 (1841).
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The language contained within the four corners of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-16-502 (a) is not ambiguous. The statute provides as
follows:
(a) It is unlawful for any person to:
(1) Report to a law enforcement officer an
offense or incident within the officer’s concern:
(A) Knowing the offense or incident
did not occur;
(B) Knowing the person reporting
has no information relating to the
offense or incident; or
(C) Knowing the information relating
to the offense is false; or
(2) Intentionally initiate or circulate a report of
a past, present, or impending bombing, fire or
other emergency, knowing that the report is false
or baseless and knowing:
(A) It will cause action of any sort by
an official or volunteer agency
organized to deal with those
emergencies;
(B) It will place a person in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury; or
(C) It will prevent or interrupt the
occupation of any building, place of
assembly, form of conveyance, or
any other place to which the public
has access.
(Emphasis added.) The natural and ordinary meaning of the word
“report,” includes statements given in response to inquiries by law
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enforcement officials. To “report” simply means “[t]o give an account of,
to relate, to tell, to convey or disseminate information.” Black’s Law
Dictionary, 1300 (6th ed. 1990). The majority’s interpretation is an
unwarranted limitation of the meaning of the language of the statute, in
contravention of this Court’s duty.
Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, resort
to extrinsic aids to determine legislative intent is not appropriate.
Roseman v. Roseman, 890 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tenn. 1994); Carson Creek
Vacation Resorts, Inc., 865 S.W.2d at 2. Because the language of the
statute at issue in this case is clear, the majority’s reliance upon extrinsic
aids to determine legislative intent is inappropriate and unnecessary.
However, even if statutory language is ambiguous, when discerning
legislative intent it is only appropriate to consider statutes “in pari
materia”-- those relating to the same subject or having a common
purpose. Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926. In this case, the majority relies
upon the definition of the term “report” in other unrelated statutes to
support its interpretation. Conspicuously absent from the majority
decision is a discussion of the other words used in the remainder of the
statute at issue which expressly limit application of Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-16-502(a)(2) (1991 Repl.) to false reports “intentionally initiate[d] or
circulate[d]” by individuals. It is clear that, had the General Assembly
intended to limit application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-502(a)(1) to
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declarant-initiated false reports, appropriate language was available to
do so. Therefore, the absence of an express limitation from subsection
(a)(1) militates against the interpretation adopted by the majority and
indicates that the General Assembly deliberately chose to give that
subsection a broad application. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d at 82.
Finally, the important element to consider in determining
whether a false report has been made is whether the person gave the
report knowing (A) the offense or incident did not occur; (B) the person
reporting has no information relating to the offense or incident; or (C) the
information relating to the offense is false. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-502
(a)(1) (1991 Repl.). By focusing upon the party initiating the contact
during which the false statement is given, the majority exalts form over
substance. See State v. Fenster, 199 A.2d 177 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1962) (so
characterizing the definition of “report” adopted in People v. Smith, 281
P.2d 103 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1955), upon which the majority in
this case rely.)
I would hold, as Judge Jerry Smith held in his dissent in the
Court of Criminal Appeals, that “report,” as used in Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-16-502 (1991 Repl.), includes statements given in response to
inquiries by law enforcement officials. Therefore, I would reverse the
Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision and affirm the defendant’s conviction
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of making a false report. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s
decision.
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I am authorized to state that Justice Holder concurs in this
Dissenting Opinion.
________________________________
Frank F. Drowota, III,
Justice
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