Davis v. Reagan

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

FOR PUBLICATION

VERNON RAY DAVIS, ) Filed: September 8, 1997
)
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) No. 03S01-9603-CV-00034
)
v. ) HON. WILLIAM R. HOLT, JR.,
) JUDGE
JIM REAGAN and HOWARD SEXTON, )
d/b/a PRECISION CONSTRUCTION ) SEVIER CIRCUIT
CO.; and TRAVELERS INSURANCE )
CO.,

Defendants/Appellees,
)
)
)
FILED
)
and ) September 8, 1997
)
LARRY BRINTON, JR., Director of ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Worker's Compensation, Tennessee ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
Dept. of Labor, Second Injury Fund, )
)
Defendant/Appellant. )

and

BESSIE LOU RAYFIELD, )
)
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) NO. 03S01-9602-CV-00009
)
v. ) HON. WILLIAM R. HOLT, JR.,
) JUDGE
EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY )
OF WAUSAU; and ED SMITH, d/b/a ) SEVIER CIRCUIT
DAYS INN OF PIGEON FORGE, )
)
Defendants/Appellants, )
)
and )
)
LARRY BRINTON, TENNESSEE )
DEPT. OF LABOR, DIVISION OF )
WORKERS' COMPENSATION, )
SECOND INJURY FUND, )
)
Defendant/Appellee. )

FOR APPELLEE : FOR APPELLANT, SECOND INJURY FUND:

R. B. Hailey John Knox Walkup
Frank Q. Vettori Attorney General & Reporter
Knoxville
Dianne Stamey Dycus
Senior Counsel, Attorney General's Office

OPINION
TRIAL COURT JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED HOLDER, J.
 OPINION

We granted this consolidated appeal to determine whether permanent

total disability can be awarded when an anatomical disability rating is less than

16.7 percent. In Seiber v. Greenbrier Industries, Inc., 906 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn.

1995), this Court adopted a panel decision holding that the limits in Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-241 (1996 Supp.) precluded an award of total disability when the

anatomical impairment was less than 16.7 percent. A later, but unpublished,

workers' compensation panel decision held that the limitations in Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-241(b) are not applicable to permanent total disability claims.

Warren v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 03S01-9506-CV-00061 (Nov. 29, 1995, at

Knoxville). We granted review to reconcile these two cases and decide this

issue. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the panel's findings in

Warren and hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241's limitations on permanent

partial disability do not apply to awards of permanent total disability.

BACKGROUND

Vernon Ray Davis and Bessie Lou Rayfield had received prior workers'

compensation awards. Both sustained subsequent work-related injuries and

received anatomical ratings of less than 16.7 per cent. Davis’ subsequent injury

caused an additional ten percent anatomical impairment. Rayfield’s physician

attributed fifteen percent of her total anatomical rating to her most recent work-

related injury. Both were adjudged permanently and totally disabled under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4) (1991 Repl.).

Both cases were appealed and argued before special workers'

compensation appeals panels. The cases were consolidated and transferred to

this Court. The parties were ordered to "file supplemental briefs on the issue of

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whether the multiplier maximums provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 &

-242 apply to findings of permanent total disability."

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The appellants, the Second Injury Fund and the workers’ compensation

carriers, assign error to the trial courts' decisions to award permanent total

disability benefits. They assert that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 prohibits

awards of permanent total disability because both Davis' and Rayfield’s most

recent medical impairment ratings were less than 16.7 percent. We disagree.

Our Workers' Compensation Act classifies compensable occupational

disabilities into four distinct classifications. These classifications are: (1)

temporary total disability; (2) temporary partial disability; (3) permanent partial

disability; and (4) permanent total disability. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(1)-

207(4) (1996 Supp.). This Court has previously recognized that each separate

disability classification is independent and serves a specific compensation goal.

Roberson v. Loretto Casket Co., 722 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. 1986); Redmond

v. McMinn County, 354 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1962). The issue in controversy

involves the interrelation of both permanent total and permanent partial disability

and a statute specifically limiting permanent partial disability awards.

Awards for permanent partial disability are governed by Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 50-6-207(3)(A) -207(F) (1996 Supp.). An employee sustaining either a

disability to a scheduled member or a disability adjudged both permanent and

partial to the body as a whole may be eligible for permanent partial disability

benefits. Permanent partial benefits are paid either as scheduled or for a period

of up to 400 weeks. Id.; Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 & 242 (1996 Supp.).

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 The statutory definition of total disability focuses on an employee's ability

to return to gainful employment. Employees who are totally incapacitated from

gainful employment by work-related disabilities not otherwise specifically

provided for under the Act are statutorily classified as "totally disabled." Disabled

workers falling within the purview of the "total disability" definition shall be paid

permanent total disability benefits pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(A)

(1996 Supp.).

In 1992, the legislature limited permanent partial disability awards. These

limits as codified provide in pertinent part:

For injuries arising on or after August 1, 1992, in cases where an
injured employee is eligible to receive any permanent partial
disability benefits, pursuant to § 50-6-207(3)(A)(I) and (F), and the
pre-injury employer returns the employee to employment at a wage
equal to or greater than the employee was receiving at the time of
the injury, the maximum permanent partial disability award the
employee may receive is two and one half (2 ½) times the medical
impairment rating . . . and [if] the pre-injury employer does not
return the employee to employment at a wage equal to or greater
than the employee was receiving at the time of the injury, the
maximum permanent partial disability award that the employee may
receive is six (6) times the medical impairment rating.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1) & (b) (1996 Supp.). Accordingly, the statute

places limitations on that subset of disabilities that are: (1) not scheduled; and

(2) adjudged to be permanent partial.

A recent panel decision, however, held that the limitations contained in

§ 50-6-241 were also applicable to awards of permanent total disability. In

Seiber v Greenbrier Industries, Inc., 906 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn. 1995), a panel held

that § 50-6-241 precluded a trial court from awarding total disability benefits

when the anatomical disability rating was less than 16.7 percent. The panel

reasoned that under § 50-6-241, the legislature had indicated an intent to limit

"permanent disability awards" to six times the impairment rating. Id. at 447. The

panel then adopted a mathematical approach to assessing permanent total

disability claims. Id.

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 We disagree with the analysis in Seiber. First, the legislature has

explicitly indicated an intent to limit permanent partial disability awards and not

"permanent disability awards" in general. Next, total disability as statutorily

defined is not based on a purely objective assessment or an anatomical

mathematical computation. See generally Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc.,

746 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Tenn. 1988) (holding vocational disability is based on both

lay and expert testimony and is not restricted to precise disability estimates

made by experts). The definition instead focuses on the injured employee's

ability to earn wages.

Lastly, Seiber's holding was premised on effectuating legislative intent

from the entire statutory scheme. The panel noted that "[t]he purpose of the

Workers' Compensation Reform Act [was] to provide benefits to injured

employees while limiting employer liability so as to keep workers' compensation

affordable . . . ." Seiber, 906 S.W.2d at 447. The panel then found that the

purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 was to "encourage employers to retain

injured workers at wages equal to or greater than received prior to the injury by

providing for lesser disability awards if the employee is retained." Id. at 447-48.

Legislative intent, however, shall be derived from a statute's face when

the statutory language is unambiguous. Hamblen County Educ. Ass'n v.

Hamblen County Bd. of Educ., 892 S.W.2d 428, 435 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); see

Carson Creek Vac. Resorts, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993)

(stating where language within four corners of statute is plain, clear, and

ambiguous, intent shall be derived from statute's face). If a statute's language is

expressed in a manner devoid of ambiguity, courts are not at liberty to depart

from the statute's words. Id. Accordingly, courts are restricted to the "natural

and ordinary" meaning of a statute unless an ambiguity necessitates resorting

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elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent. Austin v. Memphis Publ. Co., 655

S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tenn. 1983).

We find Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241's language unambiguous. The

statute requires a threshold finding that the employee is eligible to receive

permanent partial disability benefits. Moreover, the legislative language in

§ 50-6-241 narrows its application to those specific subsections or claims of

permanent partial disability falling within the purview of “[Tenn. Code Ann.]

§ 50-6-207 3(A)(I) and (F).” This narrowing language does not lend a legitimate

inference that the legislature intended the limitations in § 50-6-241 to encompass

all forms of permanent disability.

We are unpersuaded by Seiber's implication that Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 50-6-242 (1996 Supp.)1 provides the remedy for workers who would otherwise

be considered totally disabled had their anatomical rating been 16.7 percent or

1
Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-242 permits a trial judge to award

permanent partial disability benefits, not to exceed four hundred
(400) weeks, in appropriate cases where permanent medical
impairment is found and the employee is eligible to receive the
maximum disability award under § 50-6-241(a)(2) or (b).

Awards under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242 are predicated upon finding three of
the following four criteria applicable:

1. The employee lacks a high school diploma or general
equivalency diploma or the employee cannot read or write on a
grade eight (8) level;

2. The employee is age fifty-five (55) or older;

3. The employee has no reasonably transferrable job skills from
prior vocational background and training; and

4. The employee has no reasonable employment opportunities
available locally considering the employee's permanent medical
condition.

We note that criteria four speaks in terms of "reasonable employment
opportunities" whereas total disability is defined as the inability to work "at an
occupation which brings such employee an income." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
207(4)(B).

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greater. Section 50-6-242, by explicit statutory language, is applicable only to

that subset of permanent partial disability claims in which the employee is eligible

to receive the maximum disability award under Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 50-6-241(a)(2) or (b). Accordingly, if the claim does not fall within the purview

of § 50-6-241(a)(2) or (b), courts simply cannot proceed to § 50-6-242.

We find the statutory provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act set

forth the following procedures for assessing work-related permanent disabilities.

The initial inquiry is:

(1) Whether the disability is to a scheduled member (i.e.,
enumerated)?

An affirmative answer to question one mandates that the employee's award be

as enumerated. If, however, the disability is non-enumerated, the pertinent

question becomes:

(2) Whether the employee is totally incapacitated from
working at an occupation that generates an income?

If question two is answered affirmatively, the employee is eligible for total

disability benefits. If, however, the employee is able to work at an occupation

that generates an income, the trial court proceeds to § 50-6-241. If certain

conditions are satisfied under § 50-6-241, the trial court may then proceed to

§ 50-6-242. The inquiries then become: whether the job opportunities available

are reasonable; whether the employee has reasonable job skills that are

transferrable; whether the employee is fifty-five or older; and whether the

employee meets specific statutory education criteria.

Both the procedures established by the Workers' Compensation Act and

the plain and ordinary language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 convey a

specific legislative intent to limit § 50-6-241's application to awards of permanent

partial disability. We, therefore, hold that § 50-6-241 is inapplicable to

permanent total disability and does not preclude a trial judge from awarding

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permanent total disability merely because an anatomical impairment rating is

less than 16.7 percent.

Holding that § 50-6-241's limitations are inapplicable to permanent total

disability does not contravene the policy of employee retention as enunciated in

Seiber. To the contrary, employers will be encouraged to find positions that

accommodate work-related disabilities to avoid adjudications of total disability

and payment of lifetime benefits. If, however, injured workers are "totally

disabled" as statutorily defined, applying the limitations of § 50-6-241 to their

claims does not advance the policy of employee retention. Totally disabled

workers, by definition, are incapable of earning wages or being retained.

Accordingly, applying § 241 to the permanent total disability subsection on the

basis of encouraging employee retention is simply illogical.

The parties have briefed additional issues. W e have reviewed those

issues and find them devoid of merit. For the reasons discussed in this opinion,

we affirm the trial courts' judgments. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the

appellants, Second Injury Fund and the workers' compensation carriers, for

which execution may issue if necessary.

JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE

CONCURRING:

Drowota, Reid, Birch, JJ.
Anderson, C.J., not participating

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