COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Frank
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
KEVIN ALEXANDER CONNELL
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2193-99-2 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
FEBRUARY 27, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
Buford M. Parsons, Jr., Judge Designate
Christian L. Connell (Mays & Valentine,
L.L.P., on briefs), for appellant.
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Kevin Alexander Connell (appellant) appeals his convictions
by a jury of second degree murder and use of a firearm in
commission of a murder. On appeal, he contends the trial court
erred in: 1) refusing to grant his proffered jury instruction
on excusable homicide; 2) refusing to grant either of his
proffered jury instructions on imperfect self-defense; and 3)
refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of
voluntary manslaughter in mutual combat. For the reasons that
follow, we reverse the convictions.
I. BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours of January 7, 1998, Jon Lord
(victim) was shot by appellant in the parking lot of the Hyatt
Hotel in Richmond.
Judy Wiesler, a witness for the Commonwealth, testified she
met the victim and Jeff Krupnicka on the evening of January 6,
1998 at the Hyatt Hotel in Richmond. Then, Wiesler and the
victim rode with Krupnicka to the Playing Field to get something
to eat and play pool. At the Playing Field, the three were
sitting at a table when appellant sat down at the table. None
of the three knew appellant. Appellant made fun of the victim's
pastel-colored tie by saying it looked feminine and made the
victim appear gay. Wiesler testified that appellant's tone was
sarcastic and insulting. Appellant then commented in a
sarcastic tone that Krupnicka had a Yankee accent and looked
homosexual because of the earring in his ear. Wiesler then left
the table and went to play pool. A couple of minutes later,
Wiesler looked up and saw the victim throw appellant's pack of
cigarettes on the floor. Appellant then walked away from the
table and left the Playing Field. Wiesler said that she, the
victim, and Krupnicka played pool after appellant left and "blew
off" the incident.
Wiesler further testified that she, the victim, and
Krupnicka left the Playing Field at 1:45 a.m. on January 7,
1998, and returned to the parking lot at the Hyatt Hotel. At
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the Hyatt Hotel, the victim and Wiesler exited Krupnicka's
vehicle and started walking toward their parked cars. They
noticed a four-wheel drive vehicle pull into the parking lot
behind Krupnicka's car. Appellant got out of the four-wheel
drive vehicle with a pistol in one hand and a shotgun in the
other. Appellant started to walk toward Wiesler, the victim,
and Krupnicka, yelling obscenities. Appellant had the pistol
pointed down and the shotgun pointed up in the air. Appellant
told Wiesler she was not going to get hurt and to walk away
because she was not involved. Wiesler walked toward the street
and was halfway across the street when she heard a shot.
Wiesler testified she turned around and saw the victim holding
appellant against the four-wheel drive vehicle. The victim had
his hands around appellant's shirt collar. Appellant was still
holding the shotgun. Wiesler heard more shots and started to
walk back to the Hyatt parking lot. Appellant and the victim
started struggling with each other and fell below Wiesler's line
of sight. After hearing three more shots, Wiesler looked around
the corner of a car and saw the victim lying on the ground. The
victim was screaming that he had been shot, and appellant was
standing over him with both guns in his hands. Appellant told
the victim he was an idiot and he was going to have to take him
to the hospital. Krupnicka drove his car up to appellant and
hit appellant in the back of his legs, causing appellant to
stumble forward. Appellant said Krupnicka was crazy and that
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Wiesler was an idiot for hanging out with the victim and
Krupnicka. Appellant then ran to his car and drove off.
Jeff Krupnicka testified that appellant approached him, the
victim, and Wiesler at the Playing Field. Appellant made
obscene remarks about the victim's and Krupnicka's neckties.
Krupnicka testified that he and the victim responded with
obscenities. Appellant lit a cigarette while sitting at the
table with Krupnicka and the victim. The victim grabbed the
cigarette out of appellant's mouth and threw it. More
obscenities were exchanged. Then, appellant tried to light
another cigarette. The victim took appellant's pack of
cigarettes, crumpled them, and threw them. Appellant cursed
Krupnicka and the victim and walked away.
Krupnicka testified he, the victim, and Wiesler left the
Playing Field and returned to the Hyatt. The victim and Wiesler
exited his car and he stood in the doorway of his car to say
goodbye. At that time, appellant's vehicle pulled up behind
Krupnicka's car. Krupnicka saw appellant walk toward the victim
holding the pistol and the shotgun. As appellant walked, he
began talking and lowered the shotgun. Krupnicka heard
appellant say, "'I'm going to kill you.'" The victim lunged and
tried to grab the shotgun. Krupnicka testified he saw the
shotgun fire three times as the victim held it. The victim and
appellant then started wrestling. Krupnicka returned to his car
to call 911. Then, Krupnicka drove up behind appellant and hit
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him in the back of the legs. Appellant fell forward and then
got in his vehicle and drove away.
Appellant testified he was playing pool in the Playing
Field, when he first noticed Wiesler, the victim, and Krupnicka
loudly having fun at a nearby table. He testified that as he
was leaving the Playing Field, he "noticed . . . the victim's
[neck]tie and . . . actually paid him a compliment on it." He
testified that the victim responded, "I wear this tie to pick up
faggots like you." Appellant said he considered the comment
humorously "in the manner [the victim] intended it" and sat at
their table at their invitation. He testified that after he
introduced himself all three of the group introduced themselves
to him. They began a friendly conversation that later led to an
argument. Appellant testified he was intimidated and shocked
when the victim threatened him. After the victim pushed him,
appellant paid his bill and drove home, where he had another
alcoholic drink. He then decided that he would "scare the hell
out of [the group]" and "get an apology" from them. He
retrieved a rifle and a shotgun. A handgun was already in his
car. He then returned to the Playing Field.
He waited for Krupnicka, the victim, and Wiesler to leave
the Playing Field and he followed them to the Hyatt Hotel
parking lot. Appellant parked behind Krupnicka's car and got
out of his vehicle. He was carrying the shotgun and the pistol.
Appellant testified he walked to the front of his car and
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demanded an apology from Krupnicka and the victim. Appellant
testified that the victim then began to walk toward him.
Appellant told Wiesler to leave, that she was not involved, and
he did not want her to get hurt. Appellant testified he warned
the victim to stay back. He tucked the pistol in his pants and
then pointed the shotgun in the air to fire a warning shot over
the victim's head. Appellant testified he never pointed the
shotgun at the victim, did not say he was going to kill the
victim, and did not walk toward the victim. The victim
continued walking toward appellant and appellant fired a second
warning shot and said, "'Stay back.'" Appellant realized the
victim was not going to stop, so he turned to run and ran into
the front of his car. The victim then grabbed appellant and
appellant tossed away the shotgun. A struggle ensued between
the two men. Appellant testified the victim put him in a
headlock that included his left arm. The victim hoisted
appellant into the air and told him he was going to kill him.
The victim then dragged appellant around the side of appellant's
vehicle. Appellant's feet were dragging across the ground and
he did not have his weight under him. He stated that he "'was
like a rag doll in [the victim's] hands.'" Appellant stated
that it was at this point that he fired the shot into the
victim's side, which ultimately resulted in the victim's death.
The victim maintained his hold on appellant and appellant shot
him in the right thigh. The victim fell to the ground and
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appellant tried to get away from the victim. Fearing the victim
was going to grab the pistol, appellant shot him a third time in
the left shoulder. Appellant testified that he told the victim
he would not leave him and would get him to the hospital.
Appellant fled the scene after Krupnicka tried to run over him
with his vehicle.
The jury convicted appellant of second degree murder, a
lesser-included offense of the charge of first degree murder.
II. ANALYSIS
A defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed only on those theories of the
case that are supported by evidence. Tuggle
v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 508, 323
S.E.2d 539, 548 (1984), vacated on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 1096, 105 S. Ct. 2315, 85
L.Ed.2d 835, aff'd on remand, 230 Va. 99,
334 S.E.2d 838 (1985); LeVasseur[v.
Commonwealth], 225 Va. [564,] 590-91, 304
S.E.2d [644,] 658-59 [(1983)]; Linwood Earl
Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 532, 543,
273 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1031, 101 S. Ct. 3022, 69 L.Ed.2d 400
(1981). The evidence to support an
instruction "must be more than a scintilla."
LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 590, 304 S.E.2d at
658; Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 811,
814, 241 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1978).
Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 388, 345 S.E.2d 267, 280
(1986).
"[T]he trial court should instruct the
jury only on those theories of the case
which find support in the evidence." Morse
v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 627, 632-33,
440 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1994). "'If any
credible evidence in the record supports a
proffered instruction on a lesser included
offense, failure to give the instruction is
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reversible error.' 'Such an instruction,
however, must be supported by more than a
mere scintilla of evidence.'" Brandau v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 408, 411, 430
S.E.2d 563, 564 (1993) (citations omitted).
Goodson v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 61, 78, 467 S.E.2d 848, 857
(1996).
"On appeal, when the issue is a refused jury instruction,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
proponent of the instruction." Lynn v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.
App. 336, 344, 499 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (1998) (citing Turner v.
Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 270, 275, 476 S.E.2d 504, 507 (1996)),
aff'd, 257 Va. 239, 514 S.E.2d 147 (1999). Appellant first
contends the trial court erred in failing to give the jury
appellant's proffered instruction on excusable homicide. We
agree.
Excusable self-defense may be asserted
when the accused, who was at some fault in
precipitating the confrontation with the
victim, abandons the fight and retreats as
far as he or she safely can . . . . See
McCoy v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 771, 776, 99
S.E. 644, 646 (1919).
Lynn, 27 Va. App. at 350, 499 S.E.2d at 7-8.
Once the accused abandons the attack and retreats as far as
he or she safely can, he or she may kill his or her adversary if
there is "a reasonably apparent necessity to preserve his [or
her] own life or save himself [or herself] from great bodily
harm." Bailey v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 92, 96, 104 S.E.2d 28,
31 (1958).
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Appellant's evidence established he provoked the violence
in the hotel parking lot by following the victim, Krupnicka, and
Wiesler to that location. He testified that he fired two
warning shots over the victim's head when the victim began to
advance toward him. He put the pistol on safety and tucked it
into his pants. He also twice warned the victim to stay back.
Then, he turned to run and ran into the front of his vehicle,
which gave the victim the opportunity to catch him. This
testimony established more than a mere scintilla of evidence
that appellant retreated as far as possible before the victim
apprehended him. At this point, appellant tossed his shotgun
away. We believe this testimony established more than a mere
scintilla of evidence that appellant abandoned the fight.
The victim was 6'1" tall and weighed over 200 pounds, while
appellant is 5'6" tall and weighs 180 pounds. Appellant
testified the victim hoisted him into the air and told him he
was going to kill him. The victim headlocked appellant and
dragged appellant. Appellant testified that the victim again
told him he was going to kill him. Appellant said he did not
have his weight under him and "was like a rag doll in [the
victim's] hands." Appellant also testified he was fearful the
victim would shoot him with the shotgun. At this point,
appellant fired the fatal shot into the victim's side with the
pistol. This evidence provided more than a scintilla of
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evidence that appellant killed the victim out of a reasonably
apparent necessity to preserve his own life, and was sufficient
to support an instruction on excusable homicide. Therefore, we
find the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on
excusable homicide. We reverse appellant's convictions and
remand for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised.
III.
Appellant next contends the trial court erred in refusing
to grant either of appellant's proffered jury instructions on
imperfect self-defense. Appellant argues that the jury should
have been instructed on imperfect self-defense because there was
more than a scintilla of evidence that he displayed the firearms
without an intent to kill or do serious bodily harm and that he
shot the victim only because he reasonably feared he would
suffer serious bodily harm. We disagree.
Appellant argues the refused instruction would have
mitigated the malice necessary for a murder conviction to
manslaughter. Appellant cites authority from other states in
support of his argument. The cases cited by appellant liken
imperfect self-defense to voluntary manslaughter committed in
the heat of passion. See People v. Heflin, 456 N.W.2d 10, 22
n.22 (Mich. 1990); State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759, 761 (Md.
1984); State v. Sanders, 556 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977);
Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 509, 519 (Tex. Ct. App. 1892); State
v. Partlow, 4 S.W. 14 (Mo. 1887).
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In this case, the trial court instructed the jury on the
definitions of malice, heat of passion, first degree and second
degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter in the heat of
passion. The trial court also granted an instruction explaining
that malice distinguishes murder from manslaughter.
Appellant also relies upon Hash v. Commonwealth, 88 Va.
172, 13 S.E. 398 (1891), to support his argument that imperfect
self-defense is a doctrine recognized by Virginia law.
Appellant concedes, however, that Hash is the only Virginia case
that discusses "imperfect defense."
If we interpret the discussion of "imperfect defense" in
Hash for the proposition that one can provoke a confrontation
and still avail himself or herself of the defense of justifiable
homicide, such holding was overruled by Jackson v. Commonwealth,
98 Va. 845, 36 S.E. 487 (1900). However, if we interpret Hash
to hold that one may avail himself or herself of "imperfect
defense" if he or she provoked an attack without felonious
intent, such holding merely is the law of voluntary manslaughter
as it currently stands in the Commonwealth. Further, the trial
court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter, heat of
passion, and the distinction between murder and manslaughter.
We, therefore, find the trial court did not err in denying
appellant's proffered jury instructions on imperfect
self-defense.
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IV.
Finally, appellant contends the trial court erred in
refusing his request to instruct the jury on the lesser-included
offense of voluntary manslaughter by mutual combat. We
disagree.
"For combat to be 'mutual,' it must have been voluntarily
and mutually entered into by both or all parties to the affray."
Lynn, 27 Va. App. at 356, 499 S.E.2d at 10 (citing Smith v.
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 68, 72, 435 S.E.2d 414, 417 (1993)).
"'One who is assaulted may and usually does defend himself, but
the ensuing struggle cannot be accurately described as a mutual
combat.'" Smith, 17 Va. App. at 72-73, 435 S.E.2d at 417
(quoting Harper v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 816, 820, 183 S.E. 171,
173 (1936)).
Appellant's evidence established that when the victim began
walking toward him in the hotel parking lot, appellant warned
the victim to stay back, fired two warning shots over the
victim's head, and told the victim, "Stay back." When it became
clear that the victim was still advancing, appellant tried to
run away but ran into the front of his car. At that point, the
victim grabbed appellant.
The record does not contain a scintilla of evidence that
the fight between appellant and the victim was mutual combat.
Appellant's evidence showed that he was attacked by the victim,
which, under Smith, does not constitute mutual combat. We,
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therefore, find the trial court did not err in refusing
appellant's request for a jury instruction on mutual combat.
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's refusal to
instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense and mutual combat,
but we reverse appellant's convictions based on the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury on excusable homicide and
remand for further proceedings if the Commonwealth be so
advised.
Reversed and remanded.
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Benton, J., concurring and dissenting.
I concur in Part I, Part II, and Part IV of the majority
opinion. Therefore, I would also reverse the convictions and
remand for a new trial. I dissent from Part III, however,
because I believe the doctrine of imperfect self-defense was
available to Kevin Alexander Connell and required the trial
judge to give the jury a separate, additional instruction
regarding voluntary manslaughter.
In Virginia, "manslaughter is a common law offense."
Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725, 284 S.E.2d 796, 797
(1981). The common law traditionally recognized a circumstance
in which a "'killing in self-defen[s]e will be manslaughter
only.'" Hash v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 172, 194, 13 S.E. 398, 405
(1891) (citation omitted). This common law doctrine is
generally called "the imperfect right of self-defen[s]e." Id.
at 193, 13 S.E. at 405. The Supreme Court has described the
doctrine as follows:
Here is a clear recognition of the
doctrine that, although the slayer provoked
the combat, or produced the occasion, yet,
if it was done without any felonious intent,
the party may avail himself of the plea of
self-defen[s]e. . . . "Indeed the assertion
that one who begins a quarrel or brings on a
difficulty with the felonious purpose to
kill the person assaulted, and
accomplish[es] such purpose, is guilty of
murder, and cannot avail himself of the
doctrine of self-defen[s]e, carries with it
in its very bosom the inevitable corollary
that if the quarrel be begun without a
felonious purpose, then the homicidal act
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will not be murder. To deny this obvious
deduction is equivalent to the anomalous
assertion that there can be a felony without
a felonious intent; that the act done
characterizes the intent, and not the intent
the act."
Id. at 194-95, 13 S.E. at 405-06 (citations omitted). 1
Five years after Hash, the United States Supreme Court
cited several common law treatises for the proposition that
"where the accused embarks in a quarrel with no felonious
intent, or malice, or premeditated purpose of doing bodily harm
or killing, and under reasonable belief of imminent danger he
inflicts a fatal wound, it is [manslaughter,] not murder."
Wallace v. United States, 162 U.S. 466, 471 (1896). Applying
that principle, the Court observed the following:
Granting that the jury would have been
justified in finding that [the accused's]
intention in going for the gun and returning
with it as he did was to inflict bodily harm
on [the deceased] if he did not leave, still
the presumption was not an irrebuttable one,
and it was for the jury to say whether [the
accused's] statement that he procured the
1
The Court's later decision in Jackson v. Commonwealth, 98
Va. 845, 36 S.E. 487 (1900), did not abolish the doctrine of
imperfect self-defense. Jackson was primarily concerned with
the propriety of the trial judge giving a justifiable homicide
instruction. Approving that action, the Court noted that the
justifiable homicide instruction "did not instruct the jury, nor
was it intended to instruct them, upon the degree of the
prisoner's guilt, whether it was murder or manslaughter, but it
was merely intended to tell them that, upon the facts
hypothetically stated in the instruction, the prisoner was not
entitled to an acquittal." Id. at 848, 36 S.E. at 488. Thus, I
do not disagree with the majority opinion's observation that
Jackson did not eliminate the common law doctrine of imperfect
self-defense.
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gun only for self protection was or was not
true. And if they believed from the
evidence that this was true, and that the
killing was under reasonable apprehension of
imminent peril, then it was for the jury to
determine under all the facts and
circumstances whether [the accused] had
committed the offense of manslaughter,
rather than that of murder, if he could not
be excused altogether.
Id. at 477.
Several other states continue to recognize this common law
doctrine. For example, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
described the doctrine as follows:
[I]f defendant believed it was necessary to
kill the deceased in order to save herself
from death or great bodily harm, and if
defendant's belief was reasonable in that
the circumstances as they appeared to her at
the time were sufficient to create such a
belief in the mind of a person of ordinary
firmness, but defendant, although without
murderous intent, was the aggressor in
bringing on the difficulty, or defendant
used excessive force, the defendant under
those circumstances has only the imperfect
right of self-defense, having lost the
benefit of perfect self-defense, and is
guilty at least of voluntary manslaughter.
An imperfect right of self-defense is
thus available to a defendant who reasonably
believes it necessary to kill the deceased
to save himself from death or great bodily
harm even if defendant (1) might have
brought on the difficulty, provided he did
so without murderous intent, and (2) might
have used excessive force.
State v. Mize, 340 S.E.2d 439, 441-42 (N.C. 1986) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). See also Swann v. United States,
648 A.2d 928, 933 (D.C. 1994); State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759,
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761 (Md. 1984); State v. Sanders, 556 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977).
The jury absolved Connell of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated conduct by finding him not guilty of first degree
murder but guilty only of second degree murder. See Code
§ 18.2-32. Thus, we can reasonably conclude that the jury may
have accepted some portion of Connell's testimony that he armed
himself and returned to "scare" the victim and to seek an
"apology." In any event, when we view this evidence in the
light most favorable to Connell, see Martin v. Commonwealth, 13
Va. App. 524, 526, 414 S.E.2d 401, 401 (1992), we must conclude
that the jury could have found Connell's testimony to be germane
to Connell's claim of imperfect self-defense.
I disagree with the majority opinion's holding that the
manslaughter instruction the trial judge gave the jury was
sufficient to encompass the theory of imperfect self-defense.
The instruction on voluntary manslaughter was premised upon a
finding by the jury of "sudden heat of passion." The
instruction Connell tendered in support of the theory of
imperfect self-defense would have permitted the jury
alternatively to find voluntary manslaughter even if the jury
found that Connell did not act in "sudden heat of passion."
Connell's instruction would have allowed the jury to find him
guilty of voluntary manslaughter if the jury found that he
"believed it to be necessary to kill" Jon Lord "to save himself
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from death or great bodily harm" and that his belief was
"reasonable." If the jury believed that Connell had initiated
the altercation without felonious intent, it could have found
voluntary manslaughter under the theory of imperfect
self-defense, without regard to any finding of sudden heat of
passion. Neither Hash nor the other authorities that discuss
the theory of imperfect self-defense require proof of sudden
heat of passion.
In Swann, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
rejected the government's argument that the general manslaughter
instruction was sufficient and that "heat of passion"
encompasses the "fear" or "terror" found in a claim of imperfect
self-defense. See 648 A.2d at 931-32. I believe the court's
discussion is persuasive.
While [the government's] argument is not
without force, we think that an imperfect
self-defense claim must be viewed through a
different prism. Unlike other aspects of
provocation, which can only reduce a
homicide to manslaughter, a state of mind
arising out of a self-defense situation
justifies outright exoneration if
reasonable. Because the subjective state of
mind required for an imperfect self-defense
claim is identical to that required for a
true self-defense claim, we can find in the
controlling authority no suggestion that an
actual, albeit unreasonable, belief that
one's life is in danger cannot serve as a
mitigating factor justifying a voluntary
manslaughter instruction where also coupled
with an actual belief that the force used
was necessary in self-defense. Thus,
however the emotions of fear and terror
unrelated to self-defense may relate to
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mitigation of second-degree murder where the
killing was provoked or the defendant acted
in the heat of passion, we think that
analysis cannot be controlling on the
distinct issue of a killing committed in the
actual but unreasonable belief that the
defendant is in mortal danger. While fear
and terror may be a consequence of that
situation, the motivation for the killing
stems from the actual, albeit unreasonable,
perception of imminent danger to one's life,
and the mitigation issue where a
self-defense claim is involved is measured
by the actual presence of that state of
mind.
Swann, 648 A.2d at 932. 2
For these reasons, I would hold that the evidence was
sufficient to support an instruction to the jury under both
manslaughter principles and that the trial judge erred in
refusing the instruction concerning the claim of imperfect
self-defense. Accordingly, I would remand with the additional
direction that Connell is entitled to an instruction on
imperfect self-defense on retrial, if the evidence supports it.
2
The District of Columbia applies the common law rule even
when the accused has an actual, albeit unreasonable, belief that
his or her life is in danger. The Hash Court did not state
explicitly whether it required a reasonable belief on the part
of the accused to justify an imperfect self-defense instruction.
It limited its discussion to the intent with which the accused
entered the deadly encounter. See 88 Va. at 195, 13 S.E. at 406
(limiting the accused's culpability to "the intention with which
the occasion was brought about" instead of the reasonableness of
belief in danger). In this case, however, Connell requested an
instruction predicated on the jury finding his belief in the
necessity of killing the victim reasonable. Regardless of these
distinctions in the doctrine, Swann demonstrates that imperfect
self-defense encompasses a type of voluntary manslaughter
clearly distinct from the voluntary manslaughter arising from
the sudden heat of passion.
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