COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Lemons and Frank
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
ex rel. MARC GAGNE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2573-98-1 JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS
FEBRUARY 22, 2000
JANET CHAMBERLAIN, A/K/A
JANET CLARK
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Jerome James, Judge
Maryann Shea Bright, Special Counsel (Beth J.
Edwards, Regional Special Counsel; Mark L.
Earley, Attorney General; Ashley L. Taylor,
Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Robert B.
Cousins, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney
General; Craig M. Burshem, Regional Special
Counsel, on brief), for appellant.
(Herbert W. Laine, on brief), for appellee.
The Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social
Services, Division of Child Support Enforcement, ex rel. Marc
Gagne ("DSS"), appeals an order of the Circuit Court of the City
of Norfolk vacating an administrative order requiring Janet
Chamberlain to reimburse the State of New Hampshire for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") expended on behalf of
her two daughters. Finding that the trial court erred in its
conclusion that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
("UIFSA"), Code § 20-88.32, et seq., does not authorize the
Commissioner of the Department of Social Services of Virginia to
determine the existence of an amount of a public assistance debt
owed to another state, we reverse and remand.
Marc Gagne ("father") and Janet Chamberlain ("mother") are
unmarried and are the biological parents of two children.
Father and his two daughters reside in and formerly received
public assistance from the State of New Hampshire. Mother
resides in Virginia. In 1996, pursuant to the UIFSA, New
Hampshire filed a support petition with the Commonwealth
requesting the issuance of a support order against mother for
the support of her two children and requesting an order of
reimbursement for public assistance paid to father on behalf of
the children in New Hampshire while mother was residing in
Virginia. The parties stipulate that the amount of assistance
paid to father was $9,023.50.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for Isle
of Wight County entered an order requiring mother to pay child
support. That order was not appealed. The Commissioner of the
Department of Social Services administratively ordered mother to
reimburse New Hampshire for the public assistance paid to
father. Mother appealed the administrative order to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the City of
Norfolk, which vacated the administrative order. DSS appealed
that decision to the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, and
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the circuit court also vacated the administrative order. DSS
now appeals this adverse ruling.
The UIFSA is a model uniform law that has been enacted in
all fifty states. See Code § 20-88.32 et seq. It provides a
comprehensive statutory scheme to establish and enforce support
obligations in proceedings involving two or more states. In
this case, the Commonwealth, as a "responding tribunal,"
received a petition from the State of New Hampshire, the
"initiating tribunal." A "tribunal" is defined as "a court,
administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity authorized to
establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to determine
parentage." Code § 20-88.32. Pursuant to Code § 20-88.48, the
responding tribunal is authorized, inter alia, to "issue or
enforce a support order" and to "[d]etermine the amount of any
arrearages, and specify a method of payment." By definition,
"support order" "means a judgment, decree, or order, whether
temporary, final, or subject to modification, for the benefit of
a child, a spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for
monetary support, health care, arrearages, or reimbursement
. . . . " Code § 20-88.32 (emphasis added). An "obligee" is "a
state or political subdivision to which the rights under a duty
of support or support order have been assigned or which has
independent claims based on financial assistance provided to an
individual obligee." Code § 20-88.32. "Duty of support" "means
an obligation imposed or imposable by law to provide support for
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a child, spouse, or former spouse, including an unsatisfied
obligation to provide support." Code § 20-88.32.
Under New Hampshire law, the receipt of public assistance
constitutes an assignment of all rights and interest in the
support obligation up to the amount of public assistance money
paid for or on behalf of the children. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 161-C:22 (1998). Additionally, New Hampshire law states that
"any payment of public assistance made to or for the benefit of
a dependent child creates a debt due and owing to the department
by any responsible parent." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161-C:4
(1998). Consequently, the State of New Hampshire is an obligee
as defined by Code § 20-88.32. 1
The definitions of "obligee," "support order," and "duty of
support" in UIFSA anticipate states sending petitions to each
other seeking reimbursement from obligors for public assistance
paid to their families. Furthermore, when a court or agency of
the Commonwealth acts as a "responding tribunal," it "shall
apply the procedural and substantive law, including the rules on
choice of law, generally applicable to similar proceedings
originating in this Commonwealth and may exercise all powers and
1
The official comments to the UIFSA explain that while
"obligee" usually refers to the individual receiving the
payments, it "may be a support enforcement agency which has been
assigned the right to receive support payments in order to
recoup Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 et seq., formerly known as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC)." Unif. Interstate Family Support Act (1996)
§ 101, 9 U.L.A. 259 (1999).
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remedies available in those proceedings." Code § 20-88.46.
These remedies are "cumulative and do not affect availability of
remedies under other law." Code § 20-88.34.
According to Virginia law, "[a]ny payment of public
assistance money made to or for the benefit of any dependent
child or children or their caretaker creates a debt due and
owing to the Department by the person or persons who are
responsible for support of such children or caretaker in an
amount equal to the amount of public assistance money so paid."
Code § 63.1-251; see also Powers v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App.
309, 411 S.E.2d 230 (1991). "'Department' means the State
Department of Social Services." Code § 63.1-250. It is well
settled that both parents owe a duty of support to their child.
See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 7 Va. App. 614, 376 S.E.2d 787
(1989).
A cursory examination of this section would appear to
confine its application only to actions where the Virginia
Department of Social Services provided public assistance.
However, the "Definitions" provision of Code § 63.1-250 is
preceded by "[u]nless a different meaning is plainly required by
the context, the following words and phrases as hereinafter used
in this chapter shall have the following meanings." Under
UIFSA, "state" means, inter alia, "a state of the United
States." Consequently, in the context of a petition under UIFSA
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for the determination of the existence of a public assistance
debt, the word "state" means "any state."
We hold that by adoption of UIFSA the General Assembly
intended to permit Virginia to determine the existence of a
public assistance debt owed to another state.
In the construction of its provisions,
it is to be remembered that the Code itself
is a single act of the legislature. "The
different sections should be regarded, not
as prior and subsequent acts, but as
simultaneous expressions of the legislative
will." All provisions there appearing which
deal with the same subject should be
construed together and reconciled whenever
possible.
* * * * * * *
We do not search through the history of
statutes for difficulties not patent on
their face, but take them first as they are
written into the Code itself. If when so
read they are reasonably clear, that
suffices.
Shepherd v. F.J. Kress Box Co., 154 Va. 421, 425-26, 153 S.E.
649, 650 (1930) (citations omitted). "Moreover, it is a
familiar rule of statutory construction that subsequent
legislation is enacted in light and with knowledge of such
interpretive statutes, and hence the latter control unless there
be clear legislative intent to substitute a different
interpretation." Alphonse Custodis Chimney Constr. Co. v.
Molina, 183 Va. 512, 515, 32 S.E.2d 726, 727 (1945) (citation
omitted).
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Further, when possible, statutes must be read in a manner
that achieves the beneficial purpose intended by their
enactment. "A statute must be construed 'to give reasonable
effect to the words used' and to further its remedial purposes."
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 29 Va. App. 228, 233, 511 S.E.2d 423,
425 (1999) (quoting Mayhew v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 484,
489, 458 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1995)). "Proper construction seeks to
harmonize the provisions of a statute both internally, and in
relation to other statutes." Id. (citations omitted). We wrote
in Wallace:
The words chosen by the legislature in
drafting a statute derive meaning from both
definition and context and, therefore, we
divine legislative intent by construing an
enactment as a whole, together with
companion statutes, if any. The legal
maxim, noscitur a sociis, instructs that "a
word takes color and expression from the
purport of the entire phrase of which it is
a part, and . . . must be read in harmony
with its context." Turner v. Commonwealth,
226 Va. 456, 460, 309 S.E.2d 337, 339
(1983). Similarly, legislative purpose can
best be "'ascertained from the act itself
when read in the light of other statutes
relating to the same subject matter.'"
Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 197, 480
S.E.2d 792, 796 (1997). The doctrine of
pari materia teaches that "'statutes are not
to be considered as isolated fragments of
law, but as a whole, or as parts of a great,
connected homogenous system, or a simple and
complete statutory arrangement.'" Id. at
198, 480 S.E.2d at 796.
29 Va. App. at 233-34, 511 S.E.2d at 425.
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Had Virginia paid the AFDC funds, a debt due and owing DSS
would have been created as a matter of law. See Code
§ 63.1-251. Since UIFSA requires the uniform application of
Virginia laws to interstate petitions, New Hampshire is entitled
to the benefit of Virginia law allowing the creation by law of a
debt for provision of AFDC funds. To hold otherwise would
defeat the clear purpose of the statute and, therefore, be
inconsistent with the manifest intention of the General
Assembly.
Under UIFSA, an out-of-state petitioner (in this case, the
State of New Hampshire) is entitled to the application of
Virginia law in the same manner as an in-state petitioner. It
would be incongruous that no debt would be created in favor of
the providing agency if the agency is out of state while a debt
is created if the providing agency is the Commonwealth of
Virginia, particularly when the source of the funds, namely
AFDC, is the same.
Because the matter is not before us, we do not address
whether the juvenile and domestic relations district court would
also have been a proper "tribunal" for the original petition for
reimbursement of public assistance funds. We hold that an
administrative proceeding in the Department of Social Services
is a proper tribunal for receipt of a petition under UIFSA for
the provision of an order of support, including reimbursement of
AFDC funds provided by another state. Accordingly, we reverse
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the order of the trial court and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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