COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Bumgardner
Argued at Salem, Virginia
MELVIN LEE JONES
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0527-97-3 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
MARCH 10, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE
Charles M. Stone, Judge
Wayne T. Baucino, Assistant Public Defender,
for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney
General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Melvin Lee Jones was tried by a judge and convicted of
robbery. He contends the evidence was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he obtained the property by
violence or intimidation. We affirm the conviction.
The evidence at trial proved that Sandra Byrd walked from a
shopping mall in Martinsville with her purse under her arm. Byrd
testified that because she was cautious, she had "tucked" the
purse under her arm and carried it against her rib cage. As she
walked along the sidewalk, someone came behind her, tapped her on
the shoulder, and "jerked" her around by pulling her shoulder.
The man who "jerked" her around then looked directly in her face,
snatched her purse, and ran. Byrd dropped her coffee, screamed,
and chased the man. She saw him enter a white car which sped
away.
A witness, who was sitting in his vehicle near the mall, saw
a man run up behind Byrd. The witness testified that the man
snatched her purse but "didn't knock her down." During his
testimony, the witness stepped from his seat and demonstrated how
the man approached Byrd and grabbed her purse.
Another witness heard Byrd screaming and saw a man running
across the parking lot with a purse. The witness noted the
automobile's license plate number and gave it to the police.
A police investigator testified that the license plate
number belonged to Christopher Beck's automobile. When the
police investigator interviewed Beck and his passenger, Jones'
cousin, they both identified another man as the person who took
Byrd's purse. However, when the investigator later separately
re-interviewed Beck and Jones' cousin, they both identified Jones
as the person who took Byrd's purse.
Beck testified that he drove his white automobile to the
mall with Jones and Jones' cousin as his passengers. Beck also
testified that a short time after Jones exited the automobile,
Jones ran back to the car, jumped in, and said, "Let's go." As
they drove away, Jones showed Beck a purse and said he had taken
it from a woman. Jones' cousin, who was the other passenger in
the automobile, similarly testified that shortly after Jones
exited the automobile, Jones ran back, jumped in, and showed them
a woman's purse after they drove away.
The trial judge denied defense counsel's motion to strike
the robbery charge and reduce the charge to grand larceny from
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the person. At the conclusion of the evidence, the judge
convicted Jones of robbery.
"Robbery, a common law offense in Virginia, is defined as
the 'taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property of
another, from his person or in his presence, against his will, by
violence or intimidation.'" Harris v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App.
519, 521, 351 S.E.2d 356, 357 (1986) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). Recently in Winn v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 179, 462
S.E.2d 911 (1995), this Court addressed the very issue raised by
this appeal. We noted that conduct which is generally described
as "purse snatching" is a larceny unless the evidence proves the
accused employed violence against the victim's person or used
intimidation. See id. at 181-83, 462 S.E.2d at 913. Citing
cases from Virginia and other jurisdictions, Winn particularly
addressed those additional elements as follows:
"The touching or violation necessary to prove
[robbery] may be indirect, but cannot result
merely from the force associated with the
taking." Instead, "[v]iolence or force
requires a physical touching or violation of
the victim's person." . . . "'[T]he offense
of robbery . . . is not related to the force
used on the object taken but to the force or
intimidation directed at the person of the
victim.'"
* * * * * * *
[T]here must be "additional circumstances at
the time of the snatching tending to
transform the taking from a larceny to a
robbery." For example, these circumstances
are present when a struggle ensues, where the
victim is knocked down, or where the victim
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is put in fear -- in other words, where the
defendant employs violence or intimidation
against the victim's person.
21 Va. App. at 181-82, 462 S.E.2d at 912-13 (citations omitted).
The evidence in this case proved that Jones grabbed Byrd,
"jerked" her around by pulling on her shoulder, looked directly
into her face, and then grabbed the purse that Byrd was clutching
under her arm. Although defense counsel stated in closing
argument that "based on what [the witness] acted out, it is clear
that whoever did this was a purse snatcher," the Commonwealth's
attorney stated that the witness "doing the demonstration . . . ,
basically knocked [defense counsel] almost off his feet." The
trial judge found that "the taking [was] accomplished by a
physical jerking of" Byrd. Thus, the testimony and the
demonstrative evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Jones used "force . . . directed at the person of the victim."
Winn, 21 Va. App. at 182, 462 S.E.2d at 912. The taking of the
purse occurred after Jones touched and jerked Byrd.
Moreover, the evidence proved that Jones first "jerked" Byrd
around to face him before he took her purse. This was a sudden
physical confrontation. "Intimidation results when words or
conduct of the accused exercise such domination and control over
the victim as to overcome the victim's mind and overbear the
victim's will, placing the victim in fear of bodily harm."
Bivins v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 750, 753, 454 S.E.2d 741, 742
(1995). Jones' conduct, forcing Byrd to turn and face him, was
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an exercise of domination over Byrd that was designed to overbear
her will and place her in fear of bodily harm. See Harris, 3 Va.
App. at 521, 351 S.E.2d at 357.
This case is factually distinguishable from Winn because the
evidence proved that Jones touched Byrd and violated her person
in a manner unrelated to the force necessary to remove the purse.
See also Bivins, 19 Va. App. at 752, 454 S.E.2d at 742 (robbery
occurs when "a physical touching or violation of the victim's
person" is accomplished which does not "result merely from the
force associated with the taking"). In Winn, "no evidence proved
that [the accused] touched the victim's person at any time." 21
Va. App. at 183, 462 S.E.2d at 913.
For these reasons, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
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