COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Elder
Argued at Salem, Virginia
KRYSTAL ASHLEY WILSON,
s/k/a KRYSTAL ASHLEY HANDY WILSON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2185-95-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
OCTOBER 15, 1996
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY
Colin R. Gibb, Judge
Marc Alan LeBlanc (Law Offices of Moore and
Groseclose, on briefs), for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Krystal Ashley Wilson (appellant), a juvenile, appeals the
circuit court's order finding her guilty of criminal contempt for
failure to honor a subpoena. Appellant contends that (1) the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to convict her, a juvenile, of
criminal contempt; (2) the circuit court erred in failing to
appoint a guardian ad litem before issuing the subpoena and
holding the show cause hearing; and (3) the circuit court erred
in sentencing her to jail for criminal contempt. For the
following reasons, we affirm the circuit court's order.
I.
FACTS
Darren Wayne Wilson allegedly committed the crime of
unlawful carnal knowledge of a child upon appellant, who was
sixteen years old at the time of the instant proceedings. After
Darren Wilson's indictment, but before his trial, Wilson married
appellant. The circuit court scheduled a hearing to review the
status of the marriage pursuant to Code § 18.2-66 and personally
served appellant with a subpoena ordering her to attend the
hearing. Appellant failed to attend the hearing.
The circuit court issued a show cause order for appellant to
explain why she should not be held in contempt for disobeying the
subpoena. The court appointed defense counsel for appellant. At
the show cause hearing, appellant's counsel argued that the
juvenile and domestic relations district court was the proper
forum for the contempt matter and that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction over appellant. Counsel also argued that for any
court to obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile defendant or
contemnor the court is required to appoint a guardian ad litem
for the juvenile. The circuit court rejected appellant's
arguments, found appellant guilty of criminal contempt, and
imposed a sentence of four days "in the Pulaski County Jail" to
be suspended upon the completion of twenty-five hours of
community service.
II.
CIRCUIT COURT'S POWER TO PUNISH JUVENILE FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
Appellant's primary argument is a jurisdictional one: she
asserts that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to punish her,
a juvenile, for criminal contempt of court. Appellant's argument
relies on Code § 16.1-241(A)(1), which states that the juvenile
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and domestic relations district courts possess exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving delinquent juveniles. 1
We hold in this case of first impression that a circuit court
possesses the inherent power to punish juveniles for criminal
contempt for disobedience to its orders, decrees, and processes.
It has long been recognized in Virginia that the power of a
court to punish for contempt is "inherent in the nature and
constitution of a court." Holt v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 332,
336-337, 136 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 381
U.S. 131 (1965); see Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 892, 395,
345 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1986); Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 315,
321, 42 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1947); Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va.
791, 32 S.E. 780, 782 (1899); Wells v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt.
(62 Va.) 500, 503 (1871). While the General Assembly may
regulate this power, it may do so "only in a way and to an extent
not inconsistent with the exercise by the courts, with vigor and
efficiency, of those functions which are essential to the
discharge of their duties." Nicholas, 186 Va. at 321, 42 S.E.2d
at 309 (citing Yoder v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 823, 829, 57 S.E.
581, 583 (1907)). Specifically, courts must be authorized to
exercise their power to punish for contempt "without referring
the issues of fact or law to another tribunal . . . ." Nicholas,
186 Va. at 321, 42 S.E.2d at 309. Therefore, the juvenile code
1
"Delinquent act" is defined, in pertinent part, as "an act
designated a crime under the law of this Commonwealth." Code
§ 16.1-228.
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will not be construed to require a circuit court seeking to
punish a juvenile for contempt of a court's subpoena power to
refer the legal or factual issues to a separate juvenile and
domestic relations court.
"Punishment for . . . contempt is punitive in its nature and
is imposed for the purpose of preserving the power and
vindicating the dignity of the court." Local 333B, United Marine
Div. v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 773, 785, 71 S.E.2d 159, 166, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 893 (1952). "The power to fine and imprison for
contempt is incident to every court of record. The courts ex
necessitate rei, have the power of protecting the administration
of justice, with a promptitude calculated to meet the exigency of
the particular case." Board of Supervisors v. Bazile, 195 Va.
739, 746, 80 S.E.2d 566, 571 (1954). "Disobedience to 'any
lawful process' is made subject to summary punishment for
contempt by Code § 18.2-456(5)." Bellis v. Commonwealth, 241 Va.
257, 262, 402 S.E.2d 211, 214 (1991). Code § 18.2-456 states, in
pertinent part:
The courts and judges may issue
attachments for contempt, and punish them
summarily, only in the cases following:
* * * * * * *
(5) Disobedience or resistance of an officer
of the court, juror, witness or other person
to any lawful process, judgment, decree or
order of the court.
"'Process' includes a subpoena directed to a witness." Bellis,
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241 Va. at 262, 402 S.E.2d at 214.
Appellant concedes that she failed to honor the circuit
court's subpoena, properly served upon her, when she refused to
appear at the court's hearing. However, appellant argues that
circuit courts lack jurisdiction to punish juveniles for criminal
contempt. Despite appellant's contention, "[w]e refuse to hold
that a [circuit court judge] who, in the exercise of his informed
discretion, determines that a juvenile has willfully interfered
with the business of the court, thereby impugning the court's
dignity and authority, is without power to act." State v.
DeLong, 456 A.2d 877, 880 (Me. 1983).
In a similar case, the Court of Appeals of Oregon observed
that, "[w]hat little case law we have found appears unanimous in
holding that the court in which the contempt occurs possesses
full power to deal with a contemptuous juvenile in the same
manner as it would any adult who committed a similar offense."
State v. Tripp, 583 P.2d 591, 592-93 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
Contempt proceedings are sui generis.
The ability of a court to preserve its
jurisdiction and orders transcends other
concerns, such as the juvenile/adult
distinction. Absent a specific statutory
directive to the contrary, we hold that the
[circuit] court properly refused to transfer
consideration of [appellant's] contempt to a
juvenile court. We hold that the [Virginia]
Code provision granting exclusive
jurisdiction of juveniles to the juvenile
court is inapplicable to cases of contempt
committed in another court under
circumstances like those found in this case.
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Id. at 593. Accord Doe v. Commonwealth, 486 N.E.2d 698, 699
(Mass. 1985)("courts . . . have uniformly recognized the right of
a nonjuvenile court to punish direct contempt by a juvenile);
Thomas v. State, 320 A.2d 538, 542 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1974)(holding that the statute conferring original exclusive
jurisdiction over a juvenile to the juvenile courts is
inapplicable to cases of direct contempt committed in another
court); Bryant v. State, 271 N.E.2d 127, 130 (Ind. 1971)(same);
Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195, 200 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959)("We
construe the juvenile court statute as not depriving any other
court of the inherent and essential right and power to consider
and dispose of direct contempt"); Application of Balucan, 353
P.2d 631, 637 (Haw. 1960)(same). At least one federal court has
held the same. In re Williams, 306 F. Supp. 617 (D.D.C. 1969).
See generally, 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 54 (1990 & Supp. 1996);
V. Woerner, Annotation, Court's Power to Punish for Contempt a
Child Within the Age Group Subject to Jurisdiction of Juvenile
Court, 77 A.L.R.2d 1004 (1961 & Supp. 1996).
III.
FAILURE TO APPOINT GUARDIAN AD LITEM
Appellant next asserts that when the circuit court placed
appellant, a juvenile, in jeopardy of the court's criminal
contempt power, it was required to appoint a guardian ad litem to
protect the juvenile's interests. Appellant claims that when the
circuit court first subpoenaed her and then initiated an
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adversarial proceeding against her for her failure to appear at
the hearing, a guardian ad litem became necessary to act in loco
parentis on her behalf. We disagree.
As the Supreme Court of Virginia has held, "[a] defendant
under a disability who is represented by counsel need not have
appointed to him a guardian ad litem unless a statute applicable
to a particular case expressly requires such an appointment."
Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 183, 427 S.E.2d 379, 384
(1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, __ U.S. __, 114
S. Ct. 2701 (1994). We find no statutory basis for appellant's
assertion that the circuit court should have appointed a guardian
ad litem, in addition to appointing counsel, to represent her
interests. The record does not reflect that appellant's counsel
did not fully and adequately represent appellant's interests in
the adversarial proceedings below.
Code § 8.01-9, which mandates the appointment of a guardian
ad litem for a defendant under a disability in a civil suit,
states that "no guardian ad litem need be appointed for such
person unless the court determines that the interests of justice
require such appointment; or unless a statute applicable to such
suit expressly requires an answer to be filed by a guardian ad
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litem." Code § 8.01-9(B). Furthermore, Code § 16.1-266(B),
2
While the Supreme Court and this Court have stated that
infants must be represented by a guardian ad litem in all court
proceedings, these pronouncements have been in the context of
civil cases. See Moses v. Akers, 203 Va. 130, 122 S.E.2d 864
(1961); Kanter v. Holland, 154 Va. 120, 152 S.E. 328 (1930); Pigg
v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 756, 441 S.E.2d 216 (1994)(en banc);
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which mandates the appointment of counsel for juveniles appearing
at delinquency hearings in courts not of record, states that
juveniles enjoy only the right to counsel, not the right to
guardians ad litem. In light of these statutes, we hold that the
General Assembly did not intend to require a circuit court to
appoint a guardian ad litem whenever the court issues a subpoena
to compel a juvenile's testimony or where the circuit court
initiates criminal contempt proceedings against the juvenile
where the juvenile is represented by counsel.
IV.
SENTENCING JUVENILE TO "JAIL" TIME
Finally, appellant contends that the circuit court erred in
imposing a "jail" sentence upon appellant. In support of her
argument, appellant relies on Code § 16.1-292(A), which states
that a juvenile and domestic relations district court shall
confine juveniles who violate court orders "in a secure facility
for juveniles rather than in jail." We hold that circuit courts
operate under the same sentencing restriction, and therefore the
circuit court lacked authority to sentence the juvenile to jail,
where the proceeding was one in which the juvenile had not been
certified as an adult. Contra DeLong, 456 A.2d at 882 (holding
that trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
fifteen-year-old defendant to seven days in jail for criminal
Commonwealth ex rel. Gray v. Johnson, 7 Va. App. 614, 376 S.E.2d
787 (1989).
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contempt; no statutory basis for the holding discussed).
However, we assume that trial judges have knowledge of the
Commonwealth's laws and properly apply those laws. See Strickler
v. Murray, 249 Va. 120, 127, 452 S.E.2d 648, 652, cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 146 (1995); Yarborough v. Commonwealth,
217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977). We therefore
assume that in this case the circuit court was cognizant of the
basic legal principle embodied in Code §§ 16.1-292, 16.1-249(B),
which precludes juveniles who have not been certified as adults
from being placed in adult detention facilities. We decline to
declare void the circuit court's sentencing order, see Pigg v.
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 756, 760 n. 5, 441 S.E.2d 216, 219 n.5
(1994)(en banc)(discussing void and voidable judgments); instead
we construe the word "jail" in the circuit court's order as
complying with the law and meaning "the appropriate location for
juvenile confinement." To the extent necessary to conform to
this opinion, the circuit court's order is hereby amended to
reflect this holding.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's order
as amended herein.
Affirmed.
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