COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Annunziata and
Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
TROY LEE NEWTON
v. Record No. 1245-94-2 OPINION BY
JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA SEPTEMBER 19, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY
Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge
John R. Maus for appellant.
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General (James S.
Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for
appellee.
Troy Lee Newton (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial
of robbery and aggravated malicious wounding. On appeal,
appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction for aggravated malicious wounding because the
injuries sustained by the victim did not constitute permanent and
significant physical impairment, as required by Code § 18.2-51.2.
We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
On October 12, 1993, appellant entered Andy's Chevron Mart
in Zion Crossroads at about 10:00 p.m. and purchased a can of
beer from Harry Ross Bryant, the only employee working at the
store. Appellant then left the store. As Bryant kneeled down to
get a roll of quarters from the safe, he looked up and saw that
appellant had returned to the store.
Appellant told Bryant to give him the money. Appellant
waved his hand at Bryant, and Bryant could see that appellant had
a box-cutter knife. Again, appellant told Bryant to give him all
the money. Bryant complied. After appellant took the money, he
told Bryant to get down on his knees. Appellant then began
cutting Bryant with the razor. He cut Bryant on the cheek, under
his eye, on the wrist, on the ear, and several times on the back.
Appellant stepped on Bryant's glasses, which had fallen on the
floor, and cut the cord to the telephone.
As he left, appellant told Bryant not to move. After a few
minutes, however, Bryant called for help from the office
telephone. He was taken to the emergency room at the University
of Virginia Hospital, where doctors stitched wounds on his face,
ear, and wrist. Other wounds were treated with antiseptic.
On October 17, 1993, appellant gave a statement to
Investigator D. L. Bateman of the Louisa County Sheriff's
Department. Appellant said that he was "high" on crack cocaine
when he went into the store to buy beer, and as he left the store
he thought about the money he had seen there. He said that he
could not remember taking the money, but found a roll of money in
his pocket and began having "flashbacks" in which he saw the
clerk, who had been cut, lying on the floor. Appellant stated
that he spent around $300 on cocaine the night of the robbery.
He admitted to Bateman that he told his brother that he had cut
someone.
At trial, Bryant displayed his scars for the judge. The
judge noted that the scar on the right side of Bryant's face was
"obvious and visible" and not covered, even by his beard.
Following the trial, the judge issued a letter opinion in
which he found that appellant was guilty of aggravated malicious
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wounding. The judge noted that the 1991 amendment to the
aggravated malicious wounding statute "suggests that the
legislature intended Aggravated Malicious Wounding to include
injuries which do not prevent the victims functioning normally,
but are nevertheless permanent and severe."
II.
Appellant argues on appeal, as he did at trial, that the
disfiguring scars which Bryant suffered as a result of the attack
do not satisfy the requirement of the aggravated malicious
wounding statute that the victim's injuries constitute "permanent
and significant physical impairment."
In 1991, the General Assembly amended Code § 18.2-51.2,
which defines aggravated malicious wounding. The legislature
changed the provision requiring that the victim be "totally and
permanently disabled" by the malicious wounding, to requiring
that the victim be "severely injured and . . . caused to suffer
permanent and significant physical impairment."
Principles of statutory construction mandate that we "give
effect to the legislative intent." Scott v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.
App. 294, 296, 416 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1992). While penal statutes
must be strictly construed against the Commonwealth, "[t]he
plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always
preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction; a
statute should never be construed so that it leads to absurd
results." Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419
S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992).
"Where possible, a statute should be construed with a view
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toward harmonizing it with other statutes." Morris v. Morris, 4
Va. App. 539, 543, 359 S.E.2d 104, 107 (1987). "Because the Code
of Virginia is one body of law, other Code sections using the
same phraseology may be consulted in determining the meaning of a
statute." Branch, 14 Va. App. at 839, 419 S.E.2d at 425. This
Court, in interpreting the prior aggravated malicious wounding
statute, looked to the Workers' Compensation Act, Code
§ 65.2-503, to determine the meaning of "totally disabled,"
because the Act used a similar phrase. See Branch, 14 Va. App.
at 839-40, 419 S.E.2d at 425.
Title 51.5 of the Code, entitled, "Persons With
Disabilities," defines "physical impairment" as "any physical
condition, anatomic loss, or cosmetic disfigurement which is
caused by bodily injury, birth defect, or illness." Code
§ 51.5-3 (emphasis added). When the legislature amended Code
§ 18.2-51.2, it is presumed to have known the definition of
"physical impairment" found in Code § 51.5-3. Thus, it must have
intended that the term would be given the same meaning in Code
§ 18.2-51.2. See Branch, 14 Va. App. at 840, 419 S.E.2d at 425.
Bryant unquestionably suffered cosmetic disfigurement caused by
bodily injury.
The record, moreover, supports the fact finder's
determination that Bryant's physical impairment was "permanent
and significant." One of the wounds to his face required ten to
twenty stitches. At trial, five months after the attack, the
scar from that facial wound was still "obvious and visible," even
though Bryant had grown a beard. The scar resulting from the cut
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to the ear also was still visible. 1 The trial court reasonably
could have found from the number of wounds, the need for stitches
for some of them, and the resulting scars, still visible after
five months, that Bryant's injuries constituted "permanent and
significant physical impairment."
For these reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction for
aggravated malicious wounding.
Affirmed.
1
At trial, appellant conceded that "[p]resumably the scars
would be permanent unless Mr. Bryant were to have a plastic
surgery, . . . . "
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