IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FEBRUARY SESSION, 1999 FILED
March 25, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
AMI E. SMITH, )
Appellate Court Clerk
) No. 01C01-9811-CR-00438
Appellant )
) WILSON COUNTY
vs. )
) Hon. J. O. Bond, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Post-Conviction)
Appellee )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Henry Clay Barry Paul G. Summers
Attorney at Law Attorney General and Reporter
106 S. College
Lebanon, TN 37087 Kim R. Helper
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Tom P. Thompson, Jr.
District Attorney General
Robert Hibbett
Asst. District Attorney General
119 College Street
Lebanon, TN 37087
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Ami E. Smith, appeals the Wilson County Criminal Court’s
dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. The appellant collaterally attacks her
conviction for incest upon the ground that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-302 violates her
state constitutional right to privacy. Accordingly, she argues Tennessee’s incest statute
is unconstitutional and her conviction for this offense is void.
After review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s denial of post-conviction
relief.
Background
On March 13, 1997, the appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of incest 1
and was sentenced to three years supervised probation. As a condition of her
probation, the appellant was required to wear an electronically monitored ankle
bracelet. She destroyed the bracelet, and, as a result of this conduct, was charged with
the crime of vandalism. The appellant pled guilty to the charge of vandalism and was
sentenced to two years in the Community Corrections program. This sentence was
ordered to run consecutive to her three year sentence for incest, which was revoked
and reimposed as a Community Corrections sentence. Within three months of being
placed in the Community Corrections program, the appellant violated at least seven of
the terms and conditions of her behavioral contract. Based on these new violations,
the trial court revoked her Community Correction sentences and ordered that the
appellant serve her effective five year sentence in the Department of Correction.
1
The indictment charged and it is not disputed that the appellant was involved in an
incestuo us relation ship with he r paterna l uncle. Th e appe llant does n ot deny this re lationship.
We are able to glean from the sparse record before us that the incestuous relationship began
while the appellant was still a minor and continued into her majority. Her uncle was in his mid-
thirties when the relationship began. No children were born as a result of this relationship. The
appellant’s brief indicates that she suffers from various psychological disorders and was eighteen
years old when charged with this offense.
2
No appeal was taken from either conviction or sentence. As a result, the
appellant is currently confined in the Tennessee Women’s Prison. On April 14, 1998,
the appellant filed the present petition for post-conviction relief. As the sole ground for
relief, the appellant avers that “the crime of incest, between consenting adults, in a
private and non-commercial setting is unconstitutional under the privacy provisions of
the State Constitution and [the court must] set aside her conviction for the same.”2 On
October 15, 1998, the trial court denied the appellant relief. In dismissing the petition,
the trial court found this state’s incest statute constitutionally valid.
Analysis
Again, the appellant’s sole assignment of error is whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
15-302 is unconstitutional under the protections provided by the Constitution of the
State of Tennessee.3 Specifically, the appellant relies upon the Court of Appeals
decision in Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 262 (Tenn. App.), perm. to appeal
denied, (Tenn. 1996) (finding the Homosexual Practices Act unconstitutional), for the
proposition that “an adult’s right to engage in consensual and noncommercial sexual
2
As a coro llary arg um ent, th e app ellant ass erts th at, sh ould t his co urt fin d Te nne sse e’s
incest statute unconstitutional under our state constitution, her conviction and sentence for
vandalism should a lso be se t aside as it arose fro m he r invalid con viction for inc est.
3
The Pos t-Co nvictio n Pro ced ure A ct pro vides priso ners a pro ced ure f or relie f whe n the ir
conviction is void or void able bas ed upo n the abr idgem ent of a s tate or fed eral cons titutional right.
Tenn . Code A nn. § 40- 30-203 . The ap pellant ave rs that T ennes see’s sta tute m aking inc est a
pun isha ble of fens e infrin ges upon her s tate fu nda me ntal rig ht to p rivac y. Thu s, the issue is
cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding. Moreover, the State asserts that the appellant has
waived d eterm ination of this issue on appea l for failure to ra ise the issu e at prior he arings.
Howe ver, the Sta te did not pr esent the statutory de fense o f waiver at th e post-c onviction lev el.
There fore, we d ecline to ad opt the po sition of the S tate take n for the firs t time on appea l. See
Rule 36 (a), Ten n. R. App . P.; State v. W hite, 635 S.W .2d 396, 3 98 (Te nn.Crim .App.19 82).
Accordingly, the issue is entitled to a merits review because the State failed to plead waiver as an
affirm ative defe nse.
3
activities in the privacy of that adult’s home is a matter of intimate personal concern
which is at the heart of Tennessee’s protection of the right to privacy.”4
The right to privacy is addressed within the context of due process guaranties.
Protection against infringement of fundamental rights is guaranteed by both the United
States and Tennessee Constitutions. See U.S. CONST . amend. XIV; TENN. CONST . Art.
I., § 8; TENN. CONST . Art. XI, § 8. See generally State v. Tester, 879 S.W.2d 823, 827
(Tenn. 1994). When a challenge is made alleging infringement of a fundamental right,
“strict scrutiny” of the legislative classification is only required when the classification
interferes with the exercise of a “fundamental right” or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class. See Evans v. Steelman, 970 S.W.2d 431, 435
(Tenn. 1998); Tester, 879 S.W.2d at 827 (citations omitted). However, if no
fundamental right or suspect class is affected, the court must determine whether there
is some rational basis to justify a classification set out in a statute. Steelman, 970
S.W.2d at 435 (citation omitted). There is no dispute that the challenged statutory
provision does not involve a suspect class, thus, our initial determination remains
whether the appellant’s right to privacy encompasses a guaranteed protected
“fundamental right”5 to engage in incestuous sexual activity.
Neither the United States Constitution nor the Tennessee Constitution
specifically refers to a “fundamental right to privacy.”6 Nonetheless, it is well
recognized that both documents contemplate such a fundamental right. See Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598-603 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911, 113 S.Ct.
4
The appellant expressly reserves determination of the issue solely on Tennessee
constitutional law. For this reason, this court deems it unnecessary to separately analyze her
claim under the federal constitution.
5
"Fundamental rights” have been defined by the United States Supreme Court as “those
fundamental rights that are implicit in the concepts of ordered liberty such that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149
(1937), overruled on other grounds by, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056 (1969).
6
But see A LASKA C ONST ., Art. I, § 22 (right to privacy exp licitly reserved the rein); A RIZ .
C ONST ., Art. II, § 8 (sam e); H AW . C ONST ., Art. I § 6 (sam e); I LL . C ONST ., Art. I, § 6 (sam e); L A .
C ONST ., Art. I. § 5 (sam e); M O N T . C ONST ., Art. III § 10 (same); S. C. C ONST ., Art. I. § 10 (same);
W ASH . C ONST ., Art. I, § 7 (same).
4
1259 (1993). Indeed, the right of privacy is unanimously understood to exist in the
penumbra of various constitutional provisions. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 94 S.Ct. 1879 (1974) (recognizing privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed
by the federal constitution); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600 (recognizing right to privacy
guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution). To illustrate, the right of privacy as
guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution may be found in “Section 3 guaranteeing
freedom of worship;” “Section 7 prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures;”
Section 19 guaranteeing freedom of speech and press;” and “Section 27 regulating the
quartering of soldiers.” Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600.
Without doubt, our society is interested in protecting the privacy of the individual
citizen from violation by way of intrusion into his home, publicizing his purely personal
affairs, compelling divulgence of his views and beliefs which would expose the citizen
to extra legal sanctions and from inroads into the individual’s repose and relaxation.
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU , MODERN CONSTITUTION AL LAW (2d ed. 1997). Accordingly, the
right to privacy promises a realm of personal liberty, except in very limited
circumstances, which the government may not enter, and the result is a right of
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243 (1969); see also 16B AM . JUR . 2d Constitutional
Law § 603 (1998). This right, also referred to as “the right to be let alone,” see
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), overruled on other grounds by, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct.
1873 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); see also
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to provide
protection against governmental interference in a broad array of human affairs. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973) (right to abortion), holding
modified by, Casey, 505 U.S. at 833, 112 S.Ct. at 2791; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 92 S.Ct. 1029 (1972) (right to use contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
5
87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967) (right to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct.
1678 (1965) (right to marital privacy); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205
(1952) (right to bodily integrity); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438
(1944) (right to family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 62 S.Ct. 1110 (1942) (right to procreate); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43
S.Ct. 625 (1923) (right to direct education of children). It is clear from the precedent
established by the Supreme Court that the constitutional right of privacy places limits
on a state’s right to interfere with a person’s most basic decisions regarding family and
parenthood. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849, 112 S.Ct. at 2806. Compare Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986) (no right to engage in homosexual
sodomy); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (no right to
practice polygamy).
Notwithstanding the individual rights heretofore recognized as embraced within
the right to privacy, there is no general endorsement of an “all-encompassing ‘right of
privacy.’” Casey, 505 U.S. at 952, 112 S.Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Indeed, the courts “ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive
due process because guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended.” Washington v. Glucksberg, -- U.S.--, 117 S.Ct.
2258, 2267 (1997). In determining which rights are fundamental, the courts are not
unrestrained to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Griswold,
381 U.S. at 493, 855 S.Ct. at 1686-87. Rather, if the right cannot be logically deduced
from the text of the Constitution, “the court must look to the traditions and collective
conscience of our people to determine whether a principle is so rooted as to be ranked
as fundamental.”7 Id. at 493, 85 S.Ct. at 1686-87; see also Glucksberg, -- U.S. at --,
7
We acknowledge precedent recognizing a more extensive right of privacy under both the
Tennessee Constitution and this State’s constitutional jurisprudence than the corresponding right
to privacy pro vided by the Federa l Constitution . See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W .2d at 261 .
Indeed , our sup rem e court h as state d “there is n o reaso n to ass ume that there is a com plete
congruency between o ur constitution and its federal counterparts.” Dav is, 842 S.W .2d at 600 .
Notwithstanding the broader protection afforded by the Tennessee Constitution, under which
Tennessee’s incest statute is today uniquely challenged, we conclude that guidance by precedent
establish ed by the U nited State s Supre me C ourt in defin ing the bo undarie s of prote cted liberty
6
117 S.Ct. at 2262; Casey, 595 U.S. at 980, 112 S.Ct. at 2874 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 2984
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). With these historical notions at hand, the court must
then ask “whether a right invoked is of such a character that it cannot be denied without
violating these fundamental principles of liberty and justice which are at the base of all
of our civil and political institutions.” Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493, 85 S.Ct. at 1686-87.
In so doing, the court must be mindful to “exercise the utmost care . . . lest the liberty
protected . . . be subtly transformed into the policy preference of the . . . court.”
Glucksberg, -- U.S. at ---, 117 S.Ct. at 2268 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 502, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1937 (1977)).
In tracing the tradition and customs encompassing an asserted right or privilege,
the reviewing court must narrowly prescribe “ a careful description” of the asserted
fundamental right in order to prevent the promulgation of a constitutional rule of law
broader than that required by the precise facts before us. Glucksberg, -- U.S. at --, 17
S.Ct. at 2268. Indeed, “speaking no more broadly than is absolutely required avoids
throwing settled law into confusion; doing so . . . preserves a chaos that is evident to
anyone who can read and count.”8 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
490, 535, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3065 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). See, e.g., Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196-96, 106 S.Ct. at 2846 (Court recognized, in holding no
fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy, problems associated with
expanding scope of asserted right to include voluntary sexual conduct between
consenting adults including exposure to incest, polygamy, and other prohibited crimes
committed in the home). Thus, we decline the appellant’s invitation to broadly construe
interests is approp riate and n ot antithetica l to our state c onstitution. Cf. Dav is, 842 S.W.2d at
600 (“the right to privac y incorpora tes som e of the attrib utes of th e federa l constitutiona l right to
privacy and, in any given fact situation, may also share som e of its contours”).
8
The holding In Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W .2d a t 250 , igno res th e Su prem e Co urt’s
warning against overextending the scope of an asserted “fundamental right.” In declaring the
Hom osexu al Practice s Act un constitution al, a pane l of the Cou rt of Appe als determ ined that,
und er the Ten nes see Con stitutio n, a fu nda me ntal rig ht ex ists in “an a dult’s right to enga ge in
consensual and no ncomm ercial sexual activities in the privacy of that adult’s home.” Cam pbe ll,
926 S.W.2d at 262. Clearly, the ultimate holding in Cam pbe ll sweeps too broadly as forewarned
by Justice Scalia.
7
incest as part of an alleged right to engage in private consensual non-commercial
sexual activity. Rather, we perform our review within the narrower boundaries of an
asserted right to engage in incestuous relationships.
Incest is the sexual intercourse or marriage between persons related to each
other in any of the degrees of consanguinity or affinity that is prohibited by law. 9 See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-302; 42 C.J.S. Incest § 2 (1991). The taboo against incest
has been a consistent and almost universal tradition with recorded proscriptions against
incest existing as early as 1750 B.C.10 The incest taboo has been characterized as one
of the most important human cultural developments and is found in some form in all
societies. Being primarily cultural in origin, the taboo is neither instinctual nor biological
and has little to do with actual blood ties.11 See Benton v. State, 461 S.E.2d 202, 205
(Ga. 1995) (Sears, J., concurring). Anthropologists and sociologists claim the
significance of the incest taboo is twofold: (1) the restriction forces family members to
go outside their families to find sexual partners, requiring people to pursue relationships
outside family boundaries that help form important economic and political alliances, and
(2) to maintain the stability of the family hierarchy by protecting young family members
from exploitation by older family members in positions of authority and by reducing
competition and jealous friction among family members. Id.
9
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-302 provides:
(a) A person commits incest who engages in sexual penetration as defined in §
39-13-5 01, with a p erson, k nowing such p erson to be, withou t regard to
legitim acy:
(1) The person’s natural parent, child, grandparent, grandchild,
uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, stepparent, stepchild, adoptive
parent, adoptive child; or
(2) The person’s brother or sister of the whole or half-blood or by
adoption.
(b) In ces t is a C lass C felo ny.
10
Discovered in 1901, the Code of Hamm urabi, a Babylonian king, punished the
incestuo us relation ship betw een m other an d son b y burning o f both pa rties at the s take. See
S ARA R O B B I N S, L AW : A T REASURY OF A R T A N D L I T E R AT U R E 20-22 (1990).
11
The unim porta nce of blo od tie s in th e pro hibitio n of in ces t is evid ent fr om soc iety’s
condemnation of incestuous relations long before people knew of its genetic effects.
8
Although the ban on incest was widely followed in all societies, incest was not
a common law crime in England; rather, punishment was left solely to the ecclesiastical
courts. See People v. Baker, 69 Cal. Rptr. 595, 597 (1968); 42 C.J.S. Incest § 2;
Audrey W. Collins, Annotation, Incest -- Half-Blood Relatives, 34 A.L.R. 5th 729 (1995).
The ecclesiastical courts followed the interdiction of Levitical law12 which prohibited
marriages between persons more closely related than fourth cousins unless a
dispensation was procured from the Church of Rome; no distinction was made between
persons related by affinity or consanguinity. Baker, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 597-98. In 1540,
after England’s separation from the Church of Rome, legislation was enacted to correct
“an unjust law of the bishop of Rome” relating to the degrees in which marriages were
permitted. Id. The revised statutes limited prohibitions against marriage to relatives
closer than first cousins. Id. The ecclesiastical courts proclaimed the statute to be a
return to “God’s law.” Id.
The English tradition prohibiting incest within certain degrees was adopted by
the American colonists. American jurisprudence, however, deviated from the
ecclesiastical law in two respects: the majority of American jurisdictions extended the
proscriptions beyond that of first cousins while others only imposed criminal penalties
where the relationship was consanguineous. Baker, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 597-98. Specific
to our concern, Tennessee has traditionally recognized the proscription against incest
as a punishable offense. See, e.g., Ch. 23, Section 18, Code of Tennessee (1829).
The proscription continues as evidenced by today’s challenged statutory provision,
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-302. Regardless of the manner of the proscription, the crime
of incest is governed by specific statutes in every American jurisdiction. Id. at 596.
There is nothing to suggest a movement away from the historical treatment of incest;
Tennessee, as other states, continues to condemn it as a grave public wrong.
12
See Leviticus 18:6-18, 20:11-21.
9
To conclude that there exists a “fundamental right” to engage in an incestuous
relationship, this court would be called upon to contradict centuries of legal doctrine and
practice; which this court declines to do. See, e.g., Glucksberg, -- U.S. at --. 117 S.Ct.
at 2269; Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22, 31, 43 S.Ct. 9, 9-10 (1922) (“If a thing
has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong
case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it.”). The evidence is plain; the incest
taboo is deeply rooted in Anglo-American history and traditions. Although one does
have a general right to privacy, this right does not, by itself, warrant the sweeping
conclusion that all intimate and personal decisions are so protected. See San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1296-98
(1973). Accordingly, we are led to conclude that the asserted “right” to participate in
adult consensual incest is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Tennessee Constitution. Accord People v. Hurd, 85 Cal. Rptr. 718, 726 (1970);
Benton, 461 S.E.2d at 202; State v. Benson, 612 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992);
State v. Buck, 757 P.2d 861 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); Byrom v. State, 648 S.W.2d 440, 441
(Tex. App. 1983); State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d 839, 843 (Wash. App. 1983); 41 AM .JUR .2d
Incest § 3 (1995).
In the absence of a fundamental right, a rational basis test is used to examine
the statute’s constitutional validity. A legislative enactment will be deemed valid if it
bears a real and substantial relationship to the public’s health, safety, morals or general
welfare and it is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. See Nashville, C & L. Ry. v.
Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486 (1935); Erstin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657, 430 S.W.2d
345, 348 (Tenn. 1968), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 318, 89 S.Ct. 354 (1969).
There is little doubt that the prohibition against incest is directly reflective of the
moral concerns of our society. Some argument has been made that this is an
inadequate rationale to support the ban. The law, however, is constantly based on
notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be
10
invalidated, the courts would be very busy. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196, 106
S.Ct. at 2846. “[M]orality must and will remain a part of the criminal law.”
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting). The
basis of criminal law exists because there are certain standards of behavior or moral
principles which society requires to be observed; and the breach of them is an offense
not merely against the person who is injured but against society as a whole. See
DEVLIN , THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 4, 6-18, 20, 20-23 (1959). Indeed, the
destruction of morality renders the power of government invalid, government being no
more than public order. See 16A AM .JUR .2d Constitutional Law § 367. Thus, criminal
statutes prohibiting incestuous relationships reflect the belief that incest is a wrong
against the public largely because of its potential to destabilize the family, traditionally
regarded as society’s most important unit. JOYCE MCCONNELL , INCEST AS A CONUNDRUM :
JUDICIAL DISCOURSE ON PRIVATE W RONG AND PUBLIC HARM 1 Tex. J. Women & L. 143,
150 (Spring 1992).
Although the individual has a right to govern the course of his life, society, also,
has its interests. “To reconcile the true boundaries between the individual and the
community is the highest problem that thoughtful consideration of human society has
to solve.” JELLINEK, THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS 98 (1901).
The balance to be achieved is the toleration of the maximum individual freedom that
is consistent with the integrity of society. The law must protect the institutions and the
community of ideas, political and moral, without which people cannot live together.
Indeed, our legislature has proclaimed that one of the objectives of our criminal code
is to “[p]roscribe and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or
threatens harm to individual, property, or public interest for which protection through
criminal law is appropriate.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-101(1) (1997).
11
The prohibition against incest is aimed at the protection of children and of the
family unit.13 See Sentencing Commission Comments, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-302;
see also Benton, 461 S.E.2d at 203. Society is concerned with the integrity of the
family, see Douthitt v. State, 935 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Ark. 1996), because society cannot
function in an orderly manner when age distinctions, generations, sentiments, and roles
in families are in conflict. State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d 839, 843 (Wash. App. 1983); see
also 41 Am.Jur. 2d Incest § 3. The state has a legitimate and rationally based objective
in prohibiting sexual relations between those related within the proscribed degrees of
kinship to promote domestic peace and purity. See 42 C.J.S. Incest § 2. Accord
Douthitt, 935 S.W.2d at 244; Baldwin, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 295; Hurd, 85 Cal. Rptr. at
726; Benton, 461 S.E.2d at 204; People v. York, 329 N.E.2d 845, 846-47 (Ill. App.
1975); Benson, 612 N.E.2d at 340; Buck, 767 P.2d at 861; Byrom, 648 S.W.2d at 441;
Kaiser, 663 P.2d at 843; In the Interest of Tiffany Nicole M., 571 N.W.2d 872, 877
(Wis. App. 1997), perm. to appeal denied, (Wis. 1998); 41 AM . JUR . 2d Incest §3. We
conclude that the state, in the exercise of its legislative function, may legitimately
proscribe against acts which threaten public order and decency, including prohibitions
against interfamilia sexual relations. Our pronouncements of these principles are
consistent with and not contrary to deeply rooted traditions. We, therefore, hold that
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-302 does not violate the Constitution of the State of
Tennessee.
The decision of the post-conviction court denying the appellant post-conviction
relief is affirmed.
13
Comp are Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-302 (the offense of incest is classified under
Chap ter 15, Offe nse s Ag ains t the F amily ) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502 (repealed 1997)
(the offen se of “ho mos exual ac ts” is class ified as a s exual of fense u nder C hapter 1 3, Offenses
Against the Person).
12
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., Judge
_____________________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
13