IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
FEBRUARY 1997 SESSION February 25, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) NO. 03C01-9604-CC-00149
Appellee, )
) UNICOI COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. ARDEN L. HILL,
BENJAMIN D. CRAIN, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Driving While Impaired -
) Constitutionality)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
DAVID F. BAUTISTA JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
STEVE F. McEWEN WILLIAM DAVID BRIDGERS
Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
142 East Market Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
P. O. Box 996 425 Fifth Avenue North
Johnson City, TN 37605-0996 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
DAVID E. CROCKETT
District Attorney General
LISA D. NIDIFFER
Assistant District Attorney General
Unicoi County Courthouse
Erwin, TN 37650
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
JERRY L. SMITH,
JUDGE
OPINION
Defendant, Benjamin D. Crain, pled guilty to driving while impaired and
reserved for appellate purposes the issue of whether the driving while impaired
statute is unconstitutional. We find the statute to be constitutional.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant, age 19, was involved in an automobile accident. Upon being
taken to a hospital for a blood analysis, he registered .08% blood alcohol content.
After being indicted for the offense of driving while impaired pursuant to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-415, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment alleging
the unconstitutionality of the statute. Upon the motion to dismiss being overruled
by the trial court, defendant then entered a plea of guilty and was fined $250,
received a license revocation for one (1) year and was ordered to complete 20
hours of public service work. With the consent of the trial court and state,
defendant reserved the right to appeal the constitutionality issue as a certified
question of law that is dispositive of the case. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i).
EQUAL PROTECTION
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the driving while impaired
statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-415, violates the defendant’s equal protection
rights under the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution. More
specifically, the defendant argues that subjecting adults ages 18 to 21 to sanctions
based upon .02% blood alcohol content while not subjecting adults ages 21 and
older to the same sanctions violates his rights to equal protection.
Both the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution
guarantee to citizens the same basic right to equal protection of the laws. Brown
v. Campbell County Bd. of Educ., 915 S.W.2d 407, 412-413 (Tenn. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 1852 (1996). The concept of equal protection under both
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Constitutions guarantees that “all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.” Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 153
(Tenn. 1993) (quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
Tennessee has consistently followed the framework developed by the United
States Supreme Court, which applies one of three standards of scrutiny: 1) strict
scrutiny, 2) heightened scrutiny, and 3) reduced scrutiny or the rational basis test.
Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44, 52 (Tenn. 1997). Strict scrutiny analysis is
required when the legislative classification interferes with the exercise of a
“fundamental right” or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a “suspect class.”
State v. Smoky Mountain Secrets, Inc., 937 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Tenn. 1996).
The defendant does not contend that adults ages 18 to 21 are a “suspect
class.” Suspect classifications are race, alienage, national origin, and sex. King-
Bradwell Partnership v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tenn. App.
1993). Heightened review has not been extended to differential treatment based
on age. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87
L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., 937 S.W.2d 856, 858
(Tenn. 1996).
Nevertheless, strict scrutiny of a legislative classification applies when the
classification interferes with a “fundamental right.” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976); Civil
Service Merit Bd. v. Burson, 816 S.W.2d 725, 733 (Tenn. 1991). The punishment
for driving while impaired for a person age 18 or over but under age 21 is “only by
a driver license suspension of one (1) year and by fine of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars
($250.00). As additional punishment, the court may impose public service work.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-415(d). A driver’s license is not a fundamental right. See
State v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1982). However, an individual’s right
to personal liberty is a fundamental right for equal protection purposes. Doe v.
Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 842 (Tenn. 1988). Since the statute clearly authorizes the
court to require public service work, as was done in this case, this involves the
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deprivation of personal liberty. Accordingly, an equal protection analysis must be
conducted under the strict scrutiny standard.
STRICT SCRUTINY
Under the strict scrutiny standard, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate
of equal protection by requiring the state to demonstrate that its classification has
been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 217, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). We now proceed to
determine whether (1) the government has a compelling interest, and (2) if so,
whether the statute has been precisely tailored to serve that interest.
We begin with the premise that it is unlawful for any person under twenty-one
(21) years of age to even consume an alcoholic beverage. Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-
113(b). If the consumption of alcoholic beverages can be treated differently for
those under twenty-one (21) as compared to those twenty-one (21) years of age or
older, then driving offenses relating to the consumption of alcoholic beverages
based upon these age distinctions would seem appropriate. Clearly, the state has
a compelling interest in maintaining the safety of our roads and protecting the public
from younger drivers who have consumed alcoholic beverages. Furthermore, the
statute is narrowly tailored to provide this sanction against younger drivers who are
not allowed to consume alcoholic beverages, and who would present a danger to
the public.
For the above reasons, we find that the driving while impaired statute, Tenn.
Code Ann. § 55-10-415, is constitutional.
ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT
We are compelled to note that in addition to the fine, license revocation and
public service work requirement, the judgment provides for a sentence of 11 months
and 29 days with all the jail time being suspended and the defendant being placed
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on supervised probation for six (6) months. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-415(d)(1)
expressly provides that the punishment for driving while impaired for a person age
eighteen (18) or over but under age twenty-one (21) is limited to “a driver license
suspension of one (1) year and by a fine of two hundred fifty dollars ($250). As
additional punishment, the court may impose public service work.” Neither a
sentence to the county jail nor probation is an authorized sanction. Accordingly, the
trial court should enter a modified judgment deleting these sanctions.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed except that the judgment shall be
modified as set forth above.
_____________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_______________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
_______________________________
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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