IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 96-10559
Summary Calendar
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LESLIEDAWN CLARK, STEVEN LANE JOHNSON,
CHARLES A. DIXON, DONALD ALAN FRIDDELL,
SHIRLEY A. SUMMERS, RICHARD LEE SUMMERS,
LEROY SCHAEFER, and ROXANNE SCHAEFER,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
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April 17, 1998
Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendants, Lesliedawn Clark, Steven Lane Johnson, Donald
Alan Friddell, Charles Dixon, Shirley S. Summers, Richard Lee
Summers, Leroy Schaefer, and Roxanne Schaefer, appeal from the
judgments of conviction entered against them by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Clark and
Leroy Schaefer also appeal the computation of their sentences.
For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
I.
Defendants were involved with, and operated in part, the
Pilot Connection Society (“TPCS”), an organization with the
stated purpose of putting the IRS (which it considered “domestic
enemy number one”) out of business. In furtherance of this
objective, TPCS created and sold an “untax package,” which
purportedly taught people how to remove themselves from the
federal tax system. TPCS marketed its untax package through
informational seminars given across the country. TPCS publicized
its seminars through flyers and advertisements, in which it
claimed that taxes were voluntary, that there was no requirement
for a person to file tax returns, that the tax system was
illegal, and that there were legal ways not to pay taxes.
At the seminars,1 TPCS represented that the untax package
provided a way of legally and permanently “untaxing” oneself so
that a person would no longer be required to pay income taxes or
file a return. Seminar attendees were informed, however, that
TPCS was a First Amendment society and that it could not give out
information that could be construed as legal advice except to its
members. Thus, if a person wanted to learn more about the
“untaxing” process, he was required to become a TPCS member, at a
cost of $45.
The $45 membership fee entitled a TPCS member to a two-hour
consultation at a follow-up meeting with a sales representative
of TPCS, referred to as an Associate Member.2 At the follow-up
meeting, the Associate Member attempted to sell the untax package
1
Seminar attendees were often required to sign a statement indicating
that they were not a spy or a government agent.
2
A TPCS member could become an Associate Member for the cost of
$10,000.
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to the new TPCS member. The fee for being untaxed was generally
the greater of $2100 or ten (10) percent of the dollar amount
owed to the government. In addition to selling the untax
package, Associate Members also counseled and assisted new
members in the untaxing process. As compensation, Associate
Members received a percentage of the untaxing fee paid by a new
member.
The untax package included sample letters to be used to
inform the government that the member was not liable for tax.
The package also contained samples of letters to be sent by
members to employers, bankers, and mortgage holders. The sample
letters purportedly provided a method whereby TPCS members could
revoke their signatures from their bank accounts and revoke
previously filed tax returns.
Another part of the untaxing process involved TPCS members
filing new Forms W-4 so that no federal income tax was withheld
from their paychecks. The evidence showed that, although the
Associate Members did not advise TPCS members of the exact number
of exemptions that they should claim, the Associate Members
clearly advised their clients to claim as many exemptions as
necessary to eliminate withholding taxes. Thus, members were
often left to simply guess at the number of exemptions that they
would need to claim. If a member’s first guess was not high
enough to eliminate withholding, TPCS advised the member to file
another Form W-4 claiming an even higher number of exemptions
until he finally found a number high enough to completely
eliminate withholding. Some TPCS members claimed as many as
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thirty (30) exemptions on their new Forms W-4. TPCS further
instructed its members completing new Forms W-4 to write “For
Identification Only” next to their social security numbers and to
write “Without prejudice, UCC 1-207" next to their signatures.
In addition to the untaxing process, the untax package had a
second component for the protection of assets. TPCS advised its
members to close their bank accounts to prevent the IRS from
seizing the funds in those accounts. TPCS also suggested that
its members barter or deal only in cash or money orders. TPCS
further advised its members that all of a member’s money could be
put into a trust fund for protection from the IRS and that the
trust could not be taxed.
Finally, TPCS suggested several methods that its members
should employ in fighting the IRS, including filing a claim for
abatement, suing IRS employees, and filing a Title 15 commercial
lien. TPCS claimed that one of its members filed a commercial
lien against his employer, IRS agents, and others for
$236,000,000. TPCS informed members that the lien would last for
100 years and would appear on the credit report of the public
official against whom it was filed. TPCS also suggested that its
members could have IRS agents attempting to do their jobs
arrested by the sheriff or could make citizen’s arrests.
II.
On June 7, 1995, a sixteen (16) count indictment was
returned against the defendants. Count 1 of the indictment
charged all of the defendants with conspiracy to defraud the
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United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The remaining
counts charged individual defendants with aiding and abetting the
filing of fraudulent Forms W-4, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
7206(2). Friddell and Shirley Summers, however, were named only
in Count 1. On January 19, 1996, a jury convicted all eight
defendants of conspiracy to defraud the United States; Clark of
Counts 2 and 3; Johnson of Count 8; Dixon of Counts 5 and 7;
Richard Summers of Counts 7, 9, and 10; Leroy Schaefer of Counts
12, 14, 15, and 16; and Roxanne Schaefer of Counts 12, 13, and
14. The jury acquitted Clark of Count 4, Dixon of Count 6, and
Roxanne Schaefer of Count 11. All of the defendants appeal their
convictions. Clark and Leroy Schaefer also appeal the
computation of their sentences.
III.
All of the defendants argue that Count 1 of the indictment
is insufficient as a matter of law. Specifically, the defendants
argue that the indictment is defective because it merely recites
the “generic” language of the statute without identifying the
specific facts underlying the offense and because it fails to
identify the object of the alleged scheme to defraud the United
States.
Although we agree that the indictment is far from a model of
clarity, “[t]he test for validity is not whether the indictment
could have been framed in a more satisfactory manner, but whether
it conforms to minimal constitutional standards.” United States
v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1169 (5th Cir. 1986). An indictment is
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sufficient in a constitutional sense if it “(1) enumerates each
prima facie element of the charged offense, (2) notifies the
defendant of the charges filed against him, and (3) provides the
defendant with a double jeopardy defense against future
prosecutions.” United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1360 (5th
Cir. 1995) (quotation and citation omitted). We find that the
conspiracy charge in this case meets these minimal standards.
To allege a violation of § 371, the government must allege
two elements. First, the government must allege that two or more
people agreed to defraud the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
The defraud clause of § 371 reaches both a conspiracy to cheat
the government out of property or money and any conspiracy
designed to impair, obstruct, or defeat the lawful function of
any department of the government. See Hammerschmidt v. United
States, 265 U.S. 182, 187-88, 44 S. Ct. 511, 512 (1924); United
States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1990). Second, as
in all conspiracies, the government must allege that at least one
of the alleged conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance
of the objectives of the conspiracy. See United States v.
Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1997).
In this case, Count 1 of the indictment tracked the language
of the defraud clause of § 371 by charging that the defendants
“conspired, agreed, and combined to defraud the United States.”
Although we agree with the defendants that this language, by
itself, would have been insufficient, the indictment does more
than merely recite the language of the statute. In the “Manner
and Means” section, the indictment outlined the scheme in which
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the defendants engaged, thereby clearly establishing that the
defendants were charged with cheating the government out of money
and with “impairing, obstructing, or defeating” a lawful function
of the IRS -- i.e., collecting taxes. In sum, therefore, when
viewed as a whole, we find that the indictment adequately
informed the defendants of the nature of the charges against them
and was sufficiently specific to enable them to raise the defense
of double jeopardy in any future prosecutions.
IV.
Friddell, Clark, Leroy Schaefer, and Roxanne Schaefer
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their
convictions under § 371. In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we view the evidence and all inferences to be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine
if a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States
v. Sneed, 63 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing United States
v. Pruneda-Gonzalez, 953 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1992)).
As discussed above, to obtain a conviction under § 371, the
government must prove that the alleged conspirators agreed among
themselves to defraud the United States and that at least one of
the alleged conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy. United States v. Chesson, 933 F.2d 298, 306 (5th
Cir. 1991). The agreement, however, need not be an express or
formal agreement -- “a tacit understanding is sufficient.”
United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1990).
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The evidence in this case overwhelmingly showed that the
defendants knowingly participated in a conspiracy to defraud the
United States. Specifically, the evidence showed that each of
these defendants was at least an Associate Member (Clark was also
an “Area Coordinator”) of TPCS, an organization created and
designed to put the IRS out of business by having its members
falsify documents and refuse to pay taxes. As Associate Members,
the defendants were responsible for recruiting new members and
assisting those members in the untaxing process. In short, these
defendants instructed new members how to avoid paying taxes and
assisted them in preparing the necessary documents. Given the
role of the Associate Members in this scheme, and in light of the
evidence introduced at trial as to each of these defendants, we
find that a rational jury could have easily concluded that each
of these defendants conspired to defraud the United States, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
V.
Leroy and Roxanne Schaefer also contest the sufficiency of
the evidence that they aided and assisted in the preparation of
false and fraudulent Forms W-4, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
7206(2). A conviction under § 7206(2) requires proof that the
defendant willfully aided, assisted, counseled, or advised
another in the preparation or presentation under the internal
revenue laws of a document that is fraudulent or false as to any
material matter. 18 U.S.C. § 7206(2).
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The evidence in this case clearly shows that Roxanne
Schaefer counseled and advised Robert Hennis (Count 12), Kim
Hennis (Count 13), and James Perry (Count 14), and that Leroy
Schaefer counseled and advised Robert Hennis (Count 12), James
Perry (Count 14), and James Campbell (Counts 15 and 16), to file
new Forms W-4 with increased exemptions so that no withholding
taxes would be withheld from their paychecks. It is immaterial
that Mr. and Mrs. Schaefer did not advise these individuals as to
the exact number of exemptions that they should claim or that
they were not present when the forms were completed. The
evidence unmistakably shows that they counseled and advised these
TPCS members to alter their Forms W-4 so that no federal income
taxes were withheld from their paychecks, and that, based on this
advice, those individuals then filed fraudulent Forms W-4.
Consequently, we find that evidence sufficient to support these
convictions.
VI.
Clark and Leroy Schaefer argue that their sentences are
excessive because the district court computed the sentences based
on an erroneous tax loss figure.3 We disagree.
This court reviews the application of the Sentencing
Guidelines de novo, and it reviews the sentencing court’s factual
3
Clark also argues that the Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional
and that she should not have received a term of imprisonment because Congress
did not intend for first-time, nonviolent offenders to be sentenced to prison.
These arguments are meritless. See, e.g., United States v. White, 869 F.2d
822, 826-27 (5th Cir. 1989).
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findings for clear error. United States v. Edwards, 65 F.3d 430,
432 (5th Cir. 1995). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous
if it is “plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Id.
(citation omitted). The presentence report is considered
reliable evidence for sentencing purposes. United States v.
Vital, 68 F.3d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 1995). If the defendant does
not submit affidavits or other evidence to rebut the information
in the PSR, the district court may “adopt [the PSR] without
further inquiry or explanation.” Id.
In a tax loss case, a defendant’s sentence may be based on
both the tax loss that he caused directly and the tax loss caused
by his coconspirators, if that loss was reasonably foreseeable to
the defendant. United States v. Charroux, 3 F.3d 827, 838 (5th
Cir. 1993). This court reviews the district court’s
determination of the tax loss for clear error. United States v.
McCord, 33 F.3d 1434, 1453 (5th Cir. 1994).
In this case, the PSR provided that the tax harm reasonably
foreseeable to Clark was $14,832,805 and that the tax loss
reasonably foreseeable to Leroy was $14,244,280. In part, these
figures were based on the foreseeable tax losses to the
government from the date upon which the defendants became
Associate Members in TPCS (i.e., after the defendants joined the
conspiracy). See United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1233-34
(5th Cir. 1994). Because Clark and Leroy Schaefer objected to
the amounts in the PSR, the government called Special Agent
Sanders to explain how the IRS had arrived at the estimated loss
figures provided to the probation officer. Following extensive
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cross-examination by all defendants, the district court found
that Agent Sanders’s testimony established the foreseeable tax
harm by a preponderance of the evidence. Consequently, the court
adopted the findings in the PSR. After reviewing the testimony
of Agent Sanders and ascertaining that the defendants did not
introduce any evidence to contradict Agent Sanders’s testimony or
rebut the probation officer’s computation of the foreseeable
loss, we conclude that the district court’s determination of loss
for sentencing purposes was not clearly erroneous. See Vital, 68
F.3d at 120.
VII.
Clark also contends that the district court erred in not
instructing the jury on her First Amendment defense. There was,
however, no foundation for such an instruction because the
charged conduct (conspiracy to defraud) was not protected by the
First Amendment. See United States v. Fleschner, 98 F.3d 155,
158-59 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2484 (1997).
Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to give
such an instruction.
VIII.
Clark next contends that the district court erred in
removing the question of the materiality of the Forms W-4 from
the jury’s consideration. Because Clark did not object in the
district court to the challenged instruction, we review for plain
error. See Johnson v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1544 (1997).
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After careful review of the record, we conclude that, even
assuming that it was error to remove the issue of materiality
from the jury, see United States v. Klausner, 80 F.3d 55, 58-61
(2d Cir.1996) (holding that materiality under § 7206(2) was a
question of law for the court because false itemized deductions
necessarily resulted in an inaccurate computation of tax), the
error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. See Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at
1550. The very purpose of Form W-4 is to determine the amount of
taxes that should be withheld from an employee’s paycheck, and
the amount of withholding depends on the number of exemptions
claimed. Thus, it is beyond reasonable dispute that the number
of allowances claimed on a Form W-4 is a material matter.
Accordingly, we find no plain error.
IX.
In addition to the claims set forth above, defendant Clark
raises the following claims: 1) that the district court erred in
refusing to give her requested instruction as to her good faith
defense; 2) that the government withheld exculpatory evidence
from her in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.
Ct. 1194 (1963); 3) that the district court abused its discretion
in excluding certain documents and testimony from evidence; 4)
that the district court engaged in judicial misconduct; 5) that
the government introduced perjured testimony; 6) that the
government’s attorneys made improper statements before the jury;
7) that the prosecution of the defendants was vindictive because
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not all TPCS members were prosecuted; and 8) that she was
excluded from certain stages of the trial. After a careful
review of the record as to each of these points, we find no
reversible error.
X.
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM.
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