Samson v. California

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SAMSON v. CALIFORNIA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

No. 04–9728. Argued February 22, 2006—Decided June 19, 2006
Pursuant to a California statute—which requires every prisoner eligi
ble for release on state parole to “agree in writing to be subject to
search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer . . . , with or
without a search warrant and with or without cause”—and based
solely on petitioner’s parolee status, an officer searched petitioner
and found methamphetamine. The trial court denied his motions to
suppress that evidence, and he was convicted of possession. Affirm
ing, the State Court of Appeal held that suspicionless searches of pa
rolees are lawful under California law and that the search in this
case was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it was
not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.
Held: The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from
conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee. Pp. 3–12.
(a) The “totality of the circumstances” must be examined to deter
mine whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Knights, 534 U. S. 112, 118. Reasonableness “is de
termined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [the
search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate govern
mental interests.” Id., at 118–119. Applying this approach in
Knights, the Court found reasonable the warrantless search of a pro
bationer’s apartment based on reasonable suspicion and a probation
condition authorized by California law. In evaluating the degree of
intrusion into Knights’ privacy, the Court found his probationary
status “salient,” id., at 118, observing that probation is on a contin
uum of possible punishments and that probationers “do not enjoy ‘the
absolute liberty’ ” of other citizens, id., at 119. It also found probation
searches necessary to promote legitimate governmental interests of
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Syllabus

integrating probationers back into the community, combating recidi
vism, and protecting potential victims. Balancing those interests, the
intrusion was reasonable. However, because the search was predi
cated on both the probation search condition and reasonable suspi
cion, the Court did not address the reasonableness of a search solely
predicated upon the probation condition. Pp. 3–5.
(b) Parolees, who are on the “continuum” of state-imposed punish
ments, have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because
parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is. “The essence
of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on
the condition that the prisoner abides by certain rules during the
balance of the sentence.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 477.
California’s system is consistent with these observations. An inmate
electing to complete his sentence out of physical custody remains in
the Department of Corrections’ legal custody for the remainder of his
term and must comply with the terms and conditions of his parole.
The extent and reach of those conditions demonstrate that parolees
have severely diminished privacy expectations by virtue of their
status alone. Additionally, as in Knights, the state law’s parole
search condition was clearly expressed to petitioner, who signed an
order submitting to the condition and thus was unambiguously aware
of it. Examining the totality of the circumstances, petitioner did not
have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legiti
mate. The State’s interests, by contrast, are substantial. A State has
an “overwhelming interest” in supervising parolees because they “are
more likely to commit future criminal offenses.” Pennsylvania Bd. of
Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U. S. 357, 365. Similarly, a State’s
interests in reducing recidivism, thereby promoting reintegration and
positive citizenship among probationers and parolees, warrant pri
vacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the
Fourth Amendment. The Amendment does not render States power
less to address these concerns effectively. California’s 60-to70
percent recidivism rate demonstrates that most parolees are ill pre
pared to handle the pressures of reintegration and require intense
supervision. The State Legislature has concluded that, given the
State’s number of parolees and its high recidivism rate, an individu
alized suspicion requirement would undermine the State’s ability to
effectively supervise parolees and protect the public from criminal
acts by reoffenders. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, the fact that
some States and the Federal Government require a level of individu
alized suspicion before searching a parolee is of little relevance in de
termining whether California’s system is drawn to meet the State’s
needs and is reasonable, taking into account a parolee’s substantially
diminished expectation of privacy. Nor is there merit to the argu
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Syllabus

ment that California’s law grants discretion without procedural safe
guards. The concern that the system gives officers unbridled discre
tion to conduct searches, thereby inflicting dignitary harms that
arouse strong resentment in parolees and undermine their ability to
reintegrate into society, is belied by the State’s prohibition on arbi
trary, capricious, or harassing searches. And petitioner’s concern
that the law frustrates reintegration efforts by permitting intrusions
into the privacy interests of third persons is unavailing because that
concern would arise under a suspicion-based system as well. Pp. 5–
12.
Affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STE
VENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER and BREYER, JJ.,
joined.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 04–9728
_________________

DONALD CURTIS SAMSON, PETITIONER v.

CALIFORNIA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF

CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

[June 19, 2006]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
California law provides that every prisoner eligible for
release on state parole “shall agree in writing to be subject
to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace
officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a
search warrant and with or without cause.” Cal. Penal
Code Ann. §3067(a) (West 2000). We granted certiorari to
decide whether a suspicionless search, conducted under
the authority of this statute, violates the Constitution. We
hold that it does not.
I
In September 2002, petitioner Donald Curtis Samson
was on state parole in California, following a conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm. On September 6,
2002, Officer Alex Rohleder of the San Bruno Police De
partment observed petitioner walking down a street with
a woman and a child. Based on a prior contact with peti
tioner, Officer Rohleder was aware that petitioner was on
parole and believed that he was facing an at large war
rant. Accordingly, Officer Rohleder stopped petitioner and
asked him whether he had an outstanding parole warrant.
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Opinion of the Court

Petitioner responded that there was no outstanding war
rant and that he “was in good standing with his parole
agent.” Brief for Petitioner 4. Officer Rohleder confirmed,
by radio dispatch, that petitioner was on parole and that
he did not have an outstanding warrant. Nevertheless,
pursuant to Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3067(a) (West 2000)
and based solely on petitioner’s status as a parolee, Officer
Rohleder searched petitioner. During the search, Officer
Rohleder found a cigarette box in petitioner’s left breast
pocket. Inside the box he found a plastic baggie contain
ing methamphetamine.
The State charged petitioner with possession of
methamphetamine pursuant to Cal. Health & Safety Code
Ann. §11377(a) (West 1991). The trial court denied peti
tioner’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine evi
dence, finding that Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3067(a) (West
2000) authorized the search and that the search was not
“arbitrary or capricious.” App. 62–63 (Proceedings on
Motion to Supress). A jury convicted petitioner of the
possession charge and the trial court sentenced him to
seven years’ imprisonment.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed. Relying on
People v. Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th 743, 968 P. 2d 445 (1998), the
court held that suspicionless searches of parolees are
lawful under California law; that “ ‘[s]uch a search is
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
as long as it is not arbitrary, capricious or harassing’ ”; and
that the search in this case was not arbitrary, capricious,
or harassing. No. A102394 (Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist.,
Oct. 14, 2004), App. 12–14.
We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. ___ (2005), to answer a
variation of the question this Court left open in United
States v. Knights, 534 U. S. 112, 120, n. 6 (2001)—whether
a condition of release can so diminish or eliminate a re
leased prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy that a
suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would
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Opinion of the Court

not offend the Fourth Amendment.1 Answering that
question in the affirmative today, we affirm the judgment
of the California Court of Appeal.
II
“[U]nder our general Fourth Amendment approach” we
“examin[e] the totality of the circumstances” to determine
whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Id., at 118 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Whether a search is reasonable “is determined by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate govern
mental interests.” Id., at 118–119 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
We recently applied this approach in United States v.
Knights. In that case, California law required Knights, as
a probationer, to “ ‘[s]ubmit his . . . person, property, place
of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search anytime,
with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or
reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforce
ment officer.’ ” Id., at 114 (brackets in original). Several
days after Knights had been placed on probation, police
suspected that he had been involved in several incidents of
arson and vandalism. Based upon that suspicion and
pursuant to the search condition of his probation, a police
officer conducted a warrantless search of Knights’ apart
ment and found arson and drug paraphernalia. Id., at
115–116.
We concluded that the search of Knights’ apartment was
reasonable. In evaluating the degree of intrusion into
——————
1 Knights, 534 U. S., at 120, n. 6 (“We do not decide whether the proba

tion condition so diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights’ reason
able expectation of privacy . . . that a search by a law enforcement officer
without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonable
ness requirement of the Fourth Amendment”).
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Opinion of the Court

Knights’ privacy, we found Knights’ probationary status
“salient,” id., at 118, observing that “[p]robation is ‘one
point . . . on a continuum of possible punishments ranging
from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility
to a few hours of mandatory community service.’ ” Id., at
119 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 874
(1987)). Cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 530 (1984)
(holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of
privacy). We further observed that, by virtue of their status
alone, probationers “ ‘do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled,” ’ ” Knights, supra, at 119
(quoting Griffin, supra, at 874, in turn quoting Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (1972)), justifying the “im
pos[ition] [of] reasonable conditions that deprive the of
fender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”
Knights, supra, at 119. We also considered the facts that
Knights’ probation order clearly set out the probation
search condition, and that Knights was clearly informed of
the condition. See Knights, 534 U. S., at 119. We con
cluded that under these circumstances, Knights’ expecta
tion of privacy was significantly diminished. See id., at
119–120.
We also concluded that probation searches, such as the
search of Knights’ apartment, are necessary to the promo
tion of legitimate governmental interests. Noting the
State’s dual interest in integrating probationers back into
the community and combating recidivism, see id., at 120–
121, we credited the “ ‘assumption’ ” that, by virtue of his
status, a probationer “ ‘is more likely than the ordinary
citizen to violate the law.’ ” Id., at 120 (quoting Griffin,
supra, at 880). We further found that “probationers have
even more of an incentive to conceal their criminal activi
ties and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence than the
ordinary criminal because probationers are aware that
they may be subject to supervision and face revocation of
probation, and possible incarceration, in proceedings in
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Opinion of the Court

which the trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a reason
able doubt, among other things, do not apply.” Knights,
534 U. S., at 120. We explained that the State did not
have to ignore the reality of recidivism or suppress its
interests in “protecting potential victims of criminal en
terprise” for fear of running afoul of the Fourth Amend
ment. Id., at 121.
Balancing these interests, we held that “[w]hen an
officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject
to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there
is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring
that an intrusion on the probationer’s significantly dimin
ished privacy interests is reasonable.” Ibid. Because the
search at issue in Knights was predicated on both the
probation search condition and reasonable suspicion, we
did not reach the question whether the search would have
been reasonable under the Fourth Amendment had it been
solely predicated upon the condition of probation. Id., at
120, n. 6. Our attention is directed to that question today,
albeit in the context of a parolee search.
III
As we noted in Knights, parolees are on the “continuum”
of state-imposed punishments. Id., at 119 (internal quota
tion marks omitted). On this continuum, parolees have
fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because
parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to
imprisonment. As this Court has pointed out, “parole is an
established variation on imprisonment of convicted crimi
nals. . . . The essence of parole is release from prison, before
the completion of sentence, on the condition that the pris
oner abides by certain rules during the balance of the sen
tence.” Morrissey, supra, at 477. “In most cases, the State
is willing to extend parole only because it is able to condition
it upon compliance with certain requirements.” Pennsyl
vania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U. S. 357,
6 SAMSON v. CALIFORNIA

Opinion of the Court

365 (1998). See also United States v. Reyes, 283 F. 3d 446,
461 (CA2 2002) (“[F]ederal supervised release, . . . in
contrast to probation, is meted out in addition to, not in
lieu of, incarceration” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); United States v. Cardona, 903 F. 2d 60,
63 (CA1 1990) (“[O]n the Court’s continuum of possible
punishments, parole is the stronger medicine; ergo, parol
ees enjoy even less of the average citizen’s absolute liberty
than do probationers” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).2
California’s system of parole is consistent with these
observations: A California inmate may serve his parole
period either in physical custody, or elect to complete his
sentence out of physical custody and subject to certain
conditions. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3060.5 (West 2000).
Under the latter option, an inmate-turned-parolee re
mains in the legal custody of the California Department of
Corrections through the remainder of his term, §3056, and
——————
2 Contrary
to the dissent’s contention, nothing in our recognition that
parolees are more akin to prisoners than probationers is inconsistent
with our precedents. Nor, as the dissent suggests, do we equate parol
ees with prisoners for the purpose of concluding that parolees, like
prisoners, have no Fourth Amendment rights. See post, at 5 (opinion of
STEVENS, J.). That view misperceives our holding. If that were the
basis of our holding, then this case would have been resolved solely
under Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984), and there would have
been no cause to resort to Fourth Amendment analysis. See ibid.
(holding traditional Fourth Amendment analysis of the totality of the
circumstances inapplicable to the question whether a prisoner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell). Nor is our ration
ale inconsistent with Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 482 (1972). In
that case, the Court recognized that restrictions on a parolee’s liberty
are not unqualified. That statement, even if accepted as a truism,
sheds no light on the extent to which a parolee’s constitutional rights
are indeed limited—and no one argues that a parolee’s constitutional
rights are not limited. Morrissey itself does not cast doubt on today’s
holding given that the liberty at issue in that case—the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process right to a hearing before revocation of pa
role—invokes wholly different analysis than the search at issue here.
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Opinion of the Court

must comply with all of the terms and conditions of parole,
including mandatory drug tests, restrictions on association
with felons or gang members, and mandatory meetings
with parole officers, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §2512 (2005);
Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3067 (West 2000). See also Morris
sey, supra, at 478 (discussing other permissible terms and
conditions of parole). General conditions of parole also
require a parolee to report to his assigned parole officer
immediately upon release, inform the parole officer within
72 hours of any change in employment status, request
permission to travel a distance of more than 50 miles from
the parolee’s home, and refrain from criminal conduct and
possession of firearms, specified weapons, or knives unre
lated to employment. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §2512.
Parolees may also be subject to special conditions, includ
ing psychiatric treatment programs, mandatory absti
nence from alcohol, residence approval, and “[a]ny other
condition deemed necessary by the Board [of Parole Hear
ings] or the Department [of Corrections and Rehabilita
tion] due to unusual circumstances.” §2513. The extent
and reach of these conditions clearly demonstrate that
parolees like petitioner have severely diminished expecta
tions of privacy by virtue of their status alone.
Additionally, as we found “salient” in Knights with
respect to the probation search condition, the parole
search condition under California law—requiring inmates
who opt for parole to submit to suspicionless searches by a
parole officer or other peace officer “at any time,” Cal.
Penal Code Ann. §3067(a) (West 2000)—was “clearly
expressed” to petitioner. Knights, 534 U. S., at 119. He
signed an order submitting to the condition and thus was
“unambiguously” aware of it. Ibid. In Knights, we found
that acceptance of a clear and unambiguous search condi
tion “significantly diminished Knights’ reasonable expec
tation of privacy.” Id., at 120. Examining the totality of
the circumstances pertaining to petitioner’s status as a
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Opinion of the Court

parolee, “an established variation on imprisonment,” Mor
rissey, 408 U. S., at 477, including the plain terms of the
parole search condition, we conclude that petitioner did
not have an expectation of privacy that society would
recognize as legitimate.3
The State’s interests, by contrast, are substantial. This
Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a State has an
“overwhelming interest” in supervising parolees because
“parolees. . . are more likely to commit future criminal
offenses.” Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 524
U. S., at 365 (explaining that the interest in combating
recidivism “is the very premise behind the system of close
parole supervision”). Similarly, this Court has repeatedly
acknowledged that a State’s interests in reducing recidivism
and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizen
——————
3 Because we find that the search at issue here is reasonable under
our general Fourth Amendment approach, we need not reach the issue
whether “acceptance of the search condition constituted consent in the
Schneckloth [v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973),] sense of a complete
waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights.” United States v. Knights, 534
U. S. 112, 118 (2001). The California Supreme Court has not yet
construed Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3067 (West 2000), the statute which
governs parole for crimes committed after 1996, and which imposes the
consent requirement. The California Court of Appeal has, and it has
concluded that, under §3067(b), “inmates who are otherwise eligible for
parole yet refuse to agree to the mandatory search condition will
remain imprisoned . . . until either the inmate (1) agrees to the search
condition and is otherwise eligible for parole or (2) has lost all worktime
credits and is eligible for release after having served the balance of
his/her sentence.” People v. Middleton, 131 Cal. App. 4th 732, 739–740,
31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 818 (2005). Nonetheless, we decline to rest our
holding today on the consent rationale. The California Supreme Court,
we note, has not yet had a chance to address the question squarely, and
it is far from clear that the State properly raised its consent theory in
the courts below.
Nor do we address whether California’s parole search condition is
justified as a special need under Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868
(1987), because our holding under general Fourth Amendment princi
ples renders such an examination unnecessary.
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Opinion of the Court

ship among probationers and parolees warrant privacy
intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the
Fourth Amendment. See Griffin, 483 U. S., at 879; Knights,
supra, at 121.
The empirical evidence presented in this case clearly
demonstrates the significance of these interests to the
State of California. As of November 30, 2005, California
had over 130,000 released parolees. California’s parolee
population has a 68-to-70 percent recidivism rate. See
California Attorney General, Crime in California 37 (Apr.
2001) (explaining that 68 percent of adult parolees are
returned to prison, 55 percent for a parole violation, 13
percent for the commission of a new felony offense); J.
Petersilia, Challenges of Prisoner Reentry and Parole in
California, 12 California Policy Research Center Brief, p. 2
(June 2000), available at http://www.ucop.edu/cprc/pa
role.pdf (as visited June 15, 2006, and available in Clerk of
Court’s case file) (“70% of the state’s paroled felons reof
fend within 18 months—the highest recidivism rate in the
nation”). This Court has acknowledged the grave safety
concerns that attend recidivism. See Ewing v. California,
538 U. S. 11, 26 (2003) (plurality opinion) (“Recidivism is a
serious public safety concern in California and throughout
the Nation”).
As we made clear in Knights, the Fourth Amendment
does not render the States powerless to address these
concerns effectively. See 534 U. S., at 121. Contrary to
petitioner’s contention, California’s ability to conduct
suspicionless searches of parolees serves its interest in
reducing recidivism, in a manner that aids, rather than
hinders, the reintegration of parolees into productive
society.
In California, an eligible inmate serving a determinate
sentence may elect parole when the actual days he has
served plus statutory time credits equal the term imposed
by the trial court, Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§2931, 2933,
10 SAMSON v. CALIFORNIA

Opinion of the Court

3000(b)(1) (West 2000), irrespective of whether the inmate
is capable of integrating himself back into productive
society. As the recidivism rate demonstrates, most parol
ees are ill prepared to handle the pressures of reintegra
tion. Thus, most parolees require intense supervision.
The California Legislature has concluded that, given the
number of inmates the State paroles and its high recidi
vism rate, a requirement that searches be based on indi
vidualized suspicion would undermine the State’s ability
to effectively supervise parolees and protect the public
from criminal acts by reoffenders. This conclusion makes
eminent sense. Imposing a reasonable suspicion require
ment, as urged by petitioner, would give parolees greater
opportunity to anticipate searches and conceal criminality.
See Knights, supra, at 120; Griffin, 483 U. S., at 879. This
Court concluded that the incentive-to-conceal concern
justified an “intensive” system for supervising probation
ers in Griffin, id., at 875. That concern applies with even
greater force to a system of supervising parolees. See
United States v. Reyes, 283 F. 3d, at 461 (observing that
the Griffin rationale “appl[ies] a fortiori” to “federal su
pervised release, which, in contrast to probation, is ‘meted
out in addition to, not in lieu of, incareration’ ”); United
States v. Crawford, 372 F. 3d 1048, 1077 (CA9 2004) (en
banc) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (explaining that parolees,
in contrast to probationers, “have been sentenced to prison
for felonies and released before the end of their prison
terms” and are “deemed to have acted more harmfully
than anyone except those felons not released on parole”);
Hudson, 468 U. S., at 526 (persons sentenced to terms of
imprisonment have been “deemed to have acted more
harmfully than anyone except those felons not released on
parole”); id., at 529 (observing that it would be “naive” to
institute a system of “ ‘planned random searches’ ” as that
would allow prisoners to “anticipate” searches, thus de
feating the purpose of random searches).
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Opinion of the Court

Petitioner observes that the majority of States and the
Federal Government have been able to further similar
interests in reducing recidivism and promoting re
integration, despite having systems that permit parolee
searches based upon some level of suspicion. Thus, peti
tioner contends, California’s system is constitutionally
defective by comparison. Petitioner’s reliance on the
practices of jurisdictions other than California, however, is
misplaced. That some States and the Federal Government
require a level of individualized suspicion is of little rele
vance to our determination whether California’s supervi
sory system is drawn to meet its needs and is reasonable,
taking into account a parolee’s substantially diminished
expectation of privacy.4
Nor is there merit to the argument that California’s
parole search law permits “a blanket grant of discretion
——————
4 The dissent argues that, “once one acknowledges that parolees do

have legitimate expectations of privacy beyond those of prisoners, our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not permit the conclusion,
reached by the Court here for the first time, that a search supported by
neither individualized suspicion nor ‘special needs’ is nonetheless
‘reasonable.’ ” Post, at 2. That simply is not the case. The touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspi
cion. Thus, while this Court’s jurisprudence has often recognized that
“to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of indi
vidualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search
or seizure,” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 560 (1976),
we have also recognized that the “Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of such suspicion,” id., at 561. Therefore,
although this Court has only sanctioned suspicionless searches in
limited circumstances, namely programmatic and special needs
searches, we have never held that these are the only limited circum
stances in which searches absent individualized suspicion could be
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. In light of California’s
earnest concerns respecting recidivism, public safety, and reintegration
of parolees into productive society, and because the object of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness, our decision today is far from remark
able. Nor, given our prior precedents and caveats, is it “unprece
dented.” Post, at 1.
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Opinion of the Court

untethered by any procedural safeguards,” post, at 1
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). The concern that California’s
suspicionless search system gives officers unbridled dis
cretion to conduct searches, thereby inflicting dignitary
harms that arouse strong resentment in parolees and
undermine their ability to reintegrate into productive
society, is belied by California’s prohibition on “arbitrary,
capricious or harassing” searches. See Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th,
at 752, 753–754, 968 P. 2d, at 450, 451; People v. Bravo, 43
Cal. 3d 600, 610, 738 P. 2d 336, 342 (1987) (probation); see
also Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3067(d) (West 2000) (“It is not
the intent of the Legislature to authorize law enforcement
officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of har
assment”).5 The dissent’s claim that parolees under Cali
fornia law are subject to capricious searches conducted at
the unchecked “whim” of law enforcement officers, post, at
3, 4, ignores this prohibition. Likewise, petitioner’s con
cern that California’s suspicionless search law frustrates
reintegration efforts by permitting intrusions into the
privacy interests of third parties is also unavailing be
cause that concern would arise under a suspicion-based
regime as well.
IV
Thus, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless
search of a parolee. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the California Court of Appeal.
It is so ordered.

——————
5 Under California precedent, we note, an officer would not act rea

sonably in conducting a suspicionless search absent knowledge that the
person stopped for the search is a parolee. See People v. Sanders, 31
Cal. 4th 318, 331–332, 73 P. 3d 496, 505–506 (2003); Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 20.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 04–9728
_________________

DONALD CURTIS SAMSON, PETITIONER v.

CALIFORNIA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF

CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

[June 19, 2006]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and
JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.
Our prior cases have consistently assumed that the
Fourth Amendment provides some degree of protection for
probationers and parolees. The protection is not as robust
as that afforded to ordinary citizens; we have held that
probationers’ lowered expectation of privacy may justify
their warrantless search upon reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing, see United States v. Knights, 534 U. S. 112
(2001). We have also recognized that the supervisory
responsibilities of probation officers, who are required to
provide “ ‘individualized counseling’ ” and to monitor their
charges’ progress, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 876–
877 (1987), and who are in a unique position to judge “how
close a supervision the probationer requires,” id., at 876,
may give rise to special needs justifying departures from
Fourth Amendment strictures. See ibid. (“Although a
probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is
he the police officer who normally conducts searches against
the ordinary citizen”). But neither Knights nor Griffin
supports a regime of suspicionless searches, conducted
pursuant to a blanket grant of discretion untethered by
any procedural safeguards, by law enforcement personnel
who have no special interest in the welfare of the parolee
or probationer.
2 SAMSON v. CALIFORNIA

STEVENS, J., dissenting

What the Court sanctions today is an unprecedented
curtailment of liberty. Combining faulty syllogism with
circular reasoning, the Court concludes that parolees have
no more legitimate an expectation of privacy in their
persons than do prisoners. However superficially appeal
ing that parity in treatment may seem, it runs roughshod
over our precedent. It also rests on an intuition that fares
poorly under scrutiny. And once one acknowledges that
parolees do have legitimate expectations of privacy beyond
those of prisoners, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
does not permit the conclusion, reached by the Court here
for the first time, that a search supported by neither indi
vidualized suspicion nor “special needs” is nonetheless
“reasonable.”
The suspicionless search is the very evil the Fourth
Amendment was intended to stamp out. See Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 625–630 (1886); see also, e.g.,
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 37 (2000). The pre-
Revolutionary “writs of assistance,” which permitted
roving searches for contraband, were reviled precisely
because they “placed ‘the liberty of every man in the hands
of every petty officer.’ ” Boyd, 116 U. S., at 625. While
individualized suspicion “is not an ‘irreducible’ component
of reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment, Ed
mond, 531 U. S., at 37 (quoting United States v. Marti
nez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561 (1976)), the requirement
has been dispensed with only when programmatic
searches were required to meet a “ ‘special need’ . . . di
vorced from the State’s general interest in law enforce
ment.” Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U. S. 67, 79 (2001);
see Edmond, 531 U. S., at 37; see also Griffin, 483 U. S., at
873 (“Although we usually require that a search be under
taken only pursuant to a warrant (and thus supported by
probable cause, as the Constitution says warrants must
be), . . . we have permitted exceptions when ‘special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

STEVENS, J., dissenting

warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable’ ”).
Not surprisingly, the majority does not seek to justify
the search of petitioner on “special needs” grounds. Al
though the Court has in the past relied on special needs to
uphold warrantless searches of probationers, id., at 873,
880, it has never gone so far as to hold that a probationer
or parolee may be subjected to full search at the whim of
any law enforcement officer he happens to encounter,
whether or not the officer has reason to suspect him of
wrongdoing. Griffin, after all, involved a search by a
probation officer that was supported by reasonable suspi
cion. The special role of probation officers was critical to
the analysis; “we deal with a situation,” the Court ex
plained, “in which there is an ongoing supervisory rela
tionship—and one that is not, or at least not entirely,
adversarial—between the object of the search and the
decisionmaker.” Id., at 879. The State’s interest or “spe
cial need,” as articulated in Griffin, was an interest in
supervising the wayward probationer’s reintegration into
society—not, or at least not principally, the general law
enforcement goal of detecting crime, see ante, at 8–9.1
——————
1 As we observed in Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U. S. 67 (2001), Grif

fin’s special needs rationale was cast into doubt by our later decision in
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602 (1989), which
reserved the question whether “ ‘routine use in criminal prosecutions of
evidence obtained pursuant to the administrative scheme would give rise
to an inference of pretext, or otherwise impugn the administrative nature
of the . . . program,’ ” Ferguson, 532 U. S., at 79, n. 15 (quoting Skinner,
489 U. S., at 621, n. 5). But at least the State in Griffin could in good faith
contend that its warrantless searches were supported by a special need
conceptually distinct from law enforcement goals generally. Indeed, that a
State’s interest in supervising its parolees and probationers to ensure
their smooth reintegration may occasionally diverge from its general law
enforcement aims is illustrated by this very case. Petitioner’s possession
of a small amount of illegal drugs would not have been grounds for
revocation of his parole. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3063.1(a) (West Supp.
2006). Presumably, the California Legislature determined that it is
unnecessary and perhaps even counterproductive, as a means of further
4 SAMSON v. CALIFORNIA

STEVENS, J., dissenting

It is no accident, then, that when we later upheld the
search of a probationer by a law enforcement officer (again,
based on reasonable suspicion), we forwent any reliance on
the special needs doctrine. See Knights, 534 U. S. 112.
Even if the supervisory relationship between a probation
officer and her charge may properly be characterized as
one giving rise to needs “divorced from the State’s general
interest in law enforcement,” Ferguson, 532 U. S., at 79;
but see id., at 79, n. 15, the relationship between an ordi
nary law enforcement officer and a probationer unknown
to him may not. “None of our special needs precedents has
sanctioned the routine inclusion of law enforcement, both
in the design of the policy and in using arrests, either
threatened or real, to implement the system designed for
the special needs objectives.” Id., at 88 (KENNEDY, J.,
concurring in judgment).
Ignoring just how “closely guarded” is that “category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,”
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U. S. 305, 309 (1997), the Court for
the first time upholds an entirely suspicionless search
unsupported by any special need. And it goes further: In
special needs cases we have at least insisted upon pro
grammatic safeguards designed to ensure evenhandedness
in application; if individualized suspicion is to be jetti
soned, it must be replaced with measures to protect
against the state actor’s unfettered discretion. See, e.g.,
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654–655 (1979) (where
a special need “precludes insistence upon ‘some quantum
of individualized suspicion,’ other safeguards are generally
relied upon to assure that the individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy is not ‘subject to the discretion of
the official in the field’ ” (quoting Camara v. Municipal
——————

ing the goals of the parole system, to reincarcerate former prisoners for

simple possession. The general law enforcement interests the State

espouses, by contrast, call for reincarceration.

 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523,
532 (1967); footnote omitted); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 882 (1975) (“[T]he reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment demands some
thing more than the broad and unlimited discretion
sought by the Government”). Here, by contrast, there are
no policies in place—no “standards, guidelines, or proce
dures,” Prouse, 440 U. S., at 650—to rein in officers and
furnish a bulwark against the arbitrary exercise of discre
tion that is the height of unreasonableness.
The Court is able to make this unprecedented move only
by making another. Coupling the dubious holding of
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984), with the bald
statement that “parolees have fewer expectations of pri
vacy than probationers,” ante, at 5, the Court two-steps its
way through a faulty syllogism and, thus, avoids the
application of Fourth Amendment principles altogether.
The logic, apparently, is this: Prisoners have no legitimate
expectation of privacy; parolees are like prisoners; there
fore, parolees have no legitimate expectation of privacy.
The conclusion is remarkable not least because we have
long embraced its opposite.2 It also rests on false prem
ises. First, it is simply not true that a parolee’s status,
vis-à-vis either the State or the Constitution, is tanta
mount to that of a prisoner or even materially distinct
from that of a probationer. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U. S. 471, 482 (1972) (“Though the State properly subjects
[a parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other
——————
2 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 482 (1972) (“[T]he liberty of a
parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of
unqualified liberty”); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 875 (1987) (the
“degree of impingement upon [a probationer’s] privacy . . . is not unlim
ited”); see also Ferguson, 532 U. S., at 101 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (“I doubt
whether Griffin’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his home was any
less than petitioners’ reasonable expectation of privacy in their urine
taken”).
6 SAMSON v. CALIFORNIA

STEVENS, J., dissenting

citizens, his condition is very different from that of con
finement in a prison”). A parolee, like a probationer, is set
free in the world subject to restrictions intended to facili
tate supervision and guard against antisocial behavior. As
with probation, “the State is willing to extend parole only
because it is able to condition it upon compliance with
certain requirements.” Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and
Parole v. Scott, 524 U. S. 357, 365 (1998). Certainly,
parole differs from probation insofar as parole is “ ‘meted
out in addition to, not in lieu of, incarceration.’ ” Ante, at 6
(quoting United States v. Reyes, 283 F. 3d 446, 461 (CA2
2002)). And, certainly, parolees typically will have com
mitted more serious crimes—ones warranting a prior term
of imprisonment—than probationers. The latter distinc
tion, perhaps, would support the conclusion that a State
has a stronger interest in supervising parolees than it
does in supervising probationers. But see United States v.
Williams, 417 F. 3d 373, 376, n. 1 (CA3 2005) (“ ‘[T]here is
no constitutional difference between probation and parole
for purposes of the [F]ourth [A]mendment’ ”). But why
either distinction should result in refusal to acknowledge
as legitimate, when harbored by parolees, the same expec
tation of privacy that probationers reasonably may harbor
is beyond fathom.
In any event, the notion that a parolee legitimately
expects only so much privacy as a prisoner is utterly with
out foundation. Hudson v. Palmer does stand for the
proposition that “[a] right of privacy in traditional Fourth
Amendment terms” is denied individuals who are incar
cerated. 468 U. S., at 527. But this is because it “is neces
sary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of
‘institutional needs and objectives’ of prison facilities, . . .
chief among which is internal security.” Id., at 524; see
id., at 538 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I agree that the
government’s compelling interest in prison safety, together
with the necessarily ad hoc judgments required of prison
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

STEVENS, J., dissenting

officials, make prison cell searches and seizures appropri
ate for categorical treatment”3); see also Treasury Employ
ees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 680 (1989) (SCALIA, J.,
dissenting). These “institutional needs”—safety of in
mates and guards, “internal order,” and sanitation, Hud
son, 468 U. S., at 527–528—manifestly do not apply to
parolees. As discussed above and in Griffin, other state
interests may warrant certain intrusions into a parolee’s
privacy, but Hudson’s rationale cannot be mapped blindly
onto the situation with which we are presented in this
case.
Nor is it enough, in deciding whether someone’s expec
tation of privacy is “legitimate,” to rely on the existence of
the offending condition or the individual’s notice thereof.
Cf. ante, at 7. The Court’s reasoning in this respect is
entirely circular. The mere fact that a particular State
refuses to acknowledge a parolee’s privacy interest cannot
mean that a parolee in that State has no expectation of
privacy that society is willing to recognize as legitimate—
especially when the measure that invades privacy is both
the subject of the Fourth Amendment challenge and a
clear outlier. With only one or two arguable exceptions,
neither the Federal Government nor any other State
subjects parolees to searches of the kind to which peti
tioner was subjected. And the fact of notice hardly cures
the circularity; the loss of a subjective expectation of pri
vacy would play “no meaningful role” in analyzing the
legitimacy of expectations, for example, “if the Govern
ment were suddenly to announce on nationwide television
that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless
entry.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740–741, n. 5
——————
3 Particularly in view of Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, which em

phasized the prison’s programmatic interests in conducting suspi
cionless searches, see Hudson, 468 U. S., at 538, Hudson is probably best
understood as a “special needs” case—not as standing for the blanket
proposition that prisoners have no Fourth Amendment rights.
8 SAMSON v. CALIFORNIA

STEVENS, J., dissenting

(1979).4
Threaded through the Court’s reasoning is the sugges
tion that deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights is part
and parcel of any convict’s punishment. See ante, at 4–6.5
If a person may be subject to random and suspicionless
searches in prison, the Court seems to assume, then he
cannot complain when he is subject to the same invasion
outside of prison, so long as the State still can imprison
him. Punishment, though, is not the basis on which Hud
son was decided. (Indeed, it is settled that a prison inmate
“ ‘retains those [constitutional] rights that are not incon
sistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system.’ ” Turner
v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987).) Nor, to my knowledge,
have we ever sanctioned the use of any search as a puni
tive measure. Instead, the question in every case must be
whether the balance of legitimate expectations of privacy,
on the one hand, and the State’s interests in conducting
the relevant search, on the other, justifies dispensing with
——————
4 Likewise, the State’s argument that a California parolee “consents”

to the suspicionless search condition is sophistry. Whether or not a
prisoner can choose to remain in prison rather than be released on
parole, cf. ante, at 8, n. 3, he has no “choice” concerning the search
condition; he may either remain in prison, where he will be subjected to
suspicionless searches, or he may exit prison and still be subject to
suspicionless searches. Accordingly, “to speak of consent in this context
is to resort to a manifest fiction, for the [parolee] who purportedly
waives his rights by accepting such a condition has little genuine option
to refuse.” 5 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment §10.10(b), pp. 440–441 (4th ed. 2004).
5 This is a vestige of the long-discredited “act of grace” theory of pa

role. Compare Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 492–493 (1935) (“Probation
or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a
crime, and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration
as Congress may impose”), with Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 782, n.
4 (1973) (“a probationer can no longer be denied due process, in reliance
on the dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, that probation is an ‘act of grace’ ”
(citation omitted)). See also Morrissey, 408 U. S., at 482.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

STEVENS, J., dissenting

the warrant and probable-cause requirements that are
otherwise dictated by the Fourth Amendment. That bal
ance is not the same in prison as it is out. We held in
Knights—without recourse to Hudson—that the balance
favored allowing the State to conduct searches based on
reasonable suspicion. Never before have we plunged
below that floor absent a demonstration of “special needs.”
Had the State imposed as a condition of parole a re
quirement that petitioner submit to random searches by
his parole officer, who is “supposed to have in mind the
welfare of the [parolee]” and guide the parolee’s transition
back into society, Griffin, 483 U. S., at 876–877, the condi
tion might have been justified either under the special
needs doctrine or because at least part of the requisite
“reasonable suspicion” is supplied in this context by the
individual-specific knowledge gained through the supervi
sory relationship. See id., at 879 (emphasizing probation
office’s ability to “assess probabilities in the light of its
knowledge of [the probationer’s] life, character, and cir
cumstances”). Likewise, this might have been a different
case had a court or parole board imposed the condition at
issue based on specific knowledge of the individual’s
criminal history and projected likelihood of reoffending, or
if the State had had in place programmatic safeguards to
ensure evenhandedness. See supra, at 4. Under either of
those scenarios, the State would at least have gone some
way toward averting the greatest mischief wrought by
officials’ unfettered discretion. But the search condition
here is imposed on all parolees—whatever the nature of
their crimes, whatever their likelihood of recidivism, and
whatever their supervisory needs—without any program
matic procedural protections.6
——————
6 The Court devotes a good portion of its analysis to the recidivism

rates among parolees in California. See ante, at 8–9. One might
question whether those statistics, which postdate the California Su
10 SAMSON v. CALIFORNIA

STEVENS, J., dissenting

The Court seems to acknowledge that unreasonable
searches “inflic[t] dignitary harms that arouse strong
resentment in parolees and undermine their ability to
reintegrate into productive society.” Ante, at 11; see Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19, 29 (1968). It is satisfied, however,
that the California courts’ prohibition against “ ‘arbitrary,
capricious or harassing’ ” searches suffices to avert those
harms—which are of course counterproductive to the
State’s purported aim of rehabilitating former prisoners
and reintegrating them into society. See ante, at 11 (citing
People v. Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th 743, 968 P. 2d 445 (1998)). I
am unpersuaded. The requirement of individualized
suspicion, in all its iterations, is the shield the Framers
selected to guard against the evils of arbitrary action,
caprice, and harassment. To say that those evils may be
averted without that shield is, I fear, to pay lipservice to
the end while withdrawing the means.7
Respectfully, I dissent.

——————
preme Court’s decision to allow the purportedly recidivism-reducing
suspicionless searches at issue here, actually demonstrate that the
State’s interest is being served by the searches. Cf. Reply Brief for
Petitioner 10, and n. 10. Of course, one cannot deny that the interest
itself is valid. That said, though, it has never been held sufficient to
justify suspicionless searches. If high crime rates were grounds enough
for disposing of Fourth Amendment protections, the Amendment long
ago would have become a dead letter.
7 As the Court observes, see ante, at 12, n. 5, under California law “an

officer is entitled to conduct suspicionless searches only of persons
known by him to be parolees.” Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 20 (citing People v. Sanders, 31 Cal. 4th 318, 331–332, 73 P. 3d
496, 505 (2003)). It would necessarily be arbitrary, capricious, and
harassing to conduct a suspicionless search of someone without knowl
edge of the status that renders that person, in the State’s judgment,
susceptible to such an invasion.