(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
OFFICE OF SENATOR MARK DAYTON v. HANSON
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 06–618. Argued April 24, 2007—Decided May 21, 2007
After his discharge from employment with former Senator Dayton, ap
pellee Hanson sued appellant, the Senator’s office (Office), invoking
the District Court’s jurisdiction under the Congressional Accountabil
ity Act of 1995 (Act). The court denied a motion to dismiss based on a
claim of immunity under the Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause,
and the D. C. Circuit affirmed. The Office then sought to appeal un
der §412 of the Act, which authorizes review in this Court of “any . . .
judgment . . . upon the constitutionality of any provision” of the Act.
Held: This Court lacks jurisdiction under §412 because neither the
dismissal denial nor the D. C. Circuit’s affirmance can fairly be char
acterized as a ruling “upon the constitutionality” of any Act provision.
The District Court’s order does not state any grounds for decision, so
it cannot be characterized as a constitutional holding. Moreover, nei
ther the Court of Appeals’ rejection of the Office’s argument that forc
ing the Senator to defend against Hanson’s allegations would neces
sarily contravene the Speech or Debate Clause, nor that court’s
leaving open the possibility that the Clause may limit the proceed
ings’ scope in some respects, qualifies as a ruling on the Act’s valid
ity. The Office’s argument that the appeals court’s holding amounts
to a ruling that the Act is constitutional “as applied” cannot be recon
ciled with §413’s declaration that the Act’s authorization to sue “shall
not constitute a waiver of . . . the privileges of any Senator . . . under
[the Clause.]” Nor do any special circumstances justify exercise of
this Court’s discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, the D. C. Circuit
having abandoned an earlier decision that was in conflict with an
other Circuit on the Clause’s application to suits challenging a con
gressional Member’s personnel decisions. Pp. 2–4.
2 OFFICE OF SEN. MARK DAYTON v. HANSON
Syllabus
459 F. 3d 1, appeal dismissed; certiorari denied.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except ROBERTS, C. J., who took no part in the consid
eration or decision of the case.
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 06–618
_________________
OFFICE OF SENATOR MARK DAYTON, APPELLANT v.
BRAD HANSON
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May 21, 2007]
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Prior to January 3, 2007, Mark Dayton represented the
State of Minnesota in the United States Senate. Appellee,
Brad Hanson, was employed in the Senator’s Ft. Snelling
office prior to his discharge by the Senator, which he
alleges occurred on July 3, 2002. Hanson brought this
action for damages against appellant, the Senator’s office
(Office), invoking the District Court’s jurisdiction under
the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (Act), 109
Stat. 3, as amended, 2 U. S. C. §1301 et seq. (2000 ed. and
Supp. IV), and alleging violations of three other federal
statutes.1 The District Court denied appellant’s motion to
dismiss the complaint based on a claim of immunity under
the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution.2 The
——————
1 Appellee alleged violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 107 Stat. 6, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §2601 et seq. (2000 ed. and
Supp. IV), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 337,
42 U. S. C. §12101 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), and the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §201 et
seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV).
2 “[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and Rep
resentatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.” Art. I, §6, cl. 1.
2 OFFICE OF SEN. MARK DAYTON v. HANSON
Opinion of the Court
Court of Appeals affirmed, Fields v. Office of Eddie Ber
nice Johnson, Employing Office, United States Congress,
459 F. 3d 1 (CADC 2006), the Office invoked our appellate
jurisdiction under §412 of the Act, 2 U. S. C. §1412, and
we postponed consideration of jurisdiction pending hear
ing the case on the merits, 549 U. S. ___ (2007). Because
we do not have jurisdiction under §412, we dismiss the
appeal. Treating appellant’s jurisdictional statement as a
petition for a writ of certiorari, we deny the petition.
Under §412 of the Act, direct review in this Court is
available “from any interlocutory or final judgment, de
cree, or order of a court upon the constitutionality of any
provision” of the statute.3 Neither the order of the District
Court denying appellant’s motion to dismiss nor the judg
ment of the Court of Appeals affirming that order can
fairly be characterized as a ruling “upon the constitution
ality” of any provision of the Act. The District Court’s
minute order denying the motion to dismiss does not state
any grounds for decision. App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a. Both
parties agree that that order cannot, therefore, be charac
terized as a constitutional holding.4 The Court of Appeals’
——————
3 Section
412 reads in full:
“Expedited review of certain appeals
“(a) In general
“An appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States from any interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of a
court upon the constitutionality of any provision of this chapter.
“(b) Jurisdiction
“The Supreme Court shall, if it has not previously ruled on the
question, accept jurisdiction over the appeal referred to in subsection
(a) of this section, advance the appeal on the docket, and expedite the
appeal to the greatest extent possible.” 2 U. S. C. §1412.
4 Had the District Court’s order qualified as a ruling “upon the consti
tutionality” of a provision of the Act, the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction
to hear the appeal would have been called into serious doubt. See 28
U. S. C. §1291 (granting jurisdiction to the courts of appeals from final
decisions of federal district courts “except where a direct review may be
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
Opinion of the Court
opinion rejects appellant’s argument that forcing Senator
Dayton to defend against the allegations in this case
would necessarily contravene the Speech or Debate
Clause, although it leaves open the possibility that the
Speech or Debate Clause may limit the scope of the pro
ceedings in some respects. Neither of those holdings
qualifies as a ruling on the validity of the Act itself.
The Office argues that the Court of Appeals’ holding
amounts to a ruling that the Act is constitutional “as
applied.” According to the Office, an “as applied” constitu
tional holding of that sort satisfies the jurisdictional re
quirements of §412. We find this reading difficult to rec
oncile with the statutory scheme. Section 413 of the Act
provides that
“[t]he authorization to bring judicial proceedings un
der [the Act] shall not constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity for any other purpose, or of the privileges of
any Senator or Member of the House of Representa
tives under [the Speech or Debate Clause] of the Con
stitution.” 2 U. S. C. §1413.
This provision demonstrates that Congress did not intend
the Act to be interpreted to permit suits that would other
wise be prohibited under the Speech or Debate Clause.
Consequently, a court’s determination that jurisdiction
attaches despite a claim of Speech or Debate Clause im
munity is best read as a ruling on the scope of the Act, not
its constitutionality. This reading is faithful, moreover, to
our established practice of interpreting statutes to avoid
constitutional difficulties.5 See Clark v. Martinez, 543
U. S. 371, 381–382 (2005).
——————
had in the Supreme Court”).
5 Nor does this reading make a dead letter out of §412’s limitation of
appellate review in this Court to constitutional rulings. The possibility
remains that provisions of the Act could be challenged on constitutional
grounds unrelated to the Speech or Debate Clause.
4 OFFICE OF SEN. MARK DAYTON v. HANSON
Opinion of the Court
The provision for appellate review is best understood as
responding to a congressional concern that if a provision of
the statute is declared invalid there is an interest in
prompt adjudication by this Court. To extend that review
to instances in which the statute itself has not been called
into question, giving litigants under the Act preference
over litigants in other cases, does not accord with that
rationale. This is also consistent with our cases holding
that “statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly con
strued.” Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn.,
460 U. S. 37, 43 (1983); see also Fornaris v. Ridge Tool
Co., 400 U. S. 41, 42, n. 1 (1970) (per curiam).
Nor are there special circumstances that justify the
exercise of our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction to
review the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the interlocu
tory order entered by the District Court. Having aban
doned its decision in Browning v. Clerk, U. S. House of
Representatives, 789 F. 2d 923 (1986), the D. C. Circuit is
no longer in obvious conflict with any other Circuit on the
application of the Speech or Debate Clause to suits chal
lenging the personnel decisions of Members of Congress.
Compare 459 F. 3d 1 (case below), with Bastien v. Office of
Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, 390 F. 3d 1301 (CA10
2004).
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdic
tion and certiorari is denied. We express no opinion on the
merits, nor do we decide whether this action became moot
upon the expiration of Senator Dayton’s term in office.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.