Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.
METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 05–705. Argued October 10, 2006—Decided April 17, 2007
Under authority of the Communications Act of 1934, the Federal Com
munications Commission (FCC) regulates interstate telephone com
munications using a traditional regulatory system similar to what
other commissions have applied when regulating other common car
riers. Indeed, Congress largely copied language from the earlier In
terstate Commerce Act, which authorized federal railroad regulation,
when it wrote Communications Act §§201(b) and 207, the provisions
at issue. Both Acts authorize their respective commissions to declare
any carrier “charge,” “regulation,” or “practice” in connection with the
carrier’s services to be “unjust or unreasonable”; declare an “unrea
sonable,” e.g., “charge” to be “unlawful”; authorize an injured person
to recover “damages” for an “unlawful” charge or practice; and state
that, to do so, the person may bring suit in a “court” “of the United
States.” Interstate Commerce Act §§1, 8, 9; Communications Act
§§201(b), 206, 207. The underlying regulatory problem here arises at
the intersection of traditional regulation and newer, more competi
tively oriented approaches. Legislation in 1990 required payphone
operators to allow payphone users to obtain “free” access to the long-
distance carrier of their choice, i.e., access without depositing coins.
But recognizing the “free” call would impose a cost upon the pay-
phone operator, Congress required the FCC to promulgate regula
tions to provide compensation to such operators. Using traditional
ratemaking methods, the FCC ordered carriers to reimburse the op
erators in a specified amount unless a carrier and an operator agreed
to a different amount. The FCC subsequently determined that a car
rier’s refusal to pay such compensation was an “unreasonable prac
tice” and thus unlawful under §201(b). Respondent payphone opera
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Syllabus

tor brought a federal lawsuit, claiming that petitioner long-distance
carrier (hereinafter Global Crossing) had violated §201(b) by failing
to pay compensation and that §207 authorized respondent to sue in
federal court. The District Court agreed that Global Crossing’s re
fusal to pay violated §201(b), thereby permitting respondent to sue
under §207. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The FCC’s application of §201(b) to the carrier’s refusal to pay
compensation is lawful; and, given the linkage with §207, §207 au
thorizes this federal-court lawsuit. Pp. 7–19.
(a) The language of §§201(b), 206, and 207 and those sections’ his
tory, including that of their predecessors, Interstate Commerce Act
§§8 and 9, make clear that §207’s purpose is to allow persons injured
by §201(b) violations to bring federal-court damages actions. The dif
ficult question is whether the FCC regulation at issue lawfully im
plements §201(b)’s “unreasonable practice” prohibition. Pp. 7–9.
(b) The FCC’s §201(b) “unreasonable practice” determination is rea
sonable, and thus lawful. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843–844. It easily fits
within the language of the statutory phrase. Moreover, the underly
ing regulated activity at issue resembles activity long regulated by
both transportation and communications agencies. Traditionally, the
FCC, exercising its rate-setting authority, has divided revenues from
a call among providers of segments of the call. Transportation agen
cies have similarly divided revenues from a larger transportation
service among providers of segments of the service. The payphone
operator and long-distance carrier resemble those joint providers of a
communication or transportation service. Differences between the
present “unreasonable practice” classification and more traditional
regulatory subject matter do not require a different outcome. When
Congress revised the telecommunications laws in 1996 to enhance
the role of competition, creating a system that relies in part upon
competition and in part upon the role of tariffs in regulatory supervi
sion, it left §201(b) in place. In light of the absence of any congres
sional prohibition, and the similarities with traditional regulatory ac
tion, the Court finds nothing unreasonable about the FCC’s §201(b)
determination. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229.
Pp. 9–12.
(c) Additional arguments made by Global Crossing, its supporting
amici and the dissents—that §207 does not authorize actions for vio
lations of regulations promulgated to carry out statutory objectives;
that no §207 action lies for violations of substantive regulations
promulgated by the FCC; that §§201(a) and (b) concern only practices
that harm carrier customers, not carrier suppliers; that the FCC’s
“unreasonable practice” determination is unlawful because it is in
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Syllabus

adequately reasoned; and that §276 prohibits the FCC’s §201(b) clas
sification—are ultimately unpersuasive. Pp. 12–19.
423 F. 3d 1056, affirmed.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ.,
joined. SCALIA, J., and THOMAS, J., filed dissenting opinions.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–705
_________________

GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

PETITIONER v. METROPHONES TELE
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 17, 2007]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Communications Commission (Commission
or FCC) has established rules that require long-distance
(and certain other) communications carriers to compen
sate a payphone operator when a caller uses a payphone to
obtain free access to the carrier’s lines (by dialing, e.g., a
1–800 number or other access code). The Commission has
added that a carrier’s refusal to pay the compensation is a
“practice . . . that is unjust or unreasonable” within the
terms of the Communications Act of 1934, §201(b), 48
Stat. 1070, 47 U. S. C. §201(b). Communications Act
language links §201(b) to §207, which authorizes any
person “damaged” by a violation of §201(b) to bring a
lawsuit to recover damages in federal court. And we must
here decide whether this linked section, §207, authorizes a
payphone operator to bring a federal-court lawsuit against
a recalcitrant carrier that refuses to pay the compensation
that the Commission’s order says it owes.
In our view, the FCC’s application of §201(b) to the
carrier’s refusal to pay compensation is a reasonable
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METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

interpretation of the statute; hence it is lawful. See Chev
ron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843–844, and n. 11 (1984). And, given
the linkage with §207, we also conclude that §207 author
izes this federal-court lawsuit.
I

A

Because regulatory history helps to illuminate the
proper interpretation and application of §§201(b) and 207,
we begin with that history. When Congress enacted the
Communications Act of 1934, it granted the FCC broad
authority to regulate interstate telephone communica
tions. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U. S.
355, 360 (1986). The Commission, during the first several
decades of its history, used this authority to develop a
traditional regulatory system much like the systems other
commissions had applied when regulating railroads, pub
lic utilities, and other common carriers. A utility or car
rier would file with a commission a tariff containing rates,
and perhaps other practices, classifications, or regulations
in connection with its provision of communications ser
vices. The commission would examine the rates, etc., and,
after appropriate proceedings, approve them, set them
aside, or, sometimes, set forth a substitute rate schedule
or list of approved charges, classifications, or practices
that the carrier or utility must follow. In doing so, the
commission might determine the utility’s or carrier’s
overall costs (including a reasonable profit), allocate costs
to particular services, examine whether, and how, individ
ual rates would generate revenue that would help cover
those costs, and, if necessary, provide for a division of
revenues among several carriers that together provided a
single service. See 47 U. S. C. §§201(b), 203, 205(a); Mis
souri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 262 U. S. 276, 291–295 (1923)
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Opinion of the Court

(Brandeis, J., concurring in judgment) (telecommunica
tions); Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U. S.
467, 478 (2002) (same); Chicago & North Western R. Co. v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 326, 331 (1967)
(railroads); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747,
761–765, 806–808 (1968) (natural gas field production).
In authorizing this traditional form of regulation, Con
gress copied into the 1934 Communications Act language
from the earlier Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat.
379, which (as amended) authorized federal railroad regu
lation. See American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Cen
tral Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 222 (1998).
Indeed, Congress largely copied §§1, 8, and 9 of the Inter
state Commerce Act when it wrote the language of Com
munications Act §§201(b) and 207, the sections at issue
here. The relevant sections (in both statutes) authorize
the commission to declare any carrier “charge,” “regula
tion,” or “practice” in connection with the carrier’s services
to be “unjust or unreasonable”; they declare an “unreason
able,” e.g., “charge” to be “unlawful”; they authorize an
injured person to recover “damages” for an “unlawful”
charge or practice; and they state that, to do so, the person
may bring suit in a “court” “of the United States.” Inter
state Commerce Act §§1, 8, 9, 24 Stat. 379, 382; Commu
nications Act §§201(b), 206, 207, 47 U. S. C. §§201(b), 206,
207.
Historically speaking, the Interstate Commerce Act
sections changed early, preregulatory common-law rate-
supervision procedures. The common law originally per
mitted a freight shipper to ask a court to determine
whether a railroad rate was unreasonably high and to
award the shipper damages in the form of “reparations.”
The “new” regulatory law, however, made clear that a
commission, not a court, would determine a rate’s reason
ableness. At the same time, that “new” law permitted a
shipper injured by an unreasonable rate to bring a federal
4 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

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Opinion of the Court

lawsuit to collect damages. Interstate Commerce Act §§1,
8–9; Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284
U. S. 370, 383–386 (1932); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abi
lene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 436, 440–441 (1907);
Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156,
162 (1922); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Ohio Valley
Tie Co., 242 U. S. 288, 290–291 (1916); J. Ely, Railroads
and American Law 71–72, 226–227 (2001); A. Hoogenboom
& O. Hoogenboom, A History of the ICC 61 (1976). The
similar language of Communications Act §§201(b) and 207
indicates a roughly similar sharing of agency authority
with federal courts.
Beginning in the 1970’s, the FCC came to believe that
communications markets might efficiently support more
than one firm and that competition might supplement (or
provide a substitute for) traditional regulation. See MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Tele
graph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 220–221 (1994). The Commis
sion facilitated entry of new telecommunications carriers
into long-distance markets. And in the 1990’s, Congress
amended the 1934 Act while also enacting new telecom
munications statutes, in order to encourage (and some
times to mandate) new competition. See Telecommunica
tions Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, 47 U. S. C. §609 et seq.
Neither Congress nor the Commission, however, totally
abandoned traditional regulatory requirements. And the
new statutes and amendments left many traditional re
quirements and related statutory provisions, including
§§201(b) and 207, in place. E.g., National Cable & Tele
communications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545
U. S. 967, 975 (2005).
B
The regulatory problem that underlies this lawsuit
arises at the intersection of traditional regulation and
newer, more competitively oriented approaches. Compet
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

Opinion of the Court

ing long-distance carriers seek the business of individual
local callers, including those who wish to make a long-
distance call from a local payphone. A payphone operator,
however, controls what is sometimes a necessary channel
for the caller to reach the long-distance carrier. And prior
to 1990, a payphone operator, exploiting this control,
might require a caller to use a long-distance carrier that
the operator favored while blocking access to the caller’s
preferred carrier. Such a practice substituted the opera
tor’s choice of carrier for the caller’s, and it potentially
placed disfavored carriers at a competitive disadvantage.
In 1990, Congress enacted special legislation requiring
payphone operators to allow a payphone user to obtain
“free” access to the carrier of his or her choice, i.e., access
from the payphone without depositing coins. Telephone
Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act of 1990,
104 Stat. 986, codified at 47 U. S. C. §226. (For ease of
exposition, we often use familiar terms such as “long
distance” and “free” calls instead of more precise terms
such as “interexchange” and “coinless” or “dial-around”
calls.)
At the same time, Congress recognized that the “free”
call would impose a cost upon the payphone operator; and
it consequently required the FCC to “prescribe regulations
that . . . establish a per call compensation plan to ensure
that all payphone service providers are fairly compensated
for each and every completed intrastate and interstate
call.” §276(b)(1)(A) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
added by §151 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110
Stat. 106, codified at 47 U. S. C. §276(b)(1)(A).
The FCC then considered the compensation problem.
Using traditional ratemaking methods, it found that the
(fixed and incremental) costs of a “free” call from a pay-
phone to, say, a long-distance carrier warranted reim
bursement of (at the time relevant to this litigation) $0.24
per call. The FCC ordered carriers to reimburse the pay
6 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

phone operators in this amount unless a carrier and an
operator agreed upon a different amount. 47 CFR
§64.1300(d) (2005). At the same time, it left the carriers
free to pass the cost along to their customers, the pay-
phone callers. Thus, in a typical “free” call, the carrier
will bill the caller and then must share the revenue the
carrier receives—to the tune of $0.24 per call—with the
payphone operator that has, together with the carrier,
furnished a communications service to the caller. The
FCC subsequently determined that a carrier’s refusal to
pay the compensation ordered amounts to an “unreason
able practice” within the terms of §201(b). (We shall refer
to these regulations as the Compensation Order and the
2003 Payphone Order, respectively. See Appendix A,
infra, for full citations.) See generally P. Huber, M. Kel
logg, & J. Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law
§8.6.3, pp. 710–713 (2d ed. 1999) (hereinafter Huber).
That determination, it believed, would permit a payphone
operator to bring a federal-court lawsuit under §207, to
collect the compensation owed. 2003 Payphone Order, 18
FCC Rcd. 19975, 19990, ¶32.
C
In 2003, respondent, Metrophones Telecommunications,
Inc., a payphone operator, brought this federal-court
lawsuit against Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc.,
a long-distance carrier. Metrophones sought compensa
tion that it said Global Crossing owed it under the FCC’s
Compensation Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 2545 (1999). Insofar as
is relevant here, Metrophones claimed that Global Cross
ing’s refusal to pay amounted to a violation of §201(b),
thereby permitting Metrophones to sue in federal court,
under §207, for the compensation owed. The District
Court agreed. 423 F. 3d 1056, 1061 (CA9 2005). The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s determination.
Ibid. We granted certiorari to determine whether §207
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

Opinion of the Court

authorizes the lawsuit.
II

A

Section 207 says that “[a]ny person claiming to be dam
aged by any common carrier . . . may bring suit” against
the carrier “in any district court of the United States” for
“recovery of the damages for which such common carrier
may be liable under the provisions of this chapter.” 47
U. S. C. §207 (emphasis added). This language makes
clear that the lawsuit is proper if the FCC could properly
hold that a carrier’s failure to pay compensation is an
“unreasonable practice” deemed “unlawful” under §201(b).
That is because the immediately preceding section, §206,
says that a common carrier is “liable” for “damages sus
tained in consequence of” the carrier’s doing “any act,
matter, or thing in this chapter prohibited or declared to be
unlawful.” And §201(b) declares “unlawful” any common-
carrier “charge, practice, classification, or regulation that
is unjust or unreasonable.” (See Appendix B, infra, for full
text; emphasis added throughout).
The history of these sections—including that of their
predecessors, §§8 and 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act—
simply reinforces the language, making clear the purpose
of §207 is to allow persons injured by §201(b) violations to
bring federal-court damages actions. See, e.g., Arizona
Grocery Co., 284 U. S., at 384–385 (Interstate Commerce
Act §§8–9); Part I–A, supra. History also makes clear that
the FCC has long implemented §201(b) through the issu
ance of rules and regulations. This is obviously so when
the rules take the form of FCC approval or prescription for
the future of rates that exclusively are “reasonable.” See
47 U. S. C. §205 (authorizing the FCC to prescribe reason
able rates and practices in order to preclude rates or prac
tices that violate §201(b)); 5 U. S. C. §551(4) (“ ‘rule’ . . .
includes the approval or prescription for the future of
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Opinion of the Court

rates . . . or practices”). It is also so when the FCC has set
forth rules that, for example, require certain accounting
methods or insist upon certain carrier practices, while (as
here) prohibiting others as unjust or unreasonable under
§201(b). See, e.g. (to name a few), Verizon Tel. Cos. v.
FCC, 453 F. 3d 487, 494 (CADC 2006) (rates unreasonable
(and hence unlawful) if not adjusted pursuant to account
ing rules ordered in FCC regulations); Cable & Wireless
P. L. C. v. FCC, 166 F. 3d 1224, 1231 (CADC 1999) (failure
to follow Commission-ordered settlement practices unrea
sonable); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 59 F. 3d
1407, 1414 (CADC 1995) (violation of rate-of-return pre
scription unlawful); In re NOS Communications, Inc., 16
FCC Rcd. 8133, 8136, ¶6 (2001) (deceptive marketing an
unreasonable practice); In re Promotion of Competitive
Networks in Local Telecommunications Markets, 15 FCC
Rcd. 22983, 23000, ¶35 (2000) (entering into exclusive
contracts with commercial building owners an unreason
able practice).
Insofar as the statute’s language is concerned, to violate
a regulation that lawfully implements §201(b)’s require
ments is to violate the statute. See, e.g., MCI Telecommu
nications Corp., 59 F. 3d, at 1414 (“We have repeatedly
held that a rate-of-return prescription has the force of law
and that the Commission may therefore treat a violation
of the prescription as a per se violation of the requirement
of the Communications Act that a common carrier main
tain ‘just and reasonable’ rates, see 47 U. S. C. §201(b)”);
cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 284 (2001) (it is
“meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to
enforce the regulations apart from the statute”). That is
why private litigants have long assumed that they may, as
the statute says, bring an action under §207 for violation
of a rule or regulation that lawfully implements §201(b).
See, e.g., Oh v. AT&T Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 551, 556 (NJ
1999) (assuming validity of §207 suit alleging violation of
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of the Court

§201(b) in carrier’s failure to provide services listed in
FCC-approved tariff); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Allnet
Communications Servs., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 302, 304–306
(ED Mo. 1992) (assuming validity of §207 suit to enforce
FCC’s determination of reasonable practices related to
payment of access charges by long-distance carrier to local
exchange carrier); cf., e.g., Chicago & North Western
Transp. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 609 F. 2d 1221,
1224–1225 (CA7 1979) (same in respect to Interstate
Commerce Act equivalents of §§201(b), 207).
The difficult question, then, is not whether §207 covers
actions that complain of a violation of §201(b) as lawfully
implemented by an FCC regulation. It plainly does. It
remains for us to decide whether the particular FCC
regulation before us lawfully implements §201(b)’s “un-
reasonable practice” prohibition. We now turn to that
question.
B
In our view the FCC’s §201(b) “unreasonable practice”
determination is a reasonable one; hence it is lawful. See
Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 467 U. S., at 843–844. The deter
mination easily fits within the language of the statutory
phrase. That is to say, in ordinary English, one can call a
refusal to pay Commission-ordered compensation despite
having received a benefit from the payphone operator a
“practic[e] . . . in connection with [furnishing a] communi
cation service . . . that is . . . unreasonable.” The service
that the payphone operator provides constitutes an inte
gral part of the total long-distance service the payphone
operator and the long-distance carrier together provide to
the caller, with respect to the carriage of his or her par
ticular call. The carrier’s refusal to divide the revenues it
receives from the caller with its collaborator, the payphone
operator, despite the FCC’s regulation requiring it to do
so, can reasonably be called a “practice” “in connection
10 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.
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Opinion of the Court

with” the provision of that service that is “unreasonable.”
Cf. post, at 1–5 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the underlying regulated activity at issue
here resembles activity that both transportation and com
munications agencies have long regulated. Here the
agency has determined through traditional regulatory
methods the cost of carrying a portion (the payphone
portion) of a call that begins with a caller and proceeds
through the payphone, attached wires, local communica
tions loops, and long-distance lines to a distant call recipi
ent. The agency allocates costs among the joint providers
of the communications service and requires downstream
carriers, in effect, to pay an appropriate share of revenues
to upstream payphone operators. Traditionally, the FCC
has determined costs of some segments of a call while
requiring providers of other segments to divide related
revenues. See, e.g., Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,
282 U. S. 133, 148–151 (1930) (communications). And
traditionally, transportation agencies have determined
costs of providing some segments of a larger transporta
tion service (for example, the cost of providing the San
Francisco–Ogden segment of a San Francisco–New York
shipment) while requiring providers of other segments to
divide revenues. See, e.g., New England Divisions Case,
261 U. S. 184 (1923); Chicago & North Western R. Co., 387
U. S. 326; cf. Cable & Wireless P. L. C., supra, at 1231. In
all instances an agency allocates costs and provides for a
related sharing of revenues.
In these more traditional instances, transportation
carriers and communications firms entitled to revenues
under rate divisions or cost allocations might bring law
suits under §207, or the equivalent sections of the Inter
state Commerce Act, and obtain compensation or dam
ages. See, e.g., Allnet Communication Serv., Inc. v.
National Exch. Carrier Assn., Inc., 965 F. 2d 1118, 1122
(CADC 1992) (§207); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra, at
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Opinion of the Court

305 (same); Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., supra,
at 1224–1225 (Interstate Commerce Act equivalent of
§207). Again, the similarities support the reasonableness
of an agency’s bringing about a similar result here. We do
not suggest that the FCC is required to find carriers’
failures to divide revenues to be §201(b) violations in every
instance. Cf. U. S. Telepacific Corp. v. Tel-America of Salt
Lake City, Inc., 19 FCC Rcd. 24552, 24555–24556, and n.
27 (2004) (citing cases). Nor do we suggest that every
violation of FCC regulations is an unjust and unreason
able practice. Here there is an explicit statutory scheme,
and compensation of payphone operators is necessary to
the proper implementation of that scheme. Under these
circumstances, the FCC’s finding that the failure to follow
the order is an unreasonable practice is well within its
authority.
There are, of course, differences between the present
“unreasonable practice” classification and the similar more
traditional regulatory subject matter we have just de
scribed. For one thing, the connection between payphone
operators and long-distance carriers is not a traditional
“through route” between carriers. See §201(a). For an
other, as Global Crossing’s amici point out, the word
“practice” in §201(b) has traditionally applied to a carrier
practice that (unlike the present one) is the subject of a
carrier tariff—i.e., a carrier agency filing that sets forth
the carrier’s rates, classifications, and practices. Brief for
AT&T et al. as Amici Curiae 8–11. We concede the differ
ences. Indeed, traditionally, the filing of tariffs was “the
centerpiece” of the “[Communications] Act’s regulatory
scheme.” MCI Telecommunications Corp., 512 U. S., at
220. But we do not concede that these differences require
a different outcome. Statutory changes enhancing the role
of competition have radically reduced the role that tariffs
play in regulatory supervision of what is now a mixed
communications system—a system that relies in part upon
12 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.
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Opinion of the Court

competition and in part upon more traditional regulation.
Yet when Congress rewrote the law to bring about these
changes, it nonetheless left §201(b) in place. That fact
indicates that the statute permits, indeed it suggests that
Congress likely expected, the FCC to pour new substan
tive wine into its old regulatory bottles. See Policy and
Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Market
place, 12 FCC Rcd. 15014, 15057, ¶77 (1997) (despite the
absence of tariffs, FCC’s §201 enforcement obligations
have not diminished); Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F. 3d
404, 422 (CA7 2002) (same). And this circumstance, by
indicating that Congress did not forbid the agency to apply
§201(b) differently in the changed regulatory environment,
is sufficient to convince us that the FCC’s determination is
lawful.
That is because we have made clear that where “Con
gress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the
force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or
fills a space in the enacted law,” a court “is obliged to
accept the agency’s position if Congress has not previously
spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpreta
tion” (or the manner in which it fills the “gap”) is “reason
able.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229
(2001); National Cable & Telecommunications Assn., 545
U. S., at 980; Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 467 U. S., at 843–844.
Congress, in §201(b), delegated to the agency authority to
“fill” a “gap,” i.e., to apply §201 through regulations and
orders with the force of law. National Cable & Telecom
munications Assn., supra, at 980–981. The circumstances
mentioned above make clear the absence of any rele-
vant congressional prohibition. And, in light of the tradi
tional regulatory similarities that we have discussed, we
can find nothing unreasonable about the FCC’s §201(b)
determination.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007)
13

Opinion of the Court

C

Global Crossing, its supporting amici, and the dissents
make several additional but ultimately unpersuasive
arguments. First, Global Crossing claims that §207 au
thorizes only actions “seeking damages for statutory viola
tions” and not for “violations merely of regulations prom
ulgated to carry out statutory objectives.” Brief for
Petitioner 12 (emphasis in original). The lawsuit before
us, however, “seek[s] damages for [a] statutory violatio[n],”
namely, a violation of §201(b)’s prohibition of an “unrea
sonable practice.” As we have pointed out, supra, at 8,
§201(b)’s prohibitions have long been thought to extend to
rates that diverge from FCC prescriptions, as well as rates
or practices that are “unreasonable” in light of their fail
ure to reflect rules embodied in an agency regulation. We
have found no limitation of the kind Global Crossing
suggests.
Global Crossing seeks to draw support from Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275 (2001), and Adams Fruit Co. v.
Barrett, 494 U. S. 638 (1990), which, Global Crossing says,
hold that an agency cannot determine through regulation
when a private party may bring a federal court action.
Those cases do involve private actions, but they do not
support Global Crossing. The cases involve different
statutes and different regulations, and the Court made
clear in each of those cases that its holding relied on the
specific statute before it. In Sandoval, supra, at 288–289,
the Court found that an implied right of action to enforce
one statutory provision, 42 U. S. C. §2000d, did not extend
to regulations implementing another, §2000d–1. In con
trast, here we are addressing the FCC’s reasonable inter
pretation of ambiguous language in a substantive statu
tory provision, 47 U. S. C. §201(b), which Congress
expressly linked to the right of action provided in §207.
Nothing in Sandoval requires us to limit our deference to
the FCC’s reasonable interpretation of §201(b); to the
14 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.
METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
Opinion of the Court

contrary, as we noted in Sandoval, it is “meaningless to
talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the regula
tions apart from the statute. A Congress that intends the
statute to be enforced through a private cause of action
intends the authoritative interpretation of the statute to
be so enforced as well.” 532 U. S., at 284. In Adams Fruit
Co., supra, at 646–647, we rejected an agency interpreta
tion of the worker-protection statute at issue as contrary
to “the plain meaning of the statute’s language.” Given
the differences in statutory language, context, and history,
those two cases are simply beside the point.
Our analysis does not change in this case simply be
cause the practice deemed unreasonable (and hence
unlawful) in the 2003 Payphone Order is violation of an
FCC regulation adopted under authority of a separate
statutory section, §276. The FCC here, acting under the
authority of §276, has prescribed a particular rate (and a
division of revenues) applicable to a portion of a long-
distance service, and it has ordered carriers to reimburse
payphone operators for the relevant portion of the service
they jointly provide. But the conclusion that it is “unrea
sonable” to fail so to reimburse is not a §276 conclusion; it
is a §201(b) conclusion. And courts have treated a car
rier’s failure to follow closely analogous agency rate and
rate-division determinations as we treat the matter at
issue here. That is to say, the FCC properly implements
§201(b) when it reasonably finds that the failure to follow
a Commission, e.g., rate or rate-division determination
made under a different statutory provision is unjust or
unreasonable under §201(b). See, e.g., MCI Telecommuni
cations Corp., 59 F. 3d, at 1414 (failure to follow a rate
promulgated under §205 properly considered unreasonable
under §201(b)); see also Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Alabama
Great Southern R. Co., 506 F. 2d 1265, 1270 (CADC 1974)
(statutory obligation to provide reasonable rate divisions
is “implemented by orders of the ICC” issued pursuant to a
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 15

Opinion of the Court

separate statutory provision). Moreover, in resting our
conclusion upon the analogy with rate setting and rate
divisions, the traditional, historical subject matter of
§201(b), we avoid authorizing the FCC to turn §§201(b)
and 207 into a back-door remedy for violation of FCC
regulations.
Second, JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting, says that the “only
serious issue presented by this case [is] whether a practice
that is not in and of itself unjust or unreasonable can be
rendered such (and thus rendered in violation of the Act
itself) because it violates a substantive regulation of the
Commission.” Post, at 2–3. He answers this question
“no,” because, in his view, a “violation of a substantive
regulation promulgated by the Commission is not a viola
tion of the Act, and thus does not give rise to a private
cause of action.” Post, at 3. We cannot accept either
JUSTICE SCALIA’s statement of the “serious issue” or his
answer.
We do not accept his statement of the issue because
whether the practice is “in and of itself” unreasonable is
irrelevant. The FCC has authoritatively ruled that carri
ers must compensate payphone operators. The only prac
tice before us, then, and the only one we consider, is the
carrier’s violation of that FCC regulation requiring the
carrier to pay the payphone operator a fair portion of the
total cost of carrying a call that they jointly carried—each
supplying a partial portion of the total carriage. A prac
tice of violating the FCC’s order to pay a fair share would
seem fairly characterized in ordinary English as an “un
just practice,” so why should the FCC not call it the same
under §201(b)?
Nor can we agree with JUSTICE SCALIA’s claim that a
“violation of a substantive regulation promulgated by the
Commission is not a violation of” §201(b) of the Act when,
as here, the Commission has explicitly and reasonably
ruled that the particular regulatory violation does violate
16 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.
METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
Opinion of the Court

§201(b). (Emphasis added.) And what has the substan
tive/interpretive distinction that JUSTICE SCALIA empha
sizes, post, at 3, to do with the matter? There is certainly
no reference to this distinction in §201(b); the text does not
suggest that, of all violations of regulations, only viola
tions of interpretive regulations can amount to unjust or
unreasonable practices. Why believe that Congress, which
scarcely knew of this distinction a century ago before the
blossoming of administrative law, would care which kind
of regulation was at issue? And even if this distinction
were relevant, the FCC has long set forth what we now
would call “substantive” (or “legislative”) rules under §205.
Cf. 1 R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §6.4, p. 325
(4th ed. 2002); post, at 4. And violations of those substan
tive §205 regulations have clearly been deemed violations
of §201(b). E.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp., 59 F. 3d,
at 1414. Conversely, we have found no case at all in which
a private plaintiff was kept out of federal court because
the §201(b) violation it challenged took the form of a “sub
stantive regulation” rather than an “interpretive regula
tion.” Insofar as JUSTICE SCALIA uses adjectives such as
“traditional” or “textually based” to describe his distinc
tions, post, at 4, and “novel” or “absurd” to describe ours,
post, at 5, 2, we would simply note our disagreement.
We concede that JUSTICE SCALIA cites three sources in
support of his theory. See post, at 3. But, in our view,
those sources offer him no support. None of those sources
involved an FCC application of, or an FCC interpretation
of, the section at issue here, namely §201(b). Nor did any
involve a regulation—substantive or interpretive—
promulgated subsequent to the authority of §201(b). Thus
none is relevant to the case at hand. See APCC Servs.,
Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co., 418 F. 3d 1238, 1247
(CADC 2005) (per curiam) (“There was no authoritative
interpretation of §201(b) in this case”); Greene v. Sprint
Communications Co., 340 F. 3d 1047, 1052 (CA9 2003)
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 17

Opinion of the Court

(violation of substantive regulation does not violate §276;
silent as to §201(b)). The single judge who thought that
the FCC had authoritatively interpreted §201(b) (as has
occurred in the case before us) would have reached the
same conclusion that we do. APCC Servs., Inc., supra, at
1254. (D. H. Ginsburg, C. J., dissenting) (finding a private
cause of action, because there was “clearly an authorita
tive interpretation of §201(b)” that deemed the practice in
question unlawful). See also Huber §3.14.3, p. 317 (no
discussion of §201(b)).
Third, JUSTICE THOMAS (who also does not adopt
JUSTICE SCALIA’s arguments) disagrees with the FCC’s
interpretation of the term “practice.” He, along with
Global Crossing, claims instead that §§201(a) and (b)
concern only practices that harm carrier customers, not
carrier suppliers. Post, at 2–4 (dissenting opinion); Brief
for Petitioner 37–38. But that is not what those sections
say. Nor does history offer this position significant sup
port. A violation of a regulation or order dividing rates
among railroads, for example, would likely have harmed
another carrier, not a shipper. See, e.g., Chicago & North
Western Transp. Co., 609 F. 2d, at 1225–1226 (“Act . . .
provides for the regulation of inter-carrier relations as a
part of its general rate policy”). Once one takes account of
this fact, it seems reasonable, not unreasonable, to include
as a §201(b) (and §207) beneficiary a firm that performs
services roughly analogous to the transportation of one
segment of a longer call. We are not here dealing with a
firm that supplies office supplies or manual labor. Cf.,
e.g., Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. S. 249, 257
(1931) (“practice” in §1 of the Interstate Commerce Act
does not encompass employment decisions). The long-
distance carrier ordered by the FCC to compensate the
payphone operator is so ordered in its role as a provider of
communications services, not as a consumer of office sup
plies or the like. It is precisely because the carrier and the
18 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.
METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
Opinion of the Court

payphone operator jointly provide a communications
service to the caller that the carrier is ordered to share
with the payphone operator the revenue that only the
carrier is permitted to demand from the caller. Cf. Cable
& Wireless P. L. C., 166 F. 3d, at 1231 (finding that §201(b)
enables the Commission to regulate not “only the terms on
which U. S. carriers offer telecommunication services to the
public,” but also “the prices U. S. carriers pay” to foreign
carriers providing the foreign segment of an international
call).
Fourth, Global Crossing argues that the FCC’s “unrea
sonable practice” determination is unlawful because it is
inadequately reasoned. We concede that the FCC’s initial
opinion simply states that the carrier’s practice is unrea
sonable under §201(b). But the context and cross-
referenced opinions, 2003 Payphone Order, 18 FCC Rcd.,
at 19990, ¶32 (citing American Public Communications
Council v. FCC, 215 F. 3d 51, 56 (CADC 2000)), make the
FCC’s rationale obvious, namely, that in light of the his
tory that we set forth supra, at 7–9, it is unreasonable for
a carrier to violate the FCC’s mandate that it pay compen
sation. See also In re APCC Servs., Inc. v. NetworkIP,
LLC, 21 FCC Rcd. 10488, 10493–10495, ¶¶ 13–16 (2006)
(Order) (spelling out the reasoning).
Fifth Global Crossing argues that a different statutory
provision, §276, see supra, at 5, prohibits the FCC’s
§201(b) classification. Brief for Petitioner 26–28. But
§276 simply requires the FCC to “take all actions neces
sary . . . to prescribe regulations that . . . establish a per
call compensation plan to ensure” that payphone operators
“are fairly compensated.” 47 U. S. C. §276(b)(1). It no
where forbids the FCC to rely on §201(b). Rather, by
helping to secure enforcement of the mandated regulations
the FCC furthers basic §276 purposes.
Finally, Global Crossing seeks to rest its claim of a §276
prohibition upon the fact that §276 requires regulations
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 19

Opinion of the Court

that secure compensation for “every completed intrastate,”
as well as every “interstate” payphone-related call, while
§201(b) (referring to §201(a)) extends only to “interstate or
foreign” communication. Brief for Petitioner 37. But
Global Crossing makes too much of too little. We can
assume (for argument’s sake) that §201(b) may conse
quently apply only to a portion of the Compensation Or
der’s requirements. But cf., e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 476 U. S., at 375, n. 4 (suggesting approval of
FCC authority where it is “not possible to separate the
interstate and the intrastate components”). But even if
that is so (and we repeat that we do not decide this ques
tion), the FCC’s classification will help to achieve a sub
stantial portion of its §276 compensatory mission. And we
cannot imagine why Congress would have (implicitly in
this §276 language) wished to forbid the FCC from con
cluding that an interstate half loaf is better than none.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
20 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.
METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
Appendix B to opinion of the Court

APPENDIXES TO OPINION OF THE COURT

A

In re Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification
and Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd. 2545, 2631–2632, ¶¶190–191
(1999) (Compensation Order).

In re the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensa
tion Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18
FCC Rcd. 19975, 19990, ¶32 (2003) (2003 Payphone Or
der).

B

Communications Act §201:
“(a) It shall be the duty of every common carrier en
gaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire
or radio to furnish such communication service upon
reasonable request therefor; and, in accordance with
the orders of the Commission, in cases where the
Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such
action necessary or desirable in the public interest, to
establish physical connections with other carriers, to
establish through routes and charges applicable
thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to es
tablish and provide facilities and regulations for oper
ating such through routes.
“(b) All charges, practices, classifications, and regu
lations for and in connection with such communica
tion service, shall be just and reasonable, and any
such charge, practice, classification, or regulation that
is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful:
Provided, That communications by wire or radio sub
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 21

Appendix B to opinion of the Court

ject to this chapter may be classified into day, night,
repeated, unrepeated, letter, commercial, press, Gov
ernment, and such other classes as the Commission
may decide to be just and reasonable, and different
charges may be made for the different classes of com
munications: Provided further, That nothing in this
chapter or in any other provision of law shall be con
strued to prevent a common carrier subject to this
chapter from entering into or operating under any
contract with any common carrier not subject to this
chapter, for the exchange of their services, if the
Commission is of the opinion that such contract is not
contrary to the public interest: Provided further, That
nothing in this chapter or in any other provision of
law shall prevent a common carrier subject to this
chapter from furnishing reports of positions of ships
at sea to newspapers of general circulation, either at a
nominal charge or without charge, provided the name
of such common carrier is displayed along with such
ship position reports. The Commission may prescribe
such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the
public interest to carry out the provisions of this chap
ter.” 47 U. S. C. §201.
Communications Act §206:
“In case any common carrier shall do, or cause or
permit to be done, any act, matter, or thing in this
chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall
omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this chapter re
quired to be done, such common carrier shall be liable
to the person or persons injured thereby for the full
amount of damages sustained in consequence of any
such violation of the provisions of this chapter, to
gether with a reasonable counsel or attorney’s fee, to
be fixed by the court in every case of recovery, which
attorney’s fee shall be taxed and collected as part of
22 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.
METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
Appendix B to opinion of the Court

the costs in the case.” 47 U. S. C. §206.
Communications Act §207:
“Any person claiming to be damaged by any com
mon carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter
may either make complaint to the Commission as
hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit for the re
covery of the damages for which such common carrier
may be liable under the provisions of this chapter, in
any district court of the United States of competent
jurisdiction; but such person shall not have the right
to pursue both such remedies.” 47 U. S. C. §207.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

SCALIA, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–705
_________________

GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

PETITIONER v. METROPHONES TELE
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 17, 2007]

JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting.
Section 276(b)(1)(A) of the Communications Act of 1934,
as added by the Telecommunication Act of 1996, in
structed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC
or Commission) to issue regulations establishing a plan to
compensate payphone operators, leaving it up to the FCC
to prescribe who should pay and how much. Pursuant to
that authority, the FCC promulgated a substantive regu
lation that required carriers to compensate payphone
operators at a rate of 24 cents per call (the payphone
compensation regulation). The FCC subsequently de
clared a carrier’s failure to comply with the payphone
compensation regulation to be unlawful under §201(b) of
the Act (which prohibits certain “unjust or unreasonable”
practices) and privately actionable under §206 of the Act
(which establishes a private cause of action for violations
of the Act). Today’s judgment can be defended only by
accepting either of two propositions with respect to these
laws: (1) that a carrier’s failure to pay the prescribed
compensation, in and of itself and apart from the Commis
sion’s payphone-compensation regulation, is an unjust or
unreasonable practice in violation of §201(b); or (2) that a
carrier’s failure to pay the prescribed compensation is an
“unjust or unreasonable” practice under §201(b) because it
2 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

violates the Commission’s payphone-compensation
regulation.
The Court coyly avoids rejecting the first proposition.
But make no mistake: that proposition is utterly implau
sible, which is perhaps why it is nowhere to be found in
the FCC’s opinion. The unjustness or unreasonableness in
this case, if any, consists precisely of violating the FCC’s
payphone-compensation regulation.1 Absent that regula
tion, it would be neither unjust nor unreasonable for a
carrier to decline to act as collection agent for payphone
companies. The person using the services of the payphone
company to obtain access to the carrier’s network is not
the carrier but the caller. It is absurd to suggest some
natural obligation on the part of the carrier to identify
payphone use, bill its customer for that use, and forward
the proceeds to the payphone company. As a regulatory
command, that makes sense (though the free-rider prob
lem might have been solved in some other fashion); but,
absent the Commission’s substantive regulation, it would
be in no way unjust or unreasonable for the carrier to do
nothing. Indeed, if a carrier’s failure to pay payphone
compensation had been unjust or unreasonable in its own
right, the Commission’s payphone-compensation regula
tion would have been unnecessary, and the payphone
——————
1 See In re the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Pro

visions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd. 19975,
19990, ¶32 (2003) (“[F]ailure to pay in accordance with the Commis
sion’s payphone rules, such as the rules expressly requiring such
payment . . . constitutes . . . an unjust and unreasonable practice in
violation of section 201(b)”); In re APCC Servs., Inc. v. NetworkIP, LLC,
21 FCC Rcd. 10488, 10493, ¶15 (2006) (“[F]ailure to pay payphone
compensation rises to the level of being ‘unjust and unreasonable’ ”
because it is “a direct violation of Commission rules”); id., at 10493,
¶15, and n. 46 (“The fact that a failure to pay payphone compensation
directly violates Commission rules specifically requiring such payment
distinguishes this situation from other situations where the Commis
sion has repeatedly declined to entertain ‘collection actions’ ”).
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

SCALIA, J., dissenting

companies could have sued directly for violation of §201(b).
The only serious issue presented by this case relates to
the second proposition: whether a practice that is not in
and of itself unjust or unreasonable can be rendered such
(and thus rendered in violation of the Act itself) because it
violates a substantive regulation of the Commission.
Today’s opinion seems to answer that question in the
affirmative, at least with respect to the particular regula
tion at issue here. That conclusion, however, conflicts
with the Communications Act’s carefully delineated reme
dial scheme. The Act draws a clear distinction between
private actions to enforce interpretive regulations (by
which I mean regulations that reasonably and authorita
tively construe the statute itself) and private actions to
enforce substantive regulations (by which I mean regula
tions promulgated pursuant to an express delegation of
authority to impose freestanding legal obligations beyond
those created by the statute itself). Section 206 of the Act
establishes a private cause of action for violations of the
Act itself—and violation of an FCC regulation authorita
tively interpreting the Act is a violation of the Act itself.
(As the Court explains, when it comes to regulations that
“reasonabl[y] [and] authoritatively construe the statute
itself,” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 284 (2001),
“it is ‘meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action
to enforce the regulations apart from the statute.’ ” Ante,
at 8 (quoting Sandoval, supra, at 284).) On the other
hand, violation of a substantive regulation promulgated by
the Commission is not a violation of the Act, and thus does
not give rise to a private cause of action under §206. See,
e.g., APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co., 418
F. 3d 1238, 1247 (CADC 2005) (per curiam), cert. pending,
No. 05–766; Greene v. Sprint Communications Co., 340
F. 3d 1047, 1052 (CA9 2003), cert. denied, 541 U. S. 988
(2004); P. Huber, M. Kellogg, & J. Thorne, Federal Tele
4 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

communications Law §3.14.3 (2d ed. 1999).2 That is why
Congress has separately created private rights of action
for violation of certain substantive regulations. See, e.g.,
47 U. S. C. §227(b)(3) (violation of substantive regulations
prescribed under §227(b) (2000 ed. and Supp. III));
§227(c)(5) (violation of substantive regulations prescribed
under §227(c)). These do not include the payphone
compensation regulation authorized by §276(b).
There is no doubt that interpretive rules can be issued
pursuant to §201(b)—that is, rules which specify that
certain practices are in and of themselves “unjust or un
reasonable.” Orders issued under §205 of the Act, see
ante, at 14, which authorizes the FCC, upon finding that a
practice will be unjust and unreasonable, to order the
carrier to adopt a just and reasonable practice in its place,
similarly implement the statute’s proscription against
unjust or unreasonable practices. But, as explained above,
the payphone-compensation regulation does not imple
ment §201(b) and is not predicated on a finding of what
would be unjust and unreasonable absent the regulation.
The Court naively describes the question posed by this
case as follows: Since “[a] practice of violating the FCC’s
order to pay a fair share would seem fairly characterized
in ordinary English as an ‘unjust practice,’ . . . why should
the FCC not call it the same under §201(b)?” Ante, at 15.
There are at least three reasons why it is not as simple as
that. (1) There has been no FCC “order” in the ordinary

——————
2 TheCourt asserts that “[n]one of th[ese] [cases] involved an FCC
application of, or an FCC interpretation of, the relevant section, namely
§201(b)[,] nor did any involve a regulation—substantive or interpre
tive—promulgated subsequent to the authority of §201(b).” Ante, at 16.
I agree. They involved the payphone-compensation regulation, which
was not promulgated pursuant to §201(b), but pursuant to §276. The
relevant point is that violations of substantive regulations are not
directly actionable under §206.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

SCALIA, J., dissenting

sense, see 5 U. S. C. §551(6), but only an FCC regulation.3
That is to say, the FCC has never determined that peti
tioner is in violation of its regulation and ordered compli
ance. Rather, respondent has alleged such a violation and
has brought that allegation directly to District Court
without prior agency adjudication. (2) The “practice of
violating” virtually any FCC regulation can be character
ized (“in ordinary English”) as an “unjust practice”—or if
not that, then an “unreasonable practice”—so that all FCC
regulations become subject to private damage actions.
Thus, the traditional (and textually based) distinction
between private enforceability of interpretive rules, and
private nonenforceability of substantive rules is effectively
destroyed. And (3) it is not up to the FCC to “call it” an
unjust practice or not. If it were, agency discretion might
limit the regulations available for harassing litigation by
telecommunications competitors. In fact, however, the
practice of violating one or another substantive rule either
is or is not an unjust or unreasonable practice under
§201(b). The Commission is entitled to Chevron deference
with respect to that determination at the margins, see
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun
cil, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), but it will always remain
within the power of private parties to go directly to court,
asserting that a particular violation of a substantive rule
is (“in ordinary English”) “unjust” or “unreasonable” and
hence provides the basis for suit under §201(b).
The Court asks (more naively still) “what has the sub
stantive/interpretive distinction that [this dissent] empha
sizes to do with the matter? There is certainly no refer
——————
3 The Court’s departure from ordinary usage is made possible by the

fact that “the FCC commonly adopts rules in opinions called ‘orders.’ ”
New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Me., 742 F. 2d 1,
8–9 (CA1 1984) (Breyer, J.). If there had been violation of an FCC
order in this case, a private action would have been available under
§407 of the Act.
6 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

ence to this distinction in §201(b) . . . . Why believe that
Congress, which scarcely knew of this distinction a cen
tury ago before the blossoming of administrative law,
would care which kind of regulation was at issue?” Ante,
at 15–16 (citation omitted). The answer to these questions
is obvious. Section 206 (which was enacted at the same
time as §201(b), see 48 Stat. 1070, 1072) does not explicitly
refer to the distinction between interpretive and substan
tive regulations. And yet the Court acknowledges that,
while a violation of an interpretive regulation is actionable
under §206 (as a violation of the statute itself), a violation
of a substantive regulation is not. (Were this not true, the
Court’s lengthy discussion of §201(b) would be wholly
unnecessary because violation of the payphone
compensation regulation would be directly actionable
under §206.) The Court evidently believes that Congress
went out of its way to exclude from §206 private actions
that did not charge violation of the Act itself (or regula
tions that authoritatively interpret the Act) but was per
fectly willing to have those very same private actions
brought in through the back door of §201(b) as an “inter
pretation” of “unjust or unreasonable practice.” It does not
take familiarity with “the blossoming of administrative
law” to perceive that this would be nonsensical.4
Seemingly aware that it is in danger of rendering the
limitation upon §206 a nullity, the Court seeks to limit its
novel approval of private actions for violation of substan
——————
4 The Court further asserts that the “the FCC has long set forth what

we now call ‘substantive’ (or ‘legislative’) rules under §205,” “violations
of [which] . . . have clearly been deemed violations of §201(b),” ante, at
16. The §205 orders to which the Court refers are not substantive in
the relevant sense because they interpret §201(b)’s prohibition against
unjust and unreasonable rates or practices. See ante, at 7 (§205 “au
thoriz[es] the FCC to prescribe reasonable rates and practices in order
to preclude rates or practices that violate §201(b)”). The payphone
compensation regulation, by contrast, does not interpret §201(b) or any
other statutory provision.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

SCALIA, J., dissenting

tive rules to substantive rules that are “analog[ous] with
rate-setting and rate divisions, the traditional, historical
subject matter of §201(b),” ante, at 14–15 (emphasis
added). There is absolutely no basis in the statute for
this distinction (nor is it anywhere to be found in the
FCC’s opinion). As I have described earlier, interpretive
regulations are privately enforceable because to violate
them is to violate the Act, within the meaning of the pri
vate-suit provision of §206. That a substantive regulation
is analogous to traditional interpretive regulations, in the
sense of dealing with subjects that those regulations have
traditionally addressed, is supremely irrelevant to
whether violation of the substantive regulation is a viola
tion of the Act—which is the only pertinent inquiry. The
only thing to be said for the Court’s inventive distinction is
that it enables its holding to stand without massive dam
age to the statutory scheme. Better an irrational limita
tion, I suppose, than no limitation at all; even though it is
unclear how restrictive that limitation will turn out to be.
What other substantive regulations are out there, one
wonders, that can be regarded as “analogous” to actions
the Commission has traditionally taken through interpre
tive regulations under §201(b)?
It is difficult to comprehend what public good the Court
thinks it is achieving by its introduction of an unprinci
pled exception into what has hitherto been a clearly un
derstood statutory scheme. Even without the availability
of private remedies, the payphone-compensation regula
tion would hardly go unenforced. The Commission is
authorized to impose civil forfeiture penalties of up to
$100,000 per violation (or per day, for continuing viola
tions) against common carriers that “willfully or repeat
edly fai[l] to comply with . . . any rule, regulation, or order
issued by the Commission.” 47 U. S. C. §503(b)(1)(B). And
the Commission can even place enforcement in private
hands by issuing a privately enforceable order forbidding
8 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

continued violation. See §§154(i), 276(b)(1)(A), 407. Such
an order, however, would require a prior Commission
adjudication that the regulation had been violated, thus
leaving that determination in the hands of the agency
rather than a court, and preventing the unjustified private
suits that today’s decision allows.
I would hold that a private action to enforce an FCC
regulation under §§201(b) and 206 does not lie unless the
regulated practice is “unjust or unreasonable” in its own
right and apart from the fact that a substantive regulation
of the Commission has prohibited it. As the practice
regulated by the payphone-compensation regulation does
not plausibly fit that description, I would reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–705
_________________

GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

PETITIONER v. METROPHONES TELE
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 17, 2007]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
The Court holds that failure to pay a payphone operator
for coinless calls is an “unjust or unreasonable” “practice”
under 47 U. S. C. §201(b). Properly understood, however,
§201 does not reach the conduct at issue here. Failing to
pay is not a “practice” under §201 because that section
regulates the activities of telecommunications firms in
their role as providers of telecommunications services. As
such, §201(b) does not reach the behavior of telecommuni
cation firms in other aspects of their business. I respect
fully dissent.
I
The meaning of §201(b) of the Communications Act of
1934 becomes clear when read, as it should be, as a part of
the entirety of §201. Subsection (a) sets out the duties and
broad discretionary powers of a common carrier:
“It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged
in interstate or foreign communication by wire or ra
dio to furnish such communication service upon rea
sonable request therefor; and . . . to establish physical
connections with other carriers, to establish through
routes and charges applicable thereto and the divi
sions of such charges, and to establish and provide fa
2 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

cilities and regulations for operating such through
routes.”
Immediately following that description of duties and
powers, subsection (b) requires:
“All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations
for and in connection with such communication ser
vice, shall be just and reasonable, and any such
charge, practice, classification, or regulation that
is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be
unlawful . . . .”
The “charges, practices, classifications, and regulations”
referred to in subsection (b) are those “establish[ed]” un
der subsection (a). Having given common carriers discre
tionary power to set charges and establish regulations in
subsection (a), Congress required in subsection (b) that the
exercise of this power be “just and reasonable.” Thus,
unless failing to pay a payphone operator arises from one
of the duties under subsection (a), it is not a “practice”
within the meaning of subsection (b).
Subsection (a) prescribes a carrier’s duty to render
service either to customers (“furnish[ing] . . . communica
tion service”) or to other carriers (e.g., “establish[ing]
physical connections”); it does not set out duties related to
the receipt of service from suppliers. Consequently, given
the relationship between subsections (a) and (b), subsec
tion (b) covers only those “practices” connected with the
provision of service to customers or other carriers. The
Court embraced this critical limitation in Missouri Pacific
R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. S. 249 (1931), which held that
the term “practice” means a “ ‘practice’ in connection with
the fixing of rates to be charged and prescribing of service
to be rendered by the carriers.” Id., at 257. In Norwood,
the Court interpreted language from the Interstate Com
merce Act (as amended by the Mann-Elkins Act) that
Congress just three years later copied into the Communi
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

cations Act. Ante, at 3; see §7 of the Mann-Elkins Act of
1910, 36 Stat. 546. In passing the Communications Act,
Congress may “be presumed to have had knowledge” and
to have approved of the Court’s interpretation in Norwood.
See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 581 (1978). As a
result, the Supreme Court’s contemporaneous interpreta
tion of “practice” should bear heavily on our analysis.
Other terms in §201 support using Norwood’s restrictive
interpretation of “practice.” A word “is known by the
company it keeps,” and one should not “ascrib[e] to one
word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its
accompanying words.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S.
561, 575 (1995). Of the quartet “charges, practices, classi
fications, and regulations,” the terms “charges,” “classifi
cations,” and “regulations” could apply only to the party
“furnish[ing]” service. “[C]harges” refers to the charges for
physical connections and through routes. 47 U. S. C.
§§201(a), 202(b). “[R]egulations” relates to the operation
of through routes. §201(a). “[C]lassifications” refers to
different sorts of communications that carry different
charges. §201(b). These three terms involve either setting
rules for the provision of service or setting rates for that
provision. In keeping with the meaning of these terms,
the term “practices” must refer to only those practices “in
connection with the fixing of rates to be charged and pre
scribing of service to be rendered by the carriers.” Nor
wood, supra, at 257.
The statutory provisions surrounding §201 confirm this
interpretation. Section 203 requires that “[e]very common
carrier . . . shall . . . file with the Commission . . . sched
ules showing all charges for itself and its connecting carri
ers . . . and showing the classifications, practices, and
regulations affecting such charges.” See also §§204–205
(also using the phrase “charge, classification, regulation,
or practice” in the tariff context). The “charges” referred
to are those related to a carrier’s own services. §203
4 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

(“charges for itself and its connecting carriers”). The
“classifications, practices, and regulations” are also limited
to a carrier’s own services. Ibid. (applying only to prac
tices “affecting such charges”). In this context, “practices”
must mean only those “in connection with the fixing of
rates to be charged.” Norwood, 283 U. S., at 257. Section
202—outside of the tariff context—also supports this
limitation. It forbids discrimination “in charges, practices,
classifications, regulations, facilities, or services.” Dis
crimination occurs with respect to a carrier’s provision of
service—not its purchasing of services from others. I am
unaware of any context in which §§202–205 were applied
to conduct relating to the service that another party pro
vided to a telecommunications carrier.
In this case, Global Crossing has not provided any ser
vice to Metrophones. Rather, Global Crossing has failed to
pay for a service that Metrophones supplied. The failure
to pay a supplier is not in any sense a “ ‘practice’ in con
nection with the fixing of rates to be charged and prescrib
ing of service to be rendered by the carriers.” Id., at 257.
Accordingly, Global Crossing has not engaged in a practice
under subsection (b) because the failure to pay has not
come in connection with its provision of service or setting
of rates within the meaning of subsection (a). On this
understanding of §201, Global Crossing’s failure to pay
Metrophones is not a statutory violation. All that remains
is a regulatory violation, which does not provide Metro-
phones a private right of action under §207.1

——————
1 Other enforcement mechanisms exist to redress Global Crossing’s

failure to pay. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has
the power to impose fines under 47 U. S. C. §§503(b)(1)(B) and (2)(B).
In addition, the FCC may have the authority to create an administra
tive right of action under §276(b)(1) (giving the FCC power to “take all
actions necessary” to “establish a per call compensation plan” that
ensures “all payphone service providers are fairly compensated”).
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

II
The majority suggests that deference under Chevron
U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U. S. 837 (1984), compels its conclusion that a car
rier’s refusal to pay a payphone operator is unreasonable.
But “unjust or unreasonable” is a statutory term, §201(b),
and a court may not, in the name of deference, abdicate its
responsibility to interpret a statute. Under Chevron, an
agency is due no deference until the court analyzes the
statute and determines that Congress did not speak di
rectly to the issue under consideration:
“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statu
tory construction and must reject administrative con
structions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent. . . . If a court, employing traditional tools of
statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had
an intention on the precise question at issue, that in
tention is the law and must be given effect.” Id., at
843, n. 9.
The majority spends one short paragraph analyzing the
relevant provisions of the Communications Act to deter
mine whether a refusal to pay is an “ ‘unjust or unreason
able’ ” “ ‘practice.’ ” Ante, at 7. Its entire statutory analysis
is essentially encompassed in a single sentence in that
paragraph: “That is to say, in ordinary English, one can
call a refusal to pay Commission-ordered compensation
despite having received a benefit from the payphone op
erator a ‘practice . . . in connection with [furnishing a]
communication service . . . that is . . . unreasonable.’ ”
Ibid. (omissions and modifications in original). This
analysis ignores the interaction between §201(a) and
§201(b), supra, at 1–2; it ignores the three terms sur
rounding the word “practice” and the context those terms
provide, supra, at 3–4; it ignores the use of the term “prac
tice” in nearby statutory provisions, such as §§202–205,
6 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

supra, at 4; and it ignores the understanding of the term
“practice” at the time Congress enacted the Communica
tions Act, supra, at 2–3.
After breezing by the text of the statutory provisions at
issue, the majority cites lower court cases to claim that
“the underlying regulated activity at issue here resembles
activity that both transportation and communications
agencies have long regulated.” Ante, at 7–8 (citing Allnet
Communication Serv., Inc. v. National Exch. Carrier
Assn., Inc., 965 F. 2d 1118 (CADC 1992), and Southwest
ern Bell Tel. Co. v. Allnet Communications Serv., Inc., 789
F. Supp. 302 (ED Mo. 1992)). It argues that these cases
demonstrate that “communications firms entitled to reve
nues under rate divisions or cost allocations might bring
lawsuits under §207 . . . and obtain compensation or dam
ages.” Ante, at 8. But in both cases, the only issue before
the court was whether the lawsuit should be dismissed
because the FCC had primary jurisdiction; and in both
cases, the answer was yes. Allnet, supra, at 1120–1123;
Southwestern Bell, supra, at 304–306. The Court’s reli
ance on these cases is thus entirely misplaced because
both courts found they lacked jurisdiction; the cases do not
address §201 at all—the interpretation of which is the sole
question in this case; and both cases assume without
deciding that §207 applies, thus not grappling with the
point for which the majority claims their support.2
III
Finally, independent of the FCC’s interpretation of the
——————
2 Themajority’s citation to Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 609 F. 2d 1221 (CA7 1979), is similarly
misplaced. There, the Court of Appeals interpreted the meaning of the
statutory requirement to “ ‘establish just, reasonable, and equitable
divisions’ ” under the Interstate Commerce Act. Id., at 1224. It is
difficult to understand why the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of
different statutory language is relevant to the question we face in this
case.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

THOMAS, J., dissenting

language “unjust or unreasonable” “practice,” the FCC’s
interpretation is unreasonable because it regulates both
interstate and intrastate calls. The unjust-and
unreasonable requirement of §201(b) applies only to “prac
tices . . . in connection with such communication service,”
and the term “such communication service” refers to “in
terstate or foreign communication by wire or radio” in
§201(a) (emphasis added). Disregarding this limitation,
the FCC has applied its rule to both interstate and intra
state calls. 47 CFR §64.1300 (2005). In light of the fact
that the statute explicitly limits “unjust or unreasonable”
“practices” to those involving “interstate or foreign com
munication,” the FCC’s application of §201(b) to intrastate
calls is plainly an unreasonable interpretation of the
statute. To make matters worse, the FCC has not even
bothered to explain its clear misinterpretation. See In re
Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provi
sions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd.
19975 (2003).
The majority avoids directly addressing this argument
by stating there is no reason “to forbid the FCC from
concluding that an interstate half loaf is better than
none.” Ante, at 13. But if the FCC’s rule is unreasonable,
Metrophones should not be able to recover for intrastate
calls in a suit under §207. Because intrastate calls cannot
be the subject of an “unjust or unreasonable” practice
under §201, there is no private right of action to recover
for them, and the Court should cut off that half of the loaf.
By sidestepping this issue, the majority gives the lower
court no guidance about how to handle intrastate calls on
remand.
IV
Because the majority allows the FCC to interpret the
Communications Act in a way that contradicts the unam
biguous text, I respectfully dissent.