United States v. Rawlins

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-2948

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ROBERT RAWLINS,
Appellant

On Appeal from the District Court
of the Virgin Islands
District Court No. 3-04-cr-00154-005
United States District Judge: The Honorable James T. Giles

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 3, 2010

Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges

(Filed: May 26, 2010)
Mark D. Hodge, Esq.
Hodge & Francois
1340 Taarneberg
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00802
Counsel for Appellant

Delia L. Smith, Esq.
Office of United States Attorney
5500 Veterans Drive, Suite 260
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00802
Counsel for Appellee

OPINION

SMITH, Circuit Judge

Robert Rawlins was a baggage handler for Worldwide
Flight Services at Cyril E. King Airport on St. Thomas, United
States Virgin Islands. He was caught using that position to help
smuggle cocaine through the airport, and was eventually
convicted of various drug crimes. Finding no error, we will
affirm.

I.

“As required when reviewing convictions, we recite the

2
relevant facts in the light most favorable to the government.”
United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1991).

This appeal arises out of a conspiracy among employees
at Cyril E. King Airport, and others, to smuggle cocaine onto
commercial flights bound for the continental United States. The
conspirators included Alric Thomas, a cocaine supplier; Dion
Brookes, the station manager for a small airline called Air
Sunshine; and airport baggage handlers Rawlins, Bernard
Gabriel, Brent Donovan, Meleek Sylvester, and Mervin Dorival.

This group employed several methods to move cocaine
through the airport. The method the conspirators used most
often was what we will refer to for purposes of this opinion as
“tag switching” or “tag pulling.” The word “tag” refers to the
flight tags that airlines affix to checked luggage. All luggage to
be loaded onto commercial aircraft requires such a tag. The
switching the conspirators engaged in involved stealing flight
tags from legitimately checked bags and affixing those tags to
bags containing cocaine. This method allowed the cocaine to be
smuggled into the cargo holds of U.S.-bound commercial
airplanes.

The main workspace for the tag-switching operation was
the airport’s baggage room. It was located behind the ticket
counters of several airlines, including Air Sunshine, as well as
the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) inspection
area. The room had two baggage belts, both of which held

3
checked luggage intended for outgoing flights. A conspiring
baggage handler was able to select a bag that was bound for a
destination where he intended to direct the cocaine. He would
remove the bag’s flight tag, steal any valuables found inside,
then discard the plundered bag. The stolen flight tag would then
be taken to Air Sunshine’s ticket counter or office, where
Brookes was paid to hold unchecked, uninspected, untagged
bags filled with cocaine.1 The tag would be transferred to one
of the drug bags, making it appear that the bag had been checked
and inspected in the ordinary course. A baggage handler would
then transport that bag to the baggage room and place it among
other checked baggage. Finally, the bag containing drugs would
be loaded onto the flight denoted on the flight tag, along with
legitimately checked bags.

The earliest evidence of Rawlins’s involvement in this
operation pertained to the events of September 20, 2003. The
day before, Thomas had given Sylvester three suitcases filled
with cocaine, along with $60,000 in cash. Two bags were to be
loaded onto a flight to Philadelphia; the third was destined for
Newark. As agreed, Sylvester brought the suitcases to the
airport on September 20. Brookes and Dorival took them and
stored them in the Air Sunshine office. Brookes held the three
bags in his office until Rawlins delivered the tags that would
allow the two bags bound for Philadelphia to be loaded onto the

1
These bags were supplied by Thomas and delivered to
the airport by an intermediary, such as Sylvester.

4
plane.2 Either Rawlins or Brookes affixed the tags to the bags.
Rawlins then carried the two bags to the baggage room.

Unfortunately for the conspirators, the tag pullers made
a mistake that day. They failed to discard the legitimate
Philadelphia-bound bags from which the two flight tags had
been stolen. A baggage handler who was not involved in the
conspiracy was loading those bags onto the plane when he
noticed that they lacked the necessary flight tags. He and a
colleague alerted TSA, which in turn ordered an X-ray scan of
all luggage intended for the Philadelphia flight. The scan
revealed the two “replacement” bags filled with cocaine. The
third bag that Sylvester had delivered to the Air Sunshine office,
however, remained there undiscovered. Sylvester contacted
Rawlins and told him that the Air Sunshine office held a
suitcase containing ten kilograms of cocaine. Rawlins agreed to
retrieve the suitcase, and returned it to Sylvester around 7:00 or
7:30 that evening.

Rawlins’s involvement in cocaine smuggling at the
airport continued. On November 8, 2003, he removed a flight
tag from a checked bag in the baggage room, placed it in his

2
Donovan testified that he brought the tags to the office
that day, but Brookes offered testimony from which the jury
could have concluded that Rawlins did so instead. Taking the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we
must, we credit the testimony implicating Rawlins.

5
pocket, and took it to Brookes’s office. He returned with a
tagged blue bag, which he placed on the baggage belt. Later
that day, officials in Newark, New Jersey intercepted a cocaine-
filled bag that had been placed on Continental Flight 1902 from
St. Thomas.3 Rawlins was also tied to a cocaine-filled suitcase
discovered on February 21, 2004. Donovan obtained two tags
and brought them to Brookes. Brookes informed him that he
needed only one tag, so Donovan placed one tag on the drug bag
and restored the other to the luggage from which it had been
taken. Donovan testified that Rawlins was “involved with that
transaction,” and that Rawlins took the tagged drug bag to the
baggage room. This bag, too, was bound for Newark on
Continental Flight 1902, but Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) officers discovered and seized it before the flight
departed.

The next relevant incident occurred on March 10, 2004.
The day before, Sylvester had received two kilograms of cocaine
from Thomas. Thomas instructed him to place the cocaine in a
particular green suitcase that would be checked onto Flight 1902

3
Rawlins may have similarly aided a drug shipment to
Miami on May 1, 2004. Donovan, who by this time was
cooperating with law enforcement, brought a cocaine-filled
suitcase to the airport. He gave it to Brookes, who took it to the
Air Sunshine front desk. Rawlins promised Donovan that he
would obtain tags to place on the luggage, but it is unclear
whether he actually did so.

6
by an unidentified female. Rawlins was slated to help Sylvester,
but backed out at the last minute, leaving Sylvester to pack the
cocaine into a suitcase by himself. Rawlins was present in the
baggage room, however, along with Gabriel, as Sylvester
packed the cocaine. Indeed, Sylvester asked Rawlins if he
would look out for him while he packed the cocaine, and
Rawlins told him to “go ahead.” Sylvester then built a wall of
suitcases to conceal what he was doing from security cameras in
the room. He placed the cocaine in the suitcase, and the suitcase
made it onto the flight. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) agents had been tipped off about the bag, however, and
the drugs were seized at Newark Airport. After this incident,
Rawlins frequently remarked to Sylvester about how easy it was
to place drugs onto airplanes, and begged to be put in contact
with a supplier he could work with on his own.

Meanwhile, Sylvester informed Thomas that he no longer
wished to assist with drug smuggling. When Thomas inquired
about possible replacements, Sylvester told Thomas he would
get back to him. On August 30, 2004, Sylvester called Thomas
and told him he had found someone to help him. He called
Rawlins the same day and arranged a meeting between himself,
Rawlins, and Thomas.4 Before Thomas arrived, Sylvester asked
Rawlins if he had “work[ed] anything recently.” Rawlins

4
On August 13, 2004, Sylvester entered into a
cooperation agreement with the government. He set up the
meeting with Thomas and Rawlins pursuant to that agreement.

7
responded that he had moved drugs through the airport on
Wednesday, August 25, 2004. When Thomas arrived, Sylvester
introduced him to Rawlins and the three men talked about
smuggling drugs through the airport. Rawlins offered to help
Thomas move drugs on American Airlines flights to Miami and
New York, and the two exchanged cell phone numbers before
parting ways.

There was also evidence corroborating Rawlins’s
involvement in the cocaine smuggling operation that was not
attributed to a specific date. For example, Donovan testified
that baggage handlers often acted as lookouts for each other
while tag-switching occurred in the baggage room, and that
Rawlins had served as a lookout for him in the past. Brookes
identified Rawlins as one of the bag handlers whom Dorival
would send to pick up cocaine-filled bags stored in the Air
Sunshine office, though he did not say when or how often this
occurred. He also testified that Rawlins once paid him $2,000
to hold a bag containing cocaine.

Rawlins and his cohorts were eventually arrested. A
superseding indictment returned on January 13, 2005 charged
Rawlins, Sylvester, Brookes, Dorival, Gabriel, and others with
various drug crimes. Count One charged Rawlins and eleven
others with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or
more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
Rawlins was also charged in Counts Four, Five, Six, Seven, Ten,
and Eleven with aiding and abetting possession of cocaine with

8
intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841. A jury convicted him
on Counts One, Six, Seven, Ten, and Eleven.5 Count Six related
to the drugs seized on September 20, 2003; Count Seven to the
drugs seized on November 8, 2003; Count Ten to the drugs
seized on February 21, 2004; and Count Eleven to the drugs
seized on March 10, 2004.

Rawlins was sentenced to 162 months in prison. He filed
this timely appeal raising a grab bag of challenges to his
conviction.6 Rawlins challenges the sufficiency of Count One
of the indictment, and the sufficiency of the evidence against
him on several other counts. He also contends that the District
Court abused its discretion by admitting samples of cocaine into
evidence at trial, because the government failed to establish an
adequate chain of custody connecting the cocaine seized by
authorities and the cocaine tested by government chemists.

II.

We begin with Rawlins’s argument that the superseding

5
On Counts Four and Five, the District Court entered a
judgment of acquittal for Rawlins pursuant to Rule 29 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
6
Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The
District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 48
U.S.C. § 1612(a).

9
indictment was invalid because Count One failed to allege a
proper timeframe for the alleged conspiracy. Specifically,
Count One alleged a conspiracy running “from a time unknown
and continuing to September[] 2004, on St. Thomas, in the
District of the Virgin Islands, and elsewhere[.]” Rawlins argues
that the indictment was inadequate because it did not specify
when this alleged conspiracy began. His argument starts with
the non-controversial premise that the essence of conspiracy is
agreement. He contends that every agreement, by definition, is
reached at a discrete point in time, and that this requires that an
indictment setting forth a conspiracy charge must identify the
date the agreement was formed. Because Rawlins did not raise
this claim in the District Court, we review for plain error.
United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 900 (5th Cir. 2006)
(applying plain error review to unpreserved challenge to the
sufficiency of the indictment); United States v. Stein, 233 F.3d
6, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2000) (same). “Plain” error is that which is
“obvious” and affects the defendant’s substantial rights. United
States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1998).

We use a two part test to measure the sufficiency of an
indictment. First, the indictment must “contain[] the elements
of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprise[]
the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.” United
States v. Hodge, 211 F.3d 74, 76 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gov’t
of the Virgin Islands v. Moolenaar, 133 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir.
1998)). Second, it must “enable[] the defendant to plead an
acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same

10
offense.” Id. Both of those requirements were met here.

As to the first, we join the Ninth Circuit in holding that
“although an indictment cannot be completely open-ended, an
indictment that specifies an end date is sufficient to apprise
defendants of the charges and enable them to prepare a
defense[.]” 7 United States v. Forrester, 592 F.3d 972, 983 (9th
Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). See also United States v.
Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 943 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding
indictment alleging a conspiracy “[f]rom an unknown date
through on or about July 21, 1998”); United States v. Hristov,
466 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 2006) (recognizing in dicta the
sufficiency of an indictment that charged a conspiracy running
from “an unknown date through September 9, 2003”). Rawlins
mounted a vigorous defense at trial, and he does not explain
how he would have been aided by greater specificity in the
indictment. He invokes United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294
(9th Cir. 1979). Yet in Cecil, the indictment alleged a drug
conspiracy “beginning on or before July, 1975, and continuing
thereafter until on or after October, 1975[.]” Id. at 1295
(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit reversed the defendants’
convictions because the indictment failed to allege “sufficient

7
We have previously upheld a conviction based on an
indictment charging a conspiracy from a “date unknown [to]
September 8, 1999.” United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 457
(3d Cir. 2003). We did so, however, without analyzing the
sufficiency of the “date unknown” language.

11
facts to facilitate the proper preparation of a defense and to
ensure that the defendants were prosecuted on facts presented to
the Grand Jury.” Id. at 1297. It held that the indictment failed
to place the conspiratorial acts within any particular timeframe
because the language describing the dates of the conspiracy was
“open-ended in both directions.” Id. (emphasis added). The
case before us is distinguishable, because the timeframe of the
charged conspiracy was open-ended only as to the beginning
date. Count One explicitly identified September 2004 as the end
of the conspiracy. This was sufficient to inform Rawlins of the
charges he would face at trial, allowing him to adequately
prepare for trial. Forrester, 592 F.3d at 983; Pease, 240 F.3d at
943.

We further hold that Rawlins’s conviction on Count One
will afford him a basis to invoke double jeopardy in future
proceedings.8 Hodge, 211 F.3d at 76. While Count One did not
provide a starting date for the alleged conspiracy, it did supply
many other details. It identified the statute Rawlins was charged
with violating, ten of his alleged co-conspirators, and the object,
manner, means, location, and end date of the alleged conspiracy.
See Forrester, 592 F.3d at 983. It also detailed at least fifteen

8
“The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government
from ‘splitting one conspiracy into several prosecutions.’”
United States v. Rigas, __ F.3d __, No. 08-3218, 2010 WL
1880366(3d Cir. May 12, 2010) (en banc) (quoting United
States v. Becker, 892 F.2d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 1989)).

12
overt acts taken in furtherance of that conspiracy, and the
approximate date of each. “Uncertainty regarding a
conspiracy’s beginning and ending dates does not render an
indictment fatally defective so long as overt acts alleged in the
indictment adequately limit the time frame of the conspiracy.”
Id. (citing United States v. Laykin, 886 F.2d 1534, 1542 (9th Cir.
1989)). Here, the indictment alleged that the first overt act
occurred in November of 2002, when Gabriel allegedly
transported a suitcase containing a kilogram of cocaine to New
York, and that the last occurred on August 30, 2004. These
allegations “adequately limit[ed] the time frame of the
conspiracy.” Id. All in all, “the indictment was sufficient to
apprise [Rawlins] of the charges against him, enable him to
prepare a defense, and to avoid double jeopardy on the same
charge.” Id. We find no error, let alone plain error.

We reach our conclusion not only by reference to
precedent, but also taking into account the practical realities of
most criminal enterprises. By definition, conspiracies work in
furtherance of illegal ends. In the usual course, they are
inherently secretive affairs. See, e.g., United States v. Curry,
977 F.2d 1042, 1053 (7th Cir. 1992). They are ordinarily
formed by tacit agreement, United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d
225, 238 (3d Cir. 2007), and are unlikely to “operate with the
paper trail that generally accompanies legitimate business
agreements.” United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 728 (3d Cir.
1994). For these reasons, only the conspirators may know
precisely when their unlawful combination came into being. It

13
is unrealistic to expect that in every case a grand jury will be
able to identify that date, despite an abundance of evidence
before it. Recognizing this practical reality, we decline to
impose such a requirement.

III.

Rawlins argues that there is insufficient evidence of mens
rea to sustain his convictions on Counts Six, Ten, and Eleven.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply a
“particularly deferential” standard which imposes a “very heavy
burden” on the appellant. United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d
173, 175 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d
180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998)). “We must sustain the verdict if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 264 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007).
“In making our review we examine the totality of the evidence,
both direct and circumstantial. We must credit all available
inferences in favor of the government.” United States v.
Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
“[I]n order to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting, the
government must prove that ‘the defendant charged with aiding
and abetting that crime knew of the commission of the
substantive offense and acted with the intent to facilitate it.’”
United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 293 (3d Cir. 2007)
(quoting United States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 189 n.17 (3d Cir.

14
1981)). “[C]ircumstantial evidence can be sufficient to uphold
an aiding and abetting conviction.” United States v. Soto, 539
F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2008).

We begin with Count Six. Rawlins claims that there is
no proof that he knew that the luggage he moved from the Air
Sunshine office to the baggage room on September 20, 2003
contained cocaine. According to Rawlins, because his job was
to handle bags, no culpability can attach to the mere act of his
moving luggage from one location to another without direct
evidence that he knew that those bags contained cocaine. We
disagree. As described above, the tag-switchers’ modus
operandi was to (1) store bags containing cocaine with Air
Sunshine; (2) remove flight tags from legitimately checked
luggage; (3) bring those tags from the baggage room to Air
Sunshine; (4) affix the tags to the bags of cocaine; and then (5)
take those bags from the Air Sunshine office to the baggage
room, to be loaded onto the appropriate flight. Brookes
repeatedly identified Rawlins as one of the baggage handlers
whom Mervin Dorival sent to switch tags and move cocaine-
filled bags from the Air Sunshine office to the bag room. As for
the events of September 20, 2003, Sylvester testified that he
gave Brookes the three cocaine-filled suitcases that Thomas had
given him the previous night. Brookes held those suitcases in
his office until Rawlins delivered the flight tags that would
allow two of them to be placed onboard a flight to Philadelphia.
Either Rawlins or Brookes affixed the stolen tags to the drug-
laden bags before Rawlins transported those bags to the baggage

15
room. The jury could have reasonably inferred that Rawlins’s
participation in the highly irregular (and plainly illegal) act of
tag switching evidenced his knowledge of the cocaine
smuggling occurring through Brookes’s office, and his intent to
facilitate it.

That conclusion is buttressed by evidence of Rawlins’s
eager participation in cocaine smuggling at the airport on later
occasions,9 including his actions later on September 20.
Sylvester testified that although authorities had seized two of the
suitcases containing cocaine, a third remained in the Air
Sunshine office. He called Rawlins, told him that there was a
suitcase containing ten kilograms of cocaine in Brookes’s office,
and asked him to retrieve it. Rawlins complied. This
demonstrated his willingness to facilitate the drug-running that
was occurring through Brookes’s office by preventing
authorities from discovering the third bag. It is possible, of
course, that the evening of September 20 was the first time that
Rawlins had anything to do with cocaine, and that he knew
nothing of the contents of the suitcases he took to the baggage
room earlier that morning. But a rational jury considering the
totality of the evidence could have reasonably believed
otherwise. See United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 97 n.3 (3d
Cir. 1992) (“There is no requirement . . . that the inference

9
For example, Rawlins was seen pulling flight tags on
November 8, 2003, and he promised Donovan he would do the
same on May 1, 2004.

16
drawn by the jury be the only inference possible or that the
government’s evidence foreclose every possible innocent
explanation.”). We therefore reject Rawlins’s sufficiency of the
evidence challenge to his conviction on Count Six.

Rawlins’s argument concerning Count Ten is similar to
his argument on Count Six. He contends that the trial evidence
proved only that he, a baggage handler, moved bags containing
cocaine on February 21, 2004. According to Rawlins, this was
insufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude
that he aided and abetted cocaine possession. Again, we
disagree. Donovan testified that he pulled intact flight tags
from legitimately tagged bags and brought them to Brookes’s
office for placement on bags filled with drugs. He also testified
that Rawlins was “involved with that transaction,” and that
Rawlins carried the bag from the office to the baggage room. In
light of the substantial evidence of Rawlins’s involvement in the
cocaine conspiracy, including its tag-switching activities, the
jury could have reasonably understood this to mean that Rawlins
knowingly carried out a small but crucial role that day by
moving tagged, cocaine-filled suitcases from the Air Sunshine
office to the baggage room.

Finally, there is sufficient evidence to sustain Rawlins’s
conviction on Count Eleven. Sylvester testified that on March
9, 2004, Thomas paid him $4,000 and gave him two kilograms
of cocaine. Sylvester was to bring the cocaine to the airport the
next day and, with help from Rawlins, place it in a suitcase

17
bound for Newark. Rawlins backed out at the last minute,
however, leaving Sylvester to load the cocaine by himself. He
did so in the baggage room, while Gabriel and Rawlins were
present. Sylvester not only told Rawlins what he was doing, but
also asked him to act as a lookout. In response, Rawlins told
him to “go ahead.” 10 The jury could have concluded from this
evidence that Rawlins acted as a lookout and thereby aided and
abetted Sylvester’s cocaine possession, as charged in Count
Eleven. See United States v. Barber, 429 F.2d 1394, 1397 n.4
(3d Cir. 1970) (“[T]he fact that an individual has served as a
lookout during the commission of a crime is a clear indication
of participation in the wrongdoing.”).11

IV.

Rawlins also argues that the District Court erred by
admitting certain packages of cocaine into evidence at trial. He
asserts that the government failed to establish a sufficient chain

10
Sylvester’s account was consistent with Donovan’s
testimony that Rawlins had acted as a lookout for him, and that
baggage handlers often acted as lookouts for each other in the
baggage room.
11
Rawlins’s Statement of Issues suggests a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence on Count Seven, but Rawlins
waived that issue by failing to develop it in the argument section
of his brief. Mitchell v. Celone, 389 F.3d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 2004).

18
of custody showing that those cocaine samples were the same
substances seized on the occasions described in the indictment.

Physical evidence must be authenticated before it is
admitted. Authenticity is elemental to relevance, for “evidence
cannot have a tendency to make the existence of a disputed fact
more or less likely if the evidence is not that which its proponent
claims[.]” United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370 (4th
Cir. 1992). “The requirement of authentication . . . is satisfied
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).
“Establishing a chain of custody is one form of proof sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims.” United States v. Mendel, 746 F.2d 155, 166
(2d Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Howard-Arias, 679
F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1982) (“The chain of custody rule is but
a variation of the principle that real evidence must be
authenticated prior to its admission into evidence.”).

To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make
evidence admissible, the proponent “need only prove a rational
basis from which to conclude” that the evidence is what the
party claims it to be. Mendel, 746 F.2d at 167. In other words,
in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient
“evidence from which the trier [of fact] could reasonably believe
that an item still is what the [government] claims it to be.”
United States v. Mejia, 597 F.3d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(quoting 2 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence §

19
213 (6th ed. 2009)). This “burden is not a heavy one.” 5
Christopher B. Muller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence
§ 9:1 (3d ed. 2007).

We have long rejected the proposition that evidence may
only be admitted if a “complete and exclusive” chain of custody
is established. United States v. DeLarosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1068
(3d Cir. 1971). See also 2 Broun et al., supra, § 213 (explaining
that “a complete chain of custody need not always be proved”);
31 Charles Alan Wright & Victor Gold, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 7106 (1st ed.) (“It is usually unnecessary to
establish a perfect or unbroken chain of custody.”). “[S]erious”
gaps may render a chain of custody so deficient that exclusion
is required, Mejia, 597 F.3d at 1336, but in the ordinary case
gaps in the chain go to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. __,
129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 n.1 (2009) (quoting United States v. Lott,
854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988)). See also United States v.
Clark, 425 F.2d 827, 833 (3d Cir. 1970); Mejia, 597 F.3d at
1335; 5 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 9:10 (collecting cases).
Furthermore, a trial court’s ruling about the adequacy of a chain
of custody is afforded great deference. It may not be overturned
absent a “clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. Jackson,
649 F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1981).

Rawlins challenges the adequacy of the chain of custody
for packages of cocaine seized on three occasions: November 8,
2003 (the drug seizure that gave rise to Count Seven), February

20
21, 2004 (Count Ten), and March 10, 2004 (Count Eleven). We
conclude that the District Court’s decision to admit each of these
packages into evidence was not an abuse of discretion.

Gregory Reardon, a CBP Supervisor stationed in Newark,
New Jersey, testified that he set up and oversaw the November
8, 2003 enforcement operation (Count Seven). An X-ray scan
of all luggage emerging from Continental Flight 1902 revealed
one suitcase containing an anomalous-looking package.
Reardon grabbed that suitcase, and after observing a canine hit
on the bag, opened it. Inside he found a brown taped package
containing a white powdery substance that field-tested positive
for cocaine. He testified that he turned over to “the special
agents in ICE” both the package and the suitcase in which it was
discovered. ICE Special Agent Bradley Benwell testified that
the narcotics seized from Flight 1902 were turned over to him
(though he did not say by whom), and that they were transported
to the “main office” in Newark and placed in the Newark drug
evidence room. He identified Government Exhibit 64 as the
suitcase seized on November 8, but it does not appear that he
was asked to identify the drugs themselves. Later, Maureen
Craig, a DEA chemist stationed in New York City, testified that
she analyzed drugs seized in connection with Flight 1902 on
November 8, 2003. She testified that she “took the evidence out
from the main vault,” performed a series of tests, and
determined that the objects contained approximately four
kilograms of cocaine. She further testified that Government
Exhibits 70 and 71 were the same drug samples she had

21
analyzed.

Richard Peak, a CBP officer stationed at Cyril E. King
Airport, testified that he was the seized property custodian for
the drugs discovered on February 21, 2004 (Count Ten). He
stated that he took possession of a green suitcase containing
“some bricks of a substance” and placed both the suitcase and
the bricks in the seized property locker at the Federal Building.
He testified that the evidence had been “maintained in our
seized property locker . . . since that time.” Similarly, ICE
Special Agent Louis Penn testified that both the suitcase and the
drugs seized on February 21 were escorted to the seized property
room at the Federal Building. Enrique Pinero, a DEA chemist
stationed in Virginia, was later asked if he had performed tests
on bricks that were “seized from St. Thomas, Virgin Islands on
or about February 21st, 2004.” Pinero answered in the
affirmative. He testified that Government Exhibit 69 was the
“evidence” (i.e., cocaine) that he received at the lab, and that
after he received the samples, he kept them “in a lock up” until
he had a chance to perform his tests. He confirmed that the
bricks he tested contained over two kilograms of cocaine.

As for the drugs seized on March 10, 2004 (Count
Eleven), ICE agent Michael Perreaul testified that he was
present at Newark Airport as officers X-rayed the luggage from
Continental Flight 1902 from St. Thomas. He explained that
while this inspection was in progress, an inspector approached

22
him and handed him a bag containing two brick-shaped objects.
He testified that he removed the bricks, placed them in a bag,
and then signed the bricks over to Agent Benwell. Agent
Benwell confirmed that the drugs were turned over to him
(though again he did not say by whom), and testified that he
placed them in the Newark drug evidence room. Ramona
Montreuil, a DEA chemist stationed in New York City, testified
that she analyzed the evidence seized from Flight 1902 in March
2004. She stated that she “obtained the evidence and opened it,”
and after performing a series of tests, determined that the objects
tested contained just over two kilograms of cocaine. She
testified that Government Exhibits 72 and 73 were the drugs she
tested and the same substances seized in Newark on March 10,
2004.

Rawlins argues that the chain of custody of the drugs
seized each day was broken because there was no evidence
connecting the drugs that were placed in evidence lockers on
each occasion to the drugs that were received and tested by DEA
chemists. We agree. With respect to the cocaine seized on
November 8, DEA chemist Craig testified that she “took the
evidence out from the main vault,” but Craig was stationed in
New York City while Agent Benwell testified that he placed the
drugs in the Newark evidence room. It was never established
whether Craig retrieved the cocaine herself from Newark, or
whether those drugs were at some point transferred from
Newark to what Craig called the “main vault” in New York

23
City.12 Concerning the cocaine seized on February 21, there was
no explanation of how drugs placed in the evidence locker on St.
Thomas ended up in Pinero’s lab in Virginia. Finally, as to the
cocaine seized on March 10, there was only Montreuil’s
testimony that she “obtained” the evidence seized on that date,
“opened it,” and then tested it. Again, there was no explanation
of how a DEA chemist in New York City acquired evidence that
was initially stored in Newark. Montreuil testified that the drugs
she tested were the same drugs seized on March 10, 2004, but
she lacked the personal knowledge necessary to make that
assertion. The most she could say was that she tested a
substance; the substance was cocaine; and the sample introduced
at trial was the same one that she tested. The same is true of
Craig’s testimony that she tested the “samples seized in
connection with [Flight 1902] on or about November 8, 2003,”
and Pinero’s claim that he tested “bricks that were seized from
St. Thomas on or about February 21, 2004.”

Despite the foregoing gaps in the chain of evidence, we
cannot say that the District Court erred by admitting that

12
Furthermore, there is at least the possibility of a gap
between Reardon and Benwell. Reardon testified that he turned
the drugs over to unnamed ICE agents, while Benwell, an ICE
agent, testified that the drugs were turned over to him but he did
not say by whom. The exchange may well have been directly
from Reardon to Benwell, but the government hardly nailed this
down.

24
evidence at trial. Our conclusion is driven by two
considerations. The first is the deference we owe the District
Court in resolving disputes of this nature. We cannot overturn
its conclusion as to the sufficiency of the chain of custody
absent a “clear abuse of discretion.” Jackson, 649 F.2d at 973.
Here, none of the chains at issue was so deficient that there was
no “rational basis” for concluding that the evidence was what
the government claimed. Mendel, 746 F.2d at 167. The
testimony of government witnesses created a “reasonable
probability” that the cocaine packages seized on November 8,
February 21, and March 10 were the same materials tested by
DEA chemists and introduced at trial. Mejia, 597 F.3d at 1336.
Each chain could—and should—have been far stronger than it
was. But any weakness goes to the weight of the evidence, not
its admissibility.13 Clark, 425 F.2d at 833.

The second consideration is the presumption of regularity
in the handling of evidence by law enforcement. “Absent actual
proof of tampering, a trial court may presume regularity in
public officials’ handling of contraband.” Dent, 149 F.3d at 188.
See also United States v. King, 356 F.3d 774, 779 (7th Cir.

13
The adequacy of the chain is assessed in light of the
“nature of the article, the circumstances surrounding the
preservation and custody of it, and the likelihood of
intermeddlers tampering with it.” DeLarosa, 450 F.2d at 1068.
Rawlins does not explain how any of these factors weigh against
the District Court’s admissibility ruling.

25
2004) (applying “presumption of regularity when evidence is
within official custody”); 5 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 9:10
(citing cases). We employ the same presumption here. See, e.g.,
Dent, 149 F.3d at 188; Jackson, 649 F.2d at 973-74. No
allegation has been made, nor proof offered, of tampering with
any of the evidence at issue. Therefore, we presume that the
evidence placed in storage was properly transmitted to each of
the chemists who testified.14 The District Court did not err in
admitting it.

V.

We have considered the remainder of Rawlins’s
arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons
stated, the judgment will be affirmed.

14
Our reliance on this presumption should not be taken
as approval of the prosecutor’s slipshod handling of this issue at
trial.

26