United States v. Maynard

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 17, 2009 Decided August 6, 2010

No. 08-3030

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE

v.

LAWRENCE MAYNARD,
APPELLANT

Consolidated with 08-3034

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:05-cr-00386-ESH-10)

Sicilia C. Englert and Stephen C. Leckar, appointed by
the court, argued the causes for appellants. With them on the
briefs was Michael E. Lawlor.

David L. Sobel, Daniel I. Prywes, and Arthur B. Spitzer
were on the brief for amici curiae American Civil Liberties
Union of the National Capital Area and Electronic Frontier
Foundation in support of appellant Jones.
 2
Peter S. Smith, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause
for appellee. With him on the brief were Roy W. McLeese III,
John V. Geise, and Rachel C. Lieber, Assistant U.S.
Attorneys.

Before: GINSBURG, TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

I. Background 3
II. Analysis: Joint Issues 4
A. Wiretaps 5
B. Traffic Stop 8
C. Superseding Indictment 12
D. Multiple Conspiracies 13
E. Immunity 14
III. Analysis: Evidence Obtained from GPS Device 15
A. Was Use of GPS a Search? 16
1. Knotts is not controlling 17
2. Were Jones‘s locations exposed to the public? 21
a. Actually exposed? 22
(i). Precedent 23
(ii). Application 26
b. Constructively exposed? 26
(i). Precedent 27
(ii). Application 28
3. Was Jones‘s expectation of privacy reasonable? 31
4. Visual surveillance distinguished 34
B. Was the Search Reasonable Nonetheless? 38
C. Was the Error Harmless? 39
IV. Conclusion 41

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The appellants, Antoine Jones
and Lawrence Maynard, appeal their convictions after a joint
trial for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to
 3
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or
more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and
846. Maynard also challenges the sentence imposed by the
district court. Because the appellants‘ convictions arise from
the same underlying facts and they make several overlapping
arguments, we consolidated their appeals. For the reasons
that follow, we reverse Jones‘s and affirm Maynard‘s
convictions.

I. Background

Jones owned and Maynard managed the ―Levels‖
nightclub in the District of Columbia. In 2004 an FBI-
Metropolitan Police Department Safe Streets Task Force
began investigating the two for narcotics violations. The
investigation culminated in searches and arrests on October
24, 2005. We discuss that investigation and the drug
distribution operation it uncovered in greater detail where
relevant to the appellants‘ arguments on appeal.

On October 25 Jones and several alleged co-conspirators
were charged with, among other things, conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
cocaine base. Maynard, who was added as a defendant in
superseding indictments filed in March and June 2006, pled
guilty in June 2006.

In October 2006 Jones and a number of his co-defendants
went to trial. The jury acquitted the co-defendants on all
counts but one; it could not reach a verdict on the remaining
count, which was eventually dismissed. The jury acquitted
Jones on a number of counts but could not reach a verdict on
the conspiracy charge, as to which the court declared a
mistrial. Soon thereafter the district court allowed Maynard
to withdraw his guilty plea.
 4

In March 2007 the Government filed another superseding
indictment charging Jones, Maynard, and a few co-defendants
with a single count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess
with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and
50 or more grams of cocaine base. A joint trial of Jones and
Maynard began in November 2007 and ended in January
2008, when the jury found them both guilty.

II. Analysis: Joint Issues

Jones and Maynard jointly argue the district court erred
in (1) admitting evidence gleaned from wiretaps of their
phones, (2) admitting evidence arising from a search incident
to a traffic stop, (3) denying their motion to dismiss the
indictment as invalid because it was handed down by a grand
jury that had expired, (4) declining to instruct the jury on their
theory that the evidence at trial suggested multiple
conspiracies, and (5) declining to grant immunity to several
defense witnesses who invoked the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and refused to testify. Jones
also argues the court erred in admitting evidence acquired by
the warrantless use of a Global Positioning System (GPS)
device to track his movements continuously for a month.*
After concluding none of the joint issues warrants reversal,
we turn to Jones‘s individual argument.
*
Maynard waves at one individual argument, to wit, that ―the
district court erred in using acquitted conduct to calculate his
guideline range‖ but, in the same sentence, concedes his argument
―is foreclosed by‖ precedent, e.g., United States v. Dorcely, 454
F.3d 366 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (district court‘s consideration of prior
acquitted conduct did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States). He nonetheless ―raises this
issue to preserve his argument in anticipation of future changes in
the law and/or en banc review.‖ So be it.
 5

A. Wiretaps

Before their first trial Jones and his co-defendants moved
to suppress evidence taken from wiretaps on Jones‘s and
Maynard‘s phones. The police had warrants for the wiretaps,
but the defendants argued the issuing court abused its
discretion in approving the warrants because the applications
for the warrants did not satisfy the so-called ―necessity
requirement,‖ see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (―normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be
too dangerous‖); see also, e.g., United States v. Becton, 601
F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2010). They also moved for a
hearing, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978), into the credibility of one of the affidavits offered in
support of the warrant. The district court denied both
motions. 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 78–79, 81–83 (2006). Before
his second trial Jones moved the court to reconsider both
motions; Maynard adopted Jones‘s motions and made an
additional argument for a Franks hearing. The district court
held Jones‘s motion for reconsideration added nothing new
and denied it for the reasons the court had given before the
first trial. 511 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (2007). The court then
denied Maynard‘s separate motion for a Franks hearing. Id.
at 78. The appellants appeal the district court‘s denial of their
motions to suppress and for a Franks hearing.

As for their motions to suppress, the district court held
the applications for the warrants ―amply satisfie[d]‖ the
necessity requirement because they recounted the ordinary
investigative procedures that had been tried and explained
why wiretapping was necessary in order to ―ascertain the
extent and structure of the conspiracy.‖ 451 F. Supp. 2d at
83. We review the court‘s ―necessity determination‖ for
 6
abuse of discretion. United States v. Sobamowo, 892 F.2d 90,
93 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

The appellants do not directly challenge the reasoning of
the district court; rather they suggest sources of information to
which the police hypothetically might have turned in lieu of
the wiretaps, to wit, cooperating informants, controlled buys,
and further video surveillance. At best, the appellants suggest
investigative techniques that might have provided some of the
evidence needed, but they give us no reason to doubt the
district court‘s conclusion that ―[h]aving engaged in an
adequate range of investigative endeavors, the government
properly sought wiretap permission and was not required to
enumerate every technique or opportunity missed or
overlooked.‖ 451 F. Supp. 2d at 82 (quoting Sobamowo, 892
F.2d at 93).

The appellants also requested a hearing into the
credibility of the affidavit submitted by Special Agent Yanta
in support of the wiretap warrants. An affidavit offered in
support of a search warrant enjoys a ―presumption of
validity,‖ Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, but

where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary
showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a
hearing be held at the defendant‘s request.

Id. at 155–56. The substantial showing required under Franks
must be ―more than conclusory‖ and ―accompanied by an
offer of proof.‖ United States v. Gatson, 357 F.3d 77, 80
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Franks).
 7

The appellants argued Yanta intentionally or at least
recklessly both mischaracterized certain evidence and omitted
any mention in her affidavit of Holden, an informant whom
the appellants think might have assisted the investigation.
The district court denied the motion, holding the appellants
had satisfied neither the substantial showing nor the
materiality requirement for a Franks hearing. 451 F. Supp. 2d
at 78–79; 511 F. Supp. 2d at 77–78.

As we recently noted, ―[t]he circuits are split on the
question whether a district court‘s decision not to hold a
Franks hearing is reviewed under the clearly erroneous or de
novo standard of review,‖ and ―[w]e have not definitively
resolved the issue in this circuit.‖ United States v. Becton,
601 F.3d 588, 594 (2010) (internal quotation marks deleted).
We need not resolve the issue today because even proceeding
de novo we would agree with the district court: The appellants
did not make the requisite substantial preliminary showing
that Yanta, in her affidavit, intentionally or recklessly either
described the evidence in a misleading way or failed to
mention Holden. Lacking any probative evidence of Yanta‘s
scienter, the appellants argue the district court should have
inferred Yanta knew about Holden and intentionally failed to
mention him because his name must have ―flashed across the
Task Force‘s team computer screens.‖ This is speculation,
not a substantial showing, and no basis upon which to
question the ruling of the district court. See United States v.
Richardson, 861 F.2d 291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affidavit in
support of warrant not suspect under Franks where ―there has
been absolutely no showing [the affiant] made the statements
with scienter‖).
 8
B. Traffic Stop

In 2005 Officer Frederick Whitehead, of the Durham,
North Carolina Police Department, pulled over Jones‘s mini-
van for speeding. Because we consider the ―evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government,‖ Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 257 (1992), what follows is the
Officer‘s account of the incident.

Maynard was driving and one Gordon was asleep in the
passenger seat; Jones was not present. At the officer‘s request
Maynard walked to the rear of the vehicle. There, in response
to Whitehead‘s questioning, Maynard said he worked for a
nightclub in D.C. and was driving to South Carolina to pick
up a disc jockey and to bring him back for an event. When
asked about his passenger, Maynard claimed not to know
Gordon‘s last name or age. Whitehead then addressed
Gordon, who had awakened and whom he thought seemed
nervous, and asked him where he was going. Gordon told a
different story: He and Maynard were headed to Georgia in
order to meet relatives and some girls.

Whitehead then went to speak with his partner, who had
arrived in a separate car. After relating the suspicious conflict
in the stories he had been told, Whitehead called for a canine
unit and ran the usual checks on Maynard‘s license and
registration. He then returned to the rear of the van, where
Maynard was still standing, gave Maynard back his
identification, along with a warning citation, and told him he
was free to leave. By that time, the canine unit had arrived on
scene but remained in their vehicle. Maynard moved toward
the front of the van and, as he reached to open the driver‘s-
side door, Whitehead called out ―do you mind if I ask you a
few additional questions?‖ Maynard turned around and
walked back toward Whitehead, who then asked him if he
 9
was transporting any large sums of money, illegal weapons,
or explosives. Maynard ―looked scared,‖ said nothing, closed
his eyes, and held his breath. He then looked at the rear of the
van, told Whitehead he had a cooler he had meant to put some
ice in, and reached toward the rear latch. Whitehead said not
to open the door and asked Maynard if he would consent to a
search; when Maynard said ―yes,‖ Whitehead frisked
Maynard for weapons, asked Gordon to step out of the
vehicle, frisked him for weapons, and then gave the canine
unit the go-ahead. The dog alerted while sniffing around the
car, and the ensuing search of the van turned up $69,000 in
cash.

Before trial the appellants moved unsuccessfully to
suppress evidence from the traffic stop, arguing, as they do
now, that by extending the traffic stop after giving Maynard
his written warning the police (1) unreasonably seized
Maynard, see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407–08
(2005) (―A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in
issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if
it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to
complete that mission‖), and (2) unreasonably searched the
van, all in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. The district court held the
extended stop was not a seizure because Maynard was free to
leave and, if it was a seizure, then it was lawful because it was
supported by reasonable suspicion. As for the search of the
van, the district court held the canine sniff was not a search
and, once the canine alerted, the police had probable cause to
search the vehicle. ―We consider a district court‘s legal
rulings on a suppression motion de novo and review its factual
findings for clear error giving due weight to inferences drawn
from those facts and its determination of witness credibility.‖
United States v. Holmes, 505 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks deleted).
 10

In determining whether a person has been seized within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, ―the appropriate
inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to
decline the officers‘ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.‖ Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
This inquiry ―tak[es] into account all of the circumstances
surrounding the encounter,‖ id., in the light of which we ask
―not whether the citizen [in this case] perceived that he was
being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the
officer‘s words and actions would have conveyed that
[message] to a reasonable person,‖ California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991). So it is that ―[a] stop or seizure
takes place only when the officer, by means of physical force
or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of
a citizen.‖ United States v. Jones, 584 F.3d 1083, 1086 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also David
K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth
Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
51, 60 (2009) (―The Court has declined to find seizures based
on mere interaction with law enforcement without a showing
of some degree of outward coercion‖). Whether a seizure has
taken place ―is a legal conclusion that this court reviews de
novo.‖ United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1086 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).

The appellants argue Maynard was seized because, when
Officer Whitehead told Maynard he was free to go, he ―had
already decided that he was going to search the van ....
Whitehead had no intention of letting him go until after he
[had searched it].‖ This assertion, even if true, has no bearing
upon whether a reasonable person would have felt free to
decline Whitehead‘s request. That Maynard seemed nervous
when Whitehead asked him whether he was carrying any
contraband or large sums of money, which Maynard offers as
 11
further evidence he was ―under duress,‖ is irrelevant for the
same reason.

We agree with the district court that, considering all the
circumstances surrounding the stop, a reasonable person in
Maynard‘s position would have felt free to decline
Whitehead‘s request that he answer ―a few additional
questions.‖ See United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 67 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (―police-citizen communications which take place
under circumstances in which the citizen‘s ‗freedom to walk
away‘ is not limited by anything other than his desire to
cooperate do not amount to ‗seizures‘ of the person‖).
Whitehead had already returned Maynard‘s license and
registration and told him he was free to go. Although there
were by that time three police cars (two of which were
unmarked) on the scene, Whitehead‘s words and actions
unambiguously conveyed to Maynard his detention was at an
end. After that, Maynard returned to the front of the van — a
clear sign he thought he was free to go. By remaining behind
the vehicle as Maynard left, Whitehead further assured
Maynard he would not impede his leaving. Finally, Maynard
turned around and came back only when Whitehead re-
initiated the stop by asking him if he would answer a few
more questions. That Whitehead shouted the question might
in some circumstances turn it into a show of authority, but not
here; the two were standing some distance apart on the side of
a noisy interstate highway. In sum, the police did not seize
Maynard by asking him whether he would answer a few more
questions.

The appellants‘ brief might be read to argue the extension
of the stop, from the time Whitehead frisked Maynard until
the dog alerted, was a separate seizure. See United States v.
Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006) (dog sniff
―may be the product of an unconstitutional seizure [] if the
 12
traffic stop is unreasonably prolonged before the dog is
employed‖). If Maynard‘s and Gordon‘s inconsistent
statements, Maynard‘s claimed lack of knowledge about
Gordon, and Gordon‘s nervousness had not already created
―reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity [was]
afoot,‖ United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)
(internal quotation marks deleted), however, then surely the
addition of Maynard‘s agitated reaction to Whitehead‘s
renewed questioning did, see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 123 (2000) (―nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent
factor in determining reasonable suspicion‖).

The parties also dispute whether Maynard‘s consent to
the search of the van was voluntary and whether Jones has
standing to challenge that search. Those issues are mooted by
our holding the extension of the stop to ask Maynard a few
additional questions was not a seizure and any subsequent
extension of the stop leading up to the canine sniff was
supported by reasonable suspicion. The appellants do not
dispute the district court‘s determination that the police had
probable cause to search the van once the dog alerted.
Accordingly, we hold the district court properly admitted
evidence the police discovered by searching the van.

C. Superseding Indictment

The appellants argue the indictment returned June 27,
2006 was invalid because it was returned by a grand jury
whose term had expired. As the Government points out, the
validity of that indictment is irrelevant here because the
appellants were charged and tried pursuant to the superseding
indictment returned by a different grand jury on March 21,
2007. The appellants point to no infirmity in the relevant
indictment.
 13
D. Multiple Conspiracies

At trial the appellants asked the court to instruct the jury
that proof of multiple separate conspiracies is not proof of one
larger conspiracy. The district court denied that request,
which the appellants argue was reversible error under United
States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1996): ―To
convict, the jury must find appellants guilty of the conspiracy
charged in the indictment, not some other, separate
conspiracy‖; therefore, ―if record evidence supports the
existence of multiple conspiracies, the district court should ...
so instruct[] the jury.‖

The appellants argue the evidence at trial supports the
existence of ―[t]wo independent supply-side conspiracies.‖
The two purportedly separate conspiracies they instance,
however, each comprises the core conspiracy charged — that
of Maynard, Jones, and the same co-conspirators, to possess
and to distribute cocaine and cocaine base — differing only as
to the supplier of the drugs, as reflected in the following
illustration:

Appellants‘ view: Government‘s view:
Two conspiracies One conspiracy

Suppliers: X Y X Y

Distributors: Jones, Jones, Jones,
Maynard, Maynard, Maynard,
Co- Co- Co-
Conspirators Conspirators Conspirators
 14
Even if the evidence showed the charged conspiracy to
distribute drugs relied upon two different suppliers, and the
Government does not concede it did, that does not cleave in
two the single conspiracy to distribute the appellants were
charged with operating. As the appellants offer no other
reason to doubt the district court‘s conclusion, in rejecting the
proposed instruction, that ―[t]he defendants here and their
coconspirators [were] involved in a single overarching
conspiracy,‖ there was no error in the district court‘s refusal
to instruct the jury about multiple conspiracies.

E. Immunity

At trial, the appellants called a number of their co-
conspirators as witnesses, but the co-conspirators refused to
testify, asserting their right, under the Fifth Amendment, not
to be compelled to incriminate themselves. The appellants
then asked the district court, ―in its discretion, [to] adopt [the]
rationale and ... procedure‖ set forth in Carter v. United
States, 684 A.2d 331 (1996), where the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals addressed a situation in which

a defense witness possessing material, exculpatory and
non-cumulative evidence which is unobtainable from any
other source will invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination unless granted executive ―use‖
immunity.

Id. at 342. In Carter the court held that if the Government did
not ―submit to the court a reasonable basis for not affording
use immunity,‖ then the court would dismiss the indictment.
Id. at 343. The district court refused to follow Carter.

The appellants do not argue the district court‘s refusal to
follow Carter violated any right they had under any source of
 15
law. The closest they come is to say ―a strong case can be
made that [use immunity] is compelled ... by due process
considerations,‖ but they do not make any effort to show this
case presents the sort of ―extraordinary circumstances‖ in
which some courts have suggested the Government‘s failure
to grant use immunity might violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, see, e.g., United States v. Pinto, 850
F.2d 927, 935 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing three-part test used
to determine whether failure of Government to grant
immunity violates due process, including ―prosecutorial
overreaching‖); cf. United States v. Lugg, 892 F.2d 101, 104
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (reserving due process issue: ―[w]hatever it
takes to constitute a deprivation of a fair trial by the
prosecution‘s failure to exercise its broad discretion on
immunity grants, the present case does not present it‖).

Instead, their counsel told the district court:

I‘ll be straight. I‘ll be honest with the Court. I don‘t
believe that there‘s any case law in this jurisdiction or
another federal jurisdiction that would allow the Court to
do this. ... I think that the Court should, in its discretion,
adopt [the rule in Carter].

The appellants mistake our role in asking us ―to fashion[]‖ a
rule of the sort the district court declined to adopt. Absent a
well-founded claim they were deprived of due process, the
only question they may properly raise is whether the district
court abused its discretion, to which the answer is obviously
no.

III. Analysis: Evidence Obtained from GPS Device

Jones argues his conviction should be overturned because
the police violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition of
 16
―unreasonable searches‖ by tracking his movements 24 hours
a day for four weeks with a GPS device they had installed on
his Jeep without a valid warrant.* We consider first whether
that use of the device was a search and then, having
concluded it was, consider whether it was reasonable and
whether any error was harmless.

A. Was Use of GPS a Search?

For his part, Jones argues the use of the GPS device
violated his ―reasonable expectation of privacy,‖ United
States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring), and was therefore a search subject to the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Of
course, the Government agrees the Katz test applies here, but
it argues we need not consider whether Jones‘s expectation of
privacy was reasonable because that question was answered in
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), in which the
Supreme Court held the use of a beeper device to aid in
tracking a suspect to his drug lab was not a search. As
explained below, we hold Knotts does not govern this case
and the police action was a search because it defeated Jones‘s
reasonable expectation of privacy. We then turn to the
Government‘s claim our holding necessarily implicates
prolonged visual surveillance.

*
Although the Jeep was registered in the name of Jones‘s wife, the
Government notes ―Jones was the exclusive driver of the Jeep,‖ and
does not argue his non-ownership of the Jeep defeats Jones‘s
standing to object. We see no reason it should. See Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–49 & n.17 (1978) (whether defendant
may challenge police action as search depends upon his legitimate
expectation of privacy, not upon his legal relationship to the
property searched). We therefore join the district court and the
parties in referring to the Jeep as being Jones‘s. 451 F. Supp. 2d
71, 87 (2006).
 17

1. Knotts is not controlling

The Government argues this case falls squarely within
the holding in Knotts that ―[a] person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.‖ 460 U.S. at 281. In that case the police had planted
a beeper in a five-gallon container of chemicals before it was
purchased by one of Knotts‘s co-conspirators; monitoring the
progress of the car carrying the beeper, the police followed
the container as it was driven from the ―place of purchase, in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, to [Knotts‘s] secluded cabin near
Shell Lake, Wisconsin,‖ 460 U.S. at 277, a trip of about 100
miles. Because the co-conspirator, by driving on public
roads, ―voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look‖
his progress and route, he could not reasonably expect privacy
in ―the fact of his final destination.‖ Id. at 281.

The Court explicitly distinguished between the limited
information discovered by use of the beeper — movements
during a discrete journey — and more comprehensive or
sustained monitoring of the sort at issue in this case. Id. at
283 (noting ―limited use which the government made of the
signals from this particular beeper‖); see also id. at 284–85
(―nothing in this record indicates that the beeper signal was
received or relied upon after it had indicated that the
[container] had ended its automotive journey at rest on
respondent‘s premises in rural Wisconsin‖). Most important
for the present case, the Court specifically reserved the
question whether a warrant would be required in a case
involving ―twenty-four hour surveillance,‖ stating
 18
if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will
be time enough then to determine whether different
constitutional principles may be applicable.

Id. at 283–84.

Although the Government, focusing upon the term
―dragnet,‖ suggests Knotts reserved the Fourth Amendment
question that would be raised by mass surveillance, not the
question raised by prolonged surveillance of a single
individual, that is not what happened. In reserving the
―dragnet‖ question, the Court was not only addressing but in
part actually quoting the defendant‘s argument that, if a
warrant is not required, then prolonged ―twenty-four hour
surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible,
without judicial knowledge or supervision.‖ Id. at 283.* The

*
Indeed, the quoted section of the respondent‘s brief envisions a
case remarkably similar to the one before us:

We respectfully submit that the Court should remain mindful
that should it adopt the result maintained by the government,
twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country
will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision.
Without the limitations imposed by the warrant requirement
itself, and the terms of any warrant which is issued, any person
or residence could be monitored at any time and for any length
of time. Should a beeper be installed in a container of property
which is not contraband, as here, it would enable authorities to
determine a citizen‘s location at any time without knowing
whether his travels are for legitimate or illegitimate purposes,
should the container be moved. A beeper thus would turn a
person into a broadcaster of his own affairs and travels,
without his knowledge or consent, for as long as the
government may wish to use him where no warrant places a
limit on surveillance. To allow warrantless beeper monitoring,
 19
Court avoided the question whether prolonged ―twenty-four
hour surveillance‖ was a search by limiting its holding to the
facts of the case before it, as to which it stated ―the reality
hardly suggests abuse.‖ Id. at 283 (internal quotation marks
deleted).

In short, Knotts held only that ―[a] person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another,‖ id. at 281, not that such a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements whatsoever, world
without end, as the Government would have it. The Fifth
Circuit likewise has recognized the limited scope of the
holding in Knotts, see United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514,
1518 n.4 (1984) (―As did the Supreme Court in Knotts, we
pretermit any ruling on worst-case situations that may involve
persistent, extended, or unlimited violations of a warrant‘s
terms‖), as has the New York Court of Appeals, see People v.
Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 440–44 (2009) (Knotts involved a
―single trip‖ and Court ―pointedly acknowledged and reserved
for another day the question of whether a Fourth Amendment
issue would be posed if ‗twenty-four hour surveillance of any
citizen of this country [were] possible‘‖). See also Renee
McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology
and the Fourth Amendment, 419 UCLA L. Rev. 409, 457
(2007) (―According to the [Supreme] Court, its decision [in
Knotts] should not be read to sanction ‗twenty-four hour
surveillance of any citizen of this country.‘‖ (quoting Knotts,
460 U.S. at 284)).

particularly under the standard urged by the government here
(―reasonable suspicion‖), would allow virtually limitless
intrusion into the affairs of private citizens.

Br. of Resp. at 9–10 (No. 81-1802).
 20
Two circuits, relying upon Knotts, have held the use of a
GPS tracking device to monitor an individual‘s movements in
his vehicle over a prolonged period is not a search, United
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007), but in
neither case did the appellant argue that Knotts by its terms
does not control whether prolonged surveillance is a search,
as Jones argues here. Indeed, in Garcia the appellant
explicitly conceded the point. Br. of Appellant at 22 (No. 06-
2741) (―Garcia does not contend that he has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the movements of his vehicle while
equipped with the GPS tracking device as it made its way
through public thoroughfares. Knotts. His challenge rests
solely with whether the warrantless installation of the GPS
device, in and of itself, violates the Fourth Amendment.‖).
Thus prompted, the Seventh Circuit read Knotts as blessing all
―tracking of a vehicle on public streets‖ and addressed only
―whether installing the device in the vehicle converted the
subsequent tracking into a search.‖ Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996.
The court viewed use of a GPS device as being more akin to
hypothetical practices it assumed are not searches, such as
tracking a car ―by means of cameras mounted on lampposts or
satellite imaging,‖ than it is to practices the Supreme Court
has held are searches, such as attaching a listening device to a
person‘s phone. Id. at 997. For that reason it held installation
of the GPS device was not a search. Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit perceived no distinction between short- and long-term
surveillance; it noted the appellant had ―acknowledged‖
Knotts controlled the case and addressed only whether Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), in which the Court held
the use of a thermal imaging device to detect the temperature
inside a home defeats the occupant‘s reasonable expectation
of privacy, had ―heavily modified the Fourth Amendment
analysis.‖ Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
 21
In a third related case the Eighth Circuit held the use of a
GPS device to track a truck used by a drug trafficking
operation was not a search. United States v. Marquez, 605
F.3d 604 (2010). After holding the appellant had no standing
to challenge the use of the GPS device, the court went on to
state in the alternative:

Even if Acosta had standing, we would find no error. ...
[W]hen police have reasonable suspicion that a particular
vehicle is transporting drugs, a warrant is not required
when, while the vehicle is parked in a public place, they
install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a
reasonable period of time.

Id. at 609–10.

In each of these three cases the court expressly reserved
the issue it seems to have thought the Supreme Court had
reserved in Knotts, to wit, whether ―wholesale‖ or ―mass‖
electronic surveillance of many individuals requires a warrant.
Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216
n.2; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996. As we have explained, in
Knotts the Court actually reserved the issue of prolonged
surveillance. That issue is squarely presented in this case.
Here the police used the GPS device not to track Jones‘s
―movements from one place to another,‖ Knotts, 460 U.S. at
281, but rather to track Jones‘s movements 24 hours a day for
28 days as he moved among scores of places, thereby
discovering the totality and pattern of his movements from
place to place to place.

2. Were Jones‘s locations exposed to the public?

As the Supreme Court observed in Kyllo, the ―Katz test
— whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that
 22
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable — has often
been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and
unpredictable.‖ 533 U.S. at 34. Indeed, the Court has
invoked various and varying considerations in applying the
test. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987)
(―We have no talisman that determines in all cases those
privacy expectation that society is prepared to accept as
reasonable‖) (O‘Connor, J., plurality opinion); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (―legitimation of
expectations of privacy must have a source outside the Fourth
Amendment,‖ such as ―understandings that are recognized or
permitted by society‖). This much is clear, however:
Whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable depends in
large part upon whether that expectation relates to information
that has been ―expose[d] to the public,‖ Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.

Two considerations persuade us the information the
police discovered in this case — the totality of Jones‘s
movements over the course of a month — was not exposed to
the public: First, unlike one‘s movements during a single
journey, the whole of one‘s movements over the course of a
month is not actually exposed to the public because the
likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is
effectively nil. Second, the whole of one‘s movements is not
exposed constructively even though each individual
movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more —
sometimes a great deal more — than does the sum of its parts.

a. Actually exposed?

The holding in Knotts flowed naturally from the
reasoning in Katz: ―What a person knowingly exposes to the
public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,‖
389 U.S. at 351. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82 (movements
observed by police were ―voluntarily conveyed to anyone
 23
who wanted to look‖). The Government argues the same
reasoning applies here as well. We first consider the
precedent governing our analysis of whether the subject of a
purported search has been exposed to the public, then hold the
information the police discovered using the GPS device was
not so exposed.

(i). Precedent

The Government argues Jones‘s movements over the
course of a month were actually exposed to the public because
the police lawfully could have followed Jones everywhere he
went on public roads over the course of a month. The
Government implicitly poses the wrong question, however.

In considering whether something is ―exposed‖ to the
public as that term was used in Katz we ask not what another
person can physically and may lawfully do but rather what a
reasonable person expects another might actually do. See
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (―It is
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the
side of a public street are readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the
public‖); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 214 (1986)
(―in an age where private and commercial flight in the public
airways is routine,‖ defendant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in location that ―[a]ny member of the
public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have
seen‖); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (―Here, the
inspection was made from a helicopter, but as is the case with
fixed-wing planes, ‗private and commercial flight [by
helicopter] in the public airways is routine‘ in this country,
and there is no indication that such flights are unheard of in
Pasco County, Florida‖ (quoting Ciraolo)). Indeed, in Riley,
 24
Justice O‘Connor, whose concurrence was necessary to the
judgment, pointed out:

Ciraolo‘s expectation of privacy was unreasonable not
because the airplane was operating where it had a ―right
to be,‖ but because public air travel at 1,000 feet is a
sufficiently routine part of modern life that it is
unreasonable for persons on the ground to expect that
their curtilage will not be observed from the air at
that altitude.

....

If the public rarely, if ever, travels overhead at such
altitudes, the observation cannot be said to be from a
vantage point generally used by the public and Riley
cannot be said to have ―knowingly expose[d]‖ his
greenhouse to public view.

488 U.S. at 453, 455; see also id. at 467 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (explaining five justices agreed ―the
reasonableness of Riley‘s expectation depends, in large
measure, on the frequency of nonpolice helicopter flights at
an altitude of 400 feet‖).

The Supreme Court re-affirmed this approach in Bond v.
United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). There a passenger on a
bus traveling to Arkansas from California had placed his soft
luggage in the overhead storage area above his seat. During a
routine stop at an off-border immigration checkpoint in Sierra
Blanca, Texas, a Border Patrol agent squeezed the luggage in
order to determine whether it contained drugs and thus
detected a brick of what turned out to be methamphetamine.
The defendant argued the agent had defeated his reasonable
expectation of privacy, and the Government argued his
 25
expectation his bag would not be squeezed was unreasonable
because he had exposed it to the public. The Court
responded:

[A] bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be
handled. He does not expect that other passengers or bus
employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an
exploratory manner. But this is exactly what the agent
did here. We therefore hold that the agent‘s physical
manipulation of petitioner‘s bag violated the Fourth
Amendment.

Id. at 338–39. The Court focused not upon what other
passengers could have done or what a bus company employee
might have done, but rather upon what a reasonable bus
passenger expects others he may encounter, i.e., fellow
passengers or bus company employees, might actually do. A
similar focus can be seen in Kyllo, in which the Court held
use of a thermal imaging device defeats the subject‘s
reasonable expectation of privacy, ―at least where ... the
technology in question is not in general public use.‖ 533 U.S.
at 34.

The Government cites as authority to the contrary our
statement in United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 759
(2000), that ―[t]he decisive issue ... is not what the officers
saw but what they could have seen.‖ When read in context,
however, this snippet too supports the view that whether
something is ―expose[d] to the public,‖ Katz, 389 U.S. at 351,
depends not upon the theoretical possibility, but upon the
actual likelihood, of discovery by a stranger:

The decisive issue ... is not what the officers saw but
what they could have seen. At any time, the surveillance
vehicle could have pulled alongside of the taxi and the
 26
officers could have watched Gbemisola through its
window. Indeed, the taxi driver himself could have seen
the event simply by looking in his rear-view mirror or
turning around. As one cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy concerning an act performed
within the visual range of a complete stranger, the Fourth
Amendment‘s warrant requirement was not implicated.

225 F.3d at 759. In short, it was not at all unlikely Gbemisola
would be observed opening a package while seated in the rear
of a taxi, in plain view of the driver and perhaps of others.

(ii). Application

Applying the foregoing analysis to the present facts, we
hold the whole of a person‘s movements over the course of a
month is not actually exposed to the public because the
likelihood a stranger would observe all those movements is
not just remote, it is essentially nil. It is one thing for a
passerby to observe or even to follow someone during a single
journey as he goes to the market or returns home from work.
It is another thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the
scent again the next day and the day after that, week in and
week out, dogging his prey until he has identified all the
places, people, amusements, and chores that make up that
person‘s hitherto private routine.

b. Constructively exposed?

The Government does not separately raise, but we would
be remiss if we did not address, the possibility that although
the whole of Jones‘s movements during the month for which
the police monitored him was not actually exposed to the
public, it was constructively exposed because each of his
individual movements during that time was itself in public
 27
view. When it comes to privacy, however, precedent suggests
that the whole may be more revealing than the parts.
Applying that precedent to the circumstances of this case, we
hold the information the police discovered using the GPS
device was not constructively exposed.

(i). Precedent

The Supreme Court addressed the distinction between a
whole and the sum of its parts in United States Department of
Justice v. National Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749
(1989), which arose not under the Fourth Amendment but
under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. There
the respondents had requested, pursuant to the FOIA, that the
FBI disclose rap sheets compiling the criminal records of
certain named persons. Although the ―individual events in
those summaries [were] matters of public record,‖ the Court
upheld the FBI‘s invocation of the privacy exception to the
FOIA, holding the subjects had a privacy interest in the
aggregated ―whole‖ distinct from their interest in the ―bits of
information‖ of which it was composed. Id. at 764.* Most
relevant to the Fourth Amendment, the Court said disclosure
of a person‘s rap sheet ―could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.‖ Id.

The Court implicitly recognized the distinction between
the whole and the sum of the parts in the Fourth Amendment
case of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). There, in
holding the use of a pen register to record all the numbers
*
The colloquialism that ―the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts‖ is not quite correct. ―It is more correct to say that the whole
is something different than the sum of its parts.‖ Kurt Koffka,
Principles of Gestalt Psychology 176 (1935). That is what the
Court was saying in Reporters Committee and what we mean to
convey throughout this opinion.
 28
dialed from a person‘s phone was not a search, the Court
considered not just whether a reasonable person expects any
given number he dials to be exposed to the phone company
but also whether he expects all the numbers he dials to be
compiled in a list. Id. at 742–43 (―subscribers realize ... the
phone company has facilities for making permanent records
of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-
distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills‖; they ―typically
know that ... the phone company has facilities for recording‖
the numbers they dial). The Court explained that Smith could
not reasonably expect privacy in the list of numbers because
that list was composed of information that he had ―voluntarily
conveyed to [the company]‖ and that ―it had facilities for
recording and ... was free to record.‖ Id. at 745.

If, for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the
privacy interest in a whole could be no greater (or no
different) than the privacy interest in its constituent parts, then
the Supreme Court would have had no reason to consider at
length whether Smith could have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the list of numbers he had called. Indeed, Justice
Stewart dissented specifically because he thought the
difference was significant on the facts of that case. See id. at
747 (―such a list [of all the telephone numbers one called]
easily could reveal ... the most intimate details of a person‘s
life‖).

(ii). Application

The whole of one‘s movements over the course of a
month is not constructively exposed to the public because,
like a rap sheet, that whole reveals far more than the
individual movements it comprises. The difference is not one
of degree but of kind, for no single journey reveals the habits
and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the life
 29
and a way of life, nor the departure from a routine that, like
the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes story, may
reveal even more.

As with the ―mosaic theory‖ often invoked by the
Government in cases involving national security information,
―What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of
great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.‖
CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (internal quotation
marks deleted); see J. Roderick MacArthur Found. v. F.B.I.,
102 F.3d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Prolonged surveillance
reveals types of information not revealed by short-term
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he
does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of
information can each reveal more about a person than does
any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a
church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any
single visit, as does one‘s not visiting any of these places over
the course of a month. The sequence of a person‘s
movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a
gynecologist‘s office tells little about a woman, but that trip
followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store
tells a different story.* A person who knows all of another‘s

*
This case itself illustrates how the sequence of a person‘s
movements may reveal more than the individual movements of
which it is composed. Having tracked Jones‘s movements for a
month, the Government used the resulting pattern — not just the
location of a particular ―stash house‖ or Jones‘s movements on any
one trip or even day — as evidence of Jones‘s involvement in the
cocaine trafficking business. The pattern the Government would
document with the GPS data was central to its presentation of the
case, as the prosecutor made clear in his opening statement:

[T]he agents and investigators obtained an additional order
and that was to install a GPS. ... They had to figure out where
 30
travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a
heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an
outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of
particular individuals or political groups — and not just one
such fact about a person, but all such facts.

Other courts have recognized prolonged surveillance of a
person‘s movements may reveal an intimate picture of his life.
See Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 227–28 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (―Plaintiff‘s endless snooping constitutes tortious
invasion of privacy .... [he] has insinuated himself into the
very fabric of Mrs. Onassis‘ life‖) (aff’d in relevant part 487
F.2d 986, 994 & n.12 (2nd Cir. 1973) (if required to reach
privacy issue ―would be inclined to agree with‖ district
court‘s treatment)). Indeed, they have reached that conclusion
in cases involving prolonged GPS monitoring. See People v.
Weaver, 909 N.E. 2d 1194, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (Prolonged GPS
monitoring ―yields ... a highly detailed profile, not simply of
where we go, but by easy inference, of our associations —
political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few
— and of the pattern of our professional and avocational
pursuits‖); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003)
(en banc) (―In this age, vehicles are used to take people to a
vast number of places that can reveal preferences, alignments,
associations, personal ails and foibles. The GPS tracking
devices record all of these travels, and thus can provide a
detailed picture of one‘s life.‖).

is he going? When he says ten minutes, where is he going?
Again, the pattern developed. ... And I want to ... just show
you an example of how the pattern worked. ... The meetings
are short. But you will again notice the pattern you will see in
the coming weeks over and over again.

Tr. 11/15/07.
 31
A reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor
and retain a record of every time he drives his car, including
his origin, route, destination, and each place he stops and how
long he stays there; rather, he expects each of those
movements to remain ―disconnected and anonymous,‖ Nader
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 572 (1970) (Breitel, J.,
concurring). In this way the extended recordation of a
person‘s movements is, like the ―manipulation of a bus
passenger‘s carry-on‖ canvas bag in Bond, not what we
expect anyone to do, and it reveals more than we expect
anyone to know. 529 U.S. at 339.

3. Was Jones‘s expectation of privacy reasonable?

It does not apodictically follow that, because the
aggregation of Jones‘s movements over the course of a month
was not exposed to the public, his expectation of privacy in
those movements was reasonable; ―legitimation of
expectations of privacy must have a source outside the Fourth
Amendment,‖ such as ―understandings that are recognized or
permitted by society,‖ United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 123 n.22 (1984) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12).
So it is that, because the ―Congress has decided ... to treat the
interest in ‗privately‘ possessing cocaine as illegitimate,‖
―governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is
cocaine, and no other arguably ‗private‘ fact, compromises no
legitimate privacy interest.‖ Id. at 123.

The Government suggests Jones‘s expectation of privacy
in his movements was unreasonable because those
movements took place in his vehicle, on a public way, rather
than inside his home. That the police tracked Jones‘s
movements in his Jeep rather than in his home is certainly
relevant to the reasonableness of his expectation of privacy;
―in the sanctity of the home,‖ the Court has observed, ―all
 32
details are intimate details,‖ Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. A person
does not leave his privacy behind when he walks out his front
door, however. On the contrary, in Katz the Court clearly
stated ―what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.‖ 389 U.S. at 351. Or, as this court has said,
outside the home, the ―Fourth Amendment ... secur[es] for
each individual a private enclave, a ‗zone‘ bounded by the
individual‘s own reasonable expectations of privacy.‖
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. AT&T, 593 F.2d
1030, 1042–43 (1978).

Application of the test in Katz and its sequellae to the
facts of this case can lead to only one conclusion: Society
recognizes Jones‘s expectation of privacy in his movements
over the course of a month as reasonable, and the use of the
GPS device to monitor those movements defeated that
reasonable expectation. As we have discussed, prolonged
GPS monitoring reveals an intimate picture of the subject‘s
life that he expects no one to have — short perhaps of his
spouse. The intrusion such monitoring makes into the
subject‘s private affairs stands in stark contrast to the
relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts; indeed it exceeds
the intrusions occasioned by every police practice the
Supreme Court has deemed a search under Katz, such as a
urine test, see Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602 (1989) (urine test could ―reveal a host of private
medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she
is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic‖); use of an electronic
listening device to tap a payphone, Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (user
of telephone booth ―entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world‖);
inspection of a traveler‘s luggage, Bond, 529 U.S. at 338
(―travelers are particularly concerned about their carry-on
luggage‖); or use of a thermal imaging device to discover the
 33
temperature inside a home, Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (―In the
home, all details are intimate details‖).

We note without surprise, therefore, that the Legislature
of California, in making it unlawful for anyone but a law
enforcement agency to ―use an electronic tracking device to
determine the location or movement of a person,‖ specifically
declared ―electronic tracking of a person‘s location without
that person‘s knowledge violates that person‘s reasonable
expectation of privacy,‖ and implicitly but necessarily thereby
required a warrant for police use of a GPS, California Penal
Code section 637.7, Stats. 1998 c. 449 (S.B. 1667) § 2.
Several other states have enacted legislation imposing civil
and criminal penalties for the use of electronic tracking
devices and expressly requiring exclusion of evidence
produced by such a device unless obtained by the police
acting pursuant to a warrant. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§
77-23a-4, 77-23a-7, 77-23a-15.5; Minn Stat §§ 626A.37,
626A.35; Fla Stat §§ 934.06, 934.42; S.C. Code Ann § 17-30-
140; Okla. Stat, tit 13, §§ 176.6, 177.6; Haw. Rev. Stat §§
803-42, 803-44.7; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat § 5761.

Although perhaps not conclusive evidence of nationwide
―societal understandings,‖ Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 n.22,
these state laws are indicative that prolonged GPS monitoring
defeats an expectation of privacy that our society recognizes
as reasonable. So, too, are the considered judgments of every
court to which the issue has been squarely presented. See
Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d at 447 (―the installation and use of a GPS
device to monitor an individual‘s whereabouts requires a
warrant supported by probable cause‖); Jackson, 76 P.3d at
223-24 (under art. I, § 7 of Washington State Constitution,
which ―focuses on those privacy interests which citizens of
this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from
governmental trespass,‖ ―use of a GPS device on a private
 34
vehicle involves a search and seizure‖); cf. Commonwealth v.
Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369–70 (Ma. 2009) (installation
held a seizure). The federal circuits that have held use of a
GPS device is not a search were not alert to the distinction
drawn in Knotts between short-term and prolonged
surveillance,* but we have already explained our disagreement
on that collateral point.

4. Visual surveillance distinguished

The Government would have us abjure this conclusion on
the ground that ―[Jones‘s] argument logically would prohibit
even visual surveillance of persons or vehicles located in
public places and exposed to public view, which clearly is not
the law.‖ We have already explained why Jones‘s argument
does not ―logically ... prohibit‖ much visual surveillance:
Surveillance that reveals only what is already exposed to the

*
One federal district court and two state courts have also held use
of a GPS device is not per se a search, but none was presented with
the argument that prolonged use of a GPS device to track an
individual‘s movements is meaningfully different from short-term
surveillance. See United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425,
467–68 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (police used GPS device to track
defendant during one-day drive from Arizona to New York); State
v. Sveum, 269 N.W.2d 53, 59 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (―Sveum
implicitly concedes that ... using [a GPS device] to monitor public
travel does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. He contends,
however, that because the GPS device permitted the police to
monitor the location of his car while it was in his garage ... all of
the information obtained from the GPS device should have been
suppressed.‖); Stone v. State, 941 A.2d 1238 (Md. 2008) (holding,
in light of Knotts, that lower court ―did not abuse its discretion in
cutting short testimony‖ about use of GPS device; appellant did not
cite Knotts in his briefs or affirmatively argue use of device was a
search).
 35
public — such as a person‘s movements during a single
journey — is not a search. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.

Regarding visual surveillance so prolonged it reveals
information not exposed to the public, we note preliminarily
that the Government points to not a single actual example of
visual surveillance that will be affected by our holding the use
of the GPS in this case was a search. No doubt the reason is
that practical considerations prevent visual surveillance from
lasting very long.* Continuous human surveillance for a week
would require all the time and expense of several police
officers, while comparable photographic surveillance would
require a net of video cameras so dense and so widespread as
to catch a person‘s every movement, plus the manpower to
piece the photographs together. Of course, as this case and
some of the GPS cases in other courts illustrate, e.g., Weaver,
12 N.Y.3d at 447, 459 (holding use of GPS device to track
suspect for 65 days was search); Jackson, 76 P.3d 261–62
(holding use of GPS device to track suspect for two and one-
half weeks was search), prolonged GPS monitoring is not
similarly constrained. On the contrary, the marginal cost of
an additional day — or week, or month — of GPS monitoring
is effectively zero. Nor, apparently, is the fixed cost of
installing a GPS device significant; the Los Angeles Police

*
According to the former Chief of the LAPD, keeping a suspect
under ―constant and close surveillance‖ is ―not only more costly
than any police department can afford, but in the vast majority of
cases it is impossible.‖ W.H. Parker, Surveillance by Wiretap or
Dictograph: Threat or Protection?, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 727, 734
(1954). Or as one of the Special Agents involved in the
investigation of Jones testified at trial: ―Physical surveillance is
actually hard, you know. There‘s always chances of getting
spotted, you know, the same vehicle always around, so we decided
to use GPS technology.‖ Tr. 11/21/07 at 114.
 36
Department can now affix a GPS device to a passing car
simply by launching a GPS-enabled dart.* For these practical
reasons, and not by virtue of its sophistication or novelty, the
advent of GPS technology has occasioned a heretofore
unknown type of intrusion into an ordinarily and hitherto
private enclave.

The Government‘s argument — that our holding the use
of the GPS device was a search necessarily implicates
prolonged visual surveillance — fails even on its own terms.
That argument relies implicitly upon an assumption rejected
explicitly in Kyllo, to wit, that the means used to uncover
private information play no role in determining whether a
police action frustrates a person‘s reasonable expectation of
privacy; when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, means do
matter. See 533 U.S. at 35 n.2 (―The fact that equivalent
information could sometimes be obtained by other means
does not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth
Amendment‖). For example, the police may without a
warrant record one‘s conversations by planting an undercover
agent in one‘s midst, Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
429 (1963), but may not do the same by wiretapping one‘s
phone, even ―without any trespass,‖ Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967). Quite simply, in the former case one‘s reasonable

*
―The darts consist of a miniaturized GPS receiver, radio
transmitter, and battery embedded in a sticky compound material.
When fired at a vehicle, the compound adheres to the target, and
thereafter permits remote real-time tracking of the target from
police headquarters.‖ Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in
Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L.
Rev. 409, 419 (2007); see also Richard Winton, LAPD Pursues
High-Tech End to High-Speed Chases, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 2006, at
B1. GPS darts are used in exigent circumstances and for only as
long as it takes to interdict the subject driver without having to
engage in a high-speed chase on a public way.
 37
expectation of control over one‘s personal information would
not be defeated; in the latter it would be. See Reporters
Committee, 489 U.S. at 763 (―both the common law and the
literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual‘s
control of information concerning his or her person‖).

This case does not require us to, and therefore we do not,
decide whether a hypothetical instance of prolonged visual
surveillance would be a search subject to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. As the Supreme
Court said in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, ―Fourth
Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case,
not by extravagant generalizations. ‗We have never held that
potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute
searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.‘‖ 476 U.S.
227, 238 n.5 (1986) (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 712 (1984)); see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct.
2619, 2629 (2010) (―Prudence counsels caution before the
facts in the instant case are used to establish far-reaching
premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy
expectations‖). By the same token, we refuse to hold this
―search is not a search,‖ Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32, merely because
a contrary holding might at first blush seem to implicate a
different but intuitively permissible practice. See Nat’l Fed’n
of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (―Few legal issues in the Fourth Amendment
domain are so pure that they do not turn on any facts or
circumstances peculiar to the case‖). Instead, just as the
Supreme Court in Knotts reserved the lawfulness of prolonged
beeper surveillance, we reserve the lawfulness of prolonged
visual surveillance.
 38
B. Was the Search Reasonable Nonetheless?

A search conducted without a warrant is ―per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to
a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.‖ Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. Here, because the police
installed the GPS device on Jones‘s vehicle without a valid
warrant,* the Government argues the resulting search can be
upheld as a reasonable application of the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement. Under that exception,
―[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to
believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment ...
permits police to search the vehicle without more.‖
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).

As Jones points out, this argument is doubly off the mark.
First, the Government did not raise it below. See Bryant v.
Gates, 532 F.3d 888, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (argument not
made in district court is forfeited). Second, the automobile
exception permits the police to search a car without a warrant
if they have reason to believe it contains contraband; the
exception does not authorize them to install a tracking device
on a car without the approval of a neutral magistrate. See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979) (―Were the
individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every
time he entered his automobile, the security guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed‖).

*
The police had obtained a warrant to install the GPS device in
D.C. only, but it had expired before they installed it — which they
did in Maryland. When challenged in the district court, the
Government ―conceded ... the violations‖ of the court‘s order,
―confine[d] its arguments to the issue of whether or not a court
order was required[,] and assert[ed] that it was not.‖ Government‘s
Omnibus Response to Defendant‘s Legal Motions.
 39
C. Was the Error Harmless?

Finally, the Government argues in a terse and conclusory
few lines that the district court‘s error in admitting evidence
obtained by use of the GPS device was harmless. ―The
beneficiary of a constitutional error [must prove] beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.‖ Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

According to the Government, ―Overwhelming evidence
implicated [Jones] in the drug-distribution conspiracy.‖
Overwhelming evidence certainly showed there was a
conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute
drugs based out of 9508 Potomac Drive, Ft. Washington,
Maryland, where police found $850,000 in cash, 97 kilograms
of cocaine, and one kilogram of cocaine base. The evidence
linking Jones to that conspiracy, however, was not strong, let
alone overwhelming.

The Government points to no evidence of a drug
transaction in which Jones was involved, nor any evidence
that Jones ever possessed any drugs. Instead it relies upon (1)
the testimony of admitted participants in the conspiracy, one
of whom (Bermea) was at the Potomac Drive house when the
police arrived — to the effect that Jones was the ringleader of
the operation and frequented the Potomac Drive house, (2)
data showing Jones used his cell-phone frequently and often
called some of the conspirators, including one whose phone
was found at the Potomac Drive house, (3) leases in Jones‘s
name for other properties the Government alleged were used
in furtherance of the conspiracy, (4) currency seized from
Jones‘s Jeep and mini-van, and (5) physical and photographic
surveillance showing Jones visited the Potomac Drive house a
few times. Jones‘s defense responded to each type of
 40
evidence as follows: (1) the cooperating witnesses had cut
deals with the Government and were not credible, (2) the cell-
phone records and (5) visits to Potomac Drive showed only
that Jones knew the participants in the conspiracy, (3) Jones
leased the other properties for legitimate purposes and no
drugs were found there, (4) and his nightclub was a cash
business.

The GPS data were essential to the Government‘s case.
By combining them with Jones‘s cell-phone records the
Government was able to paint a picture of Jones‘s movements
that made credible the allegation that he was involved in drug
trafficking. In his closing statement the Government attorney
summarized this way the inference he was asking the jury to
draw:

[W]hen there is a conversation with Bermea and [Jones]
says, I‘m coming to see you, or I‘ll be there in ten
minutes, and within a while ... the GPS shows that that
vehicle is in Potomac Drive, how does that all fit
together? Well it fits together exactly as you know. That
the defendant is going to 9508 Potomac Drive, and
there‘s no reason anyone goes there other than drug
activity.

....

Then, that follows these series of conversations, day after
day, GPS reading after GPS reading, with the defendant
speaking with [Bermea] and then the vehicle coming to
Potomac Drive. ... You‘ll have the timeline. You‘ve got
the conversations. I won‘t go through them all.‖

Tr. 1/3/08 at 114–18. As mentioned earlier, the Government
had also stressed in its opening remarks, which would color
 41
the jury‘s understanding of the whole case, that the GPS data
would demonstrate Jones‘s involvement in the conspiracy.

To be sure, absent the GPS data a jury reasonably might
have inferred Jones was involved in the conspiracy. ―We are
not concerned here,‖ however, ―with whether there was
sufficient evidence on which [Jones] could have been
convicted without the evidence complained of‖; rather our
concern is with ―whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction.‖ Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86–87 (1963).
Without the GPS data the evidence that Jones was actually
involved in the conspiracy is so far from ―overwhelming‖ that
we are constrained to hold the Government has not carried its
burden of showing the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

IV. Conclusion

Maynard‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed because
neither any of the appellants‘ joint arguments nor Maynard‘s
individual argument warrants reversal. Jones‘s conviction is
reversed because it was obtained with evidence procured in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.

So ordered.