F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUL 7 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-8094
ROGER COWAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING
(D.C. No. 95-CR-0106-B)
Francis Leland Pico, Assistant United States Attorney (David D. Freudenthal, United
States Attorney, and David A. Kubichek, Assistant United States Attorney, with him on
the brief), Casper, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Daniel G. Blythe of Blythe & Steiner-Lewis, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, PORFILIO, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents the question of whether the intent to defraud is an element of
the crime of forging the signature of a federal judge in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 505.
Section 505 provides in relevant part: “Whoever forges the signature of any judge . . . of
any court of the United States, . . . for the purpose of authenticating any proceeding or
document, knowing such signature . . . to be false . . . shall be fined under this Title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” We hold that the intent to defraud is not
an element of the crime.
I.
A grand jury indicted Defendant-Appellant Roger Cowan with one count of
forging a federal judge’s signature in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 505. The parties presented
stipulated facts to the district court. Defendant then moved to dismiss the indictment
against him pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b), arguing that the stipulated facts did not
support the indictment’s criminal charge because the stipulated facts did not as a matter of
law establish the element of the intent to defraud. See United States v. Hall, 20 F.3d
1084, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 1994) (where the facts are uncontroverted, the district court may
examine the factual predicate for the indictment to determine whether the government as
a matter of law is incapable of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt). The district
court denied the motion to dismiss holding that the intent to defraud was not an element
of the § 505 charge. The district court held in the alternative that assuming the intent to
defraud was an element of the crime, the stipulated facts were sufficient to establish the
2
element before a jury. Thereafter, Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant
to Fed. R. Crim. P. (11)(a)(2), reserving his right to appeal the district court’s order
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo, United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, S. Ct. (1997), and affirm.
II.
Defendant was an attorney licensed to practice law in Wyoming. In the winter of
1991-1992, Carl Hostetter retained Defendant under a contingent fee arrangement to
pursue a personal injury claim against General Motors arising from an automobile
accident. During 1992 and 1993, Hostetter repeatedly contacted Defendant to determine
the status of his case. Defendant informed Hostetter that Defendant had filed suit when in
fact he had not. Upon further inquiries from Hostetter, Defendant informed him that
Defendant had submitted the case to mediation when in fact he had not.
Defendant prepared a document under the heading of the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming entitled “Mediation Decision-Hostetter v. G.M., et. al.”
The document purported to award Hostetter money damages for his injuries in the amount
of $696,000.00. At the end of the document, Defendant without authorization placed a
signature purporting to be that of United States District Judge Alan B. Johnson. At the
time Defendant prepared the document, he had yet to file suit on Hostetter’s behalf.
Nevertheless, Defendant informed Hostetter of the favorable “decision.” In January
3
1994, Hostetter obtained a copy of the “mediation decision” from Defendant.
To make a long story short, Hostetter eventually contacted the United States
District Court in Cheyenne, Wyoming, to check on the status of his lawsuit when his
award was not forthcoming. The court advised Hostetter that no such lawsuit existed.
The indictment against Defendant followed.
III.
Our starting point in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 505 is its language. See United
States v. Lira-Arrendondo, 38 F.3d 531, 533 (10th Cir. 1994). Absent a clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary, we will deem the plain language of a statute conclusive
and look no further into its meaning. See e.g., United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087,
1108 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1699 (1997); Prows v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 981 F.2d 466, 469 (10th Cir. 1992). Thus, we begin by noting that nowhere does
18 U.S.C. § 505 say the crime of forging a federal judge’s signature requires an intent to
defraud. Nothing in the text of the statute even suggests that Congress intended to
include the intent to defraud as an element of the crime. Cf. United States v. Wells, 117
S. Ct. 921, 927 (1997) (holding that materiality of falsehood is not an element of making
a false statement to a federally insured bank under 18 U.S.C. § 1014).1 To the contrary,
1
In Wells, the Supreme Court was confronted with a question of statutory
interpretation similar to the question before us. The Court refused to read into 18 U.S.C.
§ 1014 the element of materiality where a plain reading of the statute’s text did not
require it. In so holding, the Court rejected a long list of circuit court decisions holding
that materiality was an element of the crime. Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 924, 925 n.3.
4
§ 505's plain language only requires that a defendant charged under the statute knowingly
forge the signature of a federal judge “for the purpose of authenticating any proceeding or
document.” Although Congress did not define the term “forge” as used in § 505, the term
generally is defined as “[t]o fabricate, construct, or prepare one thing in imitation of
another thing, with the intention of substituting the false for the genuine . . . .” Black’s
Law Dictionary 650 (6th ed. 1990). In this case, Defendant prepared a court document
knowing it to be false, and placed the district judge’s signature thereon for the purpose of
making the document appear authentic to his client. The plain language of § 505 requires
nothing more.
Despite § 505's plain language, Defendant points out that the few circuit court
decisions addressing the issue have concluded that the intent to defraud is an element of
§ 505, which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a
conviction. In Levinson v. United States, 47 F.2d 470, 471 (6th Cir. 1931), the Sixth
Circuit opined that “Congress, regardless of its intent, by the use of the verb ‘forge,’
limited the application of the statute, in so far as cases of intended authentication are
concerned, to those in which the elements of common-law forgery enter.” Because the
common law crime of forgery required an intent to defraud, see generally Moskal v.
United States, 498 U.S. 103, 121-128 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), so did § 505. The
subsequent decisions in United States v. Bertrand, 596 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1979), and
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United States v. London, 714 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1983), followed Levinson’s rationale.2
In United States v. Barber, 39 F.3d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1994), we acknowledged
that “in other circuits . . . [§ 505] necessarily includes the element of intent to defraud.”
Without deciding whether the intent to defraud was an element of the crime under § 505,
we held that the district court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct the jury that
financial loss or gain was an element of the crime: “[D]efendant argues financial loss or
gain is a required element of 18 U.S.C. § 505; however, he has failed to demonstrate this
requirement. Section 505 itself does not mention financial gain or loss, nor does it even
mention ‘intent to defraud.’” Id. at 288 (emphasis added).
Admittedly, one principle of statutory construction is that “where a federal
criminal statute uses a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise
defining it, the general practice is to give that term its common-law meaning.” United
States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957). The Supreme Court has recognized, however,
that “Congress’ general purpose in enacting a law may prevail over this rule of statutory
construction” where the common law is inconsistent with that purpose. Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103, 117 (1990). This is so because principles of statutory construction
“‘exist to discover and not to direct the Congressional will.’” Huddleston v. United
2
In United States v. Dyer, 546 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1976), the Seventh Circuit
discussed but did not decide whether the intent to defraud is an element of § 505. Id. at
1316 (“If it were necessary to reach the issue, much could be said for the . . . view that to
prove the offense . . . the government was required to establish that the judge’s signature
was ‘forged,’ and that this meant it was necessary to prove the signer’s intent.”).
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States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974) (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537, 542 (1943)). Given the basic principle that a court should interpret statutory
language according to its terms, we must guard against interpretations which might defeat
the statute’s purpose as reflected by its text. The purpose of § 505 is to protect the
reputation and integrity of the federal courts, their official documents and proceedings,
rather than simply to outlaw a narrow category of fraud. The statute applies whenever
someone attempts to impugn this integrity by forging a federal judge’s signature onto a
document in order to make that document appear authentic. A forged signature on a
document which the forger intends to appear authentic is the only intent requirement of
§ 505.3 Our construction of § 505 is true to both its text and purpose.
A review of the texts of other related statutes lends support to our construction of
§ 505. See Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1995) (proper method of
analyzing a statutory term’s “context” to determine when a presumptive definition must
yield requires an examination of the text surrounding the word in question and the texts of
other related statutes). Chapter 25 of Title 18 of the United States Code proscribes
numerous acts pertaining to counterfeiting and forgery. Like § 505, the texts of other
statutes in Chapter 25 designed to protect the integrity of government functions do not
3
Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, the Government does not take the position
that the act of drawing a federal judge’s signature onto a document alone is a criminal act.
Such a reading of the statute would eliminate the express requirement that the forgery be
made “for the purpose of authenticating” the document.
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include the intent to defraud as an element of the crime of forgery. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 485
(prohibiting forgery of coins or bars in denominations greater than five cents); 18 U.S.C.
§ 490 (prohibiting forgery of one and five cent coins); 18 U.S.C. § 493 (prohibiting
forgery of writings issued by certain federal financial institutions); 18 U.S.C. § 496
(prohibiting forgery of documents pertaining to imports and customs duties); 18 U.S.C.
§ 497 (prohibiting forgery of letters patent); 18 U.S.C. § 498 (prohibiting forgery of
military certificates of discharge); 18 U.S.C. § 499 (prohibiting forgery of military
passes); 18 U.S.C. § 501 (prohibiting forgery of domestic postage stamps); 18 U.S.C.
§ 502 (prohibiting forgery of foreign postage stamps); 18 U.S.C. § 506 (prohibiting
forgery of government seals).
By comparison, Congress uses the phrase “with intent to defraud” no less than
twenty times in Chapter 25 to define the elements of a crime. In at least four of those
instances, Congress has used the term “forges” together with the phrase “with intent to
defraud.” E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 471 (prohibiting forgery of federal obligations “with intent to
defraud”); 18 U.S.C. § 478 (prohibiting forgery of foreign obligations “with intent to
defraud”); 18 U.S.C. § 482 (prohibiting forgery of foreign bank notes “with intent to
defraud”); 18 U.S.C. § 500 (prohibiting forgery of postal service money orders “with
intent to defraud”). We are satisfied that if Congress had intended to make the intent to
defraud an element of the crime of forging a federal judge’s signature under 18 U.S.C.
§ 505, it would have done so expressly.
8
Defendant attempts to show that Congress intended to include the intent to defraud
as an element of the crime under § 505 by tracing the history of the statute. The statute
first appeared as part of the Bankruptcy Act adopted in 1867. Much like its present day
counterpart, the statute originally read in relevant part: “[I]f any person shall forge the
signature of a judge . . . of the court, . . . for the purpose of authenticating any proceeding
or document, . . . knowing such signature . . . to be false . . . any such person shall be
guilty of a felony . . . .” Uniform System of Bankruptcy, ch. 176, § 46, 14 Stat. 517, 539
(1867).4 Defendant thus concludes that the statute was aimed at dishonest debtors and
necessarily includes as an element the intent to defraud for financial gain. No elucidating
legislative history, however, exists to support Defendant’s claim and without more we are
hesitant to stray from the plain language of the statute which notably does not limit the
statute’s effect to bankruptcy actions or require the intent to defraud. In reaching this
conclusion, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition in Hubbard v. United
States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (1995) (internal quotations omitted):
Although the historical evolution of a statute--based on decisions by the
entire Congress--should not be discounted . . . a historical analysis normally
provides less guidance to a statute’s meaning than its final text. In the
ordinary case, absent any indication that doing so would frustrate
Congress’s clear intention or yield patent absurdity, our obligation is to
apply the statute as Congress wrote it.
4
Congress subsequently reenacted and recodified the statute as part of the federal
penal code with only minor changes on four occasions. See Rev. Stat. § 5419 (1877); 35
Stat. 1112 (1909); 62 Stat. 714 (1948); 108 Stat. 2147 (1994).
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Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.5
5
Defendant also contends that the district court erred in sentencing him under the
obstruction of justice guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, rather than the fraud guidelines,
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1. To locate the guidelines that apply to a criminal charge, U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.2(a) directs the district court to “[d]etermine the offense guideline section in
Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) most applicable to the offense of conviction.”
Application Note 1 to § 1B1.2 refers to the Statutory Index. The Statutory Index for
18 U.S.C. § 505 refers to both § 2J1.2 and § 2F1.1. Where the index refers the court to
more than one guideline section, Application Note 1 to § 1B1.2 directs the court to
determine the applicable guidelines based upon the nature of the offense of conviction. In
this case, the district court properly rejected application of the fraud guidelines because
Defendant’s conduct was not designed to defraud Hostetter of any property. Rather,
Defendant’s deceit in forging Judge Johnson’s signature jeopardized Hostetter’s right to
have his legal claims heard, and thus is more properly akin to an obstruction of justice.
10