Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Company

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 9 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH C. NIELSEN, individually
and on behalf of all similarly situated
shareholders of Moroni Feed
Company,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

MORONI FEED COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation; TIM BLACKHAM,
Individually and as Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Moroni Feed
No. 97-4118
Company; DAVID BAILEY,
individually and as President of
Moroni Feed Company; CAROL
BLAIN, individually; FRANK COOK,
individually and as Vice President of
Moroni Feed Company; BLAKE
DONALDSON, individually; and
PARRY OLSON, individually and as a
member of the Board of Directors of
Moroni Feed Company,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. 2:95CV 0910S)

David L. Barclay and Lynn S. Davies, Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt
Lake City, Utah (Mark L. McCarty with them on the briefs) for Appellant-
Petitioner.
Stanley J. Preston, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah
(Michael R. Carlston and Camille N. Johnson with him on the briefs) for
Appellees-Respondents.

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, and EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

Joseph C. Nielsen (“Nielsen”) was terminated from his position as

President of the Moroni Feed Company (“Moroni Feed”) after repeated incidents

in which Nielsen was found, uninvited, in private homes in the local community,

including the homes of Moroni Feed employees. Nielsen sued Moroni Feed under

the ADA, claiming that the real reason for his termination was an erroneous

perception on behalf of his employer that he illegally used prescription pain-

killing drugs and that he was addicted to such drugs. He also sued Moroni Feed

under various state causes of action. The district court granted Moroni Feed’s

motion for summary judgment and then dismissed Nielsen’s state claims for lack

of jurisdiction. Nielsen now appeals. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Moroni Feed is a farming cooperative whose membership consists mainly

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of turkey growers operating in Sanpete County, Utah. Nielsen began his

employment with Moroni Feed in 1970 and served as President of the co-op for

the ten years prior to his termination in 1995. For many years prior to the events

that led up to his termination, Nielsen had been taking prescription pain-killing

medication as a result of a number of chronic ailments, including arthritis, back

pain, shingles, Barrett’s esophagus, and others.

In September, 1994, Moroni Feed received a report that Nielsen was found

to have entered the home of Board Member Parry Olson (“Olson”) without

permission. This was the second time Nielsen had entered that particular home

without permission, both times on a Sunday morning, when the Olson family

regularly attended church. The Chairman of the Board of Moroni Feed, Tim

Blackham (“Blackham”), testified in his deposition that he discussed these

incidents with Nielsen and requested that Nielsen cease entering homes uninvited.

According to Blackham, Nielsen promised that it would never happen again. 1 On

the morning of March 27, 1995, Nielsen was found, uninvited, in the home of

Moroni Feed employee Carol Blain (“Blain”) by the Blains’ daughter, who was

home alone and still in her pajamas. A criminal trespass complaint was filed

1
Nielsen claims that he has no recollection of this request by Blackham,
and further asserts that even if the request was made there was no indication made
to him that failure to honor the request would result in disciplinary action or
termination.

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against Nielsen as a result of that entry. 2 By the time of Nielsen’s ultimate

termination, Moroni Feed had received a total of eight reports of Nielsen’s

unauthorized entry into private homes in the Sanpete County area. 3

Following the incident at the Blain home, the Moroni Feed Board of

Directors met to discuss the situation. Olson told the Board that Nielsen had

confided in him that Nielsen had a “drug problem.” 4 Some members of the Board

subsequently met with a psychologist to discuss Nielsen’s behavior; at this

meeting members of the Board indicated that they perceived Nielsen to be

suffering from a drug problem that was interfering with Nielsen’s performance of

his duties as President of the company. Board Member David Bailey (“Bailey”)

confided in co-op member Doug Neeley (“Neeley”) that he was actively seeking

2
Nielsen claims that because he entered into a nolo contendere agreement
regarding that entry, evidence of that charge should not have been considered by
the district court at summary judgment. While we agree that evidence of a nolo
contendere plea is not admissible as evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 410, it is not
the plea, but rather the charge by the Blain family of unwarranted entry that was
relevant to the issue of whether Nielsen was engaged in a pattern of behavior of
entering private homes without permission.
3
After Nielsen’s termination, Moroni Feed became aware of eleven more
such unauthorized entries by Nielsen into private homes. Nielsen appeals the
district court’s denial of a motion to strike portions of an affidavit recounting one
of these incidents (the second entry of Mary Gibson’s home) as “irrelevant and
hearsay.” We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling. See
Duffee v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co. , 91 F.3d 1410, 1411 (10th Cir. 1996)
(evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion).
4
The reference to drugs was a reference to prescription painkillers.
Nielsen denies that he ever told Olson that he had a drug problem.

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Nielsen’s ouster due to Nielsen’s deficient performance as President. From their

conversation, Neeley received the impression that Nielsen had a drug problem,

although Bailey did not explicitly say so.

In his affidavit, Nielsen stated that members of the Board told Nielsen that

they believed that he had a drug problem, that they believed he was going into

homes to steal drugs, and that the problem was set to be discussed at an upcoming

Board meeting. Ultimately, the Board decided to make Bailey acting President.

Upon learning the news, Nielsen registered his displeasure, and the Board

suspended its decision. Nielsen then met with the Board to discuss the situation,

at which time the Board indicated to Nielsen that its decision was based upon

Nielsen’s unauthorized entry into private homes. The Board neither confirmed

nor denied that its decision was based upon a perceived drug problem, but it

requested that Nielsen be admitted to Dayspring, a drug treatment center, for

evaluation. Nielsen agreed. Nielsen’s discharge report from Dayspring indicates

that he had been admitted “for evaluation of a possible chemical dependency

problem . . . . It was felt by his company that he was going into these homes to

steal drugs, because he had a drug problem.” After three days of evaluation, the

Dayspring staff determined that Nielsen was not chemically dependent, and

Nielsen was discharged. The Moroni Feed Board of Directors was aware of this

diagnosis.

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 On April 17, Nielsen returned to Moroni Feed, reported his experiences at

Dayspring to the Board, and was instructed to “get back to work.” However, the

next day Blackham terminated Nielsen, informing Nielsen that he was taking this

action because Nielsen had lost the trust of the Board, the managers, and the

membership of the co-op “through his conduct of going into people’s homes in an

inappropriate fashion.” The Board ratified Blackham’s termination of Nielsen.

Nielsen simultaneously filed disability-based discrimination claims with the

EEOC and the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Division. After receiving a right-to-sue

letter from the EEOC, Nielsen filed suit in federal district court, claiming

discrimination in employment on the basis of a perceived disability, in violation

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Utah Anti-

Discriminatory Act. Nielsen also brought a myriad of other state-law claims,

including wrongful termination, breach of contract, defamation, negligence,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and others. Nielsen named as

defendants Moroni Feed as well as six Moroni Feed employees, including

Blackham, Bailey, Blain, and Olson. 5

5
We do not reach the question of whether persons can be sued in their
individual capacities under the ADA. See Land v. Midwest Office Tech., Inc.,
979 F. Supp. 1344, 1348 (D. Kan. 1997) (noting that Tenth Circuit has never
ruled on this exact question but listing cases from other courts and concluding
that this circuit would probably not allow such suits under ADA without requisite
showing that defendant met statutory definition of “employer”).

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 During discovery Moroni Feed deposed Nielsen’s healthcare providers, and

in the process collected evidence tending to show that Nielsen obtained large

amounts of prescription painkillers from a number of different doctors, that in

doing so he may have falsely told some of those doctors that he was not currently

receiving painkillers from other sources, and that some of his treating physicians

were concerned that Nielsen might have a dependency on prescription painkillers.

At the close of discovery both parties moved for summary judgment. The district

court granted summary judgment to Moroni Feed on Nielsen’s ADA claim, on the

ground that Moroni Feed terminated Nielsen because of his home-entering

activity and not because of a disability, real or perceived. Because the ADA

claim was the sole source of federal court jurisdiction, the district court exercised

its discretion and dismissed all of Nielsen’s state law claims as well. Nielsen

appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Moroni Feed on his

ADA claim. 6

II. ANALYSIS

A. Law

The ADA provides:

6
Nielsen does not contest the district court’s decision to deny jurisdiction
over his state law claims based upon the court’s finding that Nielsen’s ADA claim
failed on summary judgment.

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 No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The statute defines the term “disability” as any of the

following:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

Id. § 12102(2). Thus, in passing the ADA, Congress intended to protect

individuals from employment discrimination by employers on the basis of an

actual or perceived disability, provided that the disability substantially limits or is

perceived to limit substantially a major life activity.

While it is clear that the ADA protects against discrimination on the basis

of a disability or a perceived disability, this court and other circuit courts have

wrestled with the relationship between a disability and conduct related to that

disability. In Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1088 (10th Cir.

1997), this court held that ordinarily conduct caused by a qualifying disability is

protected by the ADA. Den Hartog involved a claim of mental illness, and in that

context we explained that “[t]o permit employers carte blanche to terminate

employees with mental disabilities on the basis of any abnormal behavior would

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largely nullify the ADA’s protection of the mentally disabled.” Id. at 1087.

We noted, however, that the ADA’s protection of disability-caused conduct

is subject to certain limitations found in the Act. First, a disabled employee “may

be held to any performance criteria that are job-related and consistent with

business necessity, so long as the disabled employee is given the opportunity to

meet such performance criteria by reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 1086 n.8

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)). Second, an employer need only make reasonable

accommodation, and need not make any accommodation that would constitute an

“undue hardship.” Id. at 1087 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). Third, an

employer may take action against an employee who poses a “direct threat” to the

health or safety of other individuals in the workplace. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §

12113(b)). Subject to these restrictions, which contemplate an employer dealing

with an employee’s conduct, we concluded that the ADA’s general anti-

discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), does not contemplate “a stark

dichotomy between ‘disability’ and ‘disability-caused misconduct,’” but rather

protects both. Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1088.

One area, however, where the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act 7 recognize a

7
The ADA defines disability in essentially the same terms as the
Rehabilitation Act. See Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir.
1994); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995). The
ADA enlarges the scope of the Rehabilitation Act to cover private employers, but
(continued...)

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dichotomy between a disability and disability-caused misconduct is where the

disability is related to alcoholism or illegal drug use. See Mararri v. WCI Steel,

Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1182-83 (6th Cir. 1997) (ADA); Despears v. Milwaukee

County, 63 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (ADA and Rehabilitation Act); Maddox

v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843, 847-48 (6th Cir. 1995) (Rehabilitation

Act); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (ADA);

Little v. F.B.I., 1 F.3d 255, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1993) (Rehabilitation Act); cf. Taub

v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1992) (addiction-related possession of heroin

for distribution too attenuated to be covered by Rehabilitation Act). Although

these cases often state in general terms that a disability is protected while

disability-caused misconduct is not, they all make this distinction in the context of

alcoholism or illegal drug use. See Mararri, 130 F.3d at 1182-83; Despears, 63

F.3d at 637; Maddox, 62 F.3d at 847-48; Collings, 63 F.3d at 832-33; Little, 1

F.3d at 258-59; Taub, 957 F.2d at 11. We too have noted such a distinction when

alcoholism or illegal drug use is involved. See Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1086

(ADA); Williams v. Widnall, 79 F.3d 1003, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996) (Rehabilitation

7
(...continued)
the legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress intended judicial
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act to be incorporated by reference when
interpreting the ADA. See Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943; Collings, 63 F.3d at 832 n.3;
see also Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843, 846 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995)
(“The ADA parallels the protection of the Rehabilitation Act . . . .”).

- 10 -
Act). 8

The reason this dichotomy exists in the context of alcoholism and illegal

drug use is simple: both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act clearly contemplate

removing from statutory protection unsatisfactory conduct caused by alcoholism

and illegal drug use. Specifically, the ADA states that a covered entity

may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who
is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or
job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees,
even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the
drug use or alcoholism of such employee . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4). The Rehabilitation Act similarly removes unsatisfactory

conduct caused by alcoholism from its purview, stating that the term “‘individual

with a disability’ . . . does not include any individual who is an alcoholic whose

current use of alcohol prevents such individual from performing the duties of the

job in question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol abuse,

would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.” 29 U.S.C. §

706(8)(C)(v); see also 42 Fed. Reg. 22,686 (1977) (Secretary of Department of

Only the Second Circuit has found otherwise, refusing to treat the status of
8

a disability differently from the conduct it causes in the context of alcoholism and
drug addiction. See Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511,
517 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that termination for absenteeism caused by
alcoholism violates the Rehabilitation Act); Cushing v. Moore, 970 F.2d 1103,
1108 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying Teahan in context of drug addiction). This court
has specifically disapproved of this aspect of Teahan. See Williams, 79 F.3d at
1007.

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Health, Education, and Welfare stating, in promulgating regulation under 29

U.S.C. § 706 of Rehabilitation Act, that an alcoholic or drug addict may be held

“to the same standard of performance and behavior” as others, and that, “while an

alcoholic or drug addict may not be denied services or disqualified from

employment solely because of his or her condition, the behavioral manifestations

of the condition may be taken into account in determining whether he or she is

qualified”).

Thus, unsatisfactory conduct caused by alcoholism and illegal drug use

does not receive protection under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. However,

the mere status of being an alcoholic or illegal drug user may merit such

protection. See Williams, 79 F.3d at 1005 (alcoholism covered under

Rehabilitation Act); Duda v. Board of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No.

84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1059 n.10 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing cases finding alcoholism

covered under ADA); Evans v. Federal Express Corp., 133 F.3d 137, 139 (1st Cir.

1998) (citing cases finding alcoholism covered under both statutes); Buckley v.

Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 127 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1997)

(alcoholism and drug addiction covered under ADA), vacated en banc on other

grounds, 155 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1998); Mararri, 130 F.3d 1180, 1180 (6th Cir.

1997) (alcoholism covered under ADA). “[B]ecause Congress only expressly

permitted employers to hold illegal drug users and alcoholics to the same

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objective standards of conduct as other employees even though their disability

causes misconduct or poor performance, Congress implicitly did not intend to

extend the same employer prerogative to employees with other disabilities.” Den

Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1086 (citing Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608,

616-17 (1980)) (emphasis original). As a result, we observe that the status-

conduct dichotomy exists only in the contexts of alcoholism and illegal drug use.

Outside of those contexts, as we held in Den Hartog, the ADA protects both the

disability and the conduct caused by the disability. See 129 F.3d at 1088. 9

Significantly, while the mere status of being an illegal drug user may

invoke protection under the ADA, that protection does not extend to those

“currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (excluding

from definition of “individual with a disability” individuals currently engaged in

illegal use of drugs); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3 App. (“Employers . . . may

discharge or deny employment to persons who illegally use drugs, on the basis of

such use, without fear of being held liable for discrimination.”); Shafer v. Preston

9
We note that in Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 665-
66 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment
against a plaintiff terminated on account of disability-caused misconduct not
related to alcoholism or drug addiction. However, as we observed in Den Hartog,
see 129 F.3d at 1087, the Siefken court decided the case on the ground of
proximate cause, holding that “but for” causation is not enough under the ADA.
The Seventh Circuit did not adopt the proposition that disability-caused
misconduct is never protected under the ADA.

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Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 1997) (“In light of the plain

statutory language, the relevant legislative history, and the EEOC’s interpretive

guidelines, we conclude that an employee illegally using drugs in the weeks and

months prior to discharge is a ‘current’ illegal user of drugs for purposes of the

ADA . . . .”). On the other hand, the ADA specifically exempts from the

exclusion of § 12114(a), and hence protects, an individual who

(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation
program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has
otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging
in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in such use; or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not
engaged in such use.

42 U.S.C. § 12114(b). 10

Because § 12114(b)(3) excludes erroneous perception of illegal drug use

from being disallowed as a disability under § 12114(a), the ADA protects

employees who are erroneously regarded as being current illegal drug users. See

Buckley, 127 F.3d at 273 (stating that committee reports make clear that “‘[i]n

removing protection for persons who currently use illegal drugs, the Committee

does not intend to affect coverage for individuals who have a past drug problem

10
Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act excludes current illegal drug users from
its coverage, see 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(i), but exempts from that exclusion
individuals satisfying criteria identical to 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b), see 29 U.S.C. §
706(8)(C)(ii).

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or are erroneously perceived as having a current drug problem’”) (quoting H.R.

Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 77 (1990)), vacated en banc on other grounds, 155 F.3d

150 (2d Cir. 1998); Collings, 63 F.3d at 832 (stating that the ADA

protects “individuals who are erroneously regarded as using drugs when in fact

they are not”) (citing § 12114(b)); Jones v. Corrections Corp. of America, 993 F.

Supp. 1384, 1386 (D. Kan. 1998) (“a plaintiff can establish that he is disabled

within the meaning of the ADA by showing that he was regarded as being

addicted to drugs, but was in fact not engaging in such drug use”); Herman v.

City of Allentown, 985 F. Supp. 569, 576, 578-79 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same);

Ackridge v. Comm’r, Dept. of Human Servs., Civ. A. No. 93-6783, 1994 WL

184421, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1994) (noting that ADA coverage extends to

employee who is erroneously regarded as engaging in illegal drug use); Sharon

Dietrich et al., Work Reform: The Other Side of Welfare Reform, 9 Stan. L. &

Pol’y Rev. 53, 55 (1998) (same). However, the erroneous perception of being an

illegal drug user is to be treated like any other perception of a disability, and is

only to be considered a qualifying disability if the employer perceives the

disability to substantially limit a major life activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)

(definition of disability includes being regarded as having “a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such

individual”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3, App. (noting that individuals who are

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erroneously considered by their employers to be illegally using drugs “are still

required to establish that they satisfy the requirements of [the statutory and

regulatory] definitions in order to be protected by the ADA.”); H.R. Rep. No.

101-485 (II), at 77 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 360 (noting that

individuals with perceived drug use dependence may satisfy definition of

disability by proving that they “are regarded as having a disability, as ‘disability’

has been defined under section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] and [the ADA]

(i.e., a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life

activity)”); see also E.E.O.C. v. Exxon Corp., 973 F. Supp. 612, 613-14 (N.D.

Tex. 1997) (stating that “individual who falls under one of the subcategories of 42

U.S.C. § 12114(b) is not automatically a ‘qualified person with a disability’ for

purposes of protection under the ADA,” but “must prove they suffer from a

‘disability’ as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)”) (citations omitted). 11

11
The term “major life activities” includes “‘functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working.’” MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1444
(10th Cir.1996) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)) (emphasis original). The
Supreme Court recently added to this list the major life activity of sexual
reproduction. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2205 (1998). For a
physical or mental impairment to be “substantially limiting” the individual must
be: “(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition,
manner or duration under which [the] individual can perform a particular major
life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform that same major life
(continued...)

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 Therefore, Nielsen could avoid summary judgment only by presenting

evidence to the district court that, when taken in the light most favorable to

Nielsen, would have allowed a reasonable jury to conclude (1) that Nielsen had a

perceived disability protected under the ADA because Moroni Feed erroneously

believed he was illegally using drugs and that the perceived use was severe

enough to substantially limit one or more of his major life activities, and (2) that

Moroni Feed terminated Nielsen on the basis of this perceived disability or

conduct erroneously attributed to it.

B. Application

Nielsen has failed to present evidence showing a genuine dispute of

material fact in this regard. First, Nielsen has failed to produce any evidence that

Moroni Feed erroneously believed he was illegally using drugs which use was

severe enough to substantially limit one or more of his major life activities.

While Nielsen did present evidence that at least some decision-makers at Moroni

Feed at some point were concerned about his behavior and about his perceived

addiction to prescription painkillers, 12 Nielsen proffered no evidence that anyone

11
(...continued)
activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).
12
There is no doubt that, under the ADA, illegal drug use includes the
illegal misuse of pain-killing drugs which are controlled by prescription as well as
(continued...)

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at Moroni Feed believed this perceived drug addiction was severe enough to

substantially limit one or more of his major life activities. Indeed, Nielsen failed

to state explicitly what major life activities, if any, Moroni Feed regarded as

substantially limited by the perceived drug addiction. Nielsen simply argued that

Moroni Feed “fired him due to his perceived disability in violation of the ADA.”

Hence, in terms of substantial limitation of a major life activity, the most we can

infer from Nielsen’s argument is a contention that Moroni Feed fired him because

it believed he suffered from a drug addiction severe enough to prevent him from

performing his duties as President of the co-op. However, such a contention,

even if true, falls well short of establishing that Moroni Feed regarded Nielsen as

having a disability substantially limiting the only major life activity implicated by

Nielsen’s argument—namely, working.

In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), we

noted that “‘[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a

substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.’” Id. at 904 (quoting

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)) (other citations omitted). Moreover, “[a]n employer

does not necessarily regard an employee as substantially limited in the major life

12
(...continued)
illegal street drugs like cocaine. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3, App. (“Illegal use of
drugs refers both to the use of unlawful drugs, such as cocaine, and to the
unlawful use of prescription drugs.”).

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activity of working simply because it believes that individual is incapable of

performing a particular job.” Id. Rather, in order

[t]o demonstrate that an impairment “substantially limits” the major
life activity of working, an individual must show “significant[]
restrict[ion] in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills and abilities.

Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(j)(3)(i)) (emphasis original); accord Sutton, 130 F.3d at 904; Mendoza v.

Borden, Inc., No. 97-5121, 1998 WL 751038, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 28, 1998);

Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept., No. 97-9019, 1998 WL 718358, at *7 (2d

Cir. Oct. 15, 1998); Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 1998); Skorup

v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 514 (7th Cir. 1998); Deas v. River West,

L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 1998); Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d

294, 302-03 (4th Cir. 1998); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 144 n.7

(3d Cir. 1998); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 372

(6th Cir. 1997); Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 540 (9th Cir.

1997); John F. Wagner, Annotation, What Constitutes Substantial Limitation on

Major Life Activity of Working for Purposes of Americans with Disabilities Act,

141 A.L.R. Fed. 603, § 2(a) (1997). 13 In other words, “‘[a]n impairment must

When an individual claims substantial limitation in the major life activity
13

of working, three additional factors also may be considered:
(continued...)

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substantially limit employment in general, not merely the particular job that the

plaintiff may wish to hold.’” Sutton, 130 F.3d at 904 (quoting Hileman v. City of

Dallas, 115 F.3d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1997)).

Therefore, in order to establish a disability under the ‘regarded
as’ prong of the ADA with respect to the major life activity of
working, an individual must show that the employer regarded him or
her as being substantially limited in performing either a class of jobs
or a broad range of jobs in various classes.

Id. Because Nielsen merely presented evidence suggesting that Moroni Feed no

longer believed him capable of performing his duties as President of the co-op,

but presented no evidence whatsoever that Moroni Feed believed any perceived

illegal drug addiction on his part significantly restricted his “ability to perform

either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes,” Bolton, 36 F.3d

at 942, we must affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment. See

13
(...continued)
(A) [t]he geographical area to which the individual has reasonable
access;
(B) [t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified because
of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar
training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area,
from which the individual is also disqualified because of the
impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) [t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified because
of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not
utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that
geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).

Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)).

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Sutton, 130 F.3d at 904; cf. Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th

Cir. 1997) (where “it is clear that [the plaintiff] has fallen far short of alleging he

is substantially limited in performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in

various classes,” the district court “correctly granted summary judgment”);

Bolton, 36 F.3d at 944 (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff “failed to

produce evidence showing a significant restriction in his ‘ability to perform either

a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes’”) (quoting 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(j)3)(i)); Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992)

(affirming summary judgment on perceived disability claim under Rehabilitation

Act where, inter alia, plaintiff “failed to present evidence” that he would be

precluded not only from performing “the specific job” for which he applied, “but

a wide range of jobs,” if he had disability as perceived by defendant).

In addition to Nielsen’s failure to advance evidence that he had a qualified

perceived disability because Moroni Feed believed he had an illegal drug

addiction severe enough to substantially limit the major life activity of working,

Nielsen also failed to advance evidence that Moroni Feed fired him on the basis

of any perceived disability or conduct attributed to it. On this ground summary

judgment also was proper. While, as noted, Nielsen did present evidence that

some at Moroni Feed at some point believed he was addicted to prescription

painkillers, the record is clear that Nielsen was ultimately discharged, not because

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of an erroneous perception that he was addicted to prescription painkillers, but

because of his unexplained conduct in entering uninvited into the homes of co-

workers and co-op participants in the small community where Moroni Feed was

located.

It is undisputed that for a considerable time Moroni Feed tried to work with

Nielsen after receiving information that caused some of Moroni Feed’s directors

to believe he was addicted to painkillers. The co-op also directed him to a drug

treatment center for evaluation. During none of this time was he discharged. It

was only after the evaluation came back from Dayspring that he was not addicted

to drugs and thus that his bizarre conduct of going into homes throughout the

community uninvited could not be explained by drug addiction that Nielsen was

terminated. The timing of Nielsen’s discharge, and the references in the record

about the deliberation of the Board, as well as the reasons articulated to Nielsen

himself for the discharge, all make it clear beyond peradventure that Nielsen was

discharged for his conduct, and that this conduct, at the time of his discharge, was

not erroneously attributed to illegal drug use. Simply put, Nielsen’s conduct was

potentially quite disruptive to Moroni Feed, and when it was neither stopped nor

explained, Moroni Feed determined it could no longer trust or tolerate a president

who engaged in such conduct. Therefore, because Nielsen has failed to produce

any evidence that Moroni Feed fired him on the basis of an erroneously perceived

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disability based on illegal drug use or conduct believed to be so caused, the

district court properly granted Moroni Feed’s summary judgment motion. Cf. 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified

individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual . . . .”)

(emphasis added); Maddox, 62 F.3d at 848-49 (affirming summary judgment

dismissing college football coach’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims after

finding coach’s criminal conduct and bad publicity surrounding it was “sufficient

to motivate the discharge,” because “[i]t is obvious that . . . [the coach] would be

representing not only the team but the university.”).

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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