F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 29 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-1323
MICHAEL AARON WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 97-CR-313-Z)
Raymond P. Moore, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. Katz, Federal
Public Defender, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for the appellant.
Kathleen M. Tafoya, Assistant United States Attorney (Linda A. McMahan,
United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for the appellee.
Before PORFILIO, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Michael Aaron Wilson appeals his conviction for possession of
three or more matters containing visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct which were produced using materials shipped or transported in
interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (1996). We
conclude the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to satisfy the
jurisdictional element of the charged crime, and reverse defendant’s conviction
and remand with directions to enter a judgment of acquittal.
I.
United States Customs Service agents arrested Brian Gillingham in Dayton,
Ohio, for possession of computerized child pornography. Gillingham cooperated
with agents and gave them information regarding Randy Taylor of Denver,
Colorado, with whom Gillingham had exchanged child pornography. Based upon
information provided by Gillingham and materials found in his apartment, agents
determined Randy Taylor was an alias used by defendant. Using an undercover
persona, special agent Don Daufenbach sent two letters to defendant alleging
Daufenbach was a collector of sadomasochistic child pornography involving boys.
Daufenbach received two letters from defendant in which he expressed an interest
in the same type of child pornography. In one of the letters, defendant indicated
he had a wide variety of computerized images he was willing to trade and he
included a printout of graphics files on his computer. After they exchanged
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letters, Daufenbach contacted defendant through an Internet “chat room,” where
defendant again expressed an interest in sadomasochistic child pornography
involving boys. Ultimately, agents obtained and executed a search warrant for
defendant’s residence. Defendant cooperated in the search by directing agents to
areas of his computer hard drive, as well as computer diskettes, containing child
pornography.
For reasons unclear from the record, defendant was initially indicted in the
District of Utah on charges of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (sexual
exploitation of a minor). These proceedings (Case No. 97-CR-505) were
subsequently transferred to the District of Colorado where, upon the government’s
motion, they were dismissed without prejudice. Defendant was reindicted in the
District of Colorado (Case No. 97-CR-313Z), and three superseding indictments
were subsequently filed against him (one of which was filed by the government in
the original dismissed case, i.e., Case No. 97-CR-505). The final indictment, a
stipulated amended superseding indictment, charged defendant with a single count
of possessing three or more matters (i.e., one computer hard drive and ten
computer diskettes) containing visual depictions (i.e., graphics files) of minors
engaging in sexually explicit conduct which were produced using materials that
had been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (1996). A jury convicted defendant for
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possession of the diskettes, but not for possession of the hard drive, and he was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty months.
II.
Defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
establish the jurisdictional element of the charged crime, i.e., that the visual
depictions were produced using materials that had been mailed, shipped, or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Although defendant attempts to
couch this as a single issue, we conclude he has raised two related issues: (1)
proper interpretation of the term “materials,” as used in § 2252(a)(4)(B); and (2)
whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish the requisite
jurisdictional nexus.
Interpretation of § 2252(a)(4)(B)
Defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (1996),
which provided that any person who
knowingly possesses 3 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films,
video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction . . .
which was produced using materials which have been mailed or . . .
shipped or transported [in interstate or foreign commerce], by any
means including by computer, if--
(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
Defendant contends the term “materials,” which is used in but not defined by the
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statute, refers to the “ingredients of an object--here, the ingredients or
components of a visual depiction.” Appellant’s Br. at 18. According to
defendant, this definition “precludes any contention that ‘materials’ includes
within its definitional scope tools or equipment or storage items (such as
computers or floppy disks) used to hold, mold, or manipulate ‘materials’ into a
visual depiction.” Id.
We review the interpretation of a federal criminal statute de novo. United
States v. Martin , 163 F.3d 1212, 1214 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 1999 WL
231032 (1999). In doing so, we begin, as we must, “with the language of the
statute.” Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995). The word
“materials,” as used in the statute at issue here, “must be given its ‘ordinary or
natural’ meaning.” Id. at 145. The term “material” is defined in Webster’s as
“of, relating to, or consisting of matter.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary
1392 (1993). In turn, the term “matter” is defined in Webster’s as “material
substance of a particular kind or for a particular purpose.” Id. at 1394.
Although defendant’s argument is not entirely without merit when the term
“materials” is viewed in isolation, we are obligated to “consider not only the bare
meaning of the word but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.”
Bailey , 516 U.S. at 145. The statute at issue here refers to “any visual depiction
. . . which was produced using materials which have” traveled in interstate or
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foreign commerce. In other words, the statute clearly refers to “materials” used to
produce a visual depiction. Necessarily, we believe, this encompasses not only
tangible matters that go into a visual depiction (i.e., that become an “ingredient”
of the visual depiction), but also tangible matters that are used to give being, form
or shape to, but that do not necessarily become a part or “ingredient” of, the
visual depiction. 1
In our view, defendant’s proposed construction of the term “materials”
effectively ignores the context in which the word appears in the statute, and
thereby unduly narrows the reach of the statute. Under defendant’s construction,
for example, a person in possession of a computer graphics file would be in
violation of the statute only if the bits of information making up the file (i.e., the
1’s and 0’s) had at some point traveled in interstate or foreign commerce. Thus,
under defendant’s interpretation, only graphics files copied from a computer
located in another state or country, via the Internet or a bulletin board service
1
Although defendant has focused solely on the meaning of the term
“materials,” we believe the meaning of the term “produced” is also important to
resolution of this case. The term “producing” is defined by statute to “mean[]
producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or advertising.” 18
U.S.C. § 2256(3). Obviously, this definition, standing alone, is not particularly
enlightening. For further assistance, we turn to Webster’s, which defines
“produce” as “to give being, form, or shape to,” “to bring forth a product or
production: bear, make, or yield that which is according to nature or intention:
grow, make, or furnish economically valuable products.” Webster’s Third Int’l
Dictionary 1810 (1993).
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(BBS), would satisfy the jurisdictional nexus.
The broader definition we adopt today comports with that implicitly
adopted by the First and Eighth Circuits. In United States v. Bausch , 140 F.3d
739 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 806 (1999), defendant was convicted
of violating § 2252(a)(4)(B) based upon his possession of photographs he had
personally taken of two girls, ages fifteen and sixteen, in sexually suggestive
poses. Although the photographs themselves had never traveled in interstate
commerce, the jurisdictional nexus was satisfied because the jury found defendant
took the photographs using a Japanese camera that had been transported in
interstate or foreign commerce. Thus, the “materials” used to produce the
photographs were not confined to the “ingredients” of the photographs
themselves, but instead encompassed objects, including the camera, that were
determined to give form or shape to the photographs. See United States v.
Robinson , 137 F.3d 652, 653-54 (1st Cir. 1998) (use of camera and instant film
made in another state satisfied jurisdictional nexus).
Sufficiency of Evidence
Having defined the term “materials,” we next determine whether, applying
this definition, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support
defendant’s conviction. In other words, we must determine whether the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to demonstrate the jurisdictional nexus for which
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defendant was indicted, i.e., that the visual depictions 2
contained on the diskettes
were produced using materials that traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.
Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law reviewed de novo. United
States v. Carter , 130 F.3d 1432, 1439 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct.
1856 (1998). We will not reverse a conviction based upon insufficient evidence
unless no rational trier of fact could have reached the disputed verdict. Id. ; see
Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In reviewing the record, we view
the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the government, without weighing the evidence or considering the
credibility of witnesses. Id. ; United States v. Haslip , 160 F.3d 649, 652-53 (10th
2
At the time of indictment and trial, “visual depictions” were defined
under the statute, and in the court’s instructions, as “any form of image or picture,
including undeveloped film and videotape.” Supp. Vol. 1, Doc. 51, Instruction
17. The statute has since been amended and “visual depiction” is now defined as
“includ[ing] undeveloped film and videotape, and data stored on computer disk or
by electronic means which is capable of conversion into a visual image.” 18
U.S.C. § 2256(5). Under both definitions, the term “includes potential images as
well as actual images, that is to say, images that have already been produced, yet
require additional processing to render them viewable.” United States v. Whiting ,
165 F.3d 631, 633 (8th Cir. 1999).
In this regard, an image stored as data which can be read by a
computer is directly analogous to an image on video tape. They are
both images stored as magnetic signals that require processing by the
use of a machine in order to view them. The fact that they cannot be
viewed as pornographic images until processed through the
appropriate equipment does not place them outside the definition of
“visual depiction” for purposes of the statute.
Id.
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Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 1346 (1999). The evidence necessary to
support a verdict “need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis and need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” United States v.
Parrish , 925 F.2d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Instead, the
evidence only has to “reasonably support the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. If, upon review of the evidence, we conclude the evidence
presented was insufficient to sustain a conviction, retrial is barred. See Burks v.
United States , 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978); United States v. Dalton , 990 F.2d 1166,
1168 (10th Cir. 1993). A reversal for evidentiary insufficiency is tantamount to a
declaration that the prosecution, given its single opportunity to muster its
evidence, failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Burks , 437 U.S. at
11-12.
Before reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we note the prosecution’s
strategy at trial for proving the jurisdictional element was extremely vague.
Giving the prosecution the benefit of the doubt, it appears its primary theory was
that the diskettes seized from defendant constituted both “matters” containing the
visual depictions and “materials” used to produce the visual depictions. This
theory, however, was not always clearly conveyed at trial. For example, during
trial, the prosecution argued to the district court that it was the “matter” rather
than the “materials” that needed to have traveled in interstate commerce. Supp.
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Vol. 8 at 437, 439, and 440. During closing arguments, the prosecution seemed to
return to its original theory when it argued to the jury that it needed to decide
“what is the material that produced these pictures.” Id. at 490. Again, however,
the prosecution deviated from this theory by arguing to the jury:
The information, the little Xs and Os, 1’s and 0’s, electrical
impulses, were sitting on the hard drive, sitting on the disk, waiting
to be used. But they’re not produced into a picture until they’re
called forth. They’re called forth from the disk, and they’re called
forth on the computer. And that’s what we’re talking about.
Id. at 490-91. By way of this latter argument, the prosecution seemed to be
arguing it was the act of calling images up on the computer monitor that
constituted “production” of a visual depiction.
Having outlined the prosecution’s ever-shifting theories, we focus first on
the theory that the diskettes were “materials” that traveled in interstate commerce
and were used to produce the visual depictions at issue (i.e., the graphics files).
Although the evidence was uncontroverted that the diskettes at issue traveled in
interstate commerce, see Supp. Vol. 6 at 63 (no computer diskettes were
manufactured in the state of Colorado), there was an alarming lack of proof that
the diskettes were used to actually produce the graphics files. The government’s
main expert witness, Charles Davis, a criminal investigator with the Colorado
Bureau of Investigation specializing in computer crime and high technology,
testified that images/pictures can be stored in one of several computerized formats
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(e.g., GIF, JPG, BIC), all of which are composed of bits of data (1’s and 0’s).
Supp. Vol. 7 at 263-64. More specifically, Davis testified the bits of data are
organized in sets of eight or twenty-four, with each set defining a specific pixel
and the total number of pixels representing the entire image. Id. at 318-19. The
government’s other expert witness, Daufenbach, a special agent with the U.S.
Customs Service, testified similarly that a computer graphics file is comprised of
a series of charged and uncharged bits. Supp. Vol. 6 at 178-79. Neither witness,
however, specifically explained how a computer graphics file is created. 3
Thus,
although their testimony firmly established that computer graphics files can be
stored or contained on computer diskettes, their testimony did not support the
conclusion that computer diskettes are used to actually produce graphics files. To
the contrary, their testimony left unanswered the question of whether a computer
3
During direct examination, the prosecution asked Davis to explain why a
computer graphics file was considered a “picture” or visual depiction, even
though it was a series of 1’s and 0’s unviewable (without extra measures) to the
naked eye. In particular, the prosecution asked Davis to “compare [a graphics
file] to a [roll] of film.” Supp. App. 7 at 306. Davis testified that the bits of data
in a computer graphics file “are the same thing as the [dye] or the photosensitive
chemicals on . . . film,” and that “the little plastic inside a floppy disk [i.e., the
piece of Mylar]” was like “the film itself.” Id. at 306-07. Davis also analogized
a graphics file on a diskette to an image on a videocassette. To the extent the
government intended to rely on this testimony to explain how a graphics file was
created, we reject it as insufficient. Although the average juror undoubtedly has
some familiarity with film and videocassettes, we are not convinced he or she is
sufficiently knowledgeable in how visual images are created on those types of
media to make the necessary inferential leap and determine how a computer
graphics file is created.
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graphics file is produced or created prior to being recorded on a particular storage
media, or whether, instead, it only comes into being at or after the point it is
recorded on the storage media. Although we have no doubt this question has an
answer (and thus do not foreclose the possibility that a diskette is a “material”
used to produce a graphics file contained thereon), we conclude the evidence
produced by the government in this case was insufficient to allow a reasonable
juror to answer the question. Thus, we must determine whether the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict under any other
theory.
As previously noted, the prosecution offered an alternate theory during
closing arguments that the act of converting a computer graphics file stored on a
diskette into a visual image on a computer monitor could constitute “production”
of a visual depiction for purposes of the statute. Without foreclosing application
of this theory under different circumstances, we find it of no value here. As
previously noted, the stipulated amended superseding indictment narrowly
charged defendant with violating § 2252(a)(4)(B) by possessing three or more
computer diskettes that contained visual depictions, i.e., computer graphics files.
Under § 2252(a)(4)(B), a computer graphics file is considered a “visual
depiction” as it resides on a computer diskette in binary form; no act of viewing
the file with software and a monitor is necessary. See Whiting , 165 F.3d at 633.
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Thus, the focal point of the statute’s jurisdictional element, as applied to the
circumstances of this case, is whether the graphics files were produced using
materials that traveled in interstate commerce. In other words, in determining
whether the jurisdictional element is satisfied, the statute requires us to focus on
the graphics files as they reside or are contained on the diskettes, and to
determine what materials went into producing those files. It is irrelevant that
defendant may have actually viewed the graphics files, using a computer, viewing
software, and a monitor, because such viewing did not result in production of the
graphics files; instead, such production necessarily had to have occurred either at
or prior to the time the graphics files were recorded on the diskettes.
We also find untenable the prosecution’s theory that only the “matter” must
have traveled in interstate commerce. In our view, the language of
§ 2252(a)(4)(B) makes it abundantly clear that either the visual depictions (in this
case the graphics files) or the materials used to produce the visual depictions must
have traveled in interstate commerce. If Congress had wanted the focus of the
jurisdictional element to be on the “matters” containing the visual depictions, it
would have said so.
Two other possible theories remain, neither of which was specifically
forwarded by the prosecution. At trial, Daufenbach testified that some of the
images at issue originated from a BBS in California. In light of this testimony,
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we believe it would perhaps have been reasonable for the jury to infer defendant
used his computer and modem to download those images, via telephone line,
directly from the BBS onto a diskette (in the form of graphics files). 4
The
problem, however, is that only one of the diskettes seized by authorities contained
images originating from the BBS. Because defendant was charged with
possessing three or more diskettes containing visual depictions, the fact that the
jurisdictional element was satisfied with respect to one diskette was not sufficient
to support defendant’s conviction.
Daufenbach also testified that some of the images at issue originated from
German magazines. He offered no explanation, however, as to how those
particular images found their way to the diskettes in defendant’s possession. Nor
did the prosecution otherwise attempt to outline the possible methods by which
defendant could have obtained the files through interstate commerce (e.g.,
4
Although there was no direct evidence that defendant downloaded these
images from the BBS, the evidence demonstrated (1) defendant was interested in
the specific type of child pornography portrayed in those visual depictions; (2) he
was computer literate; (3) he regularly used the computer to view such depictions
and to communicate with other persons regarding his sexual interests; and (4)
many of the pictures found on the diskettes were directly traceable to the BBS in
that they specifically contained the BBS’s name. Taken together, a jury could
rationally have concluded defendant, while residing in Colorado, used his
computer and downloaded those images from the BBS to diskette (rather than
receiving the diskettes from someone else who had downloaded them). Under this
theory, some of the “materials” used to produce the visual depictions found on the
diskettes, in particular the bits of data, necessarily would have traveled in
interstate commerce from California to Colorado via telephone line.
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obtaining copies of the German magazines and scanning the images into his
computer; downloading copies of the images from an out-of-state computer via
the Internet or a BBS, etc.). We therefore reject the possibility that Daufenbach’s
testimony regarding the origination of the images, standing alone, was sufficient
to satisfy the jurisdictional element. 5
Having carefully examined the trial record and having considered and
rejected all possible avenues for proving the jurisdictional element, we are forced
to conclude the evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction. 6
Defendant’s conviction is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the
district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
5
We offer the following example to demonstrate why Daufenbach’s
testimony could not, by itself, satisfy the jurisdictional element. Imagine a person
possesses a magazine and makes a color photocopy (copy #1) of one of the images
contained therein. Further imagine such person uses copy #1 to make a second
color photocopy (copy #2). Although the magazine would be a “material” used to
produce copy #1, it would not be a “material” used to produce copy #2. Thus, the
fact that some of the images possessed by defendant originated at some point in
German magazines does not demonstrate, without more, that the German
magazines were actually “materials” used to produce the images possessed by
defendant.
6
Because we conclude the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction, it is unnecessary to address the remaining issue asserted on appeal.
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