F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
FEB 15 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-6211
JAMES TIMOTHY REDDICK,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. CR-98-205-C)
Duane Miller, Yukon, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant.
Teresa Black, Assistant United States Attorney (Patrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney,
with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before BALDOCK, KELLY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
The Government charged Defendant with possession of a firearm while under a
domestic violence restraining order in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Defendant pled
not guilty and waived his right to a jury trial. The district court received evidence through
the parties’ stipulated facts. Defendant made an offer of proof indicating that he did not
know possession of a firearm while under a domestic violence restraining order was
illegal. The district court, on the Government’s motion, disallowed the evidence. The
district court found Defendant guilty and sentenced him to fifteen months imprisonment.
On appeal, Defendant argues (1) his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)
violated his due process rights because he did not know of the federal law which prohibits
firearm possession by a person under a domestic violence protection order, and (2) the
district court incorrectly failed to require proof that Defendant intended to harm the
person who secured the restraining order against him. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
I.
In February 1995, Defendant married Michelle Klein. They separated in July
1997. In April 1998, after Defendant attempted to strangle her, Klein filed a petition for a
restraining order against Defendant in Oklahoma state court. After receiving notice of
Klein’s application for a protective order, Defendant appeared at a hearing, and objected
to the order. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court issued a protective order
which restrained Defendant from harassing and threatening Klein. The order further
directed Defendant not to harm, abuse, molest, or interfere with Klein, not to visit or
communicate with her, to stay away from her residence, and to cease stalking her.
Finally, the order advised Defendant that violation of the order constituted a misdemeanor
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and set out the penalties for its violation. The order did not, however, advise Defendant
of the federal law providing felony penalties for the possession of a firearm or
ammunition while the order was in effect.
While the protective order was in effect, Defendant, carrying a firearm and
ammunition, approached Klein in a shopping mall where she worked. Defendant told
Klein that he had a firearm in his truck and threatened to commit suicide. Klein called
mall security and then 911. Defendant returned to Klein’s workplace a second time, then
a third, again talking of suicide. Defendant told Klein he had a gun on him and
threatened to kill himself in front of her if she called the police. When the police arrived,
Defendant left the mall. After a high speed chase, police apprehended Defendant.
II.
Defendant argues his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) violates his due
process rights because he did not have notice that federal law prohibits firearm possession
by persons under domestic restraining orders. We review Defendant’s claim of
constitutional error de novo. See United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1334 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 78 (1999).
Section 922(g)(8) prohibits the possession of a firearm or ammunition by an
individual subject to a protective order issued after a hearing.1 Defendant does not
1
The statute provides in relevant part that possession of a firearm or ammunition
which has traveled in interstate commerce is unlawful for any person who is subject to a
court order that:
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challenge his conviction based on any elements of the statute. Instead, he argues that his
conviction under § 922(g)(8) violated his due process rights because he lacked notice of
the federal law. Defendant claims that the state court informed him, both in the written
order and orally, about conduct which would constitute a violation of the protective order,
but did not mention the possession of a firearm or ammunition. Further, Defendant states
the state court informed him that violation of the protective order would be a
misdemeanor, but mentioned neither the federal statute, nor that violation of the federal
statute would be a felony.
The traditional rule provides that ignorance of the law is no defense to a criminal
prosecution. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991); see also Bryan v. United
States, 524 U.S. 184, 195 (1998). Every circuit that has considered the issue of lack of
notice with respect to § 922(g)(8) has rejected arguments similar to Defendant’s. See
United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at
which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate
partner of such person . . . or engaging in other conduct that would place an
intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner . . . ; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the
physical safety of such intimate partner . . .; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against such intimate partner . . . that would reasonably be expected
to cause bodily injury . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
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718 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2383 (1999); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211
(6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 2371 (1999).
In support of his due process argument, Defendant cites Lambert v. California, 355
U.S. 225 (1957). In Lambert, the Supreme Court held a law unconstitutional which
imposed strict liability upon convicted felons for mere presence in a municipality because
it punished, without forewarning, conduct which a reasonable person ordinarily would not
consider criminal. Id. at 228-29. Defendant claims his conviction under § 922(g)(8)
similarly punished innocent conduct. The First Circuit in Meade, 175 F.3d at 225-26,
rejected this argument. The court concluded that “a person who is subject to [an anti-
harassment or anti-stalking] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of
possessing a firearm . . . .” Id. at 226. Consequently, the court held that the prohibition
of § 922(g)(8) did not involve “conduct and circumstances so presumptively innocent as
to fall within the narrow confines of the Lambert exception.” Id.
The Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have rejected the same argument. The
Fourth Circuit upheld a § 922(g)(8) conviction against a due process challenge where the
defendant had knowledge that he possessed a firearm and was aware that he was subject
to a domestic violence restraining order. Bostic, 168 F.3d at 723. The court reasoned that
“[l]ike a felon, a person [subject to a domestic violence protection order] cannot
reasonably expect to be free from regulation when possessing a firearm.” Id. at 722. In
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Baker, 197 F.3d at 220, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the defendant could not
successfully claim a lack of fair warning with respect to the requirements of § 922(g)(8)
because it was not reasonable for someone subject to a domestic violence protection order
to “expect to possess dangerous weapons free from extensive regulation.” Finally, the
Seventh Circuit, in Wilson,159 F.3d at 288-89, held that the defendant’s lack of
knowledge of the existence of § 922(g)(8) was immaterial and his conviction did not
violate his due process rights.2
We agree with every circuit court that has considered due process challenges to
§ 922(g)(8) and conclude that due process does not require actual knowledge of the
federal statute. Accordingly, Defendant’s conviction under § 922(g)(8) did not violate his
due process rights, even though he lacked knowledge of the statute. A fundamental
principal of our justice system recognizes that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Defendant has not shown that § 922(g)(8) falls into an exception to this general rule. See
Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194 (noting exception for “highly technical statutes that present[ ] the
danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct”).
2
The conclusion that actual knowledge of the statute is not required for a 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) conviction is consistent with our rulings on similar arguments against
the law prohibiting firearm possession by felons, namely 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See
United States v. Reed, 114 F.3d 1053, 1057 (10th Cir. 1997) (defendant charged under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) need only have had knowledge of the presence and characteristics of
the gun as a firearm; government need not prove that defendant knew he was violating the
law); United States v. Capps, 77 F.3d 350, 352 (10th Cir. 1996) (only knowledge required
for a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction is knowledge that the instrument possessed is a
firearm).
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III.
Defendant next argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is designed to protect the person
who obtained the protective order. He claims that because he possessed a firearm to harm
only himself, he did not violate the intent of the law. The district court refused to allow
Defendant to argue a “no intent to harm others” defense. We review the district court’s
exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996,
1005 (10th Cir. 1999). We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the
applicable law. Transwestern Publishing Co. v. Multimedia Marketing Assocs., Inc., 133
F.3d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1998).
Before trial, the Government filed a motion in limine to prevent Defendant from
arguing that he only intended to commit suicide. The district court granted the
Government’s motion in limine, noting that Defendant agreed that lack of intent to harm
others is not a defense to the charge. Because Defendant agreed that lack of intent to
harm the person covered by the protective order is not a defense to the charge, he is
precluded from raising the same argument on appeal. See United States v. Fortier, 180
F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 1999).
Furthermore, Defendant’s argument is without merit. Defendant presents no
legislative history or case law to support his argument. The plain language of § 922(g)(8)
simply prohibits the possession of a firearm by a person subject to a protective order.
Section 922(g)(8) sets forth the three elements necessary to sustain a conviction: 1) the
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defendant was subject to a restraining order issued after a hearing, 2) the defendant
thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm, and 3) the possession was in or affecting
interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8); Baker, 197 F.3d at 215. The statute
does not require any intent to harm the person protected by the restraining order. See 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Instead, the statute prohibits the mere possession of a firearm.
See id. Defendant does not challenge the evidence on any of the three elements of
§ 922(g)(8) supporting his conviction. Consequently, Defendant’s purported lack of
intent to harm Klein is irrelevant and does not warrant reversal of his conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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