F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 28 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
vs. No. 99-2316
JOSEPH FELIX REYES PENA,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CR-98-821-1-LH)
Gregory J. Fouratt, Assistant United States Attorney (and Norman C. Bay, United
States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff
- Appellee.
Alonzo J. Padilla, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
for Defendant - Appellant.
Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Felix Reyes Pena, appeals from his sentence.
He pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2241(c), 2246(2)(c) and 1153. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
210 months, followed by a 5 year period of supervised release, ordered to pay a
$200 fine, and to make payment of $186 for restitution. On appeal, Mr. Pena
argues (1) that the district court impermissibly engaged in “double counting” by
enhancing his sentence both for the use of force, U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1), and for
the victim’s youth, U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(2)(A); (2) there was insufficient evidence
to support an enhancement for the use of force; and (3) the government breached
an implied term of the plea agreement by pursuing a sentencing enhancement for
the use of force. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a), and we affirm.
Background
Given the argument that there is insufficient evidence to support the
sentencing enhancement for use of force, it is necessary to recite in some detail
the facts surrounding Mr. Pena’s persistent sexual abuse of his stepdaughter. In
view of the argument that the government breached the plea agreement, it is
likewise necessary to set forth the facts surrounding the formation and execution
of that agreement. Other relevant facts will be discussed as necessary.
During the time period in which this abuse occurred, Mr. Pena was in his
late twenties, weighing 190 pounds. His victim was 10 years old and weighed 70
pounds. According to the presentence report, in one incident, the victim
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attempted to evade Mr. Pena by sliding “into the crack of her bed,” whereupon
Mr. Pena “grabbed her arm and made her lay next to him on the bed” and
proceeded to assault her vagina digitally. See IV R., P.S.R. at ¶ 11. On another
occasion, the victim noted that Mr. Pena anally penetrated her despite her strong
verbal protestations. Mr. Pena ignored her refusal, stating “‘[i]t is almost
through’” and “then pushed harder.” IV R., P.S.R. at ¶ 12. In a sealed statement,
the victim further stated that she would try to “kick [Mr. Pena] and push him
away” when he assaulted her, but he “would push me against the wall.” I R. doc.
42. In addition to this physical coercion, the victim reported threats; Mr. Pena
said that if she did not acquiesce to his demands, he would leave her mother and
find a new girlfriend. See IV. R., P.S.R. at ¶ 8. According to the victim, Mr.
Pena threatened that if she disclosed his conduct to anyone, she would be taken
away from her mother. See IV R., P.S.R. at ¶ 10. She also reported being
threatened with increased household chores if she failed to comply with his
desires. I R. doc. 42. A medical examination of the victim revealed that she
suffered hymenal disruption, vaginal disruption and scarring, and anal flattening
and thickening. See IV R., P.S.R. ¶ 15. It bears noting that Mr. Pena neither
disputes nor challenges these facts.
On November 5, 1998, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Pena. In the
following months, the government and Mr. Pena negotiated a plea agreement. On
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February 3, 1999, counsel for the government sent a letter to Mr. Pena offering a
plea agreement in which he would plead guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual
abuse of a child, and in exchange, the government would agree to a non-binding
stipulation that he receive a three level decrease for acceptance of responsibility
and dismissal of other charges. The letter also stated that under the plea, the
government “estimate[d] that Mr. Pena would be facing an approximate range of
121 to 151 months imprisonment, depending on his criminal history and other
factors.” I R. doc. 43, Attachment A (emphasis added). Counsel for Mr. Pena
responded by letter, asking for two more non-binding stipulations, namely, that
Mr. Pena would not receive an enhancement for serious bodily injury, §
2A3.1(b)(4), but would receive an enhancement because the child was in his care
and custody, § 2A3.1(b)(3). See id., Attachment B.
On April 22, 1999, Mr. Pena appeared with counsel before the district court
to plead guilty in accordance with the final plea agreement. At this plea colloquy,
Mr. Pena admitted that he signed the plea agreement freely, with the knowledge
that the sentencing guidelines would dictate his sentence. Change of Plea
Hearing, April 22, 1999, Tr. 4-7. Moreover, Mr. Pena acknowledged that he
understood that the sentence ultimately imposed might be different than any
estimate previously given to him by counsel. See id. at 7. The plea agreement
itself was silent as to an enhancement for the use of force. Moreover, it contained
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an integration clause, stating that the plea agreement was the complete statement
of agreement between the parties, and could not be altered absent a writing signed
by all parties. I R. doc. 36 at ¶ 15.
In June of 1999, the government filed a notice of substitution of counsel,
substituting Kathleen Bliss for the departing Michael Cox. Shortly thereafter, the
U.S. Probation Office issued the presentence report. The PSR was silent as to the
four-level enhancement for the use of force at issue in this case, although it did
recite the above facts describing the physical and psychological coercion Mr.
Pena exacted upon the victim. The government subsequently objected to the
PSR’s failure to recommend a use of force enhancement, pursuant to §
2A3.1(b)(1). A Revised PSR was issued on July 26, 1999, incorporating the
government’s suggestion. Mr. Pena objected to the enhancement, arguing that it
violated the plea agreement, and was not supported by the facts. The Probation
Office issued a Second Addendum to the PSR, adhering to its view that an
enhancement was warranted. At the close of the sentencing hearing that
followed, the district court advised Mr. Pena that a use of force enhancement was
appropriate, but if Mr. Pena felt misled by the government regarding the estimated
penalty he was facing, he could withdraw his plea. Thirteen days later, September
14, 1999, the district court reconvened the sentencing hearing. Mr. Pena declined
to withdraw his plea, although defense counsel again objected to the
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enhancement.
Discussion
Waiver
The government argues that Mr. Pena is raising the issue of double
counting for the first time on appeal, and thus our review of the district court’s
application of the sentencing guidelines is for plain error only. See United States
v. Lindsay, 184 F.3d 1138, 1142 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 438 (1999).
Our review of the record, however, shows that Mr. Pena did raise this issue before
the district court in his sentencing memorandum, and during the sentencing
hearing. See I. R. doc. 44 at 2 (“The guidelines already take such factor into
consideration, as there is a four level enhancement required when the victim of
the sexual offense is under the age of 12”); III. R. at 14 (“...the force
enhancement does not apply and . . . much of the conduct alluded to by the
government and alluded to by probation in the presentence report has already been
covered by the federal sentencing guidelines in terms of enhancements that
apply.”). Moreover, the record reflects that both the government and the district
court understood Mr. Pena’s argument was premised on the notion that imposing
enhancements for both youth of the victim and use of force constitutes
impermissible double counting. See e.g., II R. at 17 (“[W]e’re not relying on the
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age of the child, that is covered by 2241(c). However, this man used means that
are consistent with 2241(a), means of force.”); III R. at 15 (“I understand your
argument that there have been enhancements based upon the age of the victim . . .
however, the sentencing guidelines don’t say either/or, they provide for
enhancements based upon each of these separate criteria, and so I conclude . . .
that the enhancement for use of force is appropriate.”). Thus, Mr. Pena
effectively preserved the issue of double counting for appeal, and our review of
the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines is de novo, given that
none of the facts underlying the conviction are disputed. See United States v.
Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 1328 (10th Cir. 1997).
Double Counting
The essence of Mr. Pena’s argument is that a sentencing enhancement for
the use of force is implicit in the U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement for a
victim under twelve years of age. Mr. Pena asserts that because children under
the age of twelve are legally incapable of consent to sexual acts, there is a
presumption that force was applied. Thus, to apply enhancements for the use of
force and for the victim’s youth constitutes impermissible double counting. The
government responds that the enhancement provisions of §§ 2A3.1(b)(2)(A) and
2A.3.1(b)(1) address different conduct, do not overlap and serve different
purposes. Thus, the government contends, applying both enhancements to the
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same set of facts does not amount to double counting.
The Sentencing Guidelines specify that offense level adjustments for more
than one specific offense characteristic are cumulative, whereas within each
specific offense characteristic they are alternative. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1,
comment, n.4. Double counting “‘occurs when the same conduct on the part of the
defendant is used to support separate increases under separate enhancement
provisions which necessarily overlap, are indistinct, and serve identical
purposes.’” Fisher, 132 F.3d at 1329 (citation omitted). All three criteria must be
satisfied to constitute double counting. See United States v. Rucker, 178 F.3d
1369, 1371 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 386 (1999). Moreover, a court
may apply separate enhancements to reach distinct aspects of the same conduct.
See Fisher, 132 F.3d at 1329; see also, Rucker, 178 F.3d at 1372 (“[T]he
enhancements serve different purposes if only because they punish activities that
are, while related, not indistinct.”). That is, the court may punish the same act
using cumulative sentencing guidelines if the enhancements bear on “conceptually
separate notions relating to sentencing.” United States v. Lewis, 115 F.3d 1531,
1537 (11th Cir. 1997). Recently, this court, following the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit, held that such cumulative sentencing is permissible when the separate
enhancements aim at different harms emanating from the same conduct. See
Rucker, 178 F.3d at 1373. Put another way, the guidelines’ enhancements are
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tailored to the various harms that may attend a single criminal act. This
flexibility demonstrates the Commission’s likely recognition that the same harms
are not always present in every instance of a certain criminal act. See id at 1372.
Thus, two similar crimes may warrant different enhancements depending upon the
resulting harms.
Applying these principles to the instant case, it is clear that the district
court was correct in applying both enhancements. Sections 2A3.1(b)(2)(A) and
2A3.1(b)(1) serve distinct purposes, and aim at different harms. Sentencing
enhancement pursuant to § 2A3.1(b)(2)(A) punishes sexual contact with a child
under the age of twelve years old, as such children are incapable of giving
effective legal consent. Enhancement pursuant to § 2A3.1(b)(1) punishes the
actual use of force used to overbear the will of another in perpetrating aggravated
sexual abuse. Despite Mr. Pena’s claims that these concepts are always
inextricably intertwined, not every instance of sexual contact with a child under
the age of twelve involves actual physical force. See e.g., United States v. Has
No Horse, 11 F.3d 104, 105 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that eleven year old victim
and defendant engaged in consensual sex). In this way, the law recognizes the
distinction between legal and factual consent. This distinction is borne out by
both the Sentencing Guidelines themselves, and the decisions of this court. See
U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1, Background (“Any criminal sexual abuse with a child less than
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twelve years of age, regardless of ‘consent,’ is governed by § 2A3.1”); United
States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 1242, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting
that non-forcible sex offenses can be crimes of violence); United States v. Passi,
62 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 1995) (approving district court’s conclusion that
sexual abuse of one’s thirteen year old daughter is a crime of violence “whether
or not raw force is used.”); United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th
Cir. 1993) (holding that an act constitutes a crime of violence if the risk of
violence is present, regardless of whether or not physical force is actually used).
In this case, Mr. Pena’s victim was incapable of legal consent by virtue of her
age, nor did she give factual consent, evidenced by the fact that Mr. Pena had to
enlist the use of actual physical force to overcome her resistance. It was therefore
appropriate to enhance Mr. Pena’s sentence pursuant to guidelines tailored to
address these separate and distinct aspects of his criminal conduct towards his
stepdaughter.
Mr. Pena argues, relying primarily on Reyes-Castro and Coronado-
Cervantes, that the element of force is implicit in any offense involving a child
under the age of twelve years. Mr. Pena contends that these cases support his
view, in that they hold that such sexual abuse of a child is a “crime of violence”
for various sentencing purposes. See Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d at 1245 (in
the context of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2); Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d at 379 (in the context of
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18 U.S.C. § 16(b)). However, Mr. Pena misconstrues these precedents. As stated
above, both Reyes-Castro and Coronado-Cervantes explicitly recognize that it is
the serious risk of physical force, not the actual presence of such force that
determines whether or not a certain act constitutes a “crime of violence.” See also
Passi, 62 F.3d at 1282. Additionally, Mr. Pena finds no support in United States
v. Pewenofkit, No. 98-6105, 1999 WL 169429 (10th Cir. March 29, 1999), or
Passi. While no enhancement for the use of force (specifically pursuant to §
2A3.1(B)(1)) was applied in these cases, both precedents are silent as to its
application as a general matter. Thus, these authorities do not advance Mr.
Pena’s assertions. Finally, Mr. Pena argues that because a force enhancement is
mandatory in the context of adult rape, see United States v. Talk, 13 F.3d 369,
371-72 (10th Cir. 1993), but not in the context of aggravated sexual abuse of a
child, it is clear that the latter offense has an implicit enhancement for the use of
force. This argument is without merit. As we stated above, child sexual abuse
can take place even in the face of factual consent by the victim. The same cannot
be said of adult rape. Thus, in a case involving the sexual abuse of a child, the
guidelines provide the sentencing judge with the flexibility to apply a force
enhancement depending on the facts. The force enhancement is not mandatory –
not because it is already contemplated by enhancements for the youth of the
victim – but rather because unlike adult rape, it may not always be appropriate
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given the factual predicates of the crime.
Sufficiency of Evidence
Mr. Pena next argues that the government introduced facts insufficient to
support an enhancement pursuant to § 2A3.1(b)(1). He contends that because he
did not use “the brute force associated with rape,” and his victim did not fear for
her life, such an enhancement is not permissible.
We will uphold the factual findings of the district court unless they are
clearly erroneous, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s
determination. See United States v. Cruz, 58 F.3d 550, 553 (10th Cir. 1995). As
the government points out, there is no statutory definition of “force” provided by
the Guidelines. However, two of this court’s unpublished dispositions and
precedents from our sister circuits are instructive in this regard. We hold that the
§ 2A3.1(b)(1) enhancement is justified by the factual finding that the perpetrator
used “‘such physical force as is sufficient to overcome, restrain or injure a
person; or the use of a threat of harm sufficient to coerce or compel submission
by the victim.’” United States v. Yazzie, 97-2201, 1998 WL 276362, at **3 (10th
Cir. May 27, 1998) (quoting United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 747, 754 (6th
Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Fire Thunder, 908 F.2d 272, 274 (8th Cir.
1990))); see also United States v. Pewenofkit, No. 98-6105, 1999 WL 169429, at
**3 (10th Cir. March 29, 1999); United States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d 998, 1002 (5th
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Cir. 1998); United States v. Fulton, 987 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Lauck, 905 F.2d 15, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1990); H.R. Rep. No. 99-594 at 14 n.
54a (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6186, 6194, n. 54a. That is, a force
enhancement is appropriate when “the sexual contact resulted from a restraint
upon the other person that was sufficient that the other person could not escape
the sexual contact.” Lauck, 905 F.2d at 18. Moreover, force may be inferred by
such facts as disparity in size between victim and assailant, or disparity in
coercive power, such as that between an adult and a child. See Pewenofkit 1999
WL 169429, at **3 (quoting Lucas, 157 F.3d at 1002).
Applying these principles to the facts of the instant case, we find that the
district court did not err in holding that there was sufficient evidence to justify a
four-level enhancement for the use of force, pursuant to § 2A3.1(b)(1).
Breach of Plea Agreement
Finally, Mr. Pena argues that the government breached its plea agreement
with him, in that it sought a § 2A3.1(b)(1) force enhancement about which the
plea agreement was silent. Moreover, Mr. Pena points to estimates provided by
the government during plea negotiations that were lower than his actual sentence.
Thus, Mr. Pena argues that the government implicitly promised (through its
silence) not to pursue the force enhancement.
We review de novo, as a question of law, whether government conduct has
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violated a plea agreement. See United States v. Brye, 146 F.3d 1207, 1209 (10th
Cir. 1998). The government is required to fulfill all promises made in exchange
for a defendant’s plea of guilty. See id. We apply a two-step analysis to
determine whether such a breach has occurred: (1) we evaluate the nature of the
government’s promise; and (2) we examine this promise as it relates to the
defendant’s reasonable understanding at the time the guilty plea was entered. See
id. at 1210. The general principles of contract law guide our evaluation of the
government’s obligations under the agreement. Thus, we look to the express
language of the agreement for guidance. However, we will not permit the
government to rely upon a hyper-literal construction of the agreement to evade
fulfilling its promises. See id. Nevertheless, the government’s obligations to the
defendant do not arise from mere silence. See United States v. Rockwell Int’l
Corp., 124 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1997). Moreover, it is well-settled that the
parole evidence rule precludes parties from admitting extrinsic evidence to
contradict or add to the terms of a binding and completely integrated agreement.
See id.
In the instant case, the government’s plea agreement made no reference to
an enhancement for the use of force, pursuant to § 2A3.1(b)(1), although the
government did stipulate that § 2A3.1(b)(4) did not apply, but that §
2A3.1(b)(3)(A) did apply. Thus the plain language of the agreement does not
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support Mr. Pena’s claim that the government was specifically obliged not to seek
a force enhancement in exchange for his guilty plea. Furthermore, the
government clearly states in paragraph 6(a) and (b) of the Plea Agreement that it
would not agree to a specific sentence, nor would it agree not to oppose Mr.
Pena’s request for a specific sentence. Additionally, the plea agreement made it
clear, and Mr. Pena conceded, that his ultimate sentence might be different from
that discussed in the agreement. Moreover, the plea agreement contained an
integration clause, stating that the final version represented the complete
agreement between the government and Mr. Pena. Thus, Mr. Pena is unable to
alter the terms of the plea agreement with reference to the government’s early
offense level estimates. It bears noting that this court has held an erroneous
sentencing estimate does not render a plea involuntary. See United States v.
Williams, 919 F.2d 1451, 1456-57 (10th Cir. 1990). Finally, Mr. Pena was given
an opportunity by the district court to withdraw his plea, if he felt that the
government had violated its agreement. Mr. Pena’s subsequent acceptance of the
plea bargain shows that his plea was not predicated on an unfulfilled promise or
representation. See United States v. Barber, No. 98-2106, 1999 WL 152294, at
**3 (10th Cir. March 22, 1999). Thus, we conclude that the government did not
violate its plea agreement with Mr. Pena, and he is therefore not entitled to relief
on this ground.
AFFIRMED.
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